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1796.]

State Papers relative to the late Negociation with France.

from the Minifter for Foreign Affairs. He de-
clares likewife that he shall difpatch Couriers to
his Court as often as the official Communications
to him may require special instructions.
Paris 13th Norf 1796.

(No 24.)

MALMESBURY.

THE Court of London having been informed of what has paffed in confequence of the last Memorial delivered by its order to the Minifter for Foreign Affairs, does not think neceffary to add any thing to the Answer made by the Underfigned to the two Queftions which the Directory thought proper to address to him.

That Court waits, therefore, and with the greatest anxiety, for an explanation of the fentiments of the Directory, with regard to the principle it has propofed, as the bafis of a Negotiation, and the adoption of which appeared to be the best means of accelerating the progrefs of a difcuffion fo important to the happiness of fo many nations.

The Underfigned has, in confequence, received orders to renew the demand of a frank and precife Anfwer on this point, in order that his Court may know, with certainty, whether the Directory accepts that propofal; or defires to make any change or modifications whatever in it; or, laftly, whether it would wish to propose any other principle that may promote the fame end? Paris, Nov. 26, 1796. MALMESBURY.

(No. 25.)

IN answer to the Note delivered yesterday, November 26, by Lord MALMESBURY, the Underfigned Minister for Foreign Affairs is inftructed by the Directory, to obferve, that the anfwers made on the 5th and 22d of laft Brumaire, contained an acknowledgment of the principle of Compenfation, and that, in o, der to remove every pretext for farther difcuffion on that point, the Underfigned, in the name of the Executive Directory, now makes a :ormal and pofitive declaration of fuch acknowlelment

In confequence, Lord MALMSBURY is again invited to give a speedy and categorical Antwer to the Propofal made to him on the 22d of haft Brumaire, and which was conceived in these terms: "The Underfined is inftructed by the Executive Directory, to invite you to defignate, without the leaft delay, and exprefsly, the objects of reciprocal Compenfation which you have to propofe.'

Paris, Nov. 27, 1796. CH. DELACROIX. (No. 26.)

THE Underfigned Minifter Plenipotentiary of HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY, in anfwer to the Note dated this morning, which was fent to him by the Minifter for Foreign Affairs, haftens to affure him, that he will not delay a moment in communicating it to his Court, from which he must neceffarily wait for farther orders, before he can explain himself upon the important points which it contains.

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with respect to the application of the general principle already eftablished, as the bafis of the Negotiation for Peace.

He will, with the utmost readiness, enter with that Minister into every explanation which the ftate and progrefs of the Negotiation will allow, and he will not fail to enter into the difcuffion of thefe Propofitions, or of any counter-project which may be tranfinitted to him on the part of the Executive Directory, with that frankness and that spirit of conciliation, which correspond with the juft and pacific intentions of his Court. Paris, Dec. 17, 1795. MALMESBURY.

(No. 28.)

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORIAL, ON THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTS OF RESTITUTION, COMPENSATION, AND RECIPROCAL ARRANGE

MENT.

THE principle, already established, as the bafis of the Negotiation, by the confent of the two Goverments, is founded on Reftitutions to be made by HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY to France, in compenfation for the arrangements to which that Power may confent, in order to fatisfy the just pretenfions of the Allies of the King, and to preferve the political balance of Europe.

In order to accomplish thefe objects, in the manner the most complete, and to offer a fresh proof of the fincerity of his wishes for the reeftablishment of general tranquillity, His MAJESTY would propose, that there fhould be given to this principle, on each fide, all the latitude of which it may be fufceptible.

I. HIS MAJESTY demands therefore,

1. The reftitution to His Majefty the EMPEROR and KING, of all his dominions, on the footing of the Status ante Bellum..

2. The re-establishment of Peace between the

Germanic Empire and France, by a fuitable arrangement, conformably to the refpective interes and to the general fafety of Europe. This arrangement to be negotiated with HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY, as conftitutional Head of the Empire, either by the intervention of the KING, or immediately as HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY fhall prefer.

3. The evacuation of Italy by the French Troops, with an engagement not to interfere in the internal affairs or that Country; which fhould be re-established, as far as poffible, upon the footing of the Status ante Bellum.

