Your letter to Mr. Kelley asserted your Subcommittee's "legislative oversight jurisdiction with regard to wiretapping and electronic surveillance." As you know, I have been in continuing discussions with Chairman Rodino and Congressman Hutchinson with respect to the establishment of a joint House-Senate Committee for FEI oversight or, at the very least, a special Subcommittee of an appropriate House Committee to handle FBI oversight. In my judgment, a joint committee or subcommittee for specific FBI oversight is particularly essential with respect to requests such as the one contained in your November 14 letter. As you are undoubtedly aware, and as you have previously been advised, the materials you requested represent materials of the highest national security sensitivity. Accordingly, it is imperative that the number of individuals having knowledge of these matters be minimized so as to reduce the possibility of leaks or other unauthorized disclosures. We have already provided substantial information along the lines you requested to the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on FBI oversight, and, after coordination with others in the intelligence community, are willing to do so in the case of the appropriate House oversight body as soon as the House of Representatives resolves the jurisdictional issues it is now considering. We look forward to having with the House the same kind of constructive FBI oversight relationship we currently enjoy with the Senate. Sincerely, WILLIAM B. SAXBE, Attorney General. NOVEMBER 14, 1974. Hon. WILLIAM B. SAXBE, Washington, D.C. MY DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: On October 23, I wrote to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation requesting the following information: 1. The exact number of warrantless national security wiretaps and electronic surveillances during 1972 and 1973. 2. The identity of the subjects of these taps and surveillances. 3. The identity of all Government agencies receiving intelligence information based on these taps and surveillances and the number of requests for taps and surveillance received from each agency. 4. A representative sample of the logs, transcripts and FBI reports based on national security taps and surveillances. Director Kelley replied that he has referred my letter to you for your views as to how our request might be fulfilled. I regret that the Director felt unable to be more responsive to my letter; however, I look forward to hearing from you as soon as possible as to a time and place at which the Subcommittee staff may begin the review outlined in my October 23 letter. Over forty members of the House, representing both political parties, have sponsored legislation which would either greatly restrict or eliminate that power of the Executive to engage in warrantless wiretapping. In order for our Subcommittee to evaluate the merits of this legislation, we must have access to the information requested. As we are anxious to start our work in this field, I look forward to a prompt reply. Sincerely yours, ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice. Hon. ROBERT W. KASTEN MEIER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Civil Liberties and Administration of Justice, Judiciary Committee, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR Mr. CHAIRMAN: This will acknowledge your letter of October 23, 1974, in which you ask for information concerning national security electronic surveillances. I have given the most careful consideration to your request as I recognize your interest and the interest of other members of your Subcommittee in the question of national security electronic surveillance practice. However, after reviewing the content of your request I have determined that it would be inappropriate for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, acting unilaterally, to respond to your questions. As you are aware, the information you are seeking in behalf of your Subcommittee involves not only the Federal Bureau of Investigation but other agencies comprising the United States intelligence community, including the Central Intelligence Agency, whose Director as Director of Central Intelligence is charged by law with protecting the security of United States intelligence sources and methods. Accordingly, I have referred your letter to the Attorney General and solicited his views as to how your request might be fulfilled in a manner consistent with the interest of other Executive Branch agencies. Sincerely yours, CLARENCE M. KELLEY, Director. OCTOBER 23, 1974. Hon. CLARENCE M. KELLEY, DEAR MR. KELLEY: As you know, the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, of which I am Chairman, has legislative oversight jurisdiction with regard to wiretapping and electronic surveillance. We are pleased to have heard testimony on this subject from Mr. Edward S. Miller of your staff at our hearings on April 29 of this year. Mr. Miller understandably declined to discuss the details of warrantless national security surveillance in open session, but stated that the Bureau would be most willing to testify on the subject in a closed hearing. However, prior to accepting this offer of further testimony, the Subcommittee will require the following information: 1. The exact number of warrantless national security wiretaps and electronic surveillances during 1972 and 1973. 2. The identity of the subjects of these taps and surveillances. 3. The identity of all Government agencies receiving intelligence information based on these taps and surveillances and the number of requests for taps and surveillance received from each agency. 