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INDEX.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT.
See MARRIAGE, 372.

ACTION.

1. For assault — criminal prosecution.] The civil remedy of a person injured
by a felonious assault and battery is not suspended till the offender has
been prosecuted criminally. Nowlan v. Griffin (Me.), 45, and note, 46.
For purchase-money of counterfeit bonds—condition precedent — return
of bonds — repayment of redemption money.] A purchaser and holder
of counterfeit United States bonds, redeemed by the United States after his
purchase, may recover the purchase-money without returning the bonds,
and before repaying the United States. Brewster v. Burnett (Mass.), 203.
3. Set-off-demands by State against citizens.] The drawer of a draft,
accepted for his accommodation, delivered it to the State in payment of his
debt to it. He afterward filed a bill against the State and the acceptor to
set off against such draft a demand due from the State to him and grow-
ing out of a distinct transaction. Held, that the bill could not be main-
tained. Raymond v. State (Miss.), 382.

terms.

4 Remedies for breach of agreement.] A purchaser signed and delivered to
the seller a written agreement to buy shares of stock from him on speci-
fied terms. The seller did not sign, but orally agreed to sell on those
The seller tendered the stock and requested the price, but the
purchaser declined to fulfill. In an action to recover the purchase-price,
held, that the action was maintainable; that the seller might thus sue, or
he might sell the stock, apply the proceeds and recover the balance; or
retain the stock and recover the difference between the contract-price and
the market-price as damages. Mason v. Decker (N. Y.), 190.

5. Joint wrong-doers — injury by one to the other in joint wrongful act.]
The plaintiff, an innkeeper, unlawfully sold the defendant intoxicating
liquor, by reason whereof he became intoxicated, and behaved in a disor.
derly manner and assaulted the plaintiff in the inn. In an action of tres-
pass brought therefor by the innkeeper, held, that as the statute rendered
him jointly liable under such circumstances for any wrong perpetrated by
defendant, he was not entitled to recover. Aldrich v. Harvey (Vt.), 501.
Against a State for negligent loss of goods left in custody of State for
inspection.] With a view to raising a revenue, a State statute required
the inspection of tobacco and the storing of it in the State tobacco ware-
houses for that purpose. The plaintiff stored his tobacco in conformity
with that law, and while so stored it was destroyed by fire. The plaintiff
was enabled by special leave of the legislature to sue therefor. He

ACTION-Continued.

brought action therefor, alleging that the loss occurred through the neg.
ligence of the State. Held, on demurrer, that there was no contract or
obligation on the part of the State to keep the tobacco safe, and that the
State was not liable for the loss as bailee, or in any other capacity.
Moore v. State of Maryland (Md.), 483.

Against sub-lessee on assigned underlease.] See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 216.
Lawful diversion of water maliciously performed.] See WATER, 93.
For interest as damages after payment of principal.] See INTEREST, 82.
Of National bank on purchased note.] See NATIONAL BANK, 235.
By married woman for slander.] See SLANDER AND Libel, 527.
For damages when cause of, too remote.] See DAMAGES, 607.

See INJUNCTION, 448.

ADMINISTRATOR.

See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.

ADMISSIONS.

Of counsel - when binding on new trial.] See EVIDENCE, 40.

AGENCY.

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1. Agent ― authority to execute deed — when principal bound.] The au-

