missioned officers they possess for the training and discipline of this material can not develop troops needed for the varied operations of war in less than two years with the colors in time of peace, it should be obvious that it can not be done in less time. It should also be obvious that the period of training prescribed for the units of the National Guard in section 92-192 hours annually-is utterly inadequate to prepare this force for war service.

It should also be plain from what I have said above that the conditions of modern war do not afford time to train an army after war becomes imminent. Not only must material be secured, but personnel must be trained and disciplined before military operations can be undertaken with any hope of success.

Another misconception which exists very generally throughout the Nation is in regard to the number of troops the United States will need in case of war with a first-class power. In my hearing last year before your committee, I stated that in my judgment the country needed from one to two million fully trained men and that, in my opinion, the only way to obtain then was through a law requiring universal military training and service.

The General Staff, in its statement of a proper military policy, based on the conditions existing at the outbreak of the war in Europe, gave as its opinion that our system should be able to furnish 500,000 fully trained and organized mobile troops at the outbreak of war and to have at least 500,000 more available within 90 days thereafter. The former force was to be composed of the Regular Army and its reserve, in which the soldiers would receive two years of thorough training; the second 500,000 was to be composed of the citizen forces, which were to be given nine months' training in peace and three months' additional training on the outbreak of war. In its report the General Staff pointed out that two hostile expeditions alone would provide a force large enough to cope with our 1,000,000 mobile troops and consequently that we must, at the outbreak of hostilities, provide a system to raise and train, in addition, at least 500,000 troops to replace the losses and wastage in personnel incident to the war. These numbers given above were based on the strength of the nations involved in the European war at the outbreak of hostilities, August 1, 1914. In view of the changes that have taken place since the outbreak of the war, in the increase in the belligerent forces, I have caused the question to be restudied by the War College Division of the General Staff. The conclusion of the General Staff is that our system should be able now to furnish in round numbers 1,500,000 trained and organized troops at the outbreak of war and 1,500,000 additional in 90 days thereafter.

Senator BRADY. You mean as soon as it can be done?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not mean to keep an army of that many? Gen. SCOTT. No, sir; but a reserve able to furnish these men and get them together.

Senator THOMAS. What you mean is, if emergency should require, we ought to be prepared to produce just that thing?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir. We think they should be a citizen force. This is partially due to the fact that one of the powers involved in the war and whose territory extends the whole length of our northern

frontier, has increased its army from a relatively small force to a strength approximating that of the other great European powers. The navy of this power absolutely controls the sea and its merchant marine is sufficient in extent to transport without delay over 1,000,000 soldiers with the necessary equipment for such an army. Due to the fact that our northern neighbor is largely an island empire, a great portion of any trained force it may possess can be spared for use in a distant theater of operations because, being an island empire, the control of the sea gives it practical immunity from invasion where troops would have to be transported across the sea. It should be pointed out, also, that our northern neighbor is in alliance with a powerful oriental nation-another island empire-and for the same reason, when acting in alliance with a power which has control of the sea, has ability to send its army of two and one-fourth millions to any part of the world without danger of invasion. I think a mere statement of these facts makes it clear that at present we are practically defenseless before the veteran armies of our northern neighbor and could easily be crushed by the existing coalition of these island empires.

I have said enough, by way of illustration only, to make it clear that if we were menaced by one of these powers alone, having lost control of the sea, we would need more troops for defensive purposes than have entered into the popular conception of our military problem heretofore.

In determining, however, the number we need there are some other factors which must be given brief consideration. A factor which has in the past played a part in protecting us from recent aggression by any of the great nations of Europe, in spite of our comparatively defenseless condition, is the rough equilibrium of forces maintained on the continent of Europe-the so-called balance of power.

In Europe, just prior to August 1, 1914, so close was this equilibrium that no considerable part of the enormous force controlled by each of the two groups of great powers in alliance was available for action outside of Europe. It was this fact, the danger of execu tive action and the disturbance of the equilibrium which would have resulted from it, which prevented the great powers from stopping the Balkan wars of 1912, in spite of the fact that they were all anxious to do so.

