The law is thus defined by Cicero, Summa ratio insita à naturâ, quæ jubeat ea quæ facienda sunt, prohibeatque contraria*, A principal reason ingrafted in us by nature, which commandeth the things that are to be done, and forbiddeth the contrary: and all the particular and several laws of divers nations are but the branches of this law: for the laws be certain and clear intelligences, and rules, whereby the mind is addressed to pursue that which is good, and to eschew the contrary: and they offer to the mind the forms and ideas of virtue and dishonesty. So that in the sacred precepts of law, as in a chrystal glass, a man may perceive what he may do with praise, what he cannot do without infamy: for the common places, which be handled by divers, of common duties, of that which is truly good, of that which is perfect happiness, of the best estate of a common-weal, do not so sufficiently qualify and instruct the understanding, as the law itself. But here I shall be crossed by another objec

* 3. lib. 1. de legi.

tion, that great and tedious are the labours which are to be sustained in the study of the law. Surely there is nothing of weight or worth which may be compassed without pain and travail, and yet if the pain be compared and balanced with the profit, it is but as a few drops of hail to a whole shower of manna. What would not a towardly man do? what would he not undertake by his wisdom and weariness, to keep all danger from the bodies, heads, and lives of the innocent; to preserve his memory from oblivion and silence; to be of great account amongst the greatest; to attain to that knowledge, which is the highest of all human arts and sciences? and though it were as hard a matter for a young gentleman to gain the knowledge of the law, as it was for Phaeton to ascend unto the chariot of the sun, who, ere he could accomplish that, was to pass through uncouth ways, and by the ghastly forms of deformed creatures, by the terrible signs of the bull, the lion, and the scorpion*, though

* Ovid. Metamorph.

(I say) a student ought to have all the law perfect, and to pass through a multitude of cases, judgments, statutes, arguments, treatises, comments, questions, diversities, expositions, customs of courts, pleadings, mootes, readings, and such like yet since there is no art nor science by which the common-weal receiveth so great benefit: since there is no course of life, no time of age, no estate of men, which can either flourish or be without the safeguard of laws; and since the difficulty of the science is rewarded by the dignity, credit, and ample fortune which belongeth unto it: the hope of them which employ themselves in this study ought not to wax faint, nor their minds to be daunted with the labour and pain, which all arts require; but they ought to be incited and allured to proceed in their studies by the excellent and honourable rewards of the same.

CHAP. II.

OF THE GOOD QUALITIES WHEREWITH THE STUDENT OF THE LAW OUGHT TO BE

FURNISHED.

BECAUSE many apply themselves to the study of the law without deliberate consideration of their qualities and sufficiency, so that many times they find not that contentment which otherwise they might enjoy. It is very convenient that they should know what qualities are requisite in him who is to employ his time in the study of the law: for, as Aristotle sayeth, Rules and precepts have not force in all; but the mind is to be decked with good gifts, that it may take joy in things that be truly good, and abhor the con

D

trary. The first and chief thing that I do require in him is, to have the true knowledge and fear of God, without which his other, knowledge is but as a sword in the hand of a frantic person: and where the light of truth is not, there is a dark and ten-fold mist about the mind. But where God is not, there is no truth, there is no ligh, there is no law. The soul and senses are but the instruments of his will, which he bindeth and looseth at his pleasure. And if they turn from beholding him to the contemplation of any art and science whatsoever, surely they effect nothing but their own destruction. I know this is no pleasant sound to some dainty ears, who cannot tolerate any naming or mentioning of religion, which the Pagans, whom they make as precedents of their prophane manners did not only regard, but in the very front and beginning of their laws (such was their reverence) they prefixed a precept and caveat for the observation and keeping of holy rites in a

* Aristot. lib. 10. Ethico. ad Nichomach.