character of the organizations. After they were dropped and the 20 per cent additional you are down to about 570 men. Of those 570 men, roughly, 50 per cent had had a year or more of training and 50 per cent have come in in the last few months, so you had a regiment going to the front with a nucleus of, say, 285 men who had had a year's militia training, which may mean, perhaps, 48 to 72 hours' drill, or it may mean more or even less. You added to that little nucleus 285 men who had had less than one year; many of them had come in since the so-called Federalization of the militia and had had very little training. So you had 570 men of the degree of training I am describing, and to that number you added other men with a view to making up the war strength of 1,900 men, speaking in round numbers. That is what we sent to the front. Organizations, the greater portion of which consisted of untrained, undisciplined, and consequently undependable men as soldiers. In some of the regiments the percentage physically defective was nearly 50 per cent. Twenty per cent was the average for the whole department. It is to be remembered that the great Eastern Department has about 56 per cent of all the militia of the United States within its borders. Twenty per cent of the men who were in the service at the time of the call had to be dropped because of physical disability. In addition to this number many were dropped by the governors. The estimate of the training of the militia as a whole prior to the outbreak of the war showed that 64 per cent of the men in the ranks had had a year or more of service in the militia; the balance less than a year. The old men dropped out by the governors came, of course, from the 64 per cent, so that the regiment was left with men about one-half of whom had had a year's training and half less; many of them only a few months. The mounted troops were not equipped with horses, almost without exception; they had a few, but only a small per cent of what they required. The Field Artillery likewise most of them had had little training. Some had practically none. Such was the collection of willing men in uniform, equipped with arms with whose use they were little familiar, who were sent to the front. If they had had to meet highly-trained, well organized troops they would not have known what hit them.

Senator THOMAS. Were those men dropped before the regiments departed for the front or after?

Gen. WOOD. Before. In some instances it took months to fill a regiment up to the minimum strength required necessary to muster it into the Federal service. In many instances regiments were held for long periods in order to secure men to replace those who had been dropped out because of physical disability. The complement to be supplied by the Eastern Department was in round numbers 132,000. We are to-day short 47,000 of that complement; in other words, working very vigorously on this matter since June, we are still short 35 per cent of the full complement.

Senator THOMAS. What is the proportion of resignations and discharges of men after they were mobilized?

Gen. Woop. That would be hard to answer because a great many of these men were men with dependent families. I have those statistics, and I will put them in the hearing, if I may be permitted, giving you the answer as close as I can.

Senator BRADY. I wish you would do that.

Gen. WOOD. We mobilized in all 86,876 in the Eastern Department. Up to September 25, 1916, 1,836 were discharged on account of dependent relatives. The authority to do so was then recalled. We have no record of the number so discharged on the border from the regiments sent from this department. Fortunately there was no enemy to meet in the shape of an organized, well-equipped force. Had there been it would have been a tragedy, as the troops were in no sense prepared for campaign. If we have learned the impossibilities and the unworkability of the system, this mobilization will have been worth whatever it cost, because it should have taught us never again to place reliance upon militia organizations for service of this kind. Twenty per cent of all the men in the militia in this department were discharged for physical disability after thay had been mobilized and in the process of taking them into the United States service. In addition to this number a great many men were discharged by the governors during the period between the President's call and the response of the troops. In other words, they were released before going to the mobilization camps and some after they went there.

Senator BRADY. How many of the National Guard in numbers have you had on the border during this mobilization?

Gen. Wood. From our department-I can only speak for thatabout 86,800 from the Eastern Department.

Senator BRADY. What is your judgment, General, as to what the results would have been if we had not called on the National Guard at all and have attempted to raise the same force that you have raised, by volunteer service? Do you think it could have been done?

