And to come down a little more recently, one of the most pronounced and prominent advocates of increased naval preparation, Robert Wilden Neeser, said in his book on Our Navy in the Next War, as follows:

In the last analysis it is the people who govern; it is the people who must be informed of their military condition. The regulations which forbid military and naval men writing for publication for the purpose of discussion should be rewritten. The freest discussion on all military and naval topics by officers of both services should be encouraged, such writings to be signed by the authors, for which they would assume the entire responsibility. When this privilege has been given, then the people will have a means of getting at the truth and the authority in each case will be known. By sealing the lips of those capable of giving the truth we have encouraged scarehead articles upon our naval preparedness which carry little weight and make no lasting impression upon the minds of the people.

Embodied in that declaration of Mr. Neeser's is, as you will see, a recognition of the same principle which Admiral Mahan recognized in what he had to say, namely, that this broad question of military policy will of necessity be decided by the people and of right ought to be so decided. Personally I am a convinced advocate of the use of expert service in all governmental matters. I think there is no field in which that is clearer than the field of military affairs. Nevertheless, to my mind, there is as distinct a limitation upon the use of the expert there as in all other fields in the administration of the Government. The expert alone can not be intrusted with the decision of the fundamental principles on which the policy of the Nation, as a Nation, is to be based. I do think his opinion is entitled to the very greatest credit as to the methods by which that policy is to be carried out.

Now, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I find myself at the outset in some embarrassment because of the fact that I have talked with friends in the naval and military service, and particularly in the latter, where I count a number of men of whom I am very fond and of whom I have the highest opinion, and they have given a very considerable expression of individual opinion to me about all these matters. I find, however, quite frequently, a very radical difference between those opinions and the opinions expressed officially by the War College or by the General Staff. I find a very radical difference between the views of individual officials high in the service, and I have tried to talk with all of them with whom I could talk. I find also a radical difference between their opinions and the opinions of the nonmilitary heads of these two great services of ours, and, when I inquire why those opinions are not given voice, I am instantly pointed to General Order No. 10, which directly prohibits officers of our military service from publicly expressing opinions. I find that writers on this subject often refer to the freedom of discussion which exists in Germany, where certainly military affairs are treated as expert matters, if they are so treated in any country, and I find that there they have hundreds of discussions that appear in the prints. These discussions are based on the theory that there is such a thing as military science, and that military science, like every other science, can only progress if it is given freedom of expression and is subject to the freest possible criticism. For some strange reason our authorities have followed the opposite course and distinctly discourage the expression of opinion. It appears to me that our military authorities seem to think they should hand down opinions ex cathedra, that

they should determine within the service, and without publication the views of subordinates, and that the General Staff or the War College should make up its mind and then tell us what the opinions of the service are; when I know, and I think you gentlemen know, if you have talked with the officers, that there has been very great difference of opinion in the service on many of these matters.

Now, if the question which we are discussing is a question to be decided fundamentally by the general public, that system which I have just described is wrong in essence. We want to know what our military men really think and we want the differences of opinion to come to the surface.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember when that order was promulgated?

Mr. FISHER. That order was promulgated just a little while ago; I mean by that, within a year or two, as I recall it.

Senator THOMAS. Has not that been the policy, practically, of the Government for years?

Mr. FISHER. It has been, I think. I do not think it is a new thing. My impression is that General Order No. 10 is a sort of reenactment, or definite enactment, perhaps, of what I have understood to be the general policy before, and has been reenacted comparatively recently. Senator BRADY. It is merely a definite enactment of a general policy. Mr. FISHER. That would be my understanding. I desire to say here that in these matters, what I have said should be taken subject to correction, as I do not have my memoranda. I did not know that I was to address you on this subject when I came to Washington. I was called to Washington on professional matters, so I am without notes or memoranda and documents which I wish I had with me and to which I might refer for greater accuracy. General Order No. 10 reads as follows:

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, February 23, 1915. Officers of the Army will refrain, until further orders, from giving out for publication any interview, statement, discussion, or article on the military situation in the United States or abroad, as any expression of their views on this subject at present is prejudicial to the best interests of the service.

Well, from the point of view of the service alone, that may be right. I have the highest opinion of the service, but I think there is something that is beyond the service.

The CHAIRMAN. May I call your attention to the fact that that order is but a modification of Circular No. 82 issued by President Taft on the 4th of December, 1909. It has been changed a time or two since, but the one you have just read is a promulgation of the original order, somewhat modified.