When the European war is over there will still be two groups of powers, two groups of forces acting upon each other. It may be that the losses due to the war will be so equally distributed that the same close balance existing just previous to August 1, 1914, will be maintained. It is, however, possible that of the two groups the combined forces of one will be superior to the combined forces of the other. This will permit the superior group to hold the inferior group in balance with only a portion of its force, and will enable it to hold the remainder ready for action outside of Europe.

That a large force of troops can be spared from Europe to fight a campaign in a theatre of operations remote from that continent, in spite of the rough equilibrium of force constantly maintained there, is well illustrated by the fact that Russia was able to send approximately 1,000,000 soldiers from European Russia over a single-track railroad to fight the Manchurian campaign of 1903-1905

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against her present ally, Japan. Had better transportation facilities been available this force undoubtedly could have been considerably increased.

Another factor entering into the consideration of the determination of the number we should train in time of peace is involved in the losses due to casualties it is possible for us to suffer during the first year of a war with a power able to attempt an invasion of the United States.

This is under the supposition that we have lost command of the

sea.

The CHAIRMAN I do not know whether you were here when Gen. Wood testified yesterday, but he claimed under the intensive method of training in these training camps now they can practically create a reserve force by six months' intensive training.

Gen. SCOTT. Why does not Germany do it, and France? They are economical nations, and for economic reasons alone would go to a short term of service if they considered it possible to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. His statement was at variance with the consensus of expression amongst experts generally, and I was rather amazed at the statement.

Gen. SCOTT. France and Germany do not seem to be able to do it. Senator THOMAS. He made the statement that this training there was so strenuous that to continue it on the same scale for two years would be a great tax on human endurance and result in the loss of life; hence this intensive training extending through a period of six months was equivalent to four and a half to five years of that training which the soldier receives in countries where standing armies are the rule.

Senator BRADY. And that at the lowest possible estimate he could make that would be three to one.

Gen. SCOTT. I think that Germany and France train their men as strenuously as they can be trained.

Senator THOMAS. In that regard he said that the two and three year terms of service in France and Germany were essential to a hold-over system; the number of men whose terms expired this year would leave a large number whose terms expired next year, and that a hold-over force, so to speak, would carry to the new recruits the general system of training and discipline which it was necessary to produce, and for that reason two and three years, which were adopted there, differentiated from the Plattsburg plan of training.

Senator BRADY. You do not think that the six months' intensive training would be sufficient?

Gen. SCOTT. No, sir. I agree with the General Staff that 12 months' training is the minimum that will prepare troops for war service. A statement of the losses sustained by the great powers involved in the present war in Europe during the first 11 months of the war will be sufficient to emphasize the importance of the factor of numbers.

Up to June 1, 1915, after 11 months of war, according to the estimates based upon conservative figures and published abroad, the following are the estimated total losses in killed, wounded, and prisoners of the powers given below:

Russia, a total of 3,485,000 casualties; Germany, 1,567,000; Austria, 1,235,000; France, 1,400,000; Great Britain, 340,000. Great

Britain and Germany publish casualty lists, but Russia, AustriaHungary, and France do not, so their losses are estimated. It is needless to say that the huge losses involved, due to the great number engaged, are unprecedented in any war in the past, but must form a basis for our estimate of probable losses in future wars.

It is manifest from the facts so far discussed that if a coalition of the great powers as they existed on August 1, 1914, were to make war on us, we could have been invaded by very large forces within about one month from the declaration of war. It is also obvious that to meet such an attack we would need large armies whose training had been completed before the declaration of war, and it is further evident that the only way we can adequately prepare to win a war of this character; that is, one waged against us by an alliance of great powers while we fight as a single nation, is to train intensively for two years with the colors in time of peace, as do all the other great powers, practically all our young men of suitable military physique.

