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(c) Penalties and Costs. Where the recovery of the penalty, as well as the tax, is expressly authorized, it may be included in the judgment as a part of the amount recovered.2

It has been held that provisions allowing costs against the taxpayer are not unconstitutional. Only such costs can be allowed as are provided for by statute.4

(d) Validity and Effect. The validity of a judgment in a tax suit is determined by the rules which govern a judgment in an ordinary action; the judgment is subject to the same mode of attack,5 and the same presumptions are indulged in its favor. If the court has jurisdiction, it is as binding upon the parties as any other judgment. It is conclusive, and not subject to collateral

The title of a purchaser under such a judgment, is not affected. Jones v. Driskill, 94 Mo. 190.

In Job v. Tebbetts, 10 Ill. 376, it was held that a precept issued upon a judgment against lands for taxes, need not contain a list of the lands ordered to be sold. See also Manly v. Gibson, 14 Ill. 136.

1. See People v. Todd, 23 Cal. 181; People v. Smith, 94 Ill. 226.

2. Bristol v. Chicago, 22 Ill. 587; People v. Smith, 94 Ill. 226; State v. California Min. Co., 15 Nev. 234; State v. California Min. Co., 15 Nev. 259; Potts v. Cooley, 56 Wis. 45; Arnold v. Juneau County, 43 Wis. 627.

3. People v. Seymour, 16 Cal. 332; 76 Am. Dec. 521. And see State v. California Min. Co., 13 Nev. 289; Cheever v. Merritt, 5 Allen (Mass.) 563.

In State v. Illinois, etc., Bridge Co., 8 Mo. App. 599, it was held that collectors' and attorneys' fees are properly charged as costs, in a suit to enforce a lien for taxes, though the taxes, interest, and court costs are paid after the suit and before the sale.

Costs not Allowed Defendant. In People v. Moore, 1 Idaho 662, it was held that in a suit for taxes, although the defendant recovers, the judgment should be general, without costs.

4. See Potts v. Cooley, 56 Wis. 45; Kent v. Atlantic De Laine Co., 8 R.

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to costs up to and including the condemnation only.

5. Eitel v. Foote, 39 Cal. 439; Hahn 2. Kelly, 34 Cal. 391; 94 Am. Dec. 742; Mayo . Ah Loy, 32 Cal. 477; Brown v. Walker, 85 Mo. 262; Hogan v. Smith, II Mo. App. 314.

6. Allen v. McCabe, 93 Mo. 138; Brown v. Walker, 85 Mo. 262; Hogan v. Smith, 11 Mo. App. 314; Willshear v. Kelley, 69 Mo. 343; Werz v. Werz, 11 Mo. App. 26; McCarter v. Neil, 50 Ark. 188; Hahn v. Kelly, 34 Cal. 391; 94 Am. Dec. 742; McGregor . Morrow, 40 Kan. 730; Pritchard v. Madren, 31 Kan. 52; Mix v. People, 81 Ill. 118; Pulaski . Stewart, 28 Gratt. (Va.) 879; Falkner v. Guild, 10 Wis. 572; Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 332.

No extraordinary or special power of jurisdiction is conferred upon courts, by giving them jurisdiction in tax cases. It is merely an additional remedy or cause of action, by which they may, on certain conditions, foreclose a tax lien. English v. Woodman, 40 Kan. 412; McGregor v. Morrow, 40 Kan. 730.

In English v. Woodman, 40 Kan. 412, it was held that the jurisdiction of the court to render judgment, is not affected by an omission to file proof of service of notice by publication, and obtain its approval by the court, where such publication was actually made.

7. Warren v. Cook, 116 Ill. 199; Graceland Cemetery Co. v. People, 92 Ill. 619; Buckmaster v. Carlin, 4 Ill. 104; Swiggart v. Harter, 5 Ill. 364; Buckmaster v. Ryder, 12 Ill. 207; Wimberly v. Hurst, 33 Ill. 166; 87 Am. Dec. 295; Driggers v. Cassady, 71 Ala. 529; Mayo v. Ah Loy, 32 Cal. 477; English v. Woodman, 40 Kan. 412. And see Brown v. Hogle, 30 Ill. 119; Gray v. Bowles, 74 Mo. 419; State v. Sargent, 12 Mo. App. 228; Young v. Lorain, II

In State v. Duncan, 6 Lea (Tenn.) 679, it was held that under the Tennessee statute, the complainants in an action to foreclose a tax lien are entitled

attack. But want of jurisdiction invalidates it, and may be shown; 2 and if the tax is void, the judgment also may be

Ill. 624; Wellshear v. Kelley, 69 Mo. 343; Swan v. Knoxville, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 130.

Former proceedings for taxes for years prior to those involved in a proceeding of the present year, though presenting the same questions, are not to be deemed res adjudicata as to the present year. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. People, 46 Mich. 193.

Personal Judgment Precludes Sale. After the personal judgment for taxes has been rendered, the tax debtor cannot inaugurate the proceedings to have his land sold to the highest bidder, and thereby relieve himself from personal liability to pay the taxes. Byrne v. La Salle, 123 Ill. 581.

