The CHAIRMAN. We want to do that, but I did not want the responsibility for that shifted to this committee, because we practically left the preparation of the National Guard Act to the House members and the National Guard Association, and that is the way the bill was presented in the first instance, dividing the militia into three classes. That appears at page 833 of the hearings before the United States Senate in 1916 on "Preparedness for National Defense."

Gen. O'RYAN. In answer to the question about the property, I would like to make that clear. We apply the term "war strength property" to all military property that is necessary to arm, clothe and equip the number of men necessary to raise the organizations from the strength prescribed during the time of peace to the maximum strength provided for service in time of war. That is the property that the Federal Government has always insisted upon keeping in its supply depots.

Senator BRADY. But you think that will be changed now?

Gen. O'RYAN. I think it will.

Senator BRADY. That will eliminate considerable trouble in the case of mobilization?

Gen. O'RYAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you change it to State control?

Gen. O'RYAN. Not necessarily change the control, but put it there close to the organizations. I concur with Gen. Stotesbury's opinion that we should, if possible, attain that ideal condition where we maintain in time of peace our organization at approximately war strength, and we have tried to do that in New York State.

Senator BRADY. I want to ask a question relative to that. Presuming that we have a standing or regular army of 100,000 men, and 200,000 members of the National Guard, what relation do you feel that the National Guard should sustain to the Regular army; that is to say, what duties should they perform? Would they have any specific duties to perform during peace times, or would they simply be called out in case of invasion or war?

Gen. O'RYAN. I would like to cover that by rather an extended answer, by stating this: I think that the rôle of the National Guard, for the reasons stated by Gen. Stotesbury, is that of first-line troops. I think, under the law as it stands to-day, that no educated soldier would say it would be possible, from the military point of view, to consider them as first-line troops. Their dependability as first-line troops would depend upon the correctness of their organization. Then it will depend upon the professional standard of the officers, because the men will never be any better than the officers. If the officers are proficient, the men will be proficient. It should have leadership, and then have the necessary things, including the numbers of men. It should have, of course, adequate training. I believe that the cost of a standing army is lost sight of in many of these talks about what we ought to have. I agree with Gen. Stotesbury that the ideal method is to have a highly trained force of specialists and to pay them whatever is necessary. From the practical point of view we know that will not be done because it would bankrupt the country.

Senator BRADY. Is not that liable to create such a tax burden that the citizens would not vote it?

Gen. O'RYAN. Yes; I think that is so true that it is idle to speculate about it. Hence we must have some force that can be made to proximate the ideal efficiency as closely as we can with the minimum expense.

One thing that struck me forcibly about service on the border was this: I saw the troops down there and reviewed them at Brownsville; I saw my own division and the Regulars and the Texans that were in our sector. I had a Tennessee regiment there. Some of them were remarkable commands and highly efficient organizations, and some of them were not. I think those that were not, under a proper system could be made to approximate the best. They were all costing the Government about the same while they were there, costing on an average about $1,200 a year per man, Regulars and National Guardsmen. The emergency was terminated, so that it enable the withdrawal of the National Guard troops from the border to their home stations and enabled the sending back of some of the regular organizations, which latter will continue probably from their border stations to their home stations, but at their home stations the regular force continues to cost the same rate of $100 per month per man, or approximately $1,200 a year. The National Guard expense is automatically cut down to a sum that is relatively negligible. As soon as they get their final muster-they are not mustered out (they use that term erroneously in the newspapers, it is only a final muster which is for the purpose of fixing the date when full Federal pay for each guardsman ceases, and this National Guard pay that is provided for in this act, which is a nominal sum, recommences)-so that whatever the cost of maintenance of the National Guard is to the Nation-I assume it be approximately 100 per year per man-you have a force which automatically, as soon as the emergency is over, is reduced in cost from $1,200 per year per man to about $100 per year per man.

Senator BRADY. That is the point I was desirous of covering. These 200,000 men in time of peace, following the line of your statement, would be at their home station?

Gen. O'RYAN. Yes.

