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which the foundation of the fortune was laid. But the third generation is handicapped by loss of energy and by luxurious tastes developed in the day of affluence. Wealth brings relief from strife, then luxury and indolent ease, which dims the vision and lowers the mental and physical man.

NATIONS LIKE INDIVIDUALS.

In the history of the nations there are similar cycles of time. First, there is the formative period when the wealthy are few in number and work is well-nigh universal. Then after other stages, comes the era of great wealth, of many pleasures, of a numerous leisure class, with brain power weakened and the desire for ease fashioning ample excuses to avoid effort involving personal sacrifice. As a nation, the people of the United States are well within the latter stage.

The proof of this statement is to be found on every hand-in the existence of a great leisure class; in the ease with which the average man and woman may gain a luxurious livelihood with small effort, but most of all, in the tremendously important and significant fact that we have millions of persons who are actually nonproducers. Some of our greatest industries are devoted principally or wholly to the pleasures of the masses, and the circumstance that these industries give employment and high wages to many hands does not alter the truth of the statement that we are following with swift haste the pursuit of mere pleasure-a fool's paradise. Already we are weak, soft, and flabby and almost hopelessly wedded to pleasure just as were other great nations when they fell a prey to less refined but more vigorous people who coveted the wealth of the highly civilized. The yellow peril is more than a catch phrase—it is a horrible reality.

Tyre and Carthage, great in their day, even as we are in our own, passed away and a period of great wealth preceded the decline.

Jerusalem was destroyed and its people scattered.

Greece was conquered and absorbed by Rome, and the Roman Empire, once the conqueror, was dismembered and its glories finally extinguished.

Assyria, Nineveh, Babylon, the Persia of Darius and Xerxes fell into decay and Egyptian civilization was undermined and fell on the heels of wealth and ease. There is still another list of fallen nations in Asia and in India, and coming nearer home there is Spain stripped of her old power and wealth.

INDICATIONS OF LETHARGY.

The proof of the fact that the United States is entering into the lethargy, which from the beginning of the world has attended wealth and ease, is found in many familiar conditions of national life. There is, for instance, the lackadaisical interest taken by the average man in national defense, and reflected in a waste of two years after the weaknesses of our defenses became known.

What nation save one that was losing its virility would tolerate such a condition at a time when the whole world is aflame as we now find in our own Navy? We have no less than 70 ships still on paper or on the stays; we have no less than 70 more ships of all classes and kinds at anchor, tied up or out of commission, because we have no crews to man them. The Navy is short from 25,000 to 30,000 men and we are going to build more ships. But at the same time there is no dearth of men for our great fleet of luxurious pleasure yachts plying the coast waters and the inland seas; no dearth of men to run the great fleet of pleasure cars; no dearth of men to man the countless pleasure palaces.

The Army experts declare we need 1,000,000 troops to safeguard us against war500,000 ready to take the field at once and 500,000 more as a second line. They have showed us that one nation can land 827,000 troops on the Atlantic and another can land 238,000 on the Pacific, but Congress provides for a Regular Army of only 206,000 men, the increase to be made in five annual installments, and with little change in the pay or the attractiveness of the service, notwithstanding that labor was never so scarce, wages never so high. An increase of 20,000 men authorized some months ago for the army has not yet been secured because, though there are 1,000 recruiting officers looking for them, only about 9,000 have been found in three months.

NATIONAL GUARD PLAN FAILS.

It is proposed to meet the requirements of national defense by distributing annually in the way of salaries and wages, between $50,000,000 and $60,000,000 to the National Guard of the States, and to bring the guardsmen under the partial control of the Federal officers. There are many fundamental obstacles to the success of this plan.

By its adoption we are relying on the militia for military strength and this same reliance has always failed us, has caused a waste of treasure and of lives and has given the United States many years of needless war. Even as this measure was being agreed upon in Washington the futility of depending on militia was demonstrated, when the guard of three Southwestern States was called out. The men were few in number, inefficient, and responded unwillingly. There is nothing in this law just enacted that will prevent a recurrence of other disasters in our history like those which have always followed dependence upon militia. It takes a full year to make a dependable soldier whereas the guardsmen have but two weeks of field training, and 48 weekly drills during the year. In any event, the federalization of the National Guard can not be enforced if the men do not wish to serve under federal jurisdiction. They get no pay and the matter stops there.

The day has gone by when we can reasonably expect to maintain the great army and the great navy that we need on the old standards of pay. The very wealth and the very people that the army and navy are needed to protect, beckon the possible recruit away from the service.

ALWAYS DANGER OF WAR.

Another evidence of the relaxation of national perception due to our great commercial success is the doubt that there is any need for national defenses. We have said to the old world nations, you must not acquire any territory in the new world and we have shut the gates of the United States against peoples of the Orient. Each of these conditions is alone sufficient to embroil us in war at any time. If we should yield up both of these objections war would come swifter. Japan is determined to be recognized as an equal with the whole world, besides that she must find room for an annual surplus population of 1,000,000 persons. She wants our Pacific coast. As a preliminary to getting it she has planted over 40,000 of her men in the Hawaiian Islands and has established 20,000 men on the Pacific coast. The latter are not like Irish, Swedish, Italian, or other European immigrants who come as individuals to be welded into the life of the Nation. The Japanese on the coast are government men. allegiance is to Tokyo, their profits go to Japan, and their pay is fixed by their govern

ment.