thority of an agent to execute a deed in behalf of his principal need not
be given in express terms; but may be implied from the express power
given. The power to sell the land of the principal necessarily implies
the power to execute a proper deed to carry the sale into effect. Thus :
At a legal town meeting" chose H. agent to sell the balance of the town
landing, if he thinks it will be for the interest of the town to do so."
Held, that by this vote H. had authority to sell the demanded premises,
and to execute a proper deed of conveyance thereof in behalf of the town.
In Maine, where a deed is executed by an agent or attorney with author-
ity therefor, and it appears by the deed that it was the intention of the
parties to bind the principal or constituent—that it should be his deed,
and not the deed of the agent or attorney - it must be regarded as the
deed of the principal or constituent, though signed by the agent or attor-
ney in his own name. R. S., ch. 73, §§ 10 and 15. In determining the
meaning of the parties to a deed, recourse must be had to the whole in-
strument. The deed sets out that the inhabitants of the town of N.
conveyed to Clark a certain track of land. In witness whereof, they, "by
the hand of Hatch, hereunto duly authorized, .. have set their
seal, and the said Hatch has hereunto subscribed his name." Hatch, as
agent of N., acknowledged the instrument to be the free act and deed of
the inhabitants of the town. Held, that it was the deed of the inhabitants
of N. Inhabitants of Nobleboro v. Clark (Me.), 22.


& Power of attorney, construction of.] Defendant executed a power of at-
torney authorizing his son-in-law, P., " to draw and indorse any check or
checks, promissory note or notes, on any bank in the city of New York in

AGENCY- Continued.

which I may have an account, and especially in the Irving National Bank
of said city, and to do any and all matters and things connected with my
account in said Irving National Bank or any other bank in said city, which
I myself might or could do," etc. The words "promissory note or notes"
were interlined. P. executed in the name of defendant, and delivered to
plaintiff's testator, two promissory notes payable at a bank where defend-
ant had no account. In an action on the notes, held, that the making of
them was unauthorized and defendant was not liable. Craighead v.
Peterson (N. Y.), 150.

2 Ratification.] A mortgage, conditioned to secure the payment of notes
executed by P., the mortgagor's son-in-law, in the name of the mortgagor,
but which were in fact unauthorized, was executed at P.'s request, upon
lands which P. really owned, but the title to which had been taken in the
mortgagor's name without his knowledge, the mortgagor supposing the
mortgage was for the benefit of P. or his wife. In an action against the
mortgagor on the notes, he testified that he did not suppose the mortgage
was given to secure notes purporting to be made by him. The notes were
not given in his business nor for his benefit, nor did it appear that he ever
received any benefit from them. Held, that to constitute a ratification the
act must have been deliberate, intentional, and with knowledge of all the
circumstances, and that the evidence warranted a finding that the mortga
gor did not ratify P.'s acts. lb.

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The defendant by a power of at-
make drafts on me from time to

4. Execution of instrument by agent—when agent personally bound.] A
promissory note of this form: "One year after date we promise to pay to
the order of A B, one thousand dollars, value received," and signed
"George Moore, treasurer of Mechanic Falls Dairying Association," is the
note of Moore and not of the association; and it makes no difference that
the plural" we is used instead of "I." Mellen v. Moore (Me.), 77.
5. Power of attorney — construction of.]
torney authorized L. as my agent, to
time, as may be necessary for the purchase of lumber on my account, and
to consign the same to the care of S. & Co." L. drew drafts in his own
name, which the plaintiff discounted upon the faith and possession of the
power of attorney. In an action upon the drafts, held, that the authority
conferred was absolute and equivalent to an unconditional engagement to
pay such drafts as the agent should deem necessary, and it was immaterial
whether he described himself as agent or not. Merchants' Bank of Canada
v. Griswold (N. Y.), 159.

6. Delivery of principal's goods by general agent for his private debt.}
The plaintiffs were merchant tailors at C., in New Hampshire, with a
branch at M., in Vermont, in charge of their general agent C.
The latter,
owing a debt to the defendant, a physician residing there, delivered him
a suit of clothes belonging to the plaintiffs on account thereof, the de-
fendant supposing that C. had authority so to do, but knowing that the
goods belonged to plaintiffs. The plaintiffs having charged the goods to
defendant, held, that they were entitled to recover therefor in an action
of book account. Stewart v. Woodward (Vt.), 488.

AGENCY- Continued.

