taxes paid by the purchaser, with interest, are usually required.1 Sometimes the statute provides that the purchaser shall be reimbursed for improvements. There is no distinction as to amount between an individual who redeems and the state or county.3 Statutes frequently fix the interest at a very high rate.

Inter

est runs from the time of sale, and not from the time of the actual payment.5

The whole amount must be paid in order to insure redemption, even though certain of the items may be barred by the Statute of Limitations. If the sum actually paid at the sale was less than the amount of the taxes and other charges, this fact will not affect the amount to be tendered. If the payment is to an assignee of the purchaser, it is immaterial what his rights may have cost him; only the costs that have legally accrued need be paid.9 So far as the question of amount is concerned, it is immaterial whether or not a suit to enforce the tax purchaser's claim is pending.10 The full amount prescribed by statute must be paid in order that there may be a redemption.11 In some cases, however, where the deficiency is small, the courts have relaxed the rule.12

intention of the parties that it should be so applied, and no claim for such application was made until after the expiration of the period for redemption. Lamar v. Sheppard, 84 Ga. 561.

1. See various local statutes. See also Comstock v. Cover, 35 Ill. 470; Swan v. Huse, 15 Neb. 465; Byington v. Rider, 9 Iowa 566; Tebbetts v. Charleston, 33 W. Va. 705.

See

2. Towle v. Holt, 14 Neb. 221. also Lynch v. Brudie, 63 Pa. St. 206; Boatmen's Sav. Bank v. Grewe, 1OI Mo. 625; Bender v. Bean, 52 Ark. 132. If improvements are allowed to a bona fide purchaser, one redeeming may be such, although the title which he brought was clearly bad to the eye of a lawyer. House v. Stone, 64 Tex. 677. See also Indiana Rev. Stats. (1881), § 6477.

3. Briscoe v. Ellsworth County, 23 Kan. 334; State v. Haughey, 5 Kan. 625. Where the state bids in property, and afterwards assigns it to a purchaser, the sum paid by such purchaser is "the amount sold for" to be inserted in the notice to redeem and to be paid on redemption. Sperry v. Goodwin, 44 Minn. 207. 4. See various state statutes. In Estes v. Stebbins, 25 Kan. 315, a rate of fifty per cent. was held to be within the power of the legislature to fix. See also Milligan v. Hintrager, 18 Iowa 171; Augustin v. Jennings, 42 Iowa 198. In Kittle v. Shervin, 11 Neb. 65, forty per cent. was upheld. In this state the con

stitution prohibited the enactment of local or special laws regulating interest. 5. So in New York. People v. Cady, 105 N. Y. 299.

6. Long v. Smith, 67 Iowa 22.

7. Under the Iowa statutes, where land offered for sale for two years for delinquent taxes, was finally sold for less than the amount due under the provisions of a statute, it was held that the owner must pay the whole amount of the taxes and penalty in order to redeem. Soper v. Espeset, 63 Iowa 326.

8. Culbertson v.Munson, 104 Ind. 451. 9. Thus, if it is provided that land struck off to a county remains unredeemed for five years, it may be sold, but the five full years must elapse before any steps can be taken towards the second sale, and if costs are made within the five years, they are illegal. Heir v. Rullman, 22 Kan. 606.

10. Tebbetts v. Charleston, 33 W. Va. 705.

11. Chace v. Durfee, 16 R. I. 248.

Tender of amount of purchase-money without the premium allowed by law avails nothing. Lamar v. Sheppard, 84 Ga. 561.

12. A payment of five dollars and ninety-nine cents instead of six dollars and four cents is sufficient, the deficiency being too trivial to invalidate the redemption. Wyatt v. Simpson, 8 W. Va. 394.