Change of the Law.-Where a statute, under which a decree for taxes was rendered, is repealed, and other taxes are levied under subsequent statutes, the decree cannot be admitted as an estoppel in an action for the recovery of subsequent taxes. Davenport v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 38 Iowa 632. And see Richman v. Muscatine County, 77 Iowa 513.

1. Mix v. People, 116 Ill. 265; Graceland Cemetery Co. v. People, 92 Ill. 619; Job v. Tebbetts, 10 Ill. 376; Drake v. Ogden, 128 Ill. 603; People v. Smith, 94 III. 226; Rigg v. Cook, 9 Ill. 336; 46 Am. Dec. 462; Driggers v. Cassady, 71 Ala. 529; Riddle v. Messer, 84 Ala. 236; Eitel v. Foote, 39 Cal. 439; Mayo v. Ah Loy, 32 Cal. 477; Hogan v. Smith, 11 Mo. App. 314; Wellshear v. Kelley, 69 Mo. 343; Jones v. Driskill, 94 Mo. 190; Kent v. Brown, 38 La. Ann. 802; Aplin v. Sloman, 84 Mich. 118. And see McCarter v. Neil, 50 Ark. 188; Chesnut v. Marsh, 12 Ill. 173; People v. Smith, 94 Ill. 226; Chicago Theological Seminary v. Gage, 12 Fed. Rep. 398. The fact that a single judgment was rendered against distinct lands in a back tax suit, cannot be shown by parol evidence in an ejectment suit for the purpose of impeaching the judgment. Brown v. Walker, 85 Mo. 262.

The validity of a judgment rendered in a tax suit cannot be attacked in a collateral proceeding, by showing that a portion of the taxes sued for were barred by the Statute of Limitations. Wellshear v. Kelley, 69 Mo. 343.

The amount of costs on a tax sale cannot be made a question, when the

judgment comes collaterally in issue. Spellman v. Curtenius, 12 III. 409. And see Merritt v. Thompson, 13 Ill. 716.

In Glass 7. White, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 475, it was held that a provision making all the judgments or orders of sale for taxes, conclusive, unless it was shown that the taxes were duly paid before such judgment or order of sale was rendered, embraces public taxes only, and has no application to tax sales by municipal corporations.

2. Brown v. Hogle, 30 Ill. 119; Buckmaster v. Carlin, 4 Ill. 104; Spellman v. Curtenius, 12 Ill. 409; Fleming v. McGee, 81 Ala. 409; Kipp v. Collins, 33 Minn. 394. And see Pickett v. Hartsock, 15 Ill. 282; Morgan v. Camp, 16 Ill. 175; Fortman v. Ruggles, 58 Ill. 207; McGregor v. Morrow, 40 Kan. 730; English v. Woodman, 40 Kan. 412; Vaughan v. Daniels, 98 Mo. 230; Vaughan v. Moyer (Mo. 1889), 11 S. W. Rep. 574; Voorhees v. Bank of U. S., 10 Pet. (U. S.) 468; Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 162; Kemp v. Kennedy, 5 Cranch (U. S.) 173.

Want of jurisdiction of the court, to render a tax judgment, may be shown by evidence de hors the record. Brown v. Corbin, 40 Minn. 508; Chauncey v. Wass, 35 Minn. 1; Eastman v. Linn, 26 Minn. 215.

In Biggins . People, 106 Ill. 270, it was held that a decree dismissing a bill to enforce a lien for taxes for want of jurisdiction, does not bar a second bill filed for the same purpose, after the enactment of a law conferring the jurisdiction.

Presumption of Jurisdiction. - The judgment raised a presumption of jurisdiction in the court, which can be overcome only by proof that it had no jurisdiction. Kipp v. Collins, 33 Minn. 394. And see Prout v. People, 83 Ill. 154.

In Williams v. Hudson, 93 Mo. 524, it was held that the omission to name one of the years for which the taxes were due and for which suit was brought from the order of publication, will not affect the judgment when attacked in a collateral proceeding.

A recital in a decree under the California statute, that all the owners and claimants of the property have been duly summoned and have made default, is conclusive that the court acquired jurisdiction, if nothing contradictory to

void. Those who have not been made parties, or who have no interest in the land, are not affected by the judgment; 2 nor by a decree foreclosing the tax lien.3

(6) Appeal and Review.-In the absence of statute, no appeal lies from a judgment in a tax suit.4 Where provided for, the statute must be followed, and the right can be exercised only in the manner prescribed. But it has been held that orders in such

it appears in the record. Eitel v. Foote, 39 Cal. 439; Truman v. Robinson, 44 Cal. 623. In the latter case it was also held that legislative bodies have power to provide that a recital in a judgment that the summons has been served on all the defendants, and that they have made default, shall be proof of such facts.