While a war waged against us by an alliance may in the future be a possibility, it is not a probability, and it is believed that if we provide an adequate army to defend the country against any single nation, however powerful on land and sea, the probability of a war between the United States and a coalition of powers will grow even

more remote.

Having briefly discussed a few of the reasons why the General Staff maintains that 12 months intensive training is the minimum that will prepare troops for war purposes and outlined briefly some of the reasons for its views as to the number of trained troops this country will need on the outbreak of war with a first-class power or group of powers able to secure control of the sea shortly after the declaration of such war, I desire here to state briefly why the General Staff recommends that no further reliance be placed on the so-called volunteer system and recommends the adoption of universal liability to military training and service.

The volunteer system can not now, under the most favorable circumstances produce anything like the number of men required for the national defense. It is undemocratic, unreliable, inefficient, and extravagant. It is undemocratic because it shifts the burden of national defense from the shoulders of the many where it rightfully belongs to the shoulders of the few whose financial condition in life or whose patriotism impels them to offer themselves to accept the risks and hardships of war. Furthermore, instead of unifying our people to the extent where all individuals are willing to undergo scarifice for the national good, it affords great opportunity for the selfish and nonpatriotic to stay at home in time of war and to fatten on the adversity of the Nation and on the necessities of the families of better men who have volunteered for the country's defense.

It is unreliable, as all history teaches us. It has never in times of great national stress in this or any other country been able to previde the number of men needed for the emergency. It has been tried and discarded by all of the other great nations of the world, and to-day the United States and China are the only nations of size upon the globe which rely upon volunteers for the defense of national existence. Even Great Britain, from whom we derived most of our fundamental laws and many of our traditions, and who, at the begin

ning of the present great war, still adhered to the voluntary system, has since been forced to resort to compulsory service. Our own history is replete with instances of the failure of the volunteer system. It failed us in the Revolutionary War, and it was only by the material aid of France that we gained our independence. It failed us in the war of 1812-1814, when it had to be bolstered up with drastic draft laws. If failed the Confederacy early in the Civil War, and the First Confederate Congress at its first session ordained the draft. It failed the Federal Government in the Civil War. By the end of 1862 volunteering and consequently recruiting in the North had practically ceased, and in order to continue the war Congress was obliged to enact a draft law which received the approval of the President on March 3, 1863. This law was amended and made more comprehensive by the act of February 24, 1864. In view of what history teaches and of what is known of world armies and armament to-day, it may be stated without fear of successful contradiction that considering only man power no prolonged war, either offensive or defensive in character, can be carried on under the so-called volunteer system.

The system is inefficient because under it we must wait for war to come before preparing our defense. We must wait for the emergency before beginning to raise, organize, equip, and train the vast armies which war with any first-class power or coalition of powers would render necessary. Forces so raised lack all the essential attributes of modern armies. The men lack not only the mechanical and technical training necessary for them to function properly in the military machine, but they are entirely lacking in that mental attitude called discipline which can only come from long and continuous military training. The officers hastily appointed are more often than not no better prepared than the men they are supposed to train and lead in battle. They are ignorant of the simplest military matters and have no definite ideas as to their duties generally. They are equally ignorant with respect to those measures necessary for safeguarding the lives and comfort of the men entrusted to their charge. Nonpreparedness with respect to supplies and munitions of war has always existed where the voluntary system is in vogue. This must necessarily be the case because the volunteer system is so uncertain and unreliable in its results that it furnishes no advance data upon which computation of material can be based. Moreover a nation that is so short sighted with respect to its man power can not be expected to look far into the future with respect to munitions and supplies.

The volunteer system makes for national extravagance in that it forces the Government to enter the labor market as a supplicant and to compete with prices there obtaining. Out of this system grow bounties to recruits, a most iniquitous means of stimulating enlistments and one which places a premium upon desertion and repeating with its necessary concomitant of fradulent enlistment.

It is, therefore, without apology that the recommendation is made that this system which has ever been a failure from every possible angle, be discarded and a modern system of national defense erected in its stead. The time has come when this country must resort to universal liability to military training and service.