not know what our partner is up to, and do not put them to task of finding out at this time? General SUMNER. Yes, I think it is exactly right. My military judgment would be that as the treaty is implemented, the canal becomes more and more vulnerable. Because as they move in, it would be easier to take retaliatory action, and I think your point is extremely well taken, and I think the air has to be cleared on these matters before we give up this security area. Mr. HANSEN. So if both sides of the issue of implementation of the Panama Canal treaties are concerned about keeping the canal open, then both sides have a stake in finding out exactly what is going on, getting the situation righted, before a decision is made, would that be right? General SUMNER. Yes, I think, Mr. Congressman, that there is responsible elements in Panama that would want to see this done. Mr. HUBBARD. Two more minutes. General SUMNER. It is a situation where they, you know, both sides want to see-they really want to see these treaties implemented, and in effect then Panama and the United States should be interested in getting this thing thrashed out, and seeing that we do have the security question put to rest. Mr. HANSEN. A last question. Do you feel that you were suppressed at all in your testimony before the U.S. Senate, in telling the full story? General SUMNER. No, and when I testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, I think the only restraint on me was my own restraint. As you can imagine, I was in a very embarrassing position. As a lieutenant general on active duty, I had to support the administration's position, but as an individual, I felt I could not. I was on the horns of a very difficult dilemma. The only restraints were my own self-imposed restraints, and I believe my testimony was restrained in that regard. Mr. HANSEN. I thank you for your candor and testimony. nia. Mr. LAGOMARSINO. General, I want to compliment you on your testimony; I know from past discussion with you, of your deep interest in this entire subject. Do I take it from your testimony that the Inter-American Defense Board has now been disestablished? General SUMNER. No, it has not been disestablished. It is alive and active, and I am very pleased that that has not happened. Yesterday they had a special session, Colonel Ramunda, the head of the Nicaraguan-asked for a special session, and yesterday they had a special session, where the colonel laid out, for all the delegations, Nicargua's views of what was going on in their country and in the bordering countries. Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I misunderstood. I thought you said that the administration had announced its intention to disband. General SUMNER. No, when they first took office, I was asked why they should not disestablish. That was the question, and I think I gave them pretty good reasons for keeping it. It is to a forum where we talk, and there is communication at the senior military level. Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Did the Board take action yesterday? General SUMNER. Not that I know of. I have not been briefed on the results of that, and I am not sure that they will brief me on it. It was merely to be an information presentation by the chief of the Nicaraguan delegation to the Board, in full session. The consul of the delegates. Mr. LAGOMARSINO. You touched on another thing in your testimony that concerns me a great deal is our military training programs. I know that there are a lot of different ways of looking at this, but one of the things that greatly disturbs me about the future, not so much the present, because during the present, we are dealing with people who know what the political facts of life are in the United States, and they understand it. They do not like it, but they understand it. As a result of our cutting off training aid for countries in South America, particularly, and some in Central America as well, that we are not having the contact with younger military officers that we have had in the past, and, as you have pointed out, whether or not we like it, or even want to recognize it, it is a fact that the military, left and right, and not just right, it is left as well, are in all likelihood the future leaders of this country, as they have been for many, many years. As I say, we may not like that, but it is a fact, and by cutting off our-that little relationship that we have had with many of them in the past, I think we are in danger of further harming the relationships that otherwise could be very good, very helpful to us in conducting our foreign policy, even such things as human rights. If you cannot talk to people, you cannot influence them very much. With regard to the Panama Canal itself, as you might recall, a group of us from the Inter-American Subcommittee, Foreign Af fairs, visited a number of countries in South America, at the very time that the Panama Canal Treaties were signed. As a matter of fact, we were in Colombia the day that the agreement was announced. We talked to the President of every country we visited, with the exception