Gen. WOOD. I think it could have been done, but I think it would have taken a longer time to have done it. The best regiments of militia were gotten off in the first eight to ten days, much quicker than we possibly could have gotten off olunteer troops. If we had had to meet good troops, well organized and well led, it would have been simply slaughter to have sent these untrained militia against them. Organizations raised and trained as these are, are not trained, disciplined troops. The portion which had had reasonable training would not exceed 20 per cent. I believe this is a liberal estimate. The remaining 80 per cent were untrained, or slightly trained. They were organizations made up of enthusiastic well-meaning men, wearing the uniform of the United States and carrying arms of whose use they knew little or nothing. They were not soldiers in the sense of being trained men. They were actuated by the spirit of willingness to serve. They were willing but unprepared. Some of the regiments we had were better than others. Some of the New York, some of the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania regiments, and some from the other northern and southern States were good militia regiments, but they were not disciplined troops prepared for campaign and none of them were at full strength when they went to the front, or adequately equipped.

Senator BRADY. They were not up to the full requirements?

Gen. WOOD. I do not think we sent an organization excepting such units as field hospitals and ambulance companies, to the front at full war strength; we sent very few even approximately full. I want to try to make it clear that it is not the fault of the officers or men; it is the fault of the defective system.

Senator BRADY. I thoroughly understand your position in that matter, General, and I thoroughly agree with you in your statements. Will you, before you finish your remarks, give us some information or some idea as to what you think should have been done relative to the present National Guard, as to the effect its present status has upon universal military training?

Gen. WOOD. I think the system of universal military training and service should be established as soon as possible, and the enlisted personnel of the National Guard replaced by men who have had Federal training-men who are young and have the minimum of dependent and business responsibility. In other words, men who can afford to go to the front and serve-men who are under absolute Federal control. We must maintain the militia until the preliminary steps of the new system can be taken and we have men enough reasonably trained for service in the Federal Reserve Regiments. I think we should take into this new Federal reserve every officer in good standing in the National Guard. Nothing should be done which appears to be adverse to these men. We should of course, take the men also who are of suitable age.

Senator BRADY. Would you have that continued under the present form of governmental control, or would you have the National Guard revert back to its former position as State militia?

Gen. WOOD. I would drop the National Guard entirely out of the scheme of Federal defense. If the States want to keep it, of course they have, under their own sovereignty, the rights to do so if Congress consents, but I feel very strongly that the Federal Government should not be dependent upon any State for its weapons of defense.

Senator BRADY. What you believe is that it would be best to have the National Guard go back to its former status as a State organization?

Gen. Wood. If it is to be maintained, yes sir-absolutely. I have in effect so recommended in a communication which I think should have reached the War Department to-day. I feel that the Federal Government must own and control the military forces absolutely and beyond preadventure.

Senator THOMAS. Was there observable any conflict of authority between the Federal and the State authorities in the handling of its militia during its recent mobilization, or in the operations of the soldiers on the border?

Gen. WOOD. No essential one, except that the standards of efficiency are all determined very largely by the standards of interest in the State. Interest of Stato authorities.

Senator THOMAS. A necessary result.

Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir. There are, of course, possibilities of radical differences of opinion. Governors, if they wish, can muster out men and make radical changes in personnel of organizations. In fact, they can do very much anything with the militia up to the time of call. In the past, as you know, the governors, of various States have differed with the policy of the Federal Government and in some instances have refused to send the militia in response to Federal call. The only policy to be adopted is that of universal military training and service, and the building up as soon as possible of a force of citizen soldiery, officered principally by trained officers of

the Officers' Reserve Corps. The States, of course, have the right to maintain a militia force if they desire. I hope they will drop their militia, however, and establish State constabulary-a force much better fitted to do the ordinary work incident to the maintenance of public order than the militia. This universal training will do much to build up a spirit of national solidarity, to Americanize the various. new elements which are coming into our population. It will bring home to every youngster a sense of his individual obligation for the nation and make him think not in terms of the locality but of the nation. It will give us men with better bodies, bodies better coordinated and more responsive to the will. It will give us a more effective working machine, one which will aid to individual and national efficiency and be a strong influence for the betterment of public and private morals. Once in force, it would result in the establishment of such a condition of preparedness as would make any nation hestitate to attack us, and from our present state of wealth and unpreparedness with an aggressive commerce, conditions which, without adequate protection are a strong inducement for war, we should find ourselves in such a state of preparedness as would make any nation hesitate to attack us because we would be really ready.