The failure to pay anything as

Where land was sold for taxes and under a judgment at the same time, it was held that the whole amount paid, and not that of the taxes only, must be tendered.1 Taxes paid by the purchaser subsequent to redemption cannot be recovered,2 nor can those paid subsequent to the sale but before the deed is made, unless so provided in the statute.3 Neither can taxes levied and due prior to the sale. Where lots are assessed and sold separately, redemption of any one lot must be made by tendering the whole amount due on it.5

12. Notice to Redeem--a. GENERALLY.-The statutes frequently require notice to be given to him whose land has been sold for taxes, of the expiration of the time allowed for redemption, and of the purchaser's intention to apply for a deed. The form and contents of the notice vary with the language of varying statutes.7 The notice must be addressed to the proper person.8 It is presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the land is assessed at the time of notice against the same person as at

printer's fees for publication of notice of the tax sale will not avoid the redemption where the treasurer had no notice of their amount. State v. Harper, 26 Neb. 761.

The notice of the amount required to redeem from a tax sale specified the date of the judgment instead of the date of the sale as the time from which interest was to run, but the consequent increase of the amount required to redeem was little more than one cent. It was held that the defect was not substantial. Robert v. Western Land Assoc., 43 Minn. 3.

In an action to redeem land sold for taxes, the plaintiff tendered and brought into court the amount which he in good faith believed to be due, the exact amount depending upon the construction of a doubtful law. The court found a larger sum to be due, but held that a judgment in his favor should not be disturbed. Kraus v. Montgomery, 114 Ind. 103.

1. Clower v. Fleming, 81 Ga. 247. 2. Byington v. Allen, 11 Iowa 3; Byington v. Walsh, 11 Iowa 27; Byington v. Wood, 12 Iowa 479; Byington v. Hampton, 13 Iowa 23.

If the law provides for the payment of subsequent taxes, the payment of the purchase-money and premium, without such taxes, will not effect a redemption. Harmon v. Steed, 49 Fed. Rep. 779.

3. Stephens v. Holmes, 26 Ark. 48. 4. If the law prescribes that the one redeeming shall pay the amount for which the land sold, with interest

and costs and taxes paid for any subsequent years, he need not tender taxes of previous years. Sheppard v. Clark, 58 Iowa 371.

5. People v. McEwen, 23 Cal. 54.

Where lots have been assessed and sold separately, they must be redeemed separately. Boatmen's Sav. Bank v. Grewe, 101 Mo. 625.

See

6. See various local statutes. also NOTICE, vol. 16, p. 787. See Emeric v. Alvarado, 90 Cal. 444, as to the California statute.

7. See Swan v. Whaley, 75 Iowa. 623; Hinkel v. Krueger, 47 Minn. 497.

In the absence of the required notice, the statutory limitation may not be set up in defense to a suit to redeem, but a notice which is merely defective, as for lack of a seal, for example, does not affect the bar. Slyfield v. Healy, 32 Fed. Rep. 2.

The Massachusetts statute provides for redemption by a mortgagee of record at any time within two years after he has actual notice of the sale. It was held in Keith v. Wheeler (Mass. 1893), 34 N. E. Rep. 174, that the fact that a release to him from the mortgagor declared that the release was "subject to any and all unpaid taxes," was not equivalent to actual notice of a sale for taxes.

8. Hillyer v. Farneman, 65 Iowa 227; Slyfield v. Barnum, 71 Iowa 245; Lynn v. Morse, 76 Iowa 665; Wilson v. Russell, 73 Iowa 395. An immaterial variance does not invalidate the notice, as where it is directed to "Corless," instead of "Corlis," the names being

the time of the sale.1 The requirement of notice, where notice is required, is a condition precedent to the right of the purchaser to demand a deed.2 A deed issued without the notice is bad.3 So is a deed executed before the expiration of the time named in the notice.4

One who founds ejectment upon a tax title must prove that notice was given, where notice is necessary. The surrender of the tax certificate in response to a bad notice does not make valid a deed prematurely issued.

A strict compliance with the statutory requirements is essen

tial. A notice served too soon is bad.2 It need not be served on the premises.3

b. TO WHOM GIVEN (1) In General.-Notice need be given only to the persons named in the statute. Where the constitution requires notice to "parties interested," and the statute notice to the owner merely, notice to the mortgagee is not necessary. A corporation requires the same notice as does an individual.

