from returning to the matrimonial domicil, has even refused to acknowledge the receipt of his very polite and professional epistles. At this, the judge's patience is exhausted. He forthwith decrees a separation of the parties, and condemns her to pay all the costs of the proceedings, not forgetting a fee of one hundred dollars to Oily Gammon, attorney for the defendant, for his trouble in endeavoring to woo her back to the path of duty!! There is still, to be sure, a locus penitentia for the wicked and obstinate woman. This is not a dissolution of the bonds of matrimonyit is only a separation from bed and board; and from the date of this judg ment she has two years for repentance, and endeavors to find forgiveness for her offences, and a reconciliation with her injured master. Should she fail in this, (and it is for her husband to decide whether she shall fail or not, for there is no power to compel him to become reconciled, against his will, in that manner which it has been decided to be within the intention of the law,) then, at the expiration of that time, a divorce a vinculo matrimonii is decreed, as a matter of course, upon the mere filing of the petition, setting forth the previous judgment, and that no reconciliation has been had.

How different-how lamentably different is all this from the well-established policy of the common law, to preserve inviolable the sacred relation of husband and wife !--to impress upon society the solemn and indissoluble character of that contract which lies at the foundation of the well-being of a community; to erect about the conjugal relation barriers which may not be thrown down, nor easily overleaped; and, by the imposition of a salutary restraint, to teach and enforce the performance of the social duties. Compare the policy of the civil law, as evinced by the articles of the code, with that announced by Lord Stowell, when presiding in the Ecclesiastical Court of England. The policy of our law," (says that profound master of this branch of jurisprudence,)" is not that limited humanity which looks only at individuals: it is that real and extended humanity which regards the general interests of mankind. If it were once understood that, upon mutual disgust, married persons might be legally separated, many persons who now pass through the world with mutual comfort, with attention to their common offspring, and to the moral order of civil society, might have been, at this moment, living in a state of mental unkindness-of estrangement from their children, and in a state of the most licentious and unreserved immorality. In this case, as in many others, the happiness of some individuals must be sacrificed to the general and greater good. When people understand that they must live together, they learn to soften, by mutual accommodation, that yoke which they know they cannot break. They become good husbands and wives, from the necessity of remaining husbands and wives; for necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties it imposes."*

It is gratifying to turn from this branch of the subject to that, the consid eration of which was the particular design of this article-viz: the provi sions of the civil law upon the rights and duties of husband and wife, on the subject matter of property.

It cannot be expected that a cursory review of this nature should enter at any great length into the details of a system which constitutes so large a portion of the civil code. Some of the general principles of that system

* Evans vs. Evans, 1 Consistory Rep., 33.

only can be noticed, by which the reader will perceive the fundamental differences between the civil and common law of this domestic relation.

The civil code regulates the conjugal association, in relation to property, in the absence of particular agreements, which the parties are at liberty to stipulate as they please, provided the stipulations be not contrary to good morals; be not in contravention of the legal order of descents in what concerns the inheritance of their children or posterity, or of their children as between themselves; and provided that such stipulations be made by an act before a notary and two witnesses.

The property of married persons, by the civil code, is divided into separate property and common property.

Separate property is that which either party brings in marriage, or during the marriage acquires by inheritance or donation to him or her particularly.

Common property is that which is acquired by the parties during marriage, in any other manner than by inheritance or donation.

The separate property of the wife is divided into dotal and extra-dotal. Dotal property is the dowry, or marriage portion, and consists of the effects which the wife brings the husband, to assist him in bearing the expenses of the marriage establishment. The extra-dotal property consists of the paraphernalia of the wife, which form no part of the dowry;-this is called the paraphernal property.

And first, as to the common property. Every marriage contracted in Louisiana superinduces a partnership or "community of acquets and gains" between the parties, if there be no stipulation to the contrary; and the same partnership in property exists by law between persons going there to reside who were married elsewhere, with respect to property acquired during their residence. Of this partnership, the husband is the head and administrator; but his disposition of the moveables or immoveables of the community is restrained within certain legal limitations. As in any other partnership, the debts contracted during marriage enter into the community acquets, and must be acquitted out of the common fund; while the debts of both husband and wife, anterior to the marriage, must be acquitted out of their own personal and individual effects.