1 Authority of agent to sell principal's goods as his own.] A travelling sales-
man had in his possession a horse belonging to his principals, and used it
in their business. His principals wrote him that they should charge him
with the horse unless he paid for it, or returned it to them, and accounted
for his sales. He did not pay for it, or return, or account, but sold the
horse, showing the purchaser the letter. Held, that the letter was not a
proposition of sale, and the purchaser got no title. Calhoun v. Thompson
(Ala.), 754.

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Knowledge by insurance agent of breach of condition.] See INSURANCE, 535.
Insurance broker's note in payment of premium for principal.] See INSUR-
ANCE, 42.

See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 257.

ALTERATION.

See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

ANIMALS.

1. Dog "running at large ”— accidental shooting of, while chasing game.] A
hound kept for the chase, and kept chained when not hunting, was pursu-
ing a fox, followed by his master, the plaintiff, and S., his companion and
fellow huntsman. While out of sight and hearing of his master but near
to S., the hound was accidentally shot by defendant in firing at the fox.
Held, that the hound was not " running at large " within the meaning of a
statute authorizing the killing of animals running at large, and that de-
fendant was liable in damages. Wright v. Clark (Vt.), 496, and note, 500.
2. Liability of owner for act of trespassing.] A dog, while trespassing on the
plaintiff's land, killed his cow. Held, that the owner of the dog was lia.
ble for the damage, although he had no previous knowledge of the dog's
vicious propensity. Chunot v. Larson (Wis.), 567, and note, 569.

"

ANNUITY.

Legacy.] A provision in a will for the payment of "$500 per year for ten
years to
B., in equal quarterly installments, is an annuity contingent on
B.'s life, and not a legacy of $5,000 payable in installments. Bates v.
Barry (Mass.), 207.

Fraudulent.] See FRAUD, 259.

ARREST.

ASSAULT.

Action for, not suspended until criminal prosecution.] See ACTION, 45.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 392, 425.

ATTACHMENT.

Of partner's interest.] See PARTNERSHIP, 19.

BAILMENT.

National bank as special depository.] See NATIONAL BANKS, 508.

See INNKEEPER, 80.

BANKRUPTCY.

Discharge — collateral attack upon.] A discharge in bankruptcy cannot be
collaterally attacked for fraud, but the remedy is by application within
two years to the bankrupt court. Wiley v. Pavey (Ind), 676.

BILL OF LADING.

Shipping receipt - exemption from liability by.] See CARRIER, 118.

BILLS AND NOTES.

See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

BOND.

Additional statutory — liability of surety on.] Where a guardian executed
an additional bond for the performance of his general duties, in conformity
with the requirement of a statute, and it did not appear to have been sub-
sidiary to or security for his original bond, it was held, that a surety on
the additional bond was primarily liable in a suit thereon against him
alone, or jointly with the surety on the original bond, in a suit against
both on both bonds. Allen v. State ex rel. Stevens (Ind.), 672.

BOUNDARY.

To and by a road.] When the line runs "to the road and thence by the
road," the grant is to the center of the road, even though the measure
ment of distances would extend only to the side of the road. Oxton v.
Groves (Me.), 75.

BRIDGES.

See MUNICIPAL CorporatIONS, 352, 657.

BURGLARY.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 405.

BURIAL GROUND.

See ESTOPPEL, 464.

CARRIER.

Where goods are deliv.

1. Shipping receipt -exemption from liability by.]
ered to a carrier for transportation, and before the goods are shipped a bill
of lading or receipt is delivered by him to the shipper, the latter is bound
to examine it and ascertain its contents, and if he accepts it without
objection, he is bound by its terms; he cannot set up ignorance of its con-
tents, and resort cannot be had to prior parol negotiations to vary them.
Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Memphis & Charleston R. R. Co. (N. Y.), 113.
2. Liability for loss of goods of persons illegally doing business in a partner-
VOL. XXVIII — 102

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