Senator BRADY. They would be there at an expense of $100 a year, as compared with $1,200 a year for the Regular Army. Is that correct?

Gen. O'RYAN. That is correct except as to that figure of $100. That is merely an approximation on my part.

Senator BRADY. That is approximately correct, I believe.

Gen. O'RYAN. You might have that force, so far as military operations are concerned, in idleness for a period of 10 years, and yet your regular force is rolling up mountains of money at the rate of $1,200 per year per man, while the other force is running at approximately $100 per year per man; and yet when you need them, that all comes back to the same big sum again.

Senator BRADY. And all absolutely under governmental control? Gen. O'RYAN. Yes. I believe you can not have first line troops unless their government and control is placed in the War Department.

The CHAIRMAN. How near to federalization did this defense act come? It did not effect what we hoped would be accomplished by it.

Gen. O'RYAN. Yes, sir; I think it did. I think it was really a radical step toward the end we are talking about.

The CHAIRMAN. You think eventually it can be accomplished? Gen. O'RYAN. Yes, sir; I do.

The CHAIRMAN. You would advise giving the National Guard a further and fairer trial, would you not?

Gen. O'RYAN. Yes, sir. I do not consider that there has been any test of this act yet. What I have in mind is this, that before the Congress passed this act we had as many periods of enlistment, as many forms of enlistment as there were States. We had as many methods of selecting officers as there were States. We had as many standards of qualifications for officers as there were States.

Senator BRADY. You feel that all those things should be standardized?

Gen. O'RYAN. It has been done under this act.

The CHAIRMAN. Still the question that has been a serious one, and Gen. Stotesbury spoke of it, is the question of dual control. That has not yet been eliminated.

Gen. O'RYAN. There has been a great deal of talk about that, but I think any difficulties of dual control have either been misstated or they have been exaggerated. For example, the Judge Advocate has held that from the date of the President's call, even in the case of the Organized Militia, they are automatically in the Federal service. The CHAIRMAN. Officers and enlisted personnel?

Gen. O'RYAN. Yes; all the organizations. Where does the dual control come in?

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I am trying to find out myself. Of course, the officers in the first instance are appointed by the State authorities. Take your own case

Gen. O'RYAN. Under this new act?

The CHAIRMAN. Always under the constitutional provision. Gen. O'RYAN. Under this new act, they are not in effect. The effect of the new act is to follow the German Army system, where the officers are appointed by the States of the German Empire, but the system in effect merely gives to the German States the authority to nominate the officers, and that is brought about, because the appointment is subject to imperial qualifications, and that is true under this act.

The CHAIRMAN. Take a regiment that comes in from Oregon, for instance. The commissioned officers of the regiment are men who have been placed in command under the laws of the State

Gen. O'RYAN. No, sir; not now.

The CHAIRMAN. As the National Guard?

Gen. O'RYAN. No, sir; not as National Guardsmen. All the gov ernor can do is to select the man whom he desires, for instance, to be colonel of the regiment, but the nominee must be in one of five classes specified in that act. Having done that, that candidate is sent before a board to test his qualifications, and everything governing that board is prescribed by the War Department under this new system. If that board turns him down, he is not commissioned.

Senator BRADY. But the governor would have to appoint another in his place?

Gen. O'RYAN. He can keep on putting men in there until he gets somebody to pass that examination.

Senator BRADY. As a matter of fact, the appointment of officers in the National Guard still remains in the hands of the governor! Gen. O'RYAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the Federal Government?

Gen. O'RYAN. The appointment technically is of course with the governor. He writes out the commission and signs his name to it. The CHAIRMAN. I think that is true yet, notwithstanding the method adopted which eliminates State control, because I do not think the States would stand to have any other system.

Gen. O'RYAN. In the matter of the selection of officers?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Gen. O'RYAN. I agree with you. I do not think anyone in the country wants that.