Upon the dissolution of the marriage, by the death of either party, all the effects possessed by the husband and wife, reciprocally, are presumed to be community property, unless satisfactorily proved to be separate property; and upon such dissolution, the partnership property is divided into two equal portions, (the community debts being first paid,) between the surviver and the heirs of the deceased. If the wife be the surviver, she has the right of renouncing the community, if, during its existence, she took no active part in its administration. This renunciation must be made within a time limited, and with certain formalities. If not made, or if not made in good faith, or legally, judgment may be rendered against her as a partner; which can be satisfied from her individual, separate property, if the community property be insufficient.

As has been before stated, the partnership in property, of the husband and wife, exists in the absence of any agreement of the parties. It may be modified or limited by contract entered into with the solemnities required by law. In case it is stipulated that the partnership shall not exist, the wife preserves the exclusive and absolute control and administration of her moveable and immoveable property, and the free enjoyment of her

revenues. In case of such separation of property, each of the married persons contributes to the expenses of the matrimonial establishment in the manner fixed by the marriage contract; and, if no terms of contribu tion are there agreed upon, the wife contributes to the amount of one-half of her income.

Upon the decease of the husband or wife, his or her heirs, if of age, may demand the moiety of the community property belonging to the deceased. If they are under age, the surviver of the partnership, as the natural tutor or tutrix of the heirs, has the administration of the property during their minority; after which, he or she is liable to account for the faithful execution of the trust ;-and, as security for faithful payment to the heirs of the full amount to which they are entitled, they have a tacit and legal mortgage upon the immoveable property of the tutor or tutrix.

If the wife be the surviver, and marry again, her second husband be. comes co-tutor with her of the minor children of her deceased husband, if the advice of a "family meeting," duly called, in the manner prescribed by law, has been first obtained in the premises.

With regard to the separate property of the wife-and first, the paraphernal. All her property which is not declared to be brought in marriage by her--to be given her in consideration of the marriage, or to belong to her at the time of the marriage, is paraphernal. Of this property she has the sole administration, and may dispose of it as she pleases, of whatsoever it may consist. If she has allowed her husband to administer it, she may, at any time, withdraw it from his hands; and if, notwithstanding her opposition, he persists in its administration, he is accountable to her for all the fruits of the property, as well those that exist as those that have been consumed. She has a legal mortgage upon the immoveable property of her husband, as security for the payment of whatsoever comes into his hands from such administration.

The dotal property or the dowry of the wife is her separate property, which she brings in marriage to assist in defraying the expenses of the establishment. Of this property, the husband has the administration. Whatsoever is declared by the marriage contract to belong to the wife, or to be given her on account of the marriage by other persons than the husband, is part of the dowry. During the marriage, dowry can neither be settled nor increased.

Of what the dowry may consist-by whom, and in what manner, it may be settled--how the parties are bound by whom the dowry is settledwhen the interests of the dowry commence-how, by whom, and when the dowry may be recovered--are subjects provided for in great detail by the various articles of the code; but they may not be of sufficient interest to the general reader to justify the space which would be necessarily taken in their consideration.

The manner in which the restitution of the dowry and dotal effects of the wife is secured to her, is a subject of the greatest importance, as af fecting the rights and interests of those who may become the creditors of the husband; and it is this subject to which the attention of the reader is particularly directed.

The 2,355th article of the civil code, provides that, "the wife has a legal mortgage on the immoveables, and a privilege on the moveables of her husband, to wit: 1st. For the restitution of her dowry, as well as for the replacing of her dotal effects which she brought at the time of her

marriage, and which were alienated by her husband-and this, from the time of the celebration of the marriage; 2d. For the restitution or replacing of the dotal effects which she acquired during the marriage, either by succession or donation, from the day when such succession devolved to her, or such donation began to have its effect." A legal mortgage is one which exists tacitly, without a written instrument, by mere operation of law.

The article 2,399, of the civil code, declares that "the wife may, during the marriage, petition against the husband for a separation of property, whenever her dowry is in danger, owing to the mismanagement of her husband, or otherwise, or when the disorder of his affairs induces her to believe that his estate may not be sufficient to meet her rights and claims."

Now, that the importance of these rights and privileges of married women, in Louisiana, may be fully appreciated by those who are, or may become creditors of their husbands, it may be well to suppose a case, not only which may occur, but which is very likely to occur under the jurisprudence of that State. It would be hazarding little to say, that such cases are by no means of rare occurrence.