of Brazil, where Presidents do not talk to visiting Congressmen, apparently. We did talk to the Foreign Minister there. We talked, and I would say an average of an hour, with those officials, as well as many others. In only one case did any of those Presidents, or other high officials of government even mention the Panama Canal, which was supposed to be the big, burning issue in all of South and Central America. The one exception was the Foreign Minister of Ecuador, who, after 3 hours of discussing various problems, made the statement that he wanted to talk about the Panama Canal Treaty, because he was afraid that the tolls were going to go up. Now, it is true, to set the record straight, that when a member of our delegation, as he invariably did, asked the head of state what they thought about the treaties, they all said oh, yes, we are for that. Privately, several of them came back and said you should not do that, it is not very smart, and we are going to be-we are concerned about the tolls going up. But it was a very interesting sideline that the very people that we supposedly were doing this for did not seem to be all that concerned about it, and yet it was on the front page of all the newspapers, and the television, and everything down there. I know that they are very concerned about the security of the canal, and they are also concerned about the economic effects, especially the countries on the west coast of South America, that depend almost entirely on the canal for exports and imports. Mr. HUBBARD. Two minutes. Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I have no further questions. General SUMNER. I just might make the observation that I think our-first of all, to take the point of military training of the Latin American officers, I think it is shortsighted of this country to not pursue that. We have a very great moderating effect on these officers, and in the case of Brazil, when we alienated the Brazilians, they took all their officers out of this country, and Brazil had taken on the responsibility for editing the Military Review, a professional military journal of the first caliber, and we lost all that, and if we want to lose this influence on these people, and it is another part of this pattern I see developing, that we have got, it is very serious. On the last point, on the views of the Latin Americans, on the Panama Canal Treaties, it is exactly my experience, in talking with the senior officials, they all expressed concern, incidentally, at the time that most of them are asked to support it, they cannot see the treaty. They-you know, they are in the same position as SALT. Where is the treaty? Let us read it. Well, they did not have one, and after they saw it, a thromba that it was, they had second thoughts about it. So there is a real problem there. Mr. HUBBARD. Thank you very much, Lt. Gen. Gordon Sumner, for your helpful testimony, your cooperation, your willingness to try to answer each of the questions posed to you, both friendly and hostile. You have been very helpful to this subcommittee, and indeed, in my opinion, very helpful to your country, by your appearance here today, and your comments. We thank you. General SUMNER. Thank you. Mr. HUBBARD. We will now call on Col. James C. Thomas. We appreciate your being here, and we await your prepared statement, Colonel Thomas. STATEMENT OF COL. JAMES C. THOMAS, U.S. AIR FORCE (RETIRED) Colonel THOMAS. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before this committee to express some personal views and concerns regarding the deteriorating situation in Central America. My concerns stem from a firsthand knowledge of this area. Mr. HUBBARD. Can you move closer to the microphone? You speak from a firsthand knowledge of this area, and members of this subcommittee and visiting members, such as Congressman Bob Lagomarsino of California, who is a member of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Latin America, are anxious to hear your remarks, and I would encourage you to speak up. Repeat the last sentence, if you would. Colonel THOMAS. Yes, sir, I will. My concerns stem from a firsthand knowledge of this area. I have only recently retired from 6 years' duty in the Office of the Secretary of Defense with primary supervision responsibilities for Latin American affairs. My experience with Latin America stems back to the early 1960's and I have had duty in most of those nations, including 3 years as an advisor to the Nicaraguan Air Force. I care what is happening there, and I believe I understand what is happening. It is not my purpose to torpedo the implementing legislation on the Panama Canal Treaties. That is a terribly complex issue which, I believe, does not need to be made more difficult. I also believe, however, that the present inquiry relating to Panamanian support for terrorists in Nicaragua is entirely proper, that it raises some serious questions regarding U.S. security interests at our very doorstep, and that the countries known to be supporting that insurgency should be held accountable. Throughout the day yesterday I listened with great