68; 33 W. R. 275 Whitfield v. Clement, 1 Mer. 402 L. T. 210 West, In re, [1900] 1 Ch. 84; 69 L. J. 720; 48 W. R. 138 v. Shuttleworth, 2 M. & K. 684 Weston, In re, [1906] 2 Ch. 620; 76 L. J. Ch. 54; 95 . L. T. 581 369; 72 L. T. 431; 43 W. R. 449 Wheatley, In re, 27 C. D. 606; 54 L. J. Ch. 201; 51 L. T. Wheldale v. Partridge, 8 Ves. 227 Whicker v. Hume, 7 H. L. C. 124; 28 L. J. Ch. 396 ; Whistler v. Webster, 2 Ves. 367 . Whitbread v. St. John, 10 Ves. 152 v. Von Luedecke, [1906] 1 Ch. 783; 75 L. J. Ch. v. Langdale, 1 C. D. 61 Whitmore, In re, [1902] 2 Ch. 66; 71 L. J. Ch. 763; 87 Whittell v. Dudin, 2 J. & W. 279 Whyte v. Pollock, 7 A. C. 400; 47 L. T. 356 J. Ch. 251 6 276 Wildes v. Dudlow, 19 Eq. 198 Wilkins, In re, 27 C. D. 703; 54 L. J. Ch. 188; 33 W. R. 42 Wilks, In re, [1891] 3 Ch. 59; 60 L. J. Ch. 696; 65 L. T. Williams, In re, 42 C. D. 93; 58 L. J. Ch. 451; 61 L. T. In re, [1897] 2 Ch. 12; 66 L. J. Ch. 485: 76 v. Arkle, 7 H. L. 606; 45 L. J. Ch. 590; 33 L. T. v. Hensman, 1 J. & H. 546; 30 L. J. Ch. 878 116 319 136 301, 302, 305 90 93 116 Willock v. Noble, 7 H. L. 580; 44 L. J. Ch. 345 ; 32 L. T. Wilson, In re, [1907] 1 Ch. 394; 76 J. J. Ch. 210; 96 In re, [1907] 1 Ch. 450; 76 L. J. Ch. 228; 96 v. Duguid, 24 C. D. 244; 53 L. J. Ch. 52; 49 L. T. PAGE 69, 73 184 134 293 180 157 v. Morley, 5 C. D. 776; 46 L. J. Ch. 790; 36 L. T. v. O'Leary, 7 Ch. 448; 41 L. J. Ch. 342; 26 L. T. 463; 20 W. R. 501 Winans v. A.-G., [1904] A. C. 287; 73 L. J. K. B. 613; 90 L. T. 721; 20 T. L. R. 510 Wingrove v. Wingrove, 11 P. D. 81; 55 L. J. P. 7; 34 W. R. 260. Winn, In the goods of, 2 Sw. & T. 147. Woods, In re, [1904] 2 Ch. 4; 73 L. J. Ch. 204; 90 L. T.8 293 Worthing Corporation v. Heather, [1906] 2 Ch. 532; 75 Wright, In re, [1906] 2 Ch. 288; 75 L. J. Ch. 500; 94 Wroughton v. Colquhoun, 1 De G. & Sm. 357 YATES, In re, [1891] 3 Ch. 53; 64 L. T. 819; 39 W. R. 573 117 "The Will of a man is the aggregate of his testamentary intentions, so far as they are manifested in writing, duly executed according to the Statute." Lemage v. Goodban (1865), 1 P. & D. p. 62, MATHEWS' WILLS. CHAPTER I. JURISDICTION. THE jurisdiction exercised by the Court which grants probate of a will (now the Probate branch of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice) differs essentially from that exercised by a Court of Construction. Probate Division. The immediate predecessor of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division (herein often referred to as the Probate Division) was the Court of Probate, whose predecessors were in turn the Prerogative Courts (originally ecclesiastical institutions); before the amalgamation of jurisdictions brought about by the Judicature Act, 1873, the Court of Probate had the exclusive jurisdiction of granting probate of a will, where that will dealt with personal estate situated in England. Upon the passing of the Judicature Act that jurisdiction was transferred to the High Court of Justice generally; and, since all judges of the High Court may exercise the same jurisdiction, Sir George Jessel, M.R. (Pinney v. Hunt (1877), 6 C. D. 98), considered that he had jurisdiction to grant probate of a will when sitting as a judge of the Chancery Division; but he refused to do so. Nor would a judge of any Division except the Probate Division at the present day grant probate of a will. It is still, therefore, the exclusive function of the Probate Division to grant probate of a will, that is to say, to determine what valid testamentary dispositions a testator has made, and to decree probate thereof. Probate, when granted, and until recalled, is conclusive proof in all other Courts that the will is the will of the testator (Allen v. M'Pherson (1847), 1 H. L. C. 191; Meluish v. Milton (1876), 3 C. D. 27); and if in the course of proceedings in any other Court anything should come to light which seemed to throw doubt upon the validity of the will (e.g., a suspicion of forgery, or some evidence of a suppressed will), that Court could not properly do more than stay those proceedings so as to give the parties interested in disputing the validity of the will an opportunity of taking proceedings in the Probate Division for revocation of probate. Court of Construction. The function of a Court of Construction is, on the other hand, to determine what is the exact meaning of the language used by the testator, the legal effect of the document, or the various documents already admitted to probate, when viewed as a whole, and what property is affected thereby. Any Court which has to decide a question as to the meaning or effect of a will as opposed to any question as to its validity is a Court of Construction (e.g., the Chancery Division, the King's Bench Division, a |