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ringius, Swedish Agent in Holland, for a ship to convey him to Gottenburg, or, if he could not do that, to obtain for him a passport to go thither from Holland. He embarked at Dieppe for Holland, where he was received most kindly. With practically no opposition he was permitted to pass through the country, and the city of Amsterdam fitted out a vessel to carry him to Hamburg, where he arrived May 16, 1645, after a voyage of eight days with head winds.100 On the next day Grotius set out for Lübeck, where he found many friends, and the end of March saw him at Wismar, where Count Wrangel, Admiral of the Swedish fleet, entertained him splendidly and sent him to Kalmar on a man-of-war.101
The High Chancellor was at Suderacher, about five miles from Kalmar, negotiating a peace between Sweden and Denmark. Upon receiving a letter from Grotius announcing his arrival, he sent, on the 8th of June, his coach to carry him to Suderacher, where he remained for a fortnight, honored by the Chancellor and the other ambassadors. 109 Returning then to Kalmar, Grotius proceeded at once to Stockholm, where, on the day after his arrival, the Queen received him, having come from Upsala upon hearing of his approach. Several audiences and dinners with the Queen followed, and she several times refused to grant him his dismissal, insisting that he should bring his family into Sweden and remain in her service as Councillor of State. 103
But Grotius was resolved to leave. He asked for a passport, and, as this was delayed, decided to depart without one. However, he had only got to a seaport two miles away when a messenger from the Queen overtook him, saying that Christina wished to see him once more before he left. He accordingly returned to the Queen, who gave him 12,000 imperials and some silver plate, which she presented to him with his passport, explaining that the finishing of the plate had caused the delay in issuing the passport. On the 12th of August he embarked for Lübeck on a vessel furnished him by the Queen.104
100 Burigny's Vie de Grotius, II, pp. 67-68; Ep. 1760, p. 749.
104 Vindie. Grot., p. 478; Burigny's Vie de Grotius, II, p. 70; Cattenburgh's Vervolg van het leven van Huig de Groot, Bk. X, p. 409.
It is uncertain what Grotius' plans were in embarking from Stockholm. Vondel, the Dutch poet, thought he intended to go to Osnabrug, where the Peace of Westphalia was in course of negotiation. Others thought he was returning to Holland, where the Republican party was growing stronger, or that he was going to Poland in the hope that the King would send him to France as ambassador. It seems highly probable that Grotius' steps were leading him to Münster and Osnabrug to interest himself in the great peace which was to end the last professedly religious war Europe has known. But after that? Perhaps, wearied of the intrigue of negotiations, he only sought a quiet retreat where he could devote the remainder of his life to his project for the union of all Christians into one tolerant body, and all nations into an harmonious civilization.
The vessel on which Grotius embarked had hardly cleared the port when it was overtaken by a terrible storm and was obliged to put in, on the 17th of August, fourteen miles from Danzig. Grotius set out in an open wagon for Lübeck and arrived at Rostock on the 26th of August, very ill. A physician, named Stochman, was summoned, who said that Grotius was suffering from fatigue and that rest would restore his health, but the next day he was worse, being very weak and in a cold sweat. Grotius, thinking that his end was near, asked for a clergyman, and John Quistorpius was called, who, in a letter to Calovius, gives us an account of the last moments of the great man.105 It reads as follows:
You are desirous of hearing from me how that Phoenix of Literature, Hugo Grotius, behaved in his last moments, and I shall gratify your wish. He embarked at Stockholm for Lübeck, and, after being tossed for three days by a violent storm, was shipwrecked and got to shore on the coast of Pomerania, whence he came to our town of Rostock, distant over sixty miles, in an open wagon, through wind and rain. He lodged with Balleman and sent for Stochman, the physician, who, observing that he was extremely weakened by years, by the shipwreck and the inconveniences of the journey, judged that he could not live long. The second day after the arrival of Grotius in this town, that is, on the eighteenth of August (old style), he sent for me about nine o'clock at night. I went, and found him almost in the throes of death. I said there was nothing I desired more than to have seen him in good health, that I might have the pleasure of his conversation. He replied that God had willed it thus. I told him to prepare himself for a happier
106 Burigny's Vie de Grotius, II, p. 72.
life, to acknowledge that he was a sinner and to repent of his sins; and, having made mention of the Publican, who confessed that he was a sinner and asked God's mercy, he answered: “I am that Publican.” I continued and told him that must have recourse to Jesus Christ, without whom there is no salvation. He replied, "I have all my hope in Jesus Christ.” I began to repeat aloud in German the prayer which begins, “Herr Jesu”; he followed me, in a very low voice with his hands clasped. When I had finished, I asked him if he had understood me. He answered, “I understand you very well.” I continued to repeat to him those passages of the word of God which are usually recalled to the memory of the dying, and, asking him if he understood me, he answered, “I hear your voice well, but I understand with difficulty what you say." These were his last words. Soon after he expired, exactly at midnight."