In the courfe of the Negot at on, a more detailed difcuffion may be entered into of the farther measures which it may be proper to adopt, refpecting the objes of these three Articles, in order to the providing more effectually for the future fecurity of the refpective limits and poffeffions, and for the maintenance of general tranquillity.

II. With regard to the other Allies of His BRITANNIC MAJESTY, His Majesty demands, that there be referved to Her Majesty the EmPRESS of all the RUSSIAS, a full and unlimited power of taking part in this Nerociation, whenever the may think fit; or of acceding to the Definitive Treaty, and thereby returning to a state of Peace with France.

III. HIS

III. HIS MAJESTY alfo demands, that Her Molt Faithu MAJESTY may be comprehended in this Negotiation, and may return to a ftate of peace with France, without any ceffion or burthenfome condition on either fide.

IV. On thefe cnd tions, His MAJESTY OF fers to France the entire and unreferved reftitusion of all the Conquests which he has made on that Power in the East and West Indies, propofing at the fame time that a mutual understanding should be eftablished as to the means of fecuring for the future the tranquillity of the two Mations, and of confolidating, as much as poffible, the advantages of their refpe&tive poffeffons. HIS MAJESTY offers, in like manner, the reftitution of the Iflands of St Pierre and Miquelon, and of the Fishery of Newfoundland, on the footing of the Status ante Beilum.

But if, in addition to this, HIS MAJESTY were to wave the right given to him by the exprefs ftipulations of the Treaty of Uuecht, of appofing the ceffion of the Spanish part of St. Domingo to France, HIS MAJESTY would then demand, in return for this concellion, a compeniation, which might fecure, at leaft in fome degree, the maintenance of the balance of the refpective poffeffions in that part of the world.

V. In all the cafes of ceflions or reftitutions, which may come in queftion in the courfe of this Negociation there should be granted on each fide, to all individuals, the most unlimited right to withdraw with their families and their property, and to fell their land and other immoveable poffeffions; and adequate arrangements fhould also be made, in the course of this Negotiation, for the removal of all fequeftrations, and for the fatisfaction of the juft claims which individuals on either fide may have to make upon the refpective Governments.

(No. 29.)

MALMESBURY.

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With regard to the Republic of the United Provinces, HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY and his Allies find themfelves too nearly interested in the political fituation of thofe Provinces, to be able to confent in their favour to the re-eftablishment of the Status ante Bellum as with refpect to territorial poffeffions, unless France could, on her part, reinstate them in all respects in the fame political fituation in which they ftood before the War.

If, at leaft, it were pofible to re-establifh in thofe Provinces, agreeably to what is believed to be the wifh of a great majority of the inhabitants, their ancient Conftitution and form of Government, His MAJESTY might then be difpofed ro relax, in their favour, from a very confiderable part of the conditions on which the prefent ftate of things obliges him to infift.

But if, on the contrary, it is with the Republic of Holland, in its prefent ftate, that their BRITANNIC and IMPERIAL MAJESTIES will have to treat, they will feel themfelves obliged to feek in territorial acquifitions, thofe compenfations, and that fecurity, which fuch a state of things will have rendered indifpenfible to them.

Reftitutions of any kind, in favour of Holland, could in that cafe be admitted in fo far only as they fhall be compenfated by arrangements calculated to contribute to the fecurity of the Aufirian Netherlands. The means of accomplishing this object will be found in the Ceffions which France has exacted in her Treaty of Peace with Holland, and the poffeffion of which by that Power would in any cafe be abfolutely incompatible with the fecurity of the Auftrian Netherlands in the hands of His IMPERIAL

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORIAL ON THE PEACE MAJESTY.

WITH SPAIN AND HOLLAND.

