-7 In comparison, in FY 1993 the OGC had a total caseload of 14,317 with a budget of Consequently, the average cost per case to the OGC was approximately $634 in FY 3. Why shouldn't we wait until the NPR has reinvented the federal labor-management relationship and use their new model for the legislative branch? Isn't it possible that it would be more efficient and cost effective? As I noted in my response to questions 1 and 2 on page 5, I believe that the NPC Questions on Application of the NLRA to the Legislative Branch: -- It is my understanding that several of the bills before the Committee would go beyond the application of the FLRA and would actually extend the National Labor Relations Act which now applies to the private sector to the legislative branch as well. 1. Do these bills propose that the full range of National Labor Relations Act rules and regulations would be applied to the legislative branch, including collective bargaining over wages and benefits, or are there some exclusions or limitations on coverage. The intent and provisions of these various bills would probably be better explained by the bills' authors. 2. Once legislative branch employees are organized into unions and bargaining units under protection of the NLRA, would their unions or bargaining units be allowed to affiliate with existing private sector labor organizations? The only prohibition against affiliation under the NLRA is the prohibition against the representation of guards by any union affiliated with a union that represents nonguards. - 8 3. Do you see any potential for legislative decisions on issues important to private sector unions to be in any way unfairly influenced by the presence of unionized legislative branch employees inside the legislative process? Our experience to date with legislative employees who are unionized (the Library of Congress and the Government Printing Office) has not indicated any unfair influence over legislative decisions. The extent to which a union representing legislative employees might be able to influence members of Congress would essentially depend on the parameters of the union's bargaining unit--that is, on whether the unit includes employees who enjoy special access to members or who are otherwise in a position to exert influence upon legislative decisions. 4. Under either of the coverage proposals -- FLRA or NLRA, is there any reason for the public at large to be concerned that organized Labor may, through organized legislative branch employees, gain some edge or special consideration when controversial labor legislation or issues are considered by the Congress? Again, any question of whether Congress could be subjected to "undue or 'insider' influence" in considering any matter of legislation would appear to be more appropriately answered by Congress itself. Congress, of course, could decide that legislative branch employees should only be represented by an independent organization not affiliated with any other organization covered by labor-management laws. 5. Why shouldn't the right to strike be extended to employees in the legislative branch? And if the NLRA is applied, will it include the right for covered employees to strike? Congress has already determined in 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (independently of any other labormanagement legislation) that an individual "may not accept or hold a position in the Government of the United States" if that individual participates in a strike against the government, asserts a right to strike against the government, or is even a member of an employee organization which asserts a right to strike against the government. 18 U.S.C. § 1918 imposes criminal penalties for the same conduct. The NLRA provides at 29 U.S.C. § 163 that, while it does not "interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike," it also does not "affect the limitations or qualifications on that right." Application of the NLRA to the legislative branch would not, in itself, overcome the existing prohibition on strikes against the government. 6. Should there be any differences in the application of "labor law" between the legislative branch, the executive branch and the private sector? What are those differences that should be taken into account? -9 There will always be differences between the federal and private sectors. Congress itself will have to determine what differences it should take into account between executive and legislative branch employees. 7. Beyond the obvious benefits for its employees, how will Congress as an institution benefit from extending to the legislative branch and its employees coverage of the "labor law" currently applicable to the executive branch and/or private sectors? Probably the best statement of the benefits of coverage is that made by Congress in enacting the Statute: The Congress finds that- (1) experience in both private and public employment indicates that the statutory protection of the right of employees to organize, bargain collectively, and participate through labor organizations of their own choosing in decisions which affect them- (A) safeguards the public interest, (B) contributes to the effective conduct of public business, and (C) facilitates and encourages the amicable settlements of disputes between employees and their employers involving conditions of employment; and (2) the public interest demands the highest standards of employee performance and the continued development and implementation of modern and progressive work practices to facilitate and improve employee performance and the efficient accomplishment of the operations of the Government. Therefore, labor organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public interest. I have reference to the questions posed by the Honorable Thad Cochran regarding proposed legislation that would include the legislative branch under Chapter 71 of the United States Code (labor-management relations) that were sent to this office by facsimile on July 26, 1994, by Mr. Larry Novey of your office. Forwarded herewith are my responses to such questions; as you know, the Office of the Architect has never had any formal relationship with labor unions except for the effort several years ago to organize the Senate Restaurant employees. That effort resulted in a formal employee vote conducted by the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. The employees decided not to join a union. With that limited experience, my answers to the questions must necessarily be viewed as restricted in their basis for conclusions and could each be prefaced with the introductory phrase, "As I understand it." I trust this is responsive to your request and I shall, of course, be pleased to respond further should you deem that necessary. Sincerely yours, Jang George M.White, FAIA Enclosure 1. RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS POSED BY SENATOR COCHRAN Would all Architect employees be covered under the Act or would certain types of jobs be classified as exempt from the labor-management regulatory scheme? With respect to the labor-management regulatory scheme under Chapter 71 of Title 5 of the United States Code, which would apply to the Office of the Architect of the Capitol if S. 2071 were enacted, the definition of "employee" would not include any "supervisor" or "management official," as defined in 5 U.S.C. 7103, in the Office. Additionally, employees in personnel offices, confidential employees, and professional employees have limitations on the roles they assume under the labor-management regulatory scheme. The FLRA itself and case law determine how the lines would be drawn between covered and non-covered employees. Could unions or bargaining units of employees of the Office of the Architect of the Capitol formally or informally affiliate with existing public sector labor organizations, such as the American Federation of Government Employees, or with a private sector union such as the Electrical Workers" or "Teamsters" for example under the Federal LaborManagement Statute? There does not appear to be any provision in Chapter 71 of Title 5 that would preclude affiliation with existing public sector or private sector labor organizations, including the examples noted in the question. However, Chapter 71 of Title 5 of the United States Code provides that agencies shall only accord recognition to a labor organization that is free from corrupt influences and influences opposed to basic democratic principles. 3. Once unions and their affiliates are established in the legislative branch, do you see any potential for unions in the private sector, through their association or affiliation with legislative unions, to bring any undue or "insider" influence to bear on controversial legislation effecting organized labor? With respect to the Office of the Architect of the Capitol, I do not believe the bringing of undue or "insider" influence regarding controversial legislation is likely. 4. Under the FLRA labor-management scheme, would there be any prohibitions or limit on activities of legislative union members with regard to making known their agreement or solidarity with a position taken by a national union which may represent private sector employees on matters before the Congress? 5 U.S.C. 7102 provides that each employee shall have the right to form, join, or assist any labor organization, or to refrain from such activity freely and without fear of penalty or reprisal, and each employee shall be protected in the exercise of such right, which includes to act for a labor union in the capacity of representative and, in that capacity, to present the views of the labor organization to the Congress. Additionally, employees and labor organizations have First Amendment rights, so it would appear that there are no such prohibitions or limit on such activities except where they interfere with the agency's mission. |