Thus died this celebrated man, on the night of August 28 or the morning of August 29, 1645,107 at the age of sixty-two.
After the vital organs were sealed in a copper casket and buried in the Cathedral of Rostock, to the left of the choir, the embalmed body was brought to Delft and there buried in the Nieuwe Kerk, October 3, 1645, where it now rests, beside the bodies of the Princes of Orange.108 He had written this epitaph for himself:
“Grotius hic Hugo est, Batavum captivus et exul,
HAMILTON VREELAND, JR.
106 Burigny's Vie de Grotius, II, pp. 73-74. See Ep. Eccles. et Theol., 583, p. 828.
107 Cattenburgh's Vervolg van het leven van Huig de Groot, Bk. X, p. 412. Burigny's Vie de Grotius, II, p. 74.
108 Cattenburgh's Vervolg van het leven van Huig de Groot, Bk. X, pp. 412-415; Fruin's Hugo de Groot en Maria van Reigersbergh, Verspreide Geschriften, IV, p. 93, note 4.
109 Ep. 536, p. 915.
The practical application of the principle of autonomous neutralization is, in certain cases, neither so formidable nor so difficult as its name might seem to indicate. It states this doctrine: that any state may, of its own volition, declare itself permanently neutral. A state may not only engage itself to remain neutral during a particular war; but may also assume an abstract neutrality, not conditioned by the acts of any other states. Such a doctrine implies an analogy between a state and a person; namely this, that a state is given a personality, a free will, and a body of rights and obligations.
From the time when states first become distinguishable amid the shifting flux of primeval society, they have experienced a steady accretion of personal characteristics. The “State" became a being, different from the aggregate of individuals comprehended within its territorial boundaries. Patriotism developed as a cult to foster this idea, and men have lived and died for the state, with a disregard for personal interests only equaled by that which the Christian martyrs showed. The sentiment expressed by Vergil, Dulce et decore est, pro patria morior, has not been among the least of the great motives that have stirred the human heart. In the face of this evidence, coincident almost with the dawn of history, we must admit that the characteristic of a distinct personality is not unsuitably attached to the organization of a political society.
From time to time there have been amplifications in the idea of the state. Of late, we believe, its importance has been vastly overemphasized. It has, in certain instances, become, not a means to an end, but an end in itself. The purer sentiments of patriotism have degenerated into a Baal-worship. The benevolent conception of the state, as the mother of her children, has given way to the sterner picture of a Moloch, into whose burning maw the dearest things of life must be hurled. While deprecating this misguided worship, and realizing that
the state is only an expedient for the better ordering of the lives of individuals, there yet remains enough of individuality and personality in the idea of the state so that we can assign to it certain rights and obligations, and speak with accuracy of a society of nations.
The rights of sovereignty are commonly classified; as (1) existence, (2) independence, (3) equality, (4) jurisdiction, (5) property, and (6) intercourse. These have all not the same antiquity as the recognized attributes of a state. By degrees each has come to take its place as a definite component of sovereignty. As nations have become more closely bound together, the precise limits of these rights have become increasingly important, and more exactly defined.
Permanent neutralization is either a seventh right of a state, or a complementary part to the right of existence or independence. By becoming permanently neutral a state does not take an action which invades any right of another state. It does not threaten its existence, compromise its independence, relegate it to an inferior station, limit its jurisdiction, take its property, nor curtail its intercourse. The fundamental rights of no state are infringed; and such an autonomous neutralization does not prevent or hinder the same neutralization on the part of every other state.
In establishing this principle as a right, we enter a field in the realm of sovereignty hitherto unexplored. A new dimension of the concept is discovered, which bears the only test which could challenge its validity; namely, any transgression of acknowledged rights already existing or of the new right when applied reciprocally. Obligations are implied, of course, but none which invade the sovereign prerogatives of a state. The acceptance of neutralization as a right adds to the complexity of sovereignty; but, in so doing, it also adds a higher connotation to sovereignty as a legal principle. Such a step is in the direction toward binding the world by a new vinculum juris, which should be fruitful in a more intimate understanding between nations, and hasten the day when the world can take steps to gather under a reign of law, and lay aside forever “that last dread arbiter.” To abolish war, under the present legal nexus of our world, by the mere reiteration of its moral turpitude and by fervid invective against its dire destruction, is only a dream. To develop a basis of law that will ulti