It is on thefe principles that Hrs BRITANNIC MAJESTY Would be ready to treat for the reeftablishment of Peace with the Republic of Holland in its prefent ftate. The details of fuch a difcuffion must neceffarily lead to the confideration of what would be due to the intereft and the

(No. 30)

The Allies of France not having hitherto expreffed any defire or difpofition to treat with the KING, HIS MAJESTY might have forborne to enter into any detail on their account; but, in order to avoid any delays prejudicial to the great object which the KING has in view, and rights of the Houfe of Orange. to accelerate the work of a General Peace, His MAJESTY Will not refufe to explain himself in the first inftance on the points which concern thofe Powers. If, then, the CATHOLIC KING fhould defire to be comprehended in this Negociation, or to be allowed to accede to the Definitive Treaty, this would meet with no obftacle on the part of HIS MAJESTY.-Nothing having hitherto been conquered by either of the the two Soverei ns from the other, no other point could, at the prefent moment, come into queftion, but that of the re-establishment of Peace, fimply, and without any reftitution or compenfation whatever, except fuch as might poffibly refult from the application of the principle declared at the end of the fourth Article of the Memorial already delivered to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

MY LORD, Paris, Dec. 20, 1796. Mr. ELLIS returned here from London on Thursday latt, the 15th inftant, at five, P.M. and delivered to me the Dispatches No. 11 and 12, with which he was charged by your Lordfhip

Although nothing can be clearer, more ably drawn up, or more fatisfactory, than the inftructions they contain, yet as it was of the last importance that I should be completely master of the fubject before I faw the French Minister, I delayed afking for a conference till late on Friday evening, with a view that it should not take place till Saturday morning.

He appointed the hour of eleven A.M. on that day, and it was near one before we parted. Although what is faid by M. DELACROIX before

796.] State Papers relative to the late Negociation with France.

he has communicated with the Directory cannot be confidered as officially binding, and probably may, in the event, be very different from what I fhall hear when he speaks to me in their mame, yet as it is impoffible they should not nearly conjecture the nature of the overtures I fhould make, and of course be prepared in fome degree for them, it is material that your Lordfhip should be accurately acquainted with the first impreffions they appear to make on M. DELA

CROIX.

pe

I prefaced what I had to communicate with faying, that I now came authorized to enter with him into a deliberation upon one of the most important fubjects that perhaps ever was brought into difcuffion-that its magnitude forbade all fineffe, excluded all prevarication, fufpended all prejudices, and that as I had it in command to Ipeak and act with freedom and truth, I expect ed that he, on his part, would consider these as the only means which could or ought to be employed, if he wished to fee a Negotiation, in which the happiness of millions was involved, terminate fuccefsfully. That, for greater precifion, and with a view to be clearly understood in what I was about to propose, I would give him a Confidential Memorial, accompanied by an Official Note, both of which, when he had rufed them, would speak for themselves. The Memorial contained the conditions, on the accomplishment of which His MAJESTY CONfidered the restoration of Peace to depend. The Note was expreflive of HIS MAJESTY's readinefs to enter into any explanation required by the Directory on the fubject, or to receive any Contre-projet, refting on the fame bafis, which the Directory might be difpofed to give in. That, moreover, I did not hesitate declaring to him, in conformity to the principles which I had laid down, and from which I certainly never fhould depart, at any period of the Negociation, that I was prepared to answer any queftions, explain and elucidate any points, on which it was poffible to forelee that doubts or mifconceptions could arife on the confideration of thefe Papers.

And having faid thus much, I had only to remark, that I believed, in no fimilar Negociation which had ever taken place, any Minister was authorited, in the first inftance, to go fo fully into the difcuffion as I now was That I was fure neither the truth of this remark, nor the manifeft conclufion to be drawn from it, would escape M. DELACROIX'S observation.

I then put the two Papers into his hands. He began by reading the Note, on which of courfe he could only exprefs fatisfaction. After perufing the Confidential Memorial with all the atrention it deserved, he, after a fhort pause, faid, that it appeared to him to be liable to infurmountable objections; that it seemed to him to require much more than it conceded, and, in the event, not to leave France in a fituation of proportional greatnefs to the Powers of Europe. He faid, the A& of their Conftitution, according to the manner in which it was interpreted by the best Publicifts (and this phrafe is worthy remark) made it impoflible for the Republic to do what we required. The Audrian Netherlands were annexed to it; they

