LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 1;
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Alaska. Jury trial, sec. 171 of Code, 31 Stat. 358 (see Constitutional Law,
10). Rassmussen v. United States, 516.
California. Taxation (see Taxation, 4). San Francisco National Bank
v. Dodge, 70.
District of Columbia. Code, section 939 (see Criminal Law, 3). United
States v. Cadarr, 475.
Hawaii. Judiciary statutes of 1892 and Organic Act of 1900 (see Courts,
1). Carter v. Gear, 348.
Massachusetts. Compulsory vaccination law (see Constitutional Law, 12).
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 11.
Nebraska. Riparian rights (see Public Lands, 4). Whitaker v. McBride,
New York. (See Streets and Highways). Muhlker v. New York & Harlem
R. Co., 544. Foreign corporations (see Jurisdiction, B 2): Lumber-
men's Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 407.
Ohio. Constitutional provision relative to individual liability of stockholders.
Article XIII, § 3, of the constitution of Ohio of 1851, providing that
dues from corporations be secured by individual liability of the stock-
holders as may be prescribed by law to a further sum over and above
their stock at least equal to the amount of such stock, is not so far
self-executing that it may be enforced outside of the jurisdiction of
that State without compliance with the requirements of the state
statute fixing the amount of the liability and the method of enforcing
it. Middletown National Bank v. Railway Co., 394.
Corporations; remedy against stockholders under section 3260 Rev. Stat.,
Ohio. Under § 3260, Rev. Stat., Ohio, the remedy must be pursued in
the courts of that State and a creditor, who has not commenced any ac-
tion in the Ohio courts, cannot obtain the relief given by the statute,
in the Circuit Court of the United States in another State, against
stockholders resident therein. Ib.
Texas. Anti-trust act of 1895. The Supreme Court of Texas having con-
strued the act of 1895 as invalid, so far as it was discriminatory by
excepting from its operation combinations of agriculturists and or-
ganized laborers and fell within the terms of Connolly v. Union Sewer
Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, and sustained the act in other respects, and
having also held that the act of 1899 although cumulative did not
continue the invalid discriminatory provisions of the act of 1895, this
court follows the state court in holding that under the laws of Texas,
as they now exist, combinations described in the Anti-trust Laws are
forbidden and penalized whether by agriculturists, organized laborers
or others, and there is therefore no discrimination against oil com-
panies, and the latter are not deprived of the equal protection of the
laws. National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 115.
Anti-trust acts of 1889, 1895 and 1899 (see Constitutional Law, 3).
National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 115.
Washington. Limitation of actions (see Statute of Limitations, 3).
McClaine v. Rankin, 154.
See JURISDICTION, A 3; B 3.
1. Relinquishment of rights of location; subsequent rights of party relinquish-
ing.
Where an attempted mineral location is a failure by reason of a lack of
discovery and all rights have been conveyed to a third party who
formally relinquishes them, the land is again open to location and the
party so relinquishing may locate it and become entitled thereto by
subsequent discovery, and otherwise complying with the law, without
waiting until the relinquished location lapsed by failure to do the
annual work required by statute. Chrisman v. Miller, 313.
2. Sufficiency of discovery.
In controversies between two mineral claimants the rule as to sufficiency
of discovery is more liberal than it is in controversies between a mineral
claimant and an agricultural entryman, as in the latter the land is
sought to be withdrawn from the category of agricultural lands, while
in the former the question is merely one of priority. While the statute
does not prescribe what is necessary to constitute a discovery under
the mining laws of the United States, it is essential that it gives reason-
able evidence of the fact either that there is a vein or lode carrying
precious minerals, or if it be claimed as placer ground that it is valuable
for such mining; and where there is not enough in what a locator
claims to have seen to justify a prudent person in the expenditure of
money and labor in exploitation this court will not overthrow a finding
of the lower court that there was no discovery. Ib.
See COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1.
NATIONAL BANKS.
See STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 1, 2;
TAXATION, 4.
1. Regulations of 1865, paragraph 1205 construed as to what constitutes bar
to further proceedings.
An officer in the Navy failing to report at the time ordered, while his vessel
was in Japanese waters, in 1865, was placed under arrest for drunken-
ness and neglect of duty; later, on the same day he was, by order of the
rear admiral, restored to duty to await an opportunity to investigate
the case. Subsequently the rear admiral convened a court-martial
consisting of seven officers all of equal or superior rank to accused
who was served with charges and arrested, arraigned and tried, found
guilty and dismissed. Accused stated he had no objections to any of
the court and knew of no reason why it should not proceed with his
trial. Subsequently in a suit for salary on ground of illegal dismissal
he claimed the first arrest was an expiation of the offense and bar;
that the court was invalid and incompetent and the sentence invalid
not having been approved by the rear admiral or the President. Held,
that par. 1205, Naval Regulations of 1865, providing that the arrest
and discharge of a person in the Navy for an offense shall be a bar to
further martial proceedings against him for that offense, does not apply
to an arrest and temporary confinement not intended as a punish-
ment but as a reasonable precaution for the maintenance of good order
and discipline aboard. Bishop v. United States, 334.