Their

If Japan chose to land an army on the Pacific coast now, we could not prevent it. She is ready; we are not ready

The man with the rifle on whom we have in the past placed dependence can not save us now. He will be killed off by long-range guns and machine guns long before he can get within striking distance. The Mikado has trained armies, a great navy, and the money. The persistently reported story of Japan's inability to finance a war is false.

DANGER IN STATE OF MIND.

These are some of the dangers we find on awakening from the long sleep which prosperity has enabled us to indulge in, but our great danger lies in our own state of mind, our own devotion to ease and money getting, our reluctance to lay aside the pursuit of profit long enough to reclaim ourselves and repair the neglect of years of our national defense.

The failure of Congress to cure this chronic ailment was to be expected. Congress is a representative body. It is a national mirror. In its action you see the national sentiments reflected; consequently, Congress gave about what the people wanted for national defense. As a body it did not dare to give more. It legislated looking home

ward instead of overseas.

The remedy for this condition is a home remedy. It is first of all the realization that this Nation can not go on in the old way. One of two things must happen very soon. Either we must cease to cuddle in the lap of luxury, divert enough of our men and our money to real, actual, dependable armies-counting not at all on the parade soldiers or we must soon be plunged into a war in which we shall at least be shorn of wealth and of men, a war from which we may emerge a fallen people. We can no longer delegate to somebody else the duty of being a soldier at nothing per day, and then look down at him for doing it.

National defense is the state of mind. When every man realizes that national defense involves his home, his life, the honor of his mother, his wife, his daughter, no matter whether he lives in New York City, or in Haskell, Kans., then this Nation will again have set its foot on firm ground.

Now we are self-pampered, selfish, and soft, and have traveled far on the road to decay. Universal training for service is one of the first steps for our reclamation.

If, therefore, a certain number of hours each day be devoted to the mental training of the men, every requirement set out at the beginning of this letter will be met. In carrying this out a certain number of instructors from the regular service could be selected, but it would be necessary to add a sufficient corps of civilian teachers so that the work might be properly and thoroughly done. But in this, again, there would be no national expense, because somewhere the same men would be instructing these very same boys if they had not been gathered into the Army.

The whole problem is one of organization and of efficient handling. To perfect this organization will take time. The training of 2,000,000 privates would require 430,000 officers and noncommissioned officers. The Regular Army and militia could not furnish any such numbers at present. The first class, therefore, could not exceed about 200,000, which would be increased gradually, and in 7 or 8 or perhaps 10 years the whole number could be taken in. The members of this first class should be obtained by selection. It should be made a privilege, not a penance, for from this group a large proportion must be retained to provide officers and noncommissioned officers to train the later classes. To this end schools similar to West Point and Annapolis would have to be established, or those institutions themselves very largely increased. Appointments to such schools should be the prizes awarded for success in the work of the first year.

It is sometimes urged that a large standing Army will create a spirit of militarism, but it is only necessary to consider West Point and Annapolis to see that this spirit does not attach to the young men.

A careful consideration of the numbers involved will show that this whole objection is baseless. Providing that the noncommissioned class can not be retained after they are 25 (except in the case of certain special branches, where greater experience is absolutely necessary), we have to deal with only the small class of men who make the service a career. It would require about 90,000 commissioned officers, and in our country, and under our form of government, 90,000 officers, divided between the Army and Navy, would not constitute a danger to the democratic spirit.

As to cost, the 430,000 officers and noncommissioned officers would constitute the economic cost of this plan. The noncommissioned officers would range in age from 20 to 25 years, and probably 80 per cent of them would have engaged in productive enterprises if they had not gone into the service. Therefore, they are taken away from production, and so represent a true cost while thus employed. So, too, the officers, being employed for life, will be a continuing cost. But if you credit this body of men with the work that they accomplish-first, in insuring peace; second, in perfecting the physical condition of the young men of the country; third, in the decrease of crime that must result from taking impressionable youth out of the purlieus of the city and and putting him in good surroundings-then the profit and the benefit to the country can hardly be estimated. In any event, it would represent a money value many, many times the cost.

If you will look at the records of West Point and Annapolis, you will find that the average expectation of life among graduates from these institutions is much greater than that of the average citizen. This is largely because of early training, and is in spite of the wastage of war and hardship. Such a training, given to all our youth, measured in money, would show an enormous profit to universal training.

I have discussed the above proposition with many of the officers of the Army and Navy, and the only objection that I have ever had stated to it was that it involved an enormous cost. This results from confusing book cost with actual economic cost. An excessive economic cost impoverishes the Nation; an excessive book cost does nothing of the kind. It is true that the National Government will have to increase its annual expenditures. It has been doing this for many years because various new conditions have come up which the people decided could be handled better by the central Government than by the citizens or by the States. I believe this is preeminently such a condition. No State can do for the youth of the country what the United States can do.