The CHAIRMAN. You went in as a State officer, did you not?
Gen. O'RYAN. In this service?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Gen. O'RYAN. I went in as a National Guardsman of the United States. Those of us who were in the service-I think there is a provision in that act covering it--at the time we were accepted went in as National Guardsmen of the United States. In other words, these provisions governing the selection of officers and their qualifications had application only to those to be commissioned after the date of the act.

The CHAIRMAN. What I am trying to get at in this whole thing is to ascertain if there is any way, after the experience you have had, that we can really make this a Federal force. Both you and Gen. Stotesbury are agreed this is the best way for it.

Gen. O'RYAN. It does not follow that the force to be considered a Federal force must have its officers commissioned by the President. Personally I have no opinion one way or the other, but I think there are many people who would strongly object to centering in the President or in any Federal officer the possibility of abusing an authority, justifying that course by historical references.

The CHAIRMAN. I noticed quite a number of the young commissioned officers of the National Guard resigned or asked to be discharged, after they had gotten on the border, and I noticed quite a number of them gave as their reasons for that their own inefficiency or inability to command. If that condition existed-and I do not mean to say it was any large proportion of them-was there not any way of elimination?

Gen. O'RYAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. HOW?

Senator BRADY. By examinations.

Gen. O'RYAN. Much has been made by publications broadcast all over the country of the fact that 500 officers of the guard resigned, and that hence the system broke down.

The service on the border was a fine opportunity for all those charged with the responsibility, in. a large way, of developing the guard, to speed up the process of eliminating the unfit. I think if you had any way of finding out, you would learn that a very substantial percentage of the 500 were in that class.

The CHAIRMAN. I have a list of them. There are various reasons given, but I noticed in glancing over the list that some of them put it

on that ground. There ought to have been some way to eliminate them aside from their own desire to be discharged.

Gen. O'RYAN. There are methods. The act provides for boards; but why take officers away from their duties to constitute removal boards when the subject is willing? You save him and his family the chagrin. I did not know any officers had put themselves in writing to the effect that they were inefficient. When an officer was reported for incapacity he was told, in effect, "Decapitate yourself or go before the board." They usually resigned and gave business as a reason. This subject has been misrepresented. A very substantial percentage of those men were in that class.

The CHAIRMAN. After they got on the border how did the Regular Establishment and the guard get along?

Gen. O'RYAN. I observed the relations when some one mentioned the subject to me. I do not think the conditions could have been better; in fact, there were not any conditions to talk about, because they were all as one.

The CHAIRMAN. The charge has been quite frequently made that the Regular Establishment placed obstalces in the way of the National Guard.

Gen. O'RYAN. I think they do.

The CHAIRMAN. On the border?

Gen. O'RYAN. I do not think they did there.

The CHAIRMAN. You think they worked together harmoniously? Gen. O'RYAN. I know that in my own case and in the case of our entire division there was not a word of criticism. We felt that all of those officers working with us were just as much a part of our division as if they had been out-and-out National Guardsmen. I found in talking to officers of the National Guard who would stop in to pay their respects going through our station that they voluntarily expressed those sentiments. But that is not the feeling as I hear it from different parts of the country concerning the War Department. There is a sentiment that many things are done that tend to discredit the guard. I think most of those things are not evidence of hostility. I think at a distance that they perhaps appear so. I think they are generally the result of, perhaps, conservative prejudice or done through ignorance of the real facts or they are committed inadvertently. There are a number of inaccuracies; for example, in that report on mobilization and in these tables of the Division of Militia Affairs.

I will indicate something very unjust that you will see in a moment, and yet I would not for a moment think that any officer in the War Department did it deliberately. All the organizations of the Regular Army are inspected and reported upon by Regular officers. All of the National Guard organizations are inspected and reported on by Regular officers. That is the first distinction. No Regular organizations are reported on by National Guard officers. Think of the psychology of that. Then, the inspections having been made, all the criticisms and shortcomings of the Regular organizations are carefully housed away. You never hear of them. They are never published broadcast. But in the case of the National Guard they are not only published but they are tabulated and placed in graphic charts and the shortcomings set forth in such way that they make very readable matter.