interest to the evidence presented by various witnesses describing how various countries are supporting the Sandinista. I listened also with great interest to other witnesses who sought to discount or downplay the importance of the Cuban and Panamanian role-an interest bordering on amusement, were it not for the seriousness of the whole affair. But it is not amusing because it is so deadly serious. The administration has long had extensive information indicating Cuban, Panamanian, Costa Rican, and-at times, Venezuelan— support for the Sandinista. Yet the administration has been strangely quiet regarding this aspect of the problem. This administration appears to be incapable of raising a strong voice of protest against terrorism which emanates from the left, apparently feeling that to do so would somehow weaken its stance on human rights. I believe this is some of the "selective morality" referred to during yesterday's hearings. Where is the hue and cry the human rights activists for the rights of victims of the Sandinista, the ERP, the Montoneros, the MIR, the Tupmaaros and various other terrorist organizations operating throughout the Americas? Where is the hue and cry of advocates of conventional arms limitation concerning the illicit traffic in arms from the United States to the Sandinista? The display of weapons in this room, captured from the Sandinista in Nicaragua, has provided concrete evidence of a network of Communist subversion and terrorism at its worst operating in this hemisphere. I have pointedly avoided in this presentation providing any of the details of the type and extent of outside support for the insurgency in Nicaragua because I recognize that I have a continuing responsibility to protect classified information to which I had access up until my recent retirement on May 1, 1979. Instead, I believe the Congress should avail itself of information which the administration has in order to have a full and complete understanding of the problems which our country faces. Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement. I hope it will in some way contribute to a more balanced appraisal of our policies regarding arms transfers, human rights, international terrorism, U.S. economic interests, and most importantly, I believe, U.S. security interests, in this hemisphere. I shall be happy to answer any questions the committee may have. Mr. HUBBARD. Thank you very much, Colonel Thomas, for your statement and your very helpful information and for your concern and interest. The Chair recognizes and notes for the record that public law, as well as the regulations of Defense, prohibit you from-as a witness, you as a retired military officer in relation to classified information-from testifying with complete freedom in open session in spite of the fact that you are now recently retired as of May 1, this year. Consequently, we accept your testimony, fully aware that it may in some respects be necessary to limit some of your answers, is that correct? Colonel THOMAS. That is correct, sir. Mr. HUBBARD. It is the subcommittee's understanding that you have just concluded over 30 years of military service, is that correct? Colonel THOMAS. That is right, sir. Mr. HUBBARD. What was your final assignment while on active duty with the U.S. Air Force? Colonel THOMAS. That was duty with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Inter-American Region of the Office of Secretary of Defense, which has responsibility for all matters of defense interests in Central/South America and the Caribe Basin, almost 6 years with that office, sir. Mr. HUBBARD. My next question was how long did you serve in that capacity, and you said 6 years? Colonel THOMAS. Six years. Mr. HUBBARD. Would you please describe for us your duties and the scope of your authority in that particular position? Colonel THOMAS. Well, I believe, sir, the charter of that office would describe it best. I think it reads something like this. The Office of Primary Competence for all matters of Defense interests in Central America, South America and the Caribbean. The office did serve as the primary liaison between the Department of Defense and other agencies within the executive branch. Mr. HUBBARD. Colonel Thomas, were you, in fact, for 3 years an advisor to the Nicaraguan Air Force? Colonel THOMAS. Yes, sir, I was, from 1963 to 1966. Mr. HUBBARD. Is it correct to say that in that capacity you were familiar with the operations of the Nicaraguan armed forces on a day-to-day basis? Colonel THOMAS. Yes, sir, I was. Mr. HUBBARD. To your knowledge, Colonel Thomas, would it be possible for the subcommittee to obtain corroboration out of the Pentagon that Costa Rica is involved in a conspiracy with Cuba and Panama to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua? Colonel THOMAS. I believe, sir, it would be possible for this committee to obtain many, many different reports indicating that there was involvement by each of those countries, yes, sir. Mr. HUBBARD. So it is your opinion that it would be possible for us to obtain corroboration out of the Pentagon that Costa Rica is |