Mr. FISHER. Yes, and no, Senator. No, because I think it is on the wrong theory. I believe in a start in the direction of civic discipline and training. I believe in a start along the lines of increased attention to physical development and civic discipline in our educational system. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fisher, can you suggest a plan under which Congress could enact a law that would compel the young men of the several States to go into this industrial work you speak of? Mr. FISHER. I do not know; I have not thought of that. It would require considerable thought to frame the measure, but I am not at all convinced, Senator, that Congress, declaring the purpose to be preparation for possible military service, could not enact a bill of that character that would be wholly civic in its requirements. The CHAIRMAN. It might be. Mr. FISHER. In other words, if for the military defense of the Nation we must have every citizen prepared to serve as a soldier, if drafted, and if for that purpose it is necessary or proper to have the individual citizen physically developed and industrially trained so that he will be available for that service, a bill to that end might be drawn that would be constitutional. It would require these things as military measures and for the military advantage that would result. But if that is not constitutional, and if you are going to put through a measure providing for universal military training because you lack the constitutional power to require universal civic training, it is well to reflect that you can not pass either measure and expect it to be carried into practical effect unless you have behind it a public sentiment that would be sufficient to amend the Constitution of the United States, if it is convinced that the results it desires can better be obtained through universal training of a civic rather than a military character. It may well be, however, that the physical and disciplinary results which are urged as a justification for military training can better be secured by a development of compulsory educational methods through State and local governments and that the Federal Government should stimulate and assist this development rather than control it directly. STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. HUGH SCOTT, CHIEF OF general STAFF. The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Scott, you are Chief of Staff of the Army? Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. We have under consideration, General, the several bills that have been suggested for the purpose of putting into effect universal military training in this country, and we would like to hear from you in your own way on the subject of universal military training. Gen. SCOTT. I have some remarks here that I would like to read to you. The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Gen. SCOTT. Do you wish me to confine myself to that? The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, General, in any way you desire to approach the subject. Gen. SCOTT. I have made some remarks here as to various things which we would like to draw to the attention of the committee, in regard to the last national defense bill, but as they are quite lengthy, possibly you would like to hear them at some other time. Do you wish me to confine the question to universal service? The CHAIRMAN. I would rather confine it to universal military training, Gen. Scott, and any suggested amendments to the national defense act could come up in some other way. Gen SCOTT. Yes, sir. Senator BRADY. It might be well to have it in the record. Gen. SCOTT. The legislation enacted at the last session of Congress, for the Regular Army, considered as a whole, we regard as decidedly beneficial. Some parts of it, however, have been reported by the General Staff as not for the best interests of the Government. I will take that matter up on another occasion. The CHAIRMAN. Yes; if you will. Senator BRADY. You say not for the best interests of the Government. Gen. SCOTT. Some of the items have been left out. Some we found by experience to be advisable to change. Senator BRADY. In these remarks, you point out what you think these changes ought to be? Gen. SCOTT. I will, in remarks I will put in on another occasion, and I would like to say something now on the system of the National Guard which has been brought out by experience and the present mobilization of the National Guard. The CHAIRMAN. As an introduction to some other method of training. Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir. Based on the experience gained in the recent mobilization of the National Guard and its concentration on our southern frontier, together with its service there to date, I desire to discuss briefly two pahses of the national defense act-that involved in section 92, prescribing the period of training for that force, and that involved in section 79, creating reserve battalions, for recruit training, and embodying the principle of compulsory service in time of war. Section 92 reads as follows: SEC. 92. Training of the National Guard: Each company, troop, battery, and detachment in the National Guard shall assemble for drill and instruction, including indoor target practice, not less than 48 times each year, and shall, in addition thereto, participate in encampments, maneuvers, or other exercises, including outdoor target practice, at least 15 days in training each year, including target practice, unless