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could not be difpofed of withour flinging the Nation into all the confufion which must follow a convocation of the Primary Affemblies; and, he faid, he was rather furprised that Great Britain fhould bring this forward as the governing condition of the Treaty, fince he thought he had, in fome of our late converfations, fully explained the nature of their Conftitution to me. 1 replied, that every thing I had heard from him on this point was perfectly in my recollection, as it probably was in his, that though I had listened to him with that attention I always afforded to every thing he faid, yet I had never made him any fort of reply, and had neither admitted nor controverted his opinion: that although I believed I could easily difprove this opinion, from the fpirit of the French Conftitution itself, yet the difcuffion of that Conftitution was perictly foreign to the object of my miffion; fince, even allowing his two pofitions, viz. that the retroceffion of the Auftrian Netherlands was incompatible with their Laws, and that we ought to have known that beforehand; yet, that there exifted a droit public in Europe, paramount to any doit public they might think proper to eftablish within their own Dominions; and that if their Conftitution was publicly known, the Treaties exifting between His MAJESTY and the EMPEROR were at least equally public, and in thefe it was clearly and distinctly enounc ed, that the Two Contracting Parties reciprocally promise not to lay down their arms without the reftitution of all the Dominions, Territories, &c. which may have belonged to either of them before the War. That the date of this

ftipulation was previous to their annexing the Auftrian Netherlands to France; and the notoriety of this ought, at the very moment when they had paffed that Law, to have convinced them, that, if adhered to, it must prove an infurmountable obftacle to Peace. I applied his maxim to the Weft India lands, and to the Settlements in the Eaft Indies; and afked him Whether it was expected that we were to wave our right of poffeffion, and be required ftill to confider them as integral parts of the French Republic which must be restored, and on which no value was to be fet in the balance of Compenfation? I alfo ftated the poffible cafe of France having loft part of what the deemed her integral Dominions, instead of having added to them in the courfe of the War? and whether” then, under the apprehenfion of till greater loffes, the Government, as it was now compofed, fhould confider itself as not vefted with powers fufficient to fave their Country from the impending danger, by making Peace on the conditions of facrificing a portion of their Dominions to fave the remainder? M. DELACROIX faid, this was stating a cafe of neceffity, and fuch a mode of reasoning did not attach to the prefent circumstances. I readily admitted the first part of this propofition, but contended, that if the power exifted in a cafe of neceffity, it equally existed in all others, and particularly in the cafe before us, fince he himself had repeatedly told me that Peace was what this Country and its Government wifhed for, and even wanted.

M.

M. DELACROIX, in reply, shifted his ground, and by a string of arguments founded on premises calculated for this purpofe, attempted to prove, that from the relative fituation of the adjacent Countries, the prefent Government of France would be reprehenfible in the extreme, and deferve impeachment, if they ever fuffered the Netherlands to be feparated from their Dominions; that by the Partition of Poland, Ruffia, Auftria, and Pruffia, had increased their power to a most formidable degree: that England, by its Conquefts, and by the activity and judgment with which it governed its Colonies, had doubled its ftrength.-Your Indian Empire alone, faid M. DELACROIX with vehemence, has enabled you to fubfidize all the Powers of Europe against us, and your monopoly of trade has put you in poffefion of a fund of inexhauftible wealth. His words were, Votre Empire dans Indie vous a fourni les Moyens de falarier toutes les Puiffances contre nous, et vous avez accaparé le Commerce de Manière que toutes les Richefes du Monde fe verfent dans vos Coffres."

