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The CHAIRMAN. You know we all see mistakes after a thing is over. I want to get at whether you saw the thing at the time and suggested a remedy?

Gen. O'RYAN. I suggested a remedy, but I do not think I saw it as completely as I have seen it since the occurrence. I think that applies to most of us who were concerned in it.

The point is that a force was in being at the time which had a Federal status; therefore, all this ceremony of mustering had no relation to us, and it was so held later in an opinion written by Gen. Crowder that is was unnecessary for all of these 18.000 soldiers to sign their names four times, because they had already taken the Federal oath.

Senator BRADY. All those things caused delay?

Gen. O'RYAN. An immense amount of delay and exasperation, because these rolls were torn up and rewritten and torn up again. Senator BRADY. How long do you say it took you to mobilize your troops?

Gen. O'RYAN. A little less than 24 hours-about 20 hours.

Senator BRADY. At that time you say there were some of your regiments or companies that were not recruited up to the full war strength?

Gen. O'RYAN. Some of them, of course, were not.

Senator BRADY. Can you give the exact figures in that connection? Gen. O'RYAN. I will give you that accurately. I have a table which I will insert in the record in that connection.

(The table referred to is as follows:)

strength of New York Division, National Guard, United States, on date of call (June 19, 1916), and on border service.

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Strength of New York Division, National Guard, United States, etc.-Continued.

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Total strength New York State, of officers and enlisted men on June 19, 1916, 20,577. Total strength from New York State, of officers and enlisted men in the National Guard, United States.

The next point had to do with physical examination, about which there was much complaint. That we did provide for by requesting or suggesting, on at least two occasions, to the War Department that they make physical examinations of the soldiers of our division. The suggestion was made on one occasion about a year before this call, and on another occasion midway between that time and the. mobilization; that the examinations might be accurate. If you will stop to consider you will realize that it takes a careful medical examiner about 10 minutes to really examine and give a soldier any kind of an examination. He has to look at his eyes and teeth and test his hearing and examine his heart and lungs, and examine him carefully for all physical disabilities, particular flat feet. It is assumed it will take that length of time, even though the medical inspector be assisted by noncommissioned officers, who will take measurements of height, etc., and weight, and record them; also that other noncommissioned officers will have these men coming in like an uninterrupted flow of human beings, all stripped, so he has nothing to do but to conduct his examination. Ten minutes of time would be necessary to make the examination accurately and with some degree of perfection. That means at the rate of six men an hour. They sent us two medical officers for about 20,000 men, and of course promptly we gave them some assistance; but if you assume to cut that limit down to five minutes for examination for each man, and assume that these medical officers were working 10 hours a day while this process was going on, you will see that it would take the medical officers examining our regiment 10 days to make the physical examinations of a single regiment, working 10 hours a day and assuming it has a strength of 1,200 men.

Senator BRADY. They provided you with how many medical examiners?

Gen. O'RYAN. Two.

Senator BRADY. You put the responsibility for delay on the Regular Establishment?

Gen. O'RYAN. I think that is admitted, so far as we are concerned. That seems to be the sentiment among the regular officers. I know, along the border. This report was a complete surprise to us-this report on the mobilization."

Senator BRADY. It seems to me that a good deal of our trouble has arisen from the fact that the troops were called out too soon after the passage of the law.

Gen. O'RYAN. I think that complicated matters a great deal.

Senator BRADY. Permit me to ask you a question in point. Let us presume that the day we passed this law you had been given notice that your troops would be called out in 90 days from that datecould you at that time, at the end of 90 days, have embarked with your troops with the full equipment and proper examinations and everything of that sort without any delay?

Gen. O'RYAN. We were ready, as I told you, within 20 hours of the call as it was made. These other things we can not control. They are no part of the National Guard system. They were a part of the system imposed by the War Department.

Senator BRADY. I have always maintained that the National Guard was not responsible for these things, and after hearing the large amount of evidence presented here, both pro and con, I have come to the conclusion that there is no one factor to blame for conditions. As our chairman has said, part of the responsibility rests on Congress. We have not made the necessary appropriations, and possibly a greater responsibility rests upon Congress for the reason that we may not have in our appropriations provided that the supplies be more systematically distributed through the Ordnance Department, permitting, or rather requiring, supplies for each division or unit to be kept within close reach of that unit. I will be pleased to have you tell us just what difficulties you encountered in the way of getting your equipment. You made the statement or possibly it was Gen. Stotesbury who made the statement-that various sorts of equipment were given to the men at the time by private citizens and that you encountered great difficulties in securing equipment for your troops to entrain.

Gen. O'RYAN. That also had been called to the attention of the War Department, and we characterized the system in this way: We said it would require a cunning mind to devise a scheme better calculated to create confusion and delay than that prescribed by the War Department for furnishing equipment to the National Guard in the event of a war.

Senator BRADY. Of what equipment were you short?

Gen. O'RYAN. We were not short. The War Department was short on all equipment necessary to bring our division from peace strength to war strength. They were short on equipment in this sense, that they did not have it where it was needed. They had it in Philadelphia.

Senator BRADY. Did they have a sufficient supply in Philadelphia?

