he was held not to be entitled to any costs. It was held, also, that the 18th and 19th sections of the Con. Stats. U. C., chap. 126, taken together must be limited "to any such action" not provided for in section 17 of the same Act. It was held, also, that no one can have costs taxed to him who did not incur costs. Haacke v. Adamson, 10 U. C., L. J., 270.

When a magistrate commits a party for contempt, and on action brought for false imprisonment the plaintiff succeeds, he is entitled to full costs without a certificate. Armour v. Boswell, 6 O. S., 450.

SUMMARY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF CANADA.

ABANDONING CHILD.

(See CHILD.)

ABDUCTION.

The Statute 32 & 33 Vic., chap. 20, ss. 54, 55, embraces three classes of cases :-(1) Where a woman of any age, possessed of property, is from motives of lucre taken away or detained against her will, with intent to marry or carnally know her, or to cause her to be married or carnally known by any other person; (2) Where a woman under the age of twenty-one years is fraudulently allured out of the possession and against the will of her father, or of any other person having the lawful care or charge of her, with intent to marry or carnally know her, or to cause her to be married or carnally known by any other person; (3) Where a woman of any age is taken away and detained by force and against her will, with intent to marry or carnally know her, or to cause her to be married or carnally known by any other person.

It will be observed that the statute applies whether the prisoner's intention is to marry the woman himself, or to assist any other person to do so.

It would seem that it is necessary in the second case above put, that the woman should be possessed of property as in the first case, and in neither of these cases will the offender take any interest in such property.

The alleged wife is in all these cases a competent witness against the prisoner. R v. Wakefield, 1 Lew., 279.

In the second case it will be observed that the woman must be taken out of the possession of her father. This involves both a taking and also a possession by the father.

If the girl leaves without any inducement on the part of the

defendant, and then goes to him, he is not within the statute. R. v. Olifier, 10 Cox, 402. Neither is he within the statute if it does not appear that he knew or had reason to believe that the girl was under the lawful care or charge of her father or mother, or any other person. R. v. Hibbert, L.R., 1 C.C.R., 184.

Of course mere absence for a temporary purpose, and with intention of returning, does not interrupt the possession of the father. It is no defence that the defendant did not know her to be under sixteen, or might suppose from her appearance that she was older, or even that he believed that he knew she was over that age. R. v. Prince, L. R., 2 C.C.R., 154. A taking by force is not necessary to constitute the offence. It is immaterial whether there be any corrupt motive, whether the girl consent, and whether the defendant be a male or female. R. v. Hawley, 1 F. & F., 648.

The expression,“ taking out of the possession," means taking the girl to some place where the person in whose charge she is cannot exercise control over her, for some purpose inconsistent with the object of such control; a taking for a time only may amount to abduction. If the consent of the person from whose possession the girl is taken is obtained by fraud, the taking is deemed to be against the will of such person. R. v. Prince, L. R., 2 C.C.R,. 154.

An information under the 56th section of this statute which does not show that the unmarried girl is under sixteen years of age, and is taken out of the possession of and against the will of the father is insufficient. Whittier v. Diblee, 2 Pugsley, 243.

Under this 56th section, the girl must be in the posession of some person having the lawful care or charge of her, but if such exist, the consent of the girl to go away will not be a defence for the prisoner. A guardian is a person having the lawful care, &c., within the meaning of the statute, and it is not necessary to prove a strict guardianship. If the girl leave her guardian's house for a particular purpose with his sanction, and with the intention of returning, she does not cease to be in his possession within the meaning of the statute. There must be proof of the age of the girl, but the girl herself and her father or mother are competent to prove this. A certificate is not necessary, at all events where

the prisoner undertakes to establish that the girl was not baptized. R. v. Mondelet, 21 L. C. J., 154.

ABORTION.

Under the 32 & 33 Vic., chap. 20, ss. 59, 60, three classes of persons may be guilty of crimes under this heading. The woman herself, the person who procures or supplies the drugs, &c., some other person.

For a woman being with child, with intent to procure her own miscarriage, to administer to herself any poison or other noxious drug, or to use any instrument or other means, or for any person to do the same with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether she be with child or not, is felony.

For any person to procure or supply poison or other noxious thing, or any instrument or other thing, knowing that the same is intended to be unlawfully used with intent to procure the miscarriage of a woman, is a misdemeanor.

Under the 40 Vic., chap. 28 administering poison, &c., with intent to commit murder, is felony.

If A procures poison and delivers it to B, both intending that B should take it for the purpose of procuring abortion, and B afterwards takes it with that intent in the absence of A, the latter may be convicted of causing it to be taken, under the 59th section of the 32 & 33 Vic., chap. 20. R. v. Wilson, 1 Dears. & B., 127.

The prisoner gave a woman savin and also directions how to take it. The woman took the savin accordingly. The prisoner also made up into pills a drug which the woman had obtained at the prisoner's request. After taking the savin and pills, the woman became and continued very ill until she was confined. It was held that this was a causing to be taken within the section. R. v. Farron, 1 Dears. & B., 164.

A woman became pregnant by the prisoner, and died from the effects of corrosive sublimate taken by her for the purpose of procuring abortion. The prisoner knowingly procured it for the deceased at her instigation, and under the influence of her threat of self-destruction if the means of procuring abortion were not

supplied to her, it was held that the prisoner was not guilty of murder as an accessory before the fact. R. v. Fretwell, 9 Cox C. C., 152.

The thing supplied must be proved to be noxious, the supplying an innoxious drug, whatever may be the intent of the person supplying it, is not an offence against this section. R. v. Isaacs, 1 L. & C., 220.

Under section 60 of the Act, it is not necessary that the woman herself should intend to use the drug, or that any other person than the one who procured it should intend that it should be used. R. v. Hillman, 9 Cox C. C., 386.

ACCESSORIES.

(See PRINCIPALS AND ACCESSORIES.)

ACCOMPLICE.

A Justice has no power to make a promise of pardon, and it is his duty to commit an accomplice for trial, notwithstanding it is intended that he should give evidence for the prosecution.

Where the evidence would be too weak to justify a commitment, independent of the testimony of the accomplice, the proper course seems to be to take the deposition of the accomplice in the usual way, cautioning him at the same time that he is not bound to say anything which may criminate himself. In this case the accomplice would be bound over as a witness, and the circumstances explained to the Judge before the indictment against the prisoner is presented to the Grand Jury. Stone's Jus. Man., 48.

ADULTERATION OF FOOD, DRINK AND DRUGS.

The law on this subject is contained chiefly in the 37 Vic., chap. 8 (amended by the 40 Vic., chap. 13). Under this statute wilfully admixing, or ordering any other person to admix, with any article of food or drink, any deleterious or poisonous ingredient or material, to adulterate the same for sale, and wilfully admixing and ordering any other person to admix, any ingredient or material, with any drug, to adulterate the same for sale, subjects the