From the neceffity that France fhould keep the Netherlands and the Left Bank of the Rhine for the purpose of preserving its relative fituation in Europe, he paffed to the advantages which, he contended, would refult to the other Powers by fuch an addition to the French Dominions. Belgium (to ufe his words) by belonging to France, would remove what had been the fource of all Wars for two centuries paft, and the Rhine, being the natural boundary of France, would enfure the tranquillity of Europe for two centuries to come. I did not feel it neceffary to combat this prepofterous doctrine; I contented myfelf with reminding him of what he had faid to me in one of our laft conferences, when he made a comparison of the weakness of France under its Monarchs, and its ftrength and vigour under its Republican Form of Government: "Nous ne fommes plus dans la Décrépitude de la France monarchique, mais dans toute la Force d'une République adolefcente," was his expreffion and I inferred from this, according to his own reafoning, that the force and power France had acquired by its change of Government, was much greater than it could derive from any acquifition of Territory; and that it followed, if France, when under a Regal Form of Government, was a very juft and conftant object of attention, not to fay of jealousy, to the others Powers of Europe, France (admitting his axiom) was a much more reasonable object of jealoufy and attention under its prefent Conftitution than it ever had yet been, and that no addition to its Dominions could be feen by its neighbours, but under impreffions of alarm for their own future fafety, and for the general tranquillity of Europe, M. DELACROIX's Anfwer to this was fo remarkable, that I must beg leave to infert it in what I believe to be nearly his own words :"Dans le Tems Révolutionnaire tout ce que vous dites, Milord, étoit vrairien n'égaloit notre Puiffance; mais ce tems n'exifle plus. Nous ne pouvons plus lever la Nation en masse pour voler au fecours de la Patrie en danger. Nous ne pouarons plus engager nos Concitoyens d'ouvrir leurs Bourfes pour les vorfer dans le Tréfor Nationale,

et de fe priver même du nécessaire pour le bien de la chofe Publique." And he ended by saying, that the French Republic, when at Peace, neceffarily must become the moft quiet and pacific Power in Europe. I only obferved, that in this cafe the paffage of the Republic from youth to decrepitude had been very fudden; but that ftill I never could admit, that it could be a matter of indifference to its neighbours, much less one neceffary fecurity to itself, to acquire fuch a very extenfive addition to its Frontiers as that he had hinted at.

This led Monf. DELACROIX to talk of offering an equivalent to the EMPEROR for the Austrian Netherlands; and it was to be found, according to his plan, in the fecularization of the three Ecclefiaftical Electorates, and feveral Bifhoprics in Germany and in Italy.

He talked upon this fubject as one very familiar to him, and on which his thoughts had been frequently employed.

He spoke of making new Electors, and named, probably with a view to render his scheme more palatable, the STADTHOLDER and the Dukes of BRUNSWIC and WURTEMBURG, as perfons proper to replace the three Ecclefiaftical Electors who were to be reformed.

It would be making an ill ufe of your Lordfhip's time, to endeavour to repeat to you all he faid on this fubject; it went in fubftance (as he himself confeffed) to the total fubverfion of the prefent conftitution of the Gerhanic Body; and as it militated directly against the principle which both His MAJESTY and the EMPEROR laid down fo diftinctly as the bafis of the Peace to be made for the Empire, I contented myself with reminding him of this circumftance, particularly as it is impoffible to difcufs this point with any propriety, till His IMPERIAL MAJESTY becomes a party to the Negociation. I took this opportunity of hinting, that if on all the other points France agreed to the propofals now made, it would not be impoffible that fome increase of Territory might be ceded to her on the Germanic fide of her Frontiers, and that this, in addition to the Duchy of Savoy, Nice, and Avignon, would be a very great acquifition of ftrength and power. Monf. DELACROIX here again reverted to the Constitution, and faid, that thefe Countries were already conftitutionally annexed to France. I replied, that it was impoffible, in the Negociation which we were beginning, for the other Powers to take it up from any period but that which immediately preceded the War, and that any acquifition or diminution of Territory which had taken place among the Belligerent Powers fince it firft broke out, muft neceffarily become fubject matter for Negociation, and be balanced : against each other, in the final arrangement of a General Peace. "You then perfift," faid M. DELACROIX, "in applying this principle to Belgium?" I answered, "Moft certainly; and I fhould not deal fairly with you, if I hesitated to declare, in the outlet of our Negociation, that on this point you must en

tertain

$796.] State Papers relative to the late Negociation with Francë.

tertain no expectation that His MAJESTY will relax, or ever confent to fee the Netherlands remain a part of France."

M. DELACROIX replied, he faw no profpect in this cafe of our ideas ever meeting, and he defpaired of the fuccefs of our Negociation. He returned again, however, to his idea of a poffible equivalent to be found for the EMPEROR; but as all he propofed was the alienation or difmemberment of Countries not belonging to France, even by Conqueft, I did not confider it as deferving attention, and it is certainly not worth repeating to your Lordship.

I need not observe, that all the Equivalents propofed, however inadequate to the exchange, were offered as a return for our confent that the Netherlands fhould remain part of France; of courfe, the admitting them in any fhape, would have been in direct contradiction to my Inftructions.