Gen. O'RYAN. I believe they did. They did have for our division. Senator BRADY. How long did it take to get that supply from Philadelphia over to New York?

Gen. O'RYAN. That was not the problem. That was the problem as the War Department construed it. But the problem was not that. We did not know where these troops would be. We said to them, "We do not know where these troops will be, nor do you, as that depends on the policy of the Government at the time of the call. This property should be, as it is abroad, where the men can put their hands on it as fast as they report; that is to say, it should be in the armories or in Federal storehouses close to the regimental rendezvous of the companies." Gen. Wood approved that and went into it exhaustively before giving his approval of the system and recommended it, and finally the Division of Militia Affairs, under Gen. Mills, made a separate investigation and approved it; but they never adopted it. It was never promulgated, and the result was that we did find a condition of emergency on the border where it was necessary for some regiments, without waiting to go into a mobilization camp, to be put on board the trains with their recruits. and shipped immediately to the border. These other men, other than recruits, were clothed and armed and equipped and ready a few hours after the call. Their thought was, "Where is this war? We are ready for business." But they were kept there under these conditions in order to bring our companies to war strength, and we could not get the clothing or equipment, because under the system adopted and enforced by the War Department this clothing was all to be sent to a mobilization camp which was some distance away from New York City. I took up the matter with Gen. Wood and asked whether that plan was to be followed out. Was equipment to be sent up there, and will these regiments first have to go to the mobilization camp to connect with that property before they start? He promptly said, "No; we will change it right now," and he did so. If he had not taken that initiative, these regiments would have been considerably delayed in leaving. But he had the shipment changed from the mobilization camp as the point of destination to the armories of the particular organizations that were to leave promptly. The property arrived, but after it got there it had to be inventoried and checked and stored and fitted and issued and taken up and stenciled and marked. Many of those things could have been done, of course, without that great stress and pressure had this system of Federal storerooms been adopted, as was recommended.

Senator BRADY. These things you are discussing are matters of detail that you feel could be corrected by a proper organization? Gen. O'RYAN. I think they will be corrected now: yes, sir.

Senator BRADY. You have doubtless heard Gen. Stotesbury make his statement about federalizing the National Guard and bringing it entirely under Federal authority?

Gen. O'RYAN. Yes.

Senator BRADY. Do you agree with that view?

Gen. O'RYAN. Personally I do.

Senator BRADY. How would you suggest that we get the National Guard entirely transferred from State control to National control? Gen. O'RYAN. Amend section 57 and change the definition of militia and it is accomplished.

The CHAIRMAN. You assisted in the preparation of the provisions relating to the National Guard in the national defense act of June 3, 1916, did you not, General?

Gen. O'RYAN. Yes, sir; and I was surprised to see the National Guard included in the definition of militia. I did not know it was in there. I think Senator Wadsworth knows something about that. Senator WADSWORTH. As the bill passed the Senate originally the National Guard was not included in the definition of "militia." That went in in conference.

Senator BRADY. Those are matters we are trying to correct. We are getting this information for the purpose of trying to perfect a bill that will be the most beneficial in the matter of national defense. The CHAIRMAN. That is not now section 20 of the act, is it? Gen. O'RYAN. I think it is. It is the one containing a definition of the militia.

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The CHAIRMAN. Section 57 of the act of June 3, 1916, says that the militia of the United States shall consist of all able-bodied male citizens of the United States. * and said militia shall be divided into three classes, the National Guard, the Naval Militia, and the Unorganized Militia.

Gen. O'RYAN. I would change that so as to eliminate the National Guard and say, "except those citizens duly commissioned or enlisted in the Regular Army or the National Guard of the United States."

The CHAIRMAN. Would that slight change place this whole militia under the Federal control?

Gen. O'RYAN. It would as far as the Constitution of the United States is concerned, and as to what authority, if any, or what use, if any, the States might have of this force would depend entirely upon Congress and not upon the States. If they thought it expedient to permit the States to use this force, but not to train them, that is a matter for Congress to determine, just as Congress may provide now that the Regular Army may be called upon directly by the governors. It is your force and you can use it as you please. That is the system employed by the German Army. The States there may call upon the Imperial German Army direct.

The CHAIRMAN. I was rather surprised at your statement a while ago about this having been inserted in here in conference. I find that the bill as prepared and submitted to this committee by the National Guard Association divided the militia into three classes, the National Guard, the Junior Guard, and the Unorganized Militia. That is practically the same division here in the present bill.

Gen. O'RYAN. I do not advocate that; I did not know it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the way the matter came to us from the National Guard Association in the first instance.

Gen. O'RYAN. I was not a representative of the National Guard. Association. It was Senator Wadsworth, I think, who mentioned that it was changed in conference.

Senator WADSWORTH. My recollection of it, Mr. Chairman, is not absolutely reliable.

The CHAIRMAN. Here in the Senate Committee on Military Affairs hearings is the bill as it was originally presented to the committee by the National Guard Association.

Senator WADSWORTH. I know it was a great surprise to me. I know I thought it was out of the bill.

Senator BRADY. That is a matter which, in your judgment, should be corrected.

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