4. A representative sample of the logs, transcripts and FBI reports based on national security taps and surveillances. Recognizing the Bureau's concern with security, I would suggest that the information requested be screened by the Subcommittee's counsel, Mr. Bruce Lehman, so that only that which is essential to our inquiry need be presented to the full Subcommittee. You may be assured that any information given to Mr. Lehman will be kept in strict confidence and shared only with me. I will then make the information available to the Subcommittee on a need to know basis. As we are anxious to begin work. I would appreciate receiving from you, by close of business November 6, a reply to this letter stating the time and place at which Mr. Lehman may begin reviewing the requested information. Sincerely yours, REPORTS OF FEDERAL AGENCIES CONCERNING ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MADE TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR FISCAL YEARS 1973 AND 1974 Hon. ROBERT W. KASTEN MEIER, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., July 30, 1975. Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and Administration of Justice, Judiciary Committee, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your letter of May 1, 1975, to the Attorney General requesting the reports of Federal agencies concerning electronic surveillance made to the Attorney General for fiscal years 1973 and 1974. The following materials are supplied herewith: 1. The full reports for 1973 and 1974 of: The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms of the United States Treasury. The Drug Enforcement Administration of the Department of Justice. The Atomic Energy Commission. The Department of Agriculture. The United States Secret Service of the Department of the Treasury. The Department of Commerce. 2. The full reports for 1973 off: The Department of Transportation. The Department of Labor. We do not have the reports of these two agencies for 1974. However, our records reflect that they did not conduct any consensual surveillances during that period. 3. Report of the Central Intelligence Agency for 1974. 4. The partial reports of: The Internal Revenue Service of the Department of the Treasury. The Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice. Mr. W. A. Bates, Assistant Commissioner (Inspection), has requested that certain portions of the Internal Revenue Service reports be withheld from this submission because disclosure could jeopardize ongoing investigations. Mr. James F. Greene, Deputy Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, has requested that certain names and addresses be deleted from his organization's report because disclosure could jeopardize ongoing investigations or endanger law enforcement personnel. 5. Mr. Thomas Delaney, Acting Chief, Value Branch, Office of Rulings and Regulations of the United States Customs Service has asked that his organization's reports be withheld from public disclosure as constituting material for which exemption has been claimed under the Freedom of Information Act. Mr. Delaney states that the reports are interagency memoranda which a private party could not discover in litigation with the agency. He further states that the reports are based on investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes disclosure of which would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of confidential sources and reveal confidential information furnished only by a confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel. 6. The reports of the Department of Defense as well as the fiscal 1973 report of the Central Intelligence Agency are classified, therefore, you may wish to pursue your request directly through those agencies. Sincerely, MICHAEL M. UHLMANN. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, Hon. ELLIOT RICHARDSON, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. RICHARDSON: This letter is in response to a memorandum from your office dated October 16, 1972, concerning the subjects of monitoring private conversations with the consent of one of the parties and an inventory of electronic and mechanical equipment designed for the monitoring of conversations. An inventory of this agency's electronic and mechanical equipment designed for monitoring conversations is enclosed with this letter. The following is a brief summary of the results obtained by the use of this equipment during fiscal year 1973. The most common usage of electronic surveillance equipment during the past year was for the protection of agents and informers working in an undercover capacity. However, there were several occasions when the equipment was used to signal other officers and cause an arrest and seizure to be made at the time of violations. An example of the use of the equipment occurred during March of this year when an agent working in an undercover capacity, concealed a radio transmitter on his person. He purchased explosive materials from an individual and at the same time gave a signal to other officers, who arrested the violator. The investigation resulted in the seizure of 14 homemade blasting caps, 23 canisters of explosive materials and numerous chemicals used to manufacture bombs. During fiscal year 1973, we requested the use of electronic equipment 80 times. The equipment was not used on 20 of these occasions for various reasons. The use of the equipment resulted in the arrest of 10 persons and the seizure of numerous contraband firearms and explosive materials. The protection