such company, troop, battery, or detachment shall have been excused from participation in any part thereof by the Secretary of War: Provided, That credit for an assembly for drill or for indoor target practice shall not be given unless the number of officers and enlisted men present for duty at such assembly shall equal or exceed a minimum to be prescribed by the President, nor unless the period of actual military duty and instruction participated in by each officer and enlisted man at each such assembly at which he shall be credited as having been present, shall be of at least one and one-half hours' duration and the character of training such as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War. An analysis of the section above quoted shows that the armory training required by it amounts to 72 hours per year. Assuming that the total 15 days for field training are employed in training at the rate of 8 hours per day, the field training will amount to 120 hours, or a total training under the law of 192 hours, or approximately a month's training of 8 hours a day annually. Under the law relating to the militia which preceded the present act-the Dick bill-the total training obtainable in hours was 132. The difference between the two laws in regard to the training obtainable is the difference between 132 and 192 hours, or 60 hours; that is, the amount of training that can be given in 8 days' training of 8 hours per day. In view of the numerous and thorough hearings that were held by your committee last year on the subject of a citizens' force to supplement the Regular Army, I assume it to be the final judgment of Congress that the time given to the National Guard for training in the bill probably approximates the greatest amount that can be exacted for such a force under a system of voluntary enlistment, rather than that it expresses the belief on the part of your committee or Congress that the amount given is in any respect adequate as a preparation for war. When the question of the amount and value of the training given to the National Guard is discussed, any criticism of the amount of training that can be given under the law is frequently construed as a criticism of the personnel of that force. It is very difficult, in discussing this subject, to make clear the distinction between the individuals which compose the force and the militia system as a national policy. In the excellent spirit that imbues the majority of the members of this force as individuals, the willingness and desire to learn the duties of the soldier and the personal sacrifices made by many in order to do so are displayed— the very best qualities existing in our American citizenship-and mark the members of the force as citizens who are willing to make some sacrifice in an endeavor to fit themselves for service in case of war. Because of the difficulty of differentiating men from the system, many fall into the error of praising the system when they mean the individuals that compose the force and others condemn the men when they really mean the system. While it would be difficult perhaps, to praise the spirit of the officers and men too highly, the experience of a century demonstrates that it is difficult to criticize too severely the system which commits the Nation to reliance, in war, on untrained, undisciplined troops. The Inspector General's Department has recently completed a field inspection of the Organized Militia on the border, the aggregate enlisted strength of the organizations inspected totaling 138,517, the force inspected consisting of 98 regiments and 5 separate battalions of Infantry; 3 regiments, 12 squadrons, and 24 troops of Cavalry; 6 regiments, 9 battalions, and 15 batteries of Field Artillery; 3 battalions and 10 companies of Engineers; 4 battalions and 16 companies to Signal Corps troops; 24 ambulance companies, and 36 field hospitals. The following statistical data has been compiled from the reports of the various inspectors: Senator BRADY. That is what I understood you to say you would like to get? The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. Gen. SCOTT (reading): Effective strength present.. Noneffective strength present.. 119, 874 Number carried on rolls not present.. 3, 219 Number present who have a markmanship rating of first-class or better, secured before the call..... 5, 424 before the call.... Number present who have fired and secured a rating of less than first-class 19, 202 14, 802 Number present who have not fired before the call. Number with less than 3 months' service.... 56, 813 Number with 1 or more years and less than 3 years' service.. Number with three or more months and less than 1 year's service.. 20, 964 21, 610 Number with 3 or more years' service.. 34, 976 Number of men on rolls at call who did not respond.... 19, 601 Number of men enlisted under the call with prior service.. 7,258 Number of men enlisted under the call without prior service.. 13, 440 Number that have subscribed to oath under the act of June 3, 1916. Enlisted men transferred to organizations from other organizations after receipt of call... Number serving as Organized Militia who have not taken the oath required by the act of June 3, 1916... 