Mr. FISHER. I have no doubt that is correct, Senator. Do not misunderstand me. I am not suggesting in any way any criticism of the personnel of the present military authorities as compared with any previous military authorities. Indeed, my emphasis is rather on the opposite side of the thing. I think that it is naturally and perhaps almost inevitably the effect of a military service such as ours, that the point of view of the military man is thinking of the effectiveness of the service. He realizes that if there is free discussion in the service, then conflicting views will be presented and that, to some extent, will necessarily impair the effectiveness

of the official promulgation of an official point of view which is adopted by those who happen to be in charge. It is the doctrine of any hierarchy. A military organization necessarily partakes of the nature of a hierarchy. I find my friends in the military service refer to it as a hierarchy.

Now, let me say at the outset, also, that I am not one of those who believe that we do not need additional military preparation. I am quite of the opposite opinion. I notice that my friend, Mr. Hallinan, sent out a notice of this meeting in which he disclaimed in advance. responsibility for all of my views, and I have no quarrel with him, because I think, perhaps, there are differences between my views and those of some of my pacificist friends that perhaps cut very deep. I am trying to think for myself on these subjects. I believe there is no greater duty before us than that of preparing adequately for the national defense. I note that the former Secretary of War, Mr. Garrison, said the other day that it was treason for anybody not to be in favor of adequate national defense. I agree with him, but I do not want him, or anybody else, to define for me what constitutes adequate military defense. I do not like the assumption that people are unpatriotic because they happen to disagree with the principle of universal military service. I resent it, as far as I am concerned, and I trust that will not be found to be the point of view of the Congress of the United States.

I had occasion about a year ago to present my views on the general subject of "preparedness" in the form in which it was then pending before the House Committee on Military Affairs, and in connection with that I was asked for a copy of an address which I had delivered first at the University of Chicago and then later, by request, before several prominent organizations of quite a different character. That address was printed as a Senate document by order of Senator La Follette, I believe. It is document No. 323, and is dated February 14, 1916. It is not my purpose at this time to repeat what I said in that address. It is proper, perhaps, for me to say that the purpose of that address was to make clear my view that it was absolutely necessary for us to have adequate military defense; that there was a radical difference between a defensive military policy and an aggressive military policy, and that that difference was not being observed or recognized in the plans that were then pending before Congress or presented by the department; that there were differences upon this subject existing in the service which have not been permitted to come to the surface; but more than all that, the object of that address was to make clear, if I could, my conviction that it was utterly impossible for Congress or anybody else to formulate a proper defensive military policy until they at least had some agreement on the things they were going to try to defend. It goes without saying that we propose to defend our own shores and our own land against invasion. When you go beyond that you enter a field of very wide limits.

What are the things we are going to defend that are not territorial? Are we to have a military policy which will defend the Philippines, Hawaii, and Alaska from the possibility of invasion— the Panama Canal, Cuba, Porto Rico, and any other island possessions, and which, in addition to that, is going to defend the Monroe doctrine on the construction of some people as to what the Monroe doctrine consists of? I am one of those who believe that there is a

great deal of fundamental truth in that story about the man who was accused of being a traitor and unpatriotic because he did not believe in the Monroe doctrine. You will remember that he protested that it was an injustice to him. He said, "I believe in the Monroe doctrine firmly. There is no man in the world more devoted to it. I would be perfectly willing to fight for it, and if need be to die for it. I never said I did not believe in the Monroe doctrine. What I said was I did not know what the Monroe doctrine was." That is exactly the situation in which most of us find ourselves.

Now, if we are going to have the military arm of our Government present us with a program of national defense based on the theory that we are to defend the Monroe doctrine and without a definition as to what the Monroe doctrine is, we may safely start with the assumption that it will require every man in the United States to be trained in military science, and then you would not have enough, and it will take all the ships we can build and all the navies we can man, and then we would not have enough. That is exactly the position of the military authorities. They say if we are really going to define the Monroe doctrine in the broad way in which that doctrine is so frequently defined we have undertaken a military impossibility. It seems to me if, in addition to that, we declare that we are going to preserve our so-called historic policy of freedom from entangling foreign alliances-which, of course, in this country would mean that we are going to fight all our battles all alone and scorn the aid which other nations have, such as treaties and alliances with countries which have joint interests with us it means that we are going to be isolated in the world in the event of war, and then our difficulties would be enormously increased. As remarkable as these assumptions of national policy may seem to you, the fact remains that in the most authoritative document recently presented by the War College precisely these assumptions were made as a basis of their recommendations. I refer to "A proper military policy for the United States," issued by the Army War College in September, 1915. In defining what they have in mind they start out as follows:

2. Our abiding national policies.--The majority of our people have always believed in asserting their own rights and in respecting those of others. They desire that the cause of right should prevail and that lawlessness should be crushed out. To live up to these high ideals imposes upon us new duties as a world power; duties that require something more positive than a policy of mere passive defense. In addition, there are two underlying and abiding national policies whose maintenance we must consider as necessary to our national life. These are the "Monroe Doctrine" and the policy of avoiding "entangling alliances." They are distinctive and affect our international relations in a definite manner. In addition, policies may develop in the future as a result of international relations with respect to trade conditions.

A general consideration of our responsibilities as a nation and of our geographical position indicates that the maintenance of our abiding policies and interests at home and abroad involves problems of defense measures both on land and on sea. The solution of the general problem of national defense must be sought in the provision of adequate land and sea forces and a consideration of their coordinate relationship.

And then they prepared what they call a statement of a proper military policy for the United States, based on the theory that these are abiding national policies and that we have got to have the military forces necessary to defend them. There is no definition of what the Monroe Doctrine consists of, but we can have no quarrel with his conclusions if the expert adopts a theory of national defense like that. There is no longer any mystery about the amount of

preparation which he thinks we ought to have. That, fortunately, is not the view of other men who have had a wide experience, and whose opinions are entitled to great weight.

In a recent issue of the North American Review, former Secretary of State, Richard Olney, had an article on our Latin-American policy in which he discussed this matter. He said:

If opinions may differ as to the merit of any or all of the foregoing suggestions, there surely can be no difference as to the necessity of determining with the least delay practicable what our future Latin-American policy is to be. "Preparedness" for defensive war is demanded by the country, notwithstanding the immense burdens it entails. It involves many besides strictly military problems, and among them one of the most serious is for what contingencies we are to prepare and for what causes we are to be ready to fight. Shall we preserve unchanged our traditional attitude as the champion of every American State against foreign aggresion without regard to its consent or request or its preference to take care of itself or to seek some other ally then the United States, and without regard to the surely incurred hostility of the aggressive foreign power? It has often been claimed and sometimes effectively asserted that the United States in its own interest and for its own welfare must firmly resist any surrender of independence or cession of territory by an American State to a foreign power, even if the same be entirely voluntary. Suppose, for example, that an American State undertakes to permit an oversea power to plant a colony on its soil, or to convey to it a port or a coaling station, is the United States to resort to war, if necessary, in order to defeat the scheme? These are only some of the inquiries which go to show the necessity of a speedy and comprehensive revision of our Latin-American policy. The replies to them involve possibilities which must be taken into account in any intelligent estimate of the kind and measure of military "preparedness" the United States ought to initiate. Obviously, our "preparedness" means one thing with the cooperation of Latin America secured through the American concert suggested, and a wholly different and much more difficult and burdensome thing without such cooperation. The difficulties of arranging such a cooperation are not to be underrated. Yet the exigencies of the situation are apparent and threaten not merely the United States but all American States.

Now, much of that has its direct application to our international relations with Europe as well as with Latin America. If there is anything that has been demonstrated to us it is that the United States can no longer continue a policy of aloofness which was quite an intelligible and perfectly sound policy at one time. This seems to be the view of the President of the United States-and we may almost say every other really thoughtful student of the matter, were it not for the fact that it comes to my mind that Secretary Garrison in the same address to which I have referred, announced that we should not enter into any entangling alliance, not even the League to Enforce Peace, because that would be violating our historic policy, which means not doing the most effective thing that will lessen the chance of war in the future because of stubborn adherence to some shibboleth-some policy that was sound enough at the outset but which has long since ceased to apply to existing conditions. William G. Sumner said, "If you want war, nourish a doctrine. Doctrines are the most frightful tyrants to which men ever are subject because doctrines get inside of a man's own reason and betray him against himself." In the address to which reference has already

been made I said:

If the United States becomes involved in war it will be because it asserts some right or claims some privilege outside of its own territory, the assertion of which right or privilege runs counter to the interests of some foreign power, or it will be because some foreign power asserts a similar right or privilege against us. We can not of ourselves control the motives or the actions of other powers except by international agreement, backed by force or by measures short of force which may be equally effective for the purpose. Our first concern, however, is with our own attitude toward these matters. What are the rights or privileges we claim or wish to