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III. OF STATUTORY APOLOGIES.

1. Any defendant may give evidence, in mitigation of
damages, of his having made or offered an apology—
(i) Either before action;

(ii) Or as soon as possible after action, if the action
was commenced before he had time to do so.

Provided, that he has with his statement of defence delivered to the plaintiff a notice of his intention to give such evidence. (d)

2. The defendant in an action for libel against a public newspaper, or other periodical publication, may make a good defence to such action

(i) By inserting in his own paper, at his earliest opportunity, an apology.

Or, if his own paper is published less often than weekly, in some paper or periodical selected by the plaintiff.]

(ii) By showing that the libel was published-
(a.) Without actual malice; and

(8.) Without gross negligence, and

(iii) By paying into court sufficient amends for the injury sustained by the plaintiff. (e)

QUESTIONS FOR THE JURY.

1. Whether there has been a publication of the libel.
2. Whether the defamatory matter is a libel. (ƒ) That
is to say, whether it really bears the meaning
attributed to it.

3. Whether, (if it is a report, or criticism in a paper,) it
is a fair comment.

4. Whether, (if the judge holds the occasion privileged,) it was published with actual malice.

5. Whether, (if justified,) it is true.

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6. Whether, (if money is paid into court) the sum so paid in is sufficient.

§ QUESTIONS FOR THE JUDGE.

1. Whether the alleged libel is capable of bearing the meaning ascribed to it. (a)

2. Whether the occasion is privileged. (b)

OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

§ CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS MAY BE TAKEN.

1. By indictment;

2. By information, filed in the Queen's Bench, by leave

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of the court.

This is a special remedy, which the Court of Queen's Bench, in its discretion, will allow; when it considers the case one of sufficient importance not to be left to be dealt with, in the usual way, by indictment.

§ PUNISHMENT

1. Where the publisher does not know the libel to be false; Fine, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both. (c)

2. Where the publisher knows the libel to be false; Fine, and imprisonment not exceeding two years. (d)

[The crime is a misdemeanor, not triable at quarter sessions.] § An indictment will only lie for libel, and not for slander. Except

1. Where it is seditious;

2. Where it is blasphemous; (e)

3. Where it directly tends to a breach of the peace; (f)
[As a challenge to fight a duel.]

(a) Sturt v. Blogg, 10 Q. B. 908.
(b) Cooke v. Wildes, 5 E. & B. 378.

(c) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 4.

(d) Ibid, s. 5.

(e) R. v. Taylor, 3 Keb. 607.

f) R. v. Phillips, 6 East 464,

4. Where uttered against, and in the presence of a magistrate in the execution of his office. (y)

DEFENCES

1. The defendant may show that the libel is true;

Provided he also shews that it is for the public benefit that it should be published. (h)

[NOTE. At common law it was no defence to show that the libel was true; and hence the maxim, "The greater the truth, the greater the libel."

2. The defendant may shew

(i) That the publication was made without his authority, consent, or knowledge; and

(ii) That the publishing did not arise from want of due care, or caution, on his part. (i)

(g) R. v. Pocock, 2 St. 1,157; Ex parte Duke of Marlborough, 5 Q. B. 955;

R. v. Weltje, 2 Camp. 242.

(h) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 6.

(i) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 7.

PART VI.

OF BREACHES OF DUTY IN RELATION TO THE PERSON.

CHAPTER I.

NEGLIGENT PERSONAL CONDUCT.

Where one by want of reasonable care in his own personal conduct causes damage to the person, or property (real or personal) of another, he is liable to compensate that other for the loss.

For example. If Jones were to hit out recklessly, right and left, with his fists, in a crowd, and so were to wound Smith, he would be liable to Smith for the injury.

PROFESSIONAL MEN AND SKILLED WORKMEN ARE BOUND TO USE1. Reasonable care.

2. Reasonable diligence.

3. A reasonable and competent degree of skill.

In proportion to the character of the work which each professes to undertake. (a)

[NOTE. Contributory negligence.

The remarks on contribu

tory negligence (ante, p. 221) apply equally to this chapter.]

(a) Lanphier v. Phipos, 8 C. & P. 479; Seare v. Prentice, 8 East. 352.

CHAPTER II.

OF FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS.

A FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATION, for which an action will lie must be

1. A false statement (b), which may be, either a

(i) Suggestio falsi; or a

(ii) Suppressio veri.

2. Made with a knowledge of its untruth. (c)

[Or (i) With no belief in its truth. (d)

Or (ii) In a reckless ignorance of its untruth. (e)

3. Made with the intention that another should act upon

it. (f)

[NOTE. But a bare lie, without any fraudulent intent, is not actionable. (g)]

4. Acted upon by that other.

5. Resulting, from being so acted on, in damage to that

other. (h)

[NOTE. A person making a fraudulent representation will be liable, although he derives no benefit therefrom.

Illustration. Joseph Freeman represented to

Messrs. Pasley and Edward that one Falch was a person safely to be trusted in order that Falch might obtain goods upon credit. There

(b) Ashlin v. White, Holt. 387.

(c) Ormrod v. Huth, 14 M. & W. 651.
(d) Taylor v, Ashton, 11 M, & W, 415,

(e) Jarrett v. Kennedy, 6 C. B. 319.

(f) Thom v. Bigland, 8 Ex. 725.
(g) Behn v. Kemble, 7 C. B. N. S. 260.
(h) Forster v. Charles, 7 Bing. 105.

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