60, 299 21, 884 107, 706 7,435 23, 721 Number found physically disqualified on muster in. Senator BRADY. That is, after they had been taken into the National Guard. Gen. SCOTT. Yes; when they were taken from the National Guard into the Federal service. Senator BRADY. Under Federal control. Gen. SCOTT. Yes; and we had to reject 23,721. Senator BRADY. Out of the men that had already been passed into the National Guard? Gen. SCOTT. Yes; into the State guard. Number of enlisted men apparently under 18 years of age. Number who have not attended a previous encampment or period of field Number at date of inspection who were present sick in hospital. 678 71, 505 1, 816 1,887 132, 505 From a careful analysis of the above figures the following deductions are made: The extent to which the National Guard and the Organized Militia. responded to the call and passed into the Federal service may be arrived at in an indirect way through a consideration of the number of men on the rolls of the organizations at the date of call in connection with the number of men reported as having been transferred to or enlisted in the organizations included in the call after the call was issued. Seven thousand four hundred and thirty-five men were thus transferred from other organizations, 60,299 men without former service, and 13,440 men with former service were enlisted after the call. The aggregate of these three classes is 81,174 enlisted men, or 63 per cent of the total number reported upon-128,517-the remaining 47,343, or 37 per cent, representing the national or Organized Militia element on the rolls of the organizations in question at the date of the call. We got into the Federal service approximately 50 per cent of those people who were on the papers of the organization. Senator THOMAS. Of the National Guard? Gen. SCOTT. Of the State guards in the service of the State. Senator BRADY. Of the State militia at the time the call was made. Gen. SCOTT. Yes; approximately 50 per cent. The records of the Militia Bureau show that at the date of the call approximately 95,000 enlisted men were on the rolls of the organizations now under consideration. Forty-seven thousand six hundred and fifty-seven therefore represents the number of members of the Organized Militia whose names disappeared from the rolls during the transition from State service to the Federal service. This disappearance is explained in part as follows: Twenty-three thousand seven hundred and twenty-one enlisted men were found physically disqualified and discharged, and 7,258 enlisted men failed to respond to the call. These two classes combined account for 30,979 enlisted men. Deducting this number from the number stated as having disappeared from the rolls during the transition period, there still remain 16,678 men to be accounted for a number nearly equal to the strength of an Infantry division. The absence of these men may be accounted for in several ways. The numbers reported as having failed to respond to the call or as having been discharged for physical disability on muster in may have been inadvertently understated. It is known that may discharges from the National Guard were issued by governors of States or State officials in the interval between the date of the call and the actual date of muster in, but the number so discharged can not now be ascertained with any certainty. Undoubtedly, some members of the National Guard or Organized Militia on the rolls at the date of call were discharged by the Federal authorities after muster in and before the date of inspection on account of dependency or for some other reason. The reasons for such separations from the service, and whether the discharges issued by State officials were valid or not, need not be dwelt upon as these matters are of little concern now compared to the importance of the evidence which the figures afford as to the dependability of the National Guard in a national emergency requiring its employment as a Federal force. The number of enlisted men under the call without prior service gives an idea of the state of training of the commands inspected; but a more correct conception will be gained if to this number there be added the number of men with less than three months Organized Militia service at the date of call. The sum of these two is 81,263 enlisted men, which is 63 per cent of the total number, the other 37 per cent representing a partially trained Organized Militia element. Some values must attach to the partial training obtained in the National Guard, but the disposition is to overrate its value. That is, they were either entirely raw men-this 63 per cent were either entirely raw men, picked up after the call, without previous service, or they were of less than three months' service. Then, consider those who have had a year or two years in the National Guard. This bill calls for practically one month's training per year in the National Guard, and if a man served three years under this bill, he would have only three months' training scattered through three years. The CHAIRMAN. Under national defense act? Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir. The state of training in marksmanship for troops armed with the rifle is shown by the numbers giving classifications above or below a rating of first class, and the number which are reported as never having fired. Of a total of 90,817 included in the report, only 21 per cent are rated as first class or better, first class being a standard which is barely tolerable. Sixteen per cent can be rated as indifferent shots and 63 per cent are rated as being entirely untrained. Combining the latter two classes the untrained and partially trained element in marksmanship will be represented by 79 per cent and |