CIVIL RIGHTS, sections 1990, 5526, Rev. Stat. (see Constitutional Law, 8):
Clyatt v. United States, 207.
COMMERCE, 24 Stat. at L. 379, chap. 104, U. S. Comp, Stat. 1901, p. 3154
(see Jurisdiction, B 3): Knapp v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry.
Co., 530.
CUSTOMS, Act of Aug. 27, 1898, 28 Stat. 509, 552, proviso of section 25
(see Customs Duties, 1): United States v. Whitridge, 135. Rev. Stat.
sections 2550, 2551 (see Public Officers): Bartlett v. United States, 230.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Code of 1901, section 939; Rev. Stat. section 1044
(see Criminal Law 3), United States v. Cadarr, 475: Act of June 16,
1880, 21 Stat. 284, (see Claims Against the United States), District of
Columbia v. Barnes, 146.
EXTRADITION, Rev. Stat. section 5278 (see Extradition, 2): Maller of
Strauss, 324.
FOREIGN RELATIONS, Rev. Stat. section 4079-4081 (see Treaties, 1): Dalle-
magne v. Moisan, 169.
HAWAU, Organic Act of April 30, 1900, 31 Stat. 141, 157 (see Courts, 1):
Carter v. Gear, 348.
IMMIGRATION, Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1084, section 10 (see Immi-
gration): Hackfeld & Co. v. United States, 442.
INDIANS, Acts of February 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388, and January 30, 1897,
29 Stat. 506 (see Indians, 2, 3): Matter of Heff, 488.
JUDICIARY, Rev. Stat. § 709 (see Jurisdiction, A 5): McMillen v. Ferrum
Mining Co., 343. Act of February 9, 1893 establishing Court of
Appeals of District of Columbia (see Jurisdiction, A 3): Massachusetts,
Petitioner, 482.
NATIONAL BANKS, Rev. Stat. section 5219 (see Taxation, 4): San Fran-
cisco National Bank v. Dodg", 70.
NAVY, Law of April 23, 1800, article 38, 2 Stat. 50; Act of July 17, 1862,
12 Stat. 605, articles 19, 20 (see Navy, 2, 5): Bishop v. United States,
334. Rev. Stat. section 1624, articles 43, 38 (see Navy, 3, 7): United
States v. Smith, 386.
NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY, Act of April 28, 1904 (see Public Lands, 2):
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Ely, 1.
OKLAHOMA, Act of 1896, 29 Stat. 113 (see Public Lands, 7): Greer County
v. Texas, 235.
PHILIPPINES, Act of July 1, 1902, 32 Stat. 691 (see Philippine Islands, 3):
Lincoln v. United States, 419.
PUBLIC LANDS, Rev. Stat. section 2326 (see Jurisdiction, A 6): McMillen
v. Ferrum Mining Co., 343.
PUBLIC MONEYS, Rev. Stat. sections 3657, 3658 (see Public Officers):
Bartlett v. United States, 230.
ADVERSE POSSESSION.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 2.
Pay of officers for services in Porto Rico, etc., under acts of 1900 and 1901.
The ten per cent increase over and above pay proper allowed to an officer
of the United States Army for service in Porto Rico, Cuba, Philippine
Islands, Hawaii and Alaska, under the act of May 26, 1900, 31 Stat. 211,
and beyond the limits of the States comprising the Union and Terri-
tories contiguous thereto under the act of March 2, 1901, 31 Stat. 903,
is to be computed upon the total amount to which the officer is entitled
at the time of such service both for longevity pay and the pay provided
for by 1261, Rev. Stat. United States v. Mills, 223.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2;
ASSESSMENT.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4.
See STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 1, 2;
1. Preference: surrender within meaning of act of 1898 may be either com-
pelled or voluntary.
The word "surrender," as generally defined, may denote either compelled
or voluntary action. In § 57g of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, pro-
viding that the claims of creditors who have received preferences shall
not be allowed unless such creditors shall surrender their preferences,
it is unqualified and generic and hence embraces both meanings. A
penalty is not to be readily implied and a person subjected thereto
unless the words of the statute plainly impose it, and courts will not
construe the provision so as to cause the word "surrender," as used
in § 57g of the Bankruptcy Act, to embrace only voluntary action and
thus read into the statute a qualification conflicting with equality of
creditors and also creating a penalty not expressly or by implication
found in the statute. Such a construction would create a penalty by
judicial action alone and would also necessitate judicial legislation in
order to define the character and degree of compulsion essential to
prevent the surrender in fact from being a surrender within the mean-
ing of the section. Keppel v. Tiffin Savings Bank, 356.
2. Proof of claim; effect upon, of retention of preference until compelled sur-
render.
The creditor of a bankrupt, who has received a merely voidable preference,
and who has in good faith retained such preference until deprived
thereof by the judgment of a court upon a suit of the trustee, can
thereafter prove the debt so voidably preferred. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4.
Sufficiency; effect of absence of affirmative recital that bill contains all the
testimony.
