ACKNOWLEDGMENT. See MARRIAGE, 372.
1. For assault — criminal prosecution.] The civil remedy of a person injured by a felonious assault and battery is not suspended till the offender has been prosecuted criminally. Nowlan v. Griffin (Me.), 45, and note, 46. For purchase-money of counterfeit bonds—condition precedent — return of bonds — repayment of redemption money.] A purchaser and holder of counterfeit United States bonds, redeemed by the United States after his purchase, may recover the purchase-money without returning the bonds, and before repaying the United States. Brewster v. Burnett (Mass.), 203. 3. Set-off-demands by State against citizens.] The drawer of a draft, accepted for his accommodation, delivered it to the State in payment of his debt to it. He afterward filed a bill against the State and the acceptor to set off against such draft a demand due from the State to him and grow- ing out of a distinct transaction. Held, that the bill could not be main- tained. Raymond v. State (Miss.), 382.
4 Remedies for breach of agreement.] A purchaser signed and delivered to the seller a written agreement to buy shares of stock from him on speci- fied terms. The seller did not sign, but orally agreed to sell on those The seller tendered the stock and requested the price, but the purchaser declined to fulfill. In an action to recover the purchase-price, held, that the action was maintainable; that the seller might thus sue, or he might sell the stock, apply the proceeds and recover the balance; or retain the stock and recover the difference between the contract-price and the market-price as damages. Mason v. Decker (N. Y.), 190.
5. Joint wrong-doers — injury by one to the other in joint wrongful act.] The plaintiff, an innkeeper, unlawfully sold the defendant intoxicating liquor, by reason whereof he became intoxicated, and behaved in a disor. derly manner and assaulted the plaintiff in the inn. In an action of tres- pass brought therefor by the innkeeper, held, that as the statute rendered him jointly liable under such circumstances for any wrong perpetrated by defendant, he was not entitled to recover. Aldrich v. Harvey (Vt.), 501. Against a State for negligent loss of goods left in custody of State for inspection.] With a view to raising a revenue, a State statute required the inspection of tobacco and the storing of it in the State tobacco ware- houses for that purpose. The plaintiff stored his tobacco in conformity with that law, and while so stored it was destroyed by fire. The plaintiff was enabled by special leave of the legislature to sue therefor. He
brought action therefor, alleging that the loss occurred through the neg. ligence of the State. Held, on demurrer, that there was no contract or obligation on the part of the State to keep the tobacco safe, and that the State was not liable for the loss as bailee, or in any other capacity. Moore v. State of Maryland (Md.), 483.
Against sub-lessee on assigned underlease.] See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 216. Lawful diversion of water maliciously performed.] See WATER, 93. For interest as damages after payment of principal.] See INTEREST, 82. Of National bank on purchased note.] See NATIONAL BANK, 235. By married woman for slander.] See SLANDER AND Libel, 527. For damages when cause of, too remote.] See DAMAGES, 607.
ADMINISTRATOR.
See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
Of counsel - when binding on new trial.] See EVIDENCE, 40.
1. Agent ― authority to execute deed — when principal bound.] The au-
thority of an agent to execute a deed in behalf of his principal need not be given in express terms; but may be implied from the express power given. The power to sell the land of the principal necessarily implies the power to execute a proper deed to carry the sale into effect. Thus : At a legal town meeting" chose H. agent to sell the balance of the town landing, if he thinks it will be for the interest of the town to do so." Held, that by this vote H. had authority to sell the demanded premises, and to execute a proper deed of conveyance thereof in behalf of the town. In Maine, where a deed is executed by an agent or attorney with author- ity therefor, and it appears by the deed that it was the intention of the parties to bind the principal or constituent—that it should be his deed, and not the deed of the agent or attorney - it must be regarded as the deed of the principal or constituent, though signed by the agent or attor- ney in his own name. R. S., ch. 73, §§ 10 and 15. In determining the meaning of the parties to a deed, recourse must be had to the whole in- strument. The deed sets out that the inhabitants of the town of N. conveyed to Clark a certain track of land. In witness whereof, they, "by the hand of Hatch, hereunto duly authorized, .. have set their seal, and the said Hatch has hereunto subscribed his name." Hatch, as agent of N., acknowledged the instrument to be the free act and deed of the inhabitants of the town. Held, that it was the deed of the inhabitants of N. Inhabitants of Nobleboro v. Clark (Me.), 22.
& Power of attorney, construction of.] Defendant executed a power of at- torney authorizing his son-in-law, P., " to draw and indorse any check or checks, promissory note or notes, on any bank in the city of New York in
which I may have an account, and especially in the Irving National Bank of said city, and to do any and all matters and things connected with my account in said Irving National Bank or any other bank in said city, which I myself might or could do," etc. The words "promissory note or notes" were interlined. P. executed in the name of defendant, and delivered to plaintiff's testator, two promissory notes payable at a bank where defend- ant had no account. In an action on the notes, held, that the making of them was unauthorized and defendant was not liable. Craighead v. Peterson (N. Y.), 150.