given to our agents working in an undercover capacity by the use of this equipment was most important. Sincerely yours, Enclosure. REX D. DAVIS. Inventory of mechanical and/or electronic surveillance in custody of the Bureau Acting Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. KEENEY: In response to your letter of May 21, 1975, please find enclosed a copy of our report dated July 22, 1974, regarding the monitoring of private conversations with the consent of a party during fiscal year 1974. Sincerely yours, REX D. DAVIS, Director. Hon. WILLIAM B. SAXBE, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. SAXBE: This letter is in response to a memorandum from your office dated October 15, 1972, requiring the reporting of monitored private conversations with the consent of one of the parties and an inventory of electronic and mechanical equipment designed for the monitoring of such conversations owned by the Bureau. An inventory of this agency's electronic and mechanical equipment designed for monitoring conversations is enclosed with this letter. The following is a brief summary of the results obtained by the use of this equipment during Fiscal Year 1974. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms conducted 24,812 investigations during Fiscal Year 1974 and we requested authorization to conduct electronic surveillance with the consent of one of the parties in 115 of them. Authorization was granted by your office in 112 of these investigations and permission was denied in 3 cases. Our use of this equipment resulted in numerous arrests and indictments and the seizure of contraband firearms and explosive material. The most common usage of electronic surveillance equipment during the past year was for the protection of undercover agents and informants in conducting firearms and explosive investigations. However, there were several other occasions when the equipment was used, such as the investigation of the threats to government witnesses, impersonation of Federal agents and threats against the life of special agents. An example of our use of the quipment occurred during November of last year when a total of five adults were arrested as a result of special agents monitoring the conversation between our informant and the suspects. The two principal suspects were arrested as they were leaving their location for the purpose of committing an armed robbery of a bank messenger. At the time, both subjects were armed with a fully loaded shotgun. Incidental to this arrest the Tacoma, Washington, Police Department arrested three other suspects for possession of a large quantity of dangerous drugs, marijuana and narcotic paraphernalia. We believe that the use of this equipment is a useful investigative technique in enforcing the laws the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms is charged with administering and that it is especially valuable in the protection it affords our special agents working in an undercover capacity when dealing with firearms and explosive violators. Sincerely yours, REX D. DAVIS, Director. Inventory of mechanical and/or electronic surveillance equipment in custody of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Category Surveillance kits... Miniature transmitters_. Telephone induction coils__. Briefcase recorders Miniature recorders___ Quantity 15 69 1 5 8 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, August 6, 1973. Memorandum to: Honorable Elliot Richardson, Attorney General. tration. Subject: Annual report regarding electrical, mechanical, and monitoring equipment and their usage. The following is submitted in compliance with the Attorney General's memorandum to all Executive Departments and Agencies dated October 16, 1972, relative to the monitoring of private conversations with the consent of a party. The results obtained during FY 1973 by the use of eavesdropping equipment included the protection of undercover Agents and informants and the safeguarding of large sums of Official Government Funds during the purchases of narcotic drug evidence. Eavesdropping equipment was also used to corroborate the conversations of informants during negotiations with drug suspects; to provide intelligence to surveilling Agents of precise times to make arrests during undercover negotiations; and to advise surveilling Agents of the proposed activities of the undercover Agent or informant. The primary reason for requesting authorization to utilize eavesdropping equipment by Agents in the field is for the protection of the undercover Agent and/or informant. In many cases, emergency use of eavesdropping equipment was granted where circumstances dictating the cases did not develop in time to obtain advance authority from the Department of Justice. Drug Enforcement Administration Agents are continuously working at night, on weekends, and on holidays, where in many instances, the safety of the Agents involved in the investigations and cases is at stake. Prior authorization from the Department of Justice cannot be obtained in these cases, therefore, to insure the safety of the Agents involved emergency provisions are used. In further compliance with the Justice Department memorandum, attached is an inventory of Drug Enforcement Administration electronic and mechanical equipment designed for the monitoring of conversations. INVENTORY OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION Location and number Item 1 BHCC-Bell & Howell Communications Co. BHCC R.F. Surveillance Kits1 BHCC T-2 Transmitter BHCC R-2 Receiver Motorola VHF Receiver Portable Sony Video Systems |