Where the bill of exceptions, after referring to the empanelling of the jury,
contains recitals that the plaintiff produced witnesses, followed in each
case by the testimony of the witness at the close of all of which there
were further recitals that the parties rested, these statements are suffi-
cient, even in the absence of a technical affirmative recital to that
effect, to show that the bill of exceptions contains all the testimony,
and defendant is not to be deprived of a full consideration of the
question of his guilt by such omission; and even in the absence of a
motion to instruct the jury to find for the defendant this court may
examine the question where it is plain that error has been committed.
Clyatt v. United States, 207.
BOUNDARIES.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 6.
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Townsend, 190 U. S. 267, affirmed by
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Ely, 1.
Northern Securities case, 193 U. S. 197. The decree of the Circuit Court
in the Northern Securities case, affirmed by this court, 193 U. S. 197,
did not determine the quality of the transfer as between the defend-
ants, and the provisions therein as to return of shares of stock trans-
ferred to it by the railway stockholders were permissive only, and not
an adjudication that any of the vendors were entitled to a restitution
of their original railway shares. The judgment of this court affirming
the decree of the Circuit Court in the Northern Securities case went no
further than the decree itself, and while it leaves the Circuit Court at
liberty to proceed in the execution of its decree as circumstances may
require, it does not operate to change the decree or import a power to
do so not otherwise possessed. Nothing in the judgment or opinion
of this court in the Northern Securities case, 193 U. S. 197, enlarged
the scope of the decree of the Circuit Court so as to make it an adjudi-
cation that any of the vendors of railway stocks were entitled to
judicial restitution of the stocks transferred by them to the Securities
Company, or that the Securities Company could not distribute the
shares of railway stock held by it pro rata between its own shareholders.
Harriman v. Northern Securities Co., 244.
United States v. Texas, 162 U. S. 1, explained in Greer County v. Texas, 235.
Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222, followed in Lincoln v. United States,
419.
Fourteen Diamond Rings, 183 U. S. 176, followed in Lincoln v. United
States, 419.
Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, followed in Whitaker v. McBride, 510.
National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U. S. 115, followed in Southern Cotton
Oil Co. v. Texas, 134.
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Ely, 197 U. S. 1, and Northern Pacific
Railway Co. v. Townsend, 190 U. S. 267, followed in Northern Pacific
Railway Co. v. Hasse, 9.
To Circuit Court of Appeals where that court practically disposes of entire case.
Where the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals in an action in equity,
only reverses an order of the Circuit Court granting an injunction,
but the court, the record presenting the whole case, practically dis-
poses of the entire controversy on the merits, certiorari may ́issue
from this court and this court may finally dispose of it by its direction
to the Circuit Court. Harriman v. Northern Securities Co., 244.
CITIZENSHIP.
See INDIANS, 2;
JURISDICTION, B 1.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
District of Columbia Act of 1880 construed-Jurisdiction of Court of Claims.
The intent of the District of Columbia Act of June 16, 1880, 21 Stat. 284,
was to enable parties to submit the justice of their claims against the
United States for work done in the District prior to March 14, 1876, to
adjudication in a competent court, and for that purpose the jurisdic-
tion conferred was equitable as well as legal; under the equitable
jurisdiction so conferred the Court of Claims has power to reform a
written contract between the District of Columbia and a claimant to
supply therein what was omitted by mutual mistake of the parties,
and to award money relief to the claimant on the contract as so re-
formed. It was also the intention of the act of June 16, 1880, to
permit the Court of Claims to adjudicate claims for all work done by
order and direction of the Commissioners and accepted by them for the
use and benefit of the District of Columbia; for this purpose the statute
is remedial, and a claimant, if the facts support his claim, can recover
for work so done and accepted notwithstanding it was under verbal
directions of the Commissioners and not under written contract as
required by prior acts of Congress. The main purpose of the Court
of Claims is to arrive at and adjudicate the justice of alleged claims
against the United States, and the court is not bound by special rules
of pleading. District of Columbia v. Barnes, 146.
COLLATERAL ATTACK.
See NAVY, 4;
PUBLIC LANDS, 5.
COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
1. Compliance with decree in Northern Securities case.
The Northern Pacific system taken in connection with the Burlington
system is competitive with the Union Pacific system, and the entire
record considered, to deliver to the complainants, the Northern Pacific
stock claimed by them and distribute the balance of the stock ratably
between the other Securities Company stockholders, would not only be
inequitable but would tend to smother competition and thus contra-
vene the object of the Sherman law and the purposes of the suit brought
by the Government against the Northern Securities Company. It
was the duty of the Securities Company under the decree in the Gov-
ernment suit to end a situation which had been adjudged unlawful,
and as this could be effected by sale and distribution in cash, or by dis-
tribution in kind, the company was justified in adopting the latter
method and avoiding the forced sale of several hundred million dollars
of stock which would have involved disastrous results. Harriman v.
Northern Securities Co., 244.
The idea of monopoly is not now confined to a grant of privileges but is
understood to include a condition produced by the acts of individuals
and the suppression of competition by unification of interest or manage-
ment or through agreement and concert of action. It is the power to
control prices which makes both the inducement to make such com-
binations and the concern of the law to prohibit them. National
Cotton Oil Co. v. Teras, 115.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3;
LOCAL LAW (TEX.).
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