A young man, being about to enter into the bonds of matrimony, in New Orleans, resolves, at the same time, to go into commercial business in that city. The parents of his intended wife are reputed wealthy-how many such there are! The parties go before a notary public, and there a marriage contract is executed in due form of law. The intended wife brings to her future husband, as her dowry, which has been settled upon her, the sum of twenty thousand dollars. In the presence of the notary and the legal number of witnesses, this is actually paid into the hands of the future husband, as the wife's dowry. (It may have been borrowed for that purpose, for an hour or two, from some banker-but to prove this! hoc opus est!) All this is duly, and fully, and legally set forth by the notary in the marriage contract; the parties retire, and in due season the marriage is solemnized, and the husband goes into business. He goes North to purchase his goods-no man's credit is better than his--he has married a rich wife--she has brought him a handsome dowry-the marriage contract shows it-his credit is unlimited--his purchases are accordingly. But, poor fellow !-he soon becomes embarrassed. "His affairs are in disorder," owing to "his mismanagement, or otherwise," and the trembling wife "is induced to believe that his estate may not be suf ficient to meet her rights and claims." She files her petition representing these facts-they are proved. The husband, poor fellow! does not deny them-he can't deny them--his conscience would not allow such a denial; and after due proceedings she obtains a judgment against him for a separation of property--for the twenty thousand dollars paid him as her dowry, which is in danger-and the payment of this judgment is privi leged, as by article 2,355 of the code already cited, upon all the moveable and immoveable property of her husband; a privilege, which rides over all the claims of her husband's creditors--a privilege, which absorbs all the property which her husband has purchased at the North, and which is barely sufficient to meet "her rights and claims," and defray the costs of the proceedings-so improvident has the young man been in the management of his affairs! All that the creditors, in such case, would get for their judgment against the husband, would be a dear-bought knowledge of the civil law of husband and wife.

Art. V.—ORIGIN OF ATLANTIC OCEAN STEAM NAVIGATION.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MERCHANTS' MAGAZINE, ETC.

In the Merchants' Magazine of December I notice some remarks upon the inscription on Capt. Roberts' monument, erected in Cork, with some observations upon the Savannah, and a letter, said to have been written by Mr. Rush, respecting a conversation with the captain of the Savannah. As materials for history, it is important that facts should be correctly recorded.

In the first place, it is not true that the Savannah was built as an ocean steamer.

In the second place, it is not true that she ever did cross the Atlantic by

steam.

In the third place, it is not true that she could cross the Atlantic by steam-and therefore she has no claim to the credit of being the first steamer that crossed the Atlantic.

She was constructed with a view of selling her to the Emperor of Russia, for a coasting craft on the Baltic Sea, and in furtherance of that speculation proceeded from Savannah, touching at Liverpool, to St. Petersburgh. When that enterprise failed of success, her career as a steam vessel terminated-therefore it is manifest that she was not built for an ocean

steamer.

2d. Soon after her arrival at Liverpool, I happened to be in Liverpool myself, and went on board of her, examined the machinery, as well as the vessel, and was then informed that she steamed six or seven days, which corresponded with the length of her passage, and was necessary to try and prove the efficiency of her machinery. At that time I had not the slightest idea of navigating the ocean by steam, nor have we any evidence that such an idea was entertained or broached by the public. It is worthy of remark, that Mr. Rush's letter of 1845, stating what the captain told him, that the engine worked horizontally, is not true in fact. I saw it: it worked at an angle of about forty-five degrees with the horizon; and therefore the captain, or Mr. Rush, or both, are in error in this particular, and the error throws discredit upon the man's statement that she steamed eighteen days, which I suppose must require very strong faith to credit. At all events, it is admitted that she did not steam across the Atlantic.

3d. The Savannah, if my memory does not betray me, had three masts, was completely rigged as a sailing vessel, and of small capacity-and if the statement of the captain, as recorded by Mr. Rush, be true, that she was only two hundred tons burthen, it is apparent to any one acquainted with steam navigation, that she could not carry fuel enough to steam her half across the Atlantic; and therefore the argument that she was not constructed for an ocean steamer is perfectly conclusive, because it was impossible for her to perform that duty; and that fact must have been as well known by any engineer before her trial, as after. With the power of sails her engine was carried over the Atlantic, but with the power of steam on board, the engine could never carry the ship across. No pretension was made in Liverpool, or in any other quarter, at that time, that she was designed for an ocean steamer, or that she either did or could cross the Atlantic by steam-and this fact goes far to show the absurdity of the claim now attempted to be substantiated. She was no more an