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capture at sea lead to the same conclusion. The record of practice has exhibited during the last half-century the tendency to treat enemy commerce as a unit; the abolition of privateering, which removed the grossest form of private booty-getting, has indeed been followed in several states by the abolition of prize money, but also, among the maritime Powers, by the extension of the traditional belligerent rights; the devising of supplementary means for rendering the older rights effective; and the consolidation of old and new limitations upon commerce into what have been termed “systems" for the control of all trade which may contain possibilities of assistance to the enemy. “Control” rather than "destruction” is the object of such a system in its complete development, making possible the separation of enemy from neutral commerce, the requisition of enemy and the release of innocent neutral property. The willingness to apply a policy of indiscriminate destruction must be regarded as having been evoked by the necessity that knows no law. Such a policy, however, displays the realization of the importance of attacking enemy commerce in its entirety, of disregarding the value of individual prizes, and of hesitating at no measure calculated to assist toward strangling the enemy by economic pressure.
Partisans of immunity continue to discuss the question as concerned only with capture. The weight of their argument is now being directed, however, toward demonstrating the impracticability of the right of capture, rather than its inconsistency with theoretical justice. This continued attack upon capture per se is justified, perhaps, as an attempt to obtain half the loaf where the whole loaf is beyond the possibilities of the moment. It fails to convince because it takes as its starting point the Declaration of Paris - which has been effectually abrogated in practice — and because it fails to appreciate sufficiently the attitude which nations possessed of considerable maritime power have come to adopt toward enemy commerce.
Governments, if their own relation to the development of this attitude has been sometimes unconscious, realize that the attitude exists and interpret the question of capture with that fact in view. It is true that to all states capture presents its own aspects of benefit and injury. It has seemed to the writer that Great Britain would
be justified, on considerations of selfish interest, in desiring the practice contemplated by the Declaration of Paris; and that, conversely, states to which war with Great Britain is not an impossible consideration are consulting their own interests in favoring the abolition of capture. The most efficient navy must in the nature of things accomplish the greatest injury to enemy commerce. Capture, if the Declaration of Paris were observed, would become a less decisive factor, but one that would be most effective, in the hands of the navy which could most nearly interdict the use of the sea to its enemy's fleets of war.
The situation that exists demands, however, that governments so shape their policies as to ensure that whatever advance in principle is accomplished shall be made effective. Accordingly we find that the proposition of immunity has received within the last decade a wider interpretation in parliamentary discussion and international conferences. Henceforth it can hardly be considered except in relation to the various elements — blockade, contraband, continuous voyage, visit and search, war zones — that are capable of being incorporated with the basic element, capture, into "systems" for the “control of enemy trade,” systems designed with the object of disorganizing utterly the economic life of an enemy state.
Reviewing the history of capture, estimating the value of existing legal limitations upon it, regarding the nature of foreign trade, recognizing the varying interests of states, estimating the effectiveness of maritime operations against commerce in the present war, one is inclined to ask whether the Declaration of Paris did not grant a degree of immunity greater than the spirit and conditions of the period justified. Assuredly certain of the means which have been taken to evade its rules have been defensible in reason to an extent that has baffled the efforts directed toward maintaining them in effectiveness. It is this consideration that deprives the situation of a discouraging aspect from the standpoint of international law. That one result of the tendency toward an adaptation of the rules of warfare to changed conditions has been that the trend today appears to be away from the realization of immunity for private property from capture at sea is a consideration of minor importance if at the same
time a just equation of relative advantage has been preserved between belligerents. Assuming that neutral interests also must receive consideration, and granting that they have not been adequately protected, it is inevitable that, while resort to war continues, accepted rules will have to be revised in the light of circumstances unforeseen at the time of their formulation. The principle of immunity is far from being realized in practice today, not because belligerents choose to disregard the rules of international law, but because under present conditions the destruction of an enemy's trade in its entirety appears to constitute an object of warfare of the first importance. So long as that attitude persists, there will be necessary a work of reconstruction which will select and legalize those extensions of practice which are consistent with the progress of international law and will reject other extensions the operation of which is contrary to progress.
HAROLD SCOTT QUIGLEY.
THE HELLENIC CRISIS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
It is not the broad-chested and broad-backed men that are the safest, but those who think well prevail everywhere. Thus the broad-ribbed ox is driven in the path-way by a little whip. — Sophocles, Ajax. 1248–52. a
THE Hellenic crisis which, from the beginning of the European War up to the present time (December 15, 1916), baffled all political calculations and brought Greece to the very verge of destruction, is principally due to the fundamental difference in the conception of the Constitution by the King of the Hellenes, on one side, and the Hellenic nation, at large, on the other. This divergence of views between sovereign and people, in general, not only resulted in an internal upheaval and external pressure culminating in a forcible intervention, but also left a stigma on the country on account of the violation of solemn treaty obligations.
But the ruler of Greece and his ministers, who execute the orders of their King, not only repudiate the charge of the alleged violation of the provisions of the Constitution and the obligations of a treaty, but claim that although, as a matter of fact, they observed a “benevolent neutrality” towards the Quadruple Entente, as promised, and strict neutrality towards the Teutonic Powers and their satellites, as the rules of international law prescribe, the territory of their country was occupied or invaded by both sets of belligerents, followed by various acts of spoliation. The former, namely, the Allies, pretend that their initial occupation of Greek territory was done at the invitation of the Greek Government of the time, and that the subsequent occupation and the other coercive measures were due to the unneutral conduct of the Greek King, acting through his nominees,
* An allusion to the physique of King Constantine and the wisdom of Mr. Venizelos.
the Ministers. The latter, namely the Central Powers and their allies, allege that, being entitled to an equal treatment by Greece as & neutral state, the invasion and occupation of Greek territory is justified. In other words, the Teutonic group contend that as Greece willingly or unwillingly allowed the use of her territory to their enemies as a base of military operations against them, they also have the same right to utilize such territory for the same purpose.
The questions which will, therefore, be here examined are:
First: Whether Constantine, the King of the Hellenes, violated the Constitution of the country, setting thereby at naught the liberties of the people, and imposed his personal policy, both in the internal and external affairs of Greece.
Second: Whether the King and the Government installed by him after the fall of the Cabinet presided over by Mr. Venizelos, by refusing to afford military assistance to Serbia when the territory of the latter country was invaded by the Bulgarian army, violated the obligations arising out of the treaty of alliance between Greece and Serbia.
Third: Whether the occupation and use of Greek territory by the Allies for military purposes and the forcible measures taken by them against Greece, and the invasion of such territory by the Central Powers and their supporters, and the consequences resulting from it, are justifiable either by reason of a treaty obligation or unneutral conduct on the part of King Constantine's Government.
The first question is connected with constitutional law, the second and third concern international law. They will therefore be examined in their order.
But in order to comprehend the questions at issue, it is necessary to review shortly the historical development of the Constitution of Greece and the events which gave rise to the Hellenic crisis, resulting in the formation of the Provisional Government now established in the capital of Macedonia, namely, in Salonica.
Any one conversant with the history and social life of modern Greece cannot but be struck with a national characteristic of the Hellenic people, that is, their intense love of political and personal liberty, and, as a consequence, their resentment toward anything