As to the authority for such action, the preamble of the Constitution declares that "to provide for the common defense" was one of the fundamental reasons for forming this Union of States. And let us remember that when by this Constitution the Federal Government took away from the individual States the right to maintain troops and defend themselves, it in return for this solemnly guaranteed to protect each of them against invasion. For that duty the National Government must be at all times ready. It seems to me, therefore that it is not a question of authority; rather it is the absolute duty of the United States to take steps to carry out this contract with the States. And such action should be taken now because the conditions now existing are such that the States are all in danger until such proper preparation be made.

May I trespass upon your time for one more detail, and that is, to call your attention to the necessity of differentiating between the provisions for the Army and Navy.

Suggestions have been made that a training period of two years is longer than is necessary. However this may be as concerns the Army, I am sure that investigation will convince you that a lesser period of training for the Navy would imperil the efficiency of that branch of the service. Further, you will find that our actual and practical naval experience shows that if boys of 18 are put on board ships for two years there is no difficulty in teaching them, provided additional officers or teachers are employed so as not to put undue strain upon the combatant officers.

This sort of naval force would require a preliminary training on shore, such as is given to our naval apprentices. For the Navy we are looking forward to we would require annual classes of about 100,000. As the continued work of training and breaking in fresh recruits would put additional strain upon the officers, the numbers in the commissioned ranks should be increased and ultimately brought up to about the ratio employed in the German service. This will not only insure good preliminary training, but it will provide for the expansion of the number of men in time of war, and will afford excellent opportunities for vocational training in connection with the machine shops and electric plants on board ship.

I beg leave to express my deep appreciation of the honor paid me in permitting me to address your committee, and I am, sir, Yours, with great respect,

ROBERT M. THOMPSON,

President.

Senator BRADY. Mr. Chairman, if there is nothing further I move the committee adjourn.

(Accordingly, at 12.30 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned until to-morrow, Wednesday, December 20, 1916, at 10.30 o'clock a. m.)

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 20, 1916.

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m. at the room of the committee in the Capitol, Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Thomas and Brady.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harding, of New York, is present, and the committee understands that he desires to make a statement. Mr. Harding, the committee will be glad to hear you.

STATEMENT OF MR. EDWARD HARDING, 43 EXCHANGE PLACE, NEW YORK.

Mr. Harding, what body of citizens, or organizations, do you represent at this hearing?

Mr. HARDING. My partner, John T. Pratt, is a director of the Universal Military Training League.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee is holding hearings now on what is known as S. 1695, proposing universal military training, and the proposed draft of a substitute for it, sometimes known as the Moseley draft, which was based upon S. 1695, and we will be glad to have your views on those measures, or any measures, and your views in general on the subject of universal military training. You may proceed in your own way to discuss the subject.

Senator BRADY. I understand you belong to some particular organization?

Mr. HARDING. My partner, Mr. Pratt, who is one of the directors of the Universal Military Training League, was unable to be present to-day. He asked me to appear in his place, and I appear as a citizen as well.

I notice, Mr. Chairman, by the accounts in the newspapers that there was some dispute as to the length of time required to make a soldier. Some of the witnesses, as I understand it, have testified that at least a year is required; others, that six months would be sufficient. Of course, that is a matter for expert opinion, but I think there is one point that is well to bear in mind, namely, that even if we have an act passed which provides for the shorter period which any of the experts will approve, say six months, two very great advantages other than the actual training of the men would accrue to the country.

In making a plan for an adequate force it is necessary to provide for three things-that is, to provide not only for training the individuals but also to provide for their organization and equipment. If we had an act passed which called for a six months' period of training, we would create an organization which, although demobilized, would be in existence and would come together as an effective force in case war broke out. We would have men trained at any rate to the extent of six months, even though they were not perfect soldiers. We would also have them organized and we would presumably be some distance along the road of having a complete equipment for them.

It seems to me, then, that even if we do not accept the longest period of training advocated by experts, but instead accept the shortest period, we make a very great advance in the other two necessary branches of preparation of the country. I do not know whether that question has been brought before the committee or not, as I have not had access to its minutes. Another aspect of universal military training which I think can not be overemphasized consists in its valuable nonmilitary features.

As you gentlemen are probably well aware, only 5 per cent of the boys in this country go to high school or to college. In other words, 95 per cent of our boys stop school either at 16 or before they reach 16. The result is that these boys have no discipline or training of any kind, except such little discipline or training as they may get in the home or in the church. The result is that the boys of the present day are notorious, I may say, for their lack of manners and their lack of respect for authority. Mr. Taft, two years ago, wrote an article on this subject under the title of "The slouch," in which he scores very severely the youth of the day and his lack of manners. It seems to me that vast good can be accomplished by military training in that it will teach boys discipline and will teach them respect for authority. We have at the present time in this country a tremendous growing force in the form of the Boy Scouts of America, with which you gentlemen are all more or less, doubtless, familiar. The Boy Scouts of America takes a boy at 12 and develops his character and teaches him certain fundamentals of citizenship. The Boy Scout movement is not promilitary; it is not antimilitary. It concerns itself solely with the development of the character and personal efficiency of the boy and the foundations of the principles of better citizenship.

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