A great many people, and strangely enough, those who argue against militarism, advocate a very large Regular Army-an Army of perhaps three-fourths of a million of soldiers. They do not realize that this means the establishment of a force which tends to militarism and the establishment of conditions not desirable from the standpoint of the Republic. So far as I know the opinions of the more intelligent officers of the Army, they are not in favor of a movement of this kind, but, generally speaking, they are in favor of universal military training-a trained citizenry standing behind an Army adequate for the peace of the Nation. We do not want to build up a great mercenary Army with its attendant isolated military class. We want a Regular Army of the size recommended by the General Staff-about 250,000 men. This force will be needed for garrisoning the oversea possessions, for a mobile force in the home country for purposes of home defense and service as an expeditionary force such as we used in 1898 and later. It will also serve as a training nucleus for the great mass of citizens who will come under our direction each year for military training. Back of this regular force we want a citizenry trained, armed, and ready to be soldiers, all of them, who are physically fit, but not living the lives of soldiers.

This is what we can expect under a system of universal training— the highest degree of preparedness with the minimum of regular force. Senator BRADY. Do you think that would give us two or three lines of defense? Your Regular Army would be the first line of defense? Gen. WOOD. The Regular Army would be ready for any expeditionary operations and as a training nucleus for the citizen soldiery. It would also furnish the reasonable mobile force in the United States and Coast Artillery troops sufficient for the coast defense in peace time. This would be, so to speak, first line.

And these, if

Senator BRADY. What would be your second? Gen. WOOD. Citizenry from 21 to 29 years of age. trained as contemplated, could be mobilized very promptly. Senator BRADY. Then what would you do with the State militia?

Gen. WOOD. It should absolutely disappear unless the State chooses to keep armed bodies of troops. We have no use for State troops in this country. All officers and men in the State organization would be welcomed in the proposed Federal force if physically fit and the enlisted men were of suitable age.

Senator BRADY. Do you not believe we will necessarily have to have a State militia?

Gen. WOOD. I see what you are driving at. I think that it is much better to have a State constabulary.

Senator BRADY. I fully agree with you on that, but I wanted to get your views on the subject. It should be maintained in the States, by the States and, for the States' use, except in time of war.

Gen. Wood. That is right, a State constabulary

Senator BRADY. Do you not think there should be some scheme to bring the three together?

Gen. WOOD. No. I think the State constabulary should be kept apart and be used as a State police force, pure and simple, for the control of local disorders. Of course, in case of a great war all the police force would perhaps become, in times of emergency, a portion of the Military Establishment.

When the citizen training has been going on for eight years we shall have 4,000,000 men, less the ordinary losses from death and disease who have passed through the training. This would leave us about 3,700,000 men in the first line group available and ready for service. We shall have each year 500,000 in arms, assembled in regiments or other tactical organizations, fully equipped for immediate service. They will be distributed over the country more or less as the militia is to-day, their numbers being in accordance with the population. That is, a large city like New York would have many organizations. It will be a much better trained force than the militia and its value about three to one. It will be organized so as to constitute a well-balanced force with a proper proportion of the different arms. It will be at war strength, officered by trained officers of the reserve. We shall know exactly what we have available. Back of it will be the remaining class of the first line group, the class of 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 28, or about 3,200,000 men. We must have the arms and equipment for this force always ready and so distributed as to be near the organizations which are to use them. In case we need more than 500,000 men a class could be held for an additional year, so that you would have the old class and the new class, or a total of 1,000,000 men ready for immediate service. In the Civil War we had, North and South, a little over 4,000,000 men. This with one-third of our present population, no over-sea enemy and nothing like our present coastal wealth. When this is remembered I feel that the first line group, of 3,700,000 men, is not excessive. I do not think we would have to call them all out except in a great war. I think once we have completed our organization on the basis of national service and training our position will be very secure and it will be very doubtful if any nation will attack us-it would require an extraordinay combination of force to attack us with any hope of success. The arms and equipment though must be maintained; an army poorly equipped is almost as helpless as one poorly trained.