(2) The Owner.--Under a requirement of notice to the owner, one to whom land was assessed and in whom the record title was at the time of the sale, is prima facie the owner at the time of the giving of notice. The death of the owner does not dispense with notice.8

1. Blackistone v. Sherwood, 31 Kan. 35; Thompson v. Burhans, 61 N. Y. 52; Clifton Heights Land Co. v. Randell. 82 Iowa 89.

The discovery by the owner, in the treasurer's office, of the sale of his land for taxes, is not the formal official notice required by law. Broughton v. Journeay, 51 Pa. St. 31.

That the land was unoccupied, does not preclude the necessity for notice. Lucas v. McEnerna, 19 Hun (N. Y.) 14. A requirement that notice shall be published at least six months before the expiration of the time for redemption, is not disregarded by a notice published sixteen months before such time. Hoffman v. Clark County, 61 Wis. 5.

2. Griffin . Tuttle, 74 Iowa 219; Smith v. Walker, 56 N. Y. Super. Ct. 391; Donahue v. O'Conor, 45 N. Y. Super. Ct. 278; Lockwood v. Gehlert, 127 N. Y. 241; 53 Hun (N. Y.) 15; Arthurs v. Smathers, 38 Pa. St. 40.

3. Gage v. Bailey, 102 Ill. 11.

4. If notice is required to be served on the person in possession and also on the one in whose name the land is taxed, if a resident of the county where the land lies, none is needed where there is no one in possession and the land is not taxed in the name of any one. Lawrence v. Hornick, 81 Iowa 193; Fuller v. Armstrong, 53 Iowa 683; Tuttle . Griffin, 64 Iowa 455; Chambers v. Haddock, 64 Iowa 556; Parker v. Cochran, 64 Iowa 757.

Where three years after the sale of land for taxes, it was both unoccupied and taxed to no one, the purchaser was held to be entitled to a deed therefor without giving any notice to the owner at the expiration of the time for redemption; and such deed will be good though made pursuant to a notice

published several years later when the land was both occupied by and taxed to the owner. Meredith v. Phelps, 65 Iowa 118.

Under the Minnesota statute, requiring that the notice be served on the person in whose name the land is assessed, service must be made on such person, even though he is the holder of the tax sale certificate. The statute makes no exception. Mitchell v. McFarland, 47 Minn. 535.

5. Smyth v. Neff, 123 Ill. 310. See People v. Edwards, 56 Hun (N. Y.) 377, as to notice to the mortgagee, under the New York statute.

6. Garmoe v. Sturgeon, 65 Iowa 147.

7. Ellsworth v. Cordrey, 65 Iowa 303. Under a statute requiring notice to be given to the owner personally or by publication, it was held that the owner must be designated by name. If the land was described as listed to

66

owners unknown," the notice was insufficient. Hartley v. Boynton, 17 Fed. Rep. 873; 5 McCrary (U.S.) 453.

Where the land is owned by a woman, it is not enough, under the Illinois statute, to leave a copy of the notice with her husband. Cotes v. Rohrbeck, 139 Ill. 532.

See, as to notice to the owner, Hall v. Guthridge, 52 Iowa 408; Martin v. Stoddard (Bklyn. City Ct.), 4 N. Y. Supp. 177; Lyman v. Anderson, 9 Neb. 367.

8. The fact that the orginal owner, J. T., is dead, does not make it proper to dispense with notice; it does not follow that there may not be another of the same name, the land remaining taxed to J. T. after the death of the original J. T. Kessey v. Connell, 68 Iowa 430.

If the owner dies, the notice must be given to his successor in interest. A

(3) The Occupant.-Notice must, by many statutes, be given to the occupant" or the person "in possession." 1 The terms refer to actual occupancy or possession only, and to occupancy and possession at the time of the giving of notice.3 In the absence of proof, it is presumed that the owner is in possession.4 Slight acts of ownership are sufficient to constitute occupancy, neither residence on the land nor systematic cultivation being essential. A cultivation of a part of the tract sold entitles the one cultivating to notice. If it be not given, the title to the