2. Service of charges-Arrest within meaning of law of 1800 and Naval
Regulations of 1865.
Under Article 38 of the law of April 23, 1800, 2 Stat. 50, and Par. 1202,
Naval Regulations of 1865, the provision as to service of charges upon
the accused at the time, that he is put under arrest refers not to the
temporary arrest necessary for order and discipline at the time of the
commission of the offense but to the subsequent arrest for trial by
court-martial. Ib.
3. Service of charges-Arrest within meaning of Article 43 of Section 1624,
Rev. Stat.
The word "arrest" as employed in Article 43 of § 1624, Rev. Stat., re-
quiring service of the charge on which the accused is to be tried by
court-martial, does not relate to the preliminary arrest or detention
of an accused person awaiting the action of higher authority to frame
charges and specifications and order a court-martial, but to the arrest
resulting from preferring the charges by the proper authority, and the
convening of a court-martial. United States v. Smith, 386.
4. Court-martial-Personnel of court; waiver of objection to.
It is a question for the officer convening the court to determine whether
more officers could be convened without injury to the service and his
action in this respect cannot be attacked collaterally, and if the ac-
cused expresses satisfaction with the court-martial as constituted, it
is a clear waiver of any objection to its personnel. Bishop v. United
States, 334.
5. Court-martial-Confirmation of sentence by officer convening court.
Under Articles 19 and 20 of the act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 605, the rear
admiral convening the court-martial was not obliged to confirm the
sentence of dismissal. Ib.
6. Court-martial-Sentence; approval by President; sufficiency of showing.
The approval by the President sufficiently appears where the record shows
that the sentence was submitted to the President and his approval
appears at the foot of a brief in the case and the Secretary of the Navy
writes to the accused that the President has approved the sentence. Ib.
7. Court-martial; power to convene-Article 38 of section 1624, Rev. Stat.,
applicable where.
The provision in Article 38 of § 1624, Rev. Stat., that no commander of a
fleet or squadron shall convene a general court-martial without ex-
press authority from the President was enacted in 1862 and will be
construed as intending to apply to waters within the continental limits
of the United States, and not to waters in the territory beyond the seas
acquired since the passage of that act, and the acquisition whereof was
not contemplated at that time. United States v. Smith, 386.
NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 2.
NORTHERN SECURITIES CASE.
See CASES EXPLAINED;
COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT CF TRADE;
CONTRACTS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5;
JURISDICTION, B 1.
PATENT FOR LAND.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 1.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8, 9;
1. Insurrection after treaty of peace; effect upon status of islands.
After the title to the Philippine Islands passed to the United States by the
exchange of ratifications of the treaty of peace, there was nothing in
the Philippine insurrection of sufficient gravity to give to the islands
the character of foreign countries within the meaning of a tariff act
(Fourteen Diamond Rings, 183 U. S. 176). Lincoln v. United States,
419.
2. Executive order of July 12, 1898, relative to duties on imports.
The order of the President of July 12, 1898, directing the levying of duties
on goods landed in the Philippine Islands, was a regulation for and
during the then existing war with Spain, referred to as definitely as if
it had been named, and was not a power for any other military occa-
sion. The right to levy duties thereunder on goods brought from the
United States ceased on the termination of the war by the exchange
of ratifications of the treaty of peace with Spain on April 11, 1899
(Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222). Ib.
3. Ratification by Congress of Executive order; scope of, as to collection of
duties.
Under the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, 32 Stat. 691, ratifying the action
of the President and the authorities of the government of the Philip-
pine Islands, the ratification is confined to those acts which were in
accordance with the provisions of the order of July 12, 1898, and not
to the collection of duties after April 11, 1899, which were within such
provisions. Ib.
See CLAIMS AGAINST UNITED STATES;
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.
1. Public health regulations-Constitutionality of execution of police power.
The drainage of a city in the interest of the public health and welfare is one
of the most important purposes for which the police power can be
exercised. Every reason of public policy requires that grants in the
sub-surface of streets shall be held subject to such regulation as the
public health and safety may require. Uncompensated obedience to
a regulation enacted for the public safety under the police power of
the State is not a taking of property without due compensation. Un-
der the facts of this case, the changing of the location of gas pipes at
the expense of the Gas Company to accommodate a system of drainage,
which has been upheld by the state court as an execution of the police
power of the State, does not amount to a deprivation of property with-
out due process of law. New Orleans Gas Co. v. Drainage Commis-
sion, 453.
2. Relation of state to Federal Government—Regulation of sale of intoxicants
--Federal license not an attempted exercise of police power.
In the United States there is a dual system of government, National and
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