M. DELACROIX touched very flightly on Italy; and the courfe of our converfation did not bring this part of the fubject more into difcuffion.

I must add, that whenever I mentioned the restoration of the Netherlands to the EMPEROR, I always took care it fhould be undertood that thefe were to be accompanied by fuch further ceffions as fhould form a cómpetent line of defence, and that France could not be permitted to keep poffeffion of all the intermediate Country to the Rhine; and I particularly dwelt on this point, when I held out the poffibility of admitting an extenfion of the limits of France on the fide of Germany. But as the French Minifter no lefs Arenuously oppofed the reftitution of the Netherlands to the EMPEROR, than I tenacioufly infifted upon it, the further extenfion of my claim could not of courfe become a fubject of argument,

I believe I have now, with a tolerable degree of accuracy, informed your Lordship of all that the French Minifter faid on my opening myfelf to him on that part of my Inftructions which more immediately relates to Peace between Great Britain, His IMPERIAL MAJESTY, and France. It remains with me to inform your Lordships what paffed between us on the fubject of our refpective Allies.

On the articles referving a right to the Court of St. Petersburgh, and to that of Lifbon, to accede to the Treaty of Peace on the firict Status ante Bellum, the French Minifter made no other remark than by mentioning the Allies of the Republic, and by enquiring whether I was prepared to fay any thing relative to their interefts, which certainly the Republic could never abandon. This afforded me the opportunity of giving in the confidential Memorial B. relative to Spain and Holland, and I prefaced it by repeating to him the fubflance of the first part of your Lordship's No. 12.

Although I had touched upon the fubject of the Spanish part of St. Domingo, when I MONTHLY MAO. No. XI.

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had been speaking to M. DELACROIX on the Peace with France, yet, as it did not become. a matter of difcuffion between us till I came to mention the peace with Spain, I thought it better to place all that paffed on the subject in this part of my Difpatch: it was the only point on which he entered; but I by: no means infer from his not bringing forward · fome claims for Spain, that we are not to hear of any in the courfe of the Negociation; on the contrary, I have little doubt that many,* and most of them inadmiffible, will be made before it can end. He, however, was filent on them at this moment, and confined all ho. had to fay to combating the idea that Spain: was bound by the Treaty of Utrecht not tax alienate her Poffeffions in America.-I had the Article copied in my pocket, and I read, it to him. He confeffed it was clear and ex-. plicit, but that circumftances had fo material-/ ly altered fince the year 1713, that engagements made then ought not to be confidered as in force now. I faid, that the fpirit: of the Article itself went to provide for diftant Contingencies, not for what was expected to happen at or near the time when the Treaty was made; and that it was because the alteration of circumstances he alluded to was foreseen as poffible, that the claufe was inferted; and that if Spain paid any regard to the faith of Treaties, the must confider herself as no lefs ftrictly bound by this clause now, than at the moment when it was drawn up. I went on by faying, that it did not, however, appear quite impoffible that this point might be fettled without much difficulty; and that means might be devifed that His CATHOLIC MAJESTY fhould not break his faith, and both England and France be equally fatisfied. I then held out to him, but in general terms, that either Spain might regain her part of St. Domingo, by making fome confiderable ceffion to Great Britain and France, as the price of Peace, or that, in return for leaving the whole of St. Domingo to France, we should retain either Martinico, or St. Lucia and Tobago. M. DELACROIX liftened with a degree of attention to thefe propofals, but he was fearful of committing himself by any expreffion of approbation; and he difmiffed the fubject of the Court of Madrid, by obferving, that France never would forfake the interests of its Allies.

Our converfation on thofe of its other Ally, Holland, was much longer, as the wording of the Memorial inevitably led at once deep into the fubject.

M. DELACROIX affected to treat any deviation from the Treaty of Peace concluded be tween France and that Country, or any reftoration of Territories acquired under that Treaty to France, as quite impracticable. He treated as equally impracticable any attempt. at reftoring the Ancient Form of Government in the Seven United Provinces. He talked with an air of triumph of the establishment of a National Convention at the Hague, and with an affectation of feeling, that by it the

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