2 Ratification.] A mortgage, conditioned to secure the payment of notes executed by P., the mortgagor's son-in-law, in the name of the mortgagor, but which were in fact unauthorized, was executed at P.'s request, upon lands which P. really owned, but the title to which had been taken in the mortgagor's name without his knowledge, the mortgagor supposing the mortgage was for the benefit of P. or his wife. In an action against the mortgagor on the notes, he testified that he did not suppose the mortgage was given to secure notes purporting to be made by him. The notes were not given in his business nor for his benefit, nor did it appear that he ever received any benefit from them. Held, that to constitute a ratification the act must have been deliberate, intentional, and with knowledge of all the circumstances, and that the evidence warranted a finding that the mortga gor did not ratify P.'s acts. lb.
The defendant by a power of at- make drafts on me from time to
4. Execution of instrument by agent—when agent personally bound.] A promissory note of this form: "One year after date we promise to pay to the order of A B, one thousand dollars, value received," and signed "George Moore, treasurer of Mechanic Falls Dairying Association," is the note of Moore and not of the association; and it makes no difference that the plural" we is used instead of "I." Mellen v. Moore (Me.), 77. 5. Power of attorney — construction of.] torney authorized L. as my agent, to time, as may be necessary for the purchase of lumber on my account, and to consign the same to the care of S. & Co." L. drew drafts in his own name, which the plaintiff discounted upon the faith and possession of the power of attorney. In an action upon the drafts, held, that the authority conferred was absolute and equivalent to an unconditional engagement to pay such drafts as the agent should deem necessary, and it was immaterial whether he described himself as agent or not. Merchants' Bank of Canada v. Griswold (N. Y.), 159.
6. Delivery of principal's goods by general agent for his private debt.} The plaintiffs were merchant tailors at C., in New Hampshire, with a branch at M., in Vermont, in charge of their general agent C. The latter, owing a debt to the defendant, a physician residing there, delivered him a suit of clothes belonging to the plaintiffs on account thereof, the de- fendant supposing that C. had authority so to do, but knowing that the goods belonged to plaintiffs. The plaintiffs having charged the goods to defendant, held, that they were entitled to recover therefor in an action of book account. Stewart v. Woodward (Vt.), 488.
1 Authority of agent to sell principal's goods as his own.] A travelling sales- man had in his possession a horse belonging to his principals, and used it in their business. His principals wrote him that they should charge him with the horse unless he paid for it, or returned it to them, and accounted for his sales. He did not pay for it, or return, or account, but sold the horse, showing the purchaser the letter. Held, that the letter was not a proposition of sale, and the purchaser got no title. Calhoun v. Thompson (Ala.), 754.
Knowledge by insurance agent of breach of condition.] See INSURANCE, 535. Insurance broker's note in payment of premium for principal.] See INSUR- ANCE, 42.
See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 257.
See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
1. Dog "running at large ”— accidental shooting of, while chasing game.] A hound kept for the chase, and kept chained when not hunting, was pursu- ing a fox, followed by his master, the plaintiff, and S., his companion and fellow huntsman. While out of sight and hearing of his master but near to S., the hound was accidentally shot by defendant in firing at the fox. Held, that the hound was not " running at large " within the meaning of a statute authorizing the killing of animals running at large, and that de- fendant was liable in damages. Wright v. Clark (Vt.), 496, and note, 500. 2. Liability of owner for act of trespassing.] A dog, while trespassing on the plaintiff's land, killed his cow. Held, that the owner of the dog was lia. ble for the damage, although he had no previous knowledge of the dog's vicious propensity. Chunot v. Larson (Wis.), 567, and note, 569.
Legacy.] A provision in a will for the payment of "$500 per year for ten years to B., in equal quarterly installments, is an annuity contingent on B.'s life, and not a legacy of $5,000 payable in installments. Bates v. Barry (Mass.), 207.
Fraudulent.] See FRAUD, 259.
Action for, not suspended until criminal prosecution.] See ACTION, 45.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 392, 425.
Of partner's interest.] See PARTNERSHIP, 19.
National bank as special depository.] See NATIONAL BANKS, 508.
Discharge — collateral attack upon.] A discharge in bankruptcy cannot be collaterally attacked for fraud, but the remedy is by application within two years to the bankrupt court. Wiley v. Pavey (Ind), 676.
Shipping receipt - exemption from liability by.] See CARRIER, 118.
BILLS AND NOTES.
See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
Additional statutory — liability of surety on.] Where a guardian executed an additional bond for the performance of his general duties, in conformity with the requirement of a statute, and it did not appear to have been sub- sidiary to or security for his original bond, it was held, that a surety on the additional bond was primarily liable in a suit thereon against him alone, or jointly with the surety on the original bond, in a suit against both on both bonds. Allen v. State ex rel. Stevens (Ind.), 672.
To and by a road.] When the line runs "to the road and thence by the road," the grant is to the center of the road, even though the measure ment of distances would extend only to the side of the road. Oxton v. Groves (Me.), 75.
See MUNICIPAL CorporatIONS, 352, 657.
BURGLARY.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 405.
BURIAL GROUND.
See ESTOPPEL, 464.
1. Shipping receipt -exemption from liability by.] ered to a carrier for transportation, and before the goods are shipped a bill of lading or receipt is delivered by him to the shipper, the latter is bound to examine it and ascertain its contents, and if he accepts it without objection, he is bound by its terms; he cannot set up ignorance of its con- tents, and resort cannot be had to prior parol negotiations to vary them. Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Memphis & Charleston R. R. Co. (N. Y.), 113. 2. Liability for loss of goods of persons illegally doing business in a partner- VOL. XXVIII — 102
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