1. See Gage v. Bailey, 102 Ill. 14; Belleville Nail Co. v. People, 98 I. 399; Thatcher v. People, 93 Ill. 240; Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill. 9; Campbell v. State, 41 Ill. 454; Drake v. Ogden, 128 Ill. 603; Kent v. Brown, 38 La. Ann. 802; Gamble v. Witty, 55 Miss. 26. 2. See Williams 7. Hudson, 93 Mo. 524; Hogan v. Smith, 11 Mo. App. 314; Allen v. McCabe, 93 Mo. 138; Blodgett v. Schaffer, 94 Mo. 652; Watt v. Donnell, 80 Mo. 195; Boatmen's Sav. Bank v. Grewe, 13 Mo. App. 335; Mayo v. Ah Loy, 32 Cal. 477; Mix v. People, 116 Ill. 265; Virden v. Needles, 98 Ill. 366; Davenport v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 38 Iowa 633; Pritchard v. Greenwood County, 26 Kan. 584; Desormeaux v. Moylan, 26 La. Ann. 730. Compare Reiley v. Lancaster, 39 Cal. 354.

Those claiming under persons made parties to the action, are bound by a judgment in rem, though not made parties. State v. Central Pac. R. Co., 10 Nev. 47; Vance v. Corrigan, 78

Mo. 94.

In Berlien v. Bieler, 96 Mo. 491, it was held that a sale of land for taxes in a proceeding against heirs, will not divest the life estate of the widow under a will.

Where a tax debtor is dead, a judgment against him is void as to his heirs. Crosley v. Hutton, 98 Mo. 196.

A trustee under a deed of trust is an "owner," and so a necessary party to a suit to enforce a lien for taxes; but the omission to join him as a party does not render the tax sale wholly void. His rights are not foreclosed by the tax sale. Gitchell v. Kreidler, 84 Mo. 472. See also Boyd v. Ellis, 107 Mo. 394.

A cestui que trust has the right to pay the taxes and redeem the land from

the paramount lien of the state, and when he is not made a party to the tax suit, that right remains unimpaired, and not affected by the judgment and sale in the tax proceeding. Allen v. McCabe, 93 Mo. 138; Williams v. Hudson, 93 Mo. 524.

3. Williams v. Hudson, 93 Mo. 524; Gitchell v. Kreidler, 84 Mo. 474; Stafford v. Fizer, 82 Mo. 393; Corrigan v. Bell, 73 Mo. 53; Mix v. People, 116 Ill. 265; Bleidorn v. Abel, 6 Iowa 6.

In Hogan v. Smith, 11 Mo. App. 314, it was held that the fact that the defendant in an action to enforce a lien for taxes is merely the owner of a life estate in the land and that the remainderman is not made a party, does not make the judgment rendered therein void. But the judgment is not binding upon the remainderman. Allen v. De Groodt, 98 Mo. 159.

4. State v. Jones, 24 Minn. 251; People v. Smith, 94 Ill. 226. See Hess v. People, 84 Ill. 247; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Brown, 26 Kan. 443; State v. Jones, 24 Minn. 251.

In Hess v. People, 84 Ill. 247, it was held that where a statute allowing an appeal from a tax judgment is repealed, no appeal will lie where the final judgment is rendered, after the day the appeal takes effect, although the application is made before that time.

To What Court.-Under the Illinois statutes, suits for taxes are regarded as suits relating to the public revenue, from the determination of which, appeals must be taken directly to the supreme court. Johnson v. Eliel, 9 Ill. App. 520; Mix v. People, 7 Ill. App. 224. 5. See Mix v. People, 7 Ill. App. 224; Johnson v. Eliel, 9 Ill. App. 520; Andrews v. Rumsey, 75 Ill. 598; State v. Jones, 24 Minn. 251; Washington County v. German-American Bank, 28 Minn. 360.

Where the statute requires the transcript of a judgment in a tax suit, to be filed at the next term after the appeal is taken, a delay in doing so amounts to an abandonment of the appeal. Fortman v. Ruggles, 58 Ill. 207.

proceedings may be reviewed where similar orders in ordinary actions are made reviewable.1

Where the right of appeal is given, and no mode of procedure is prescribed, that obtaining in ordinary actions is adhered to.2 For example, a question cannot be raised, for the first time, in the appellate court.3 But this rule does not apply to jurisdictional questions, nor to questions as to the observance of mandatory requirements of law,5 which may be raised upon appeal, though no exceptions were taken in the court below.

4. The Return-a. OF THE WARRANT.-A return of the tax

Parties. A former owner having no interest in the property taxed, cannot appeal. McClure v. Maitland, 24 W. Va. 561.

Security on Appeal.-In Nashville v. Weiser, 54 Ill. 245, it was held that the appeal bond on an appeal from a judgment against real estate for the nonpayment of taxes assessed by a city, in which the city alone is interested, need not be made payable to the people of the state; but may be made payable to the city.

The legislature may constitutionally require one who wishes to appeal from a judgment against his land for taxes, to deposit a sum equal to the amount of the judgment and costs. Andrews 7. Rumsey, 75 Ill. 598.

1. Chisago County v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 27 Minn. 109; Aitkin County v. Morrison, 25 Minn. 295.

In Minnesota, notice to the supreme court of an appeal from an order of the district court, refusing to set aside a tax judgment, must be served upon the county attorney. Nobles County v. Sutton, 23 Minn. 299.

2. See State v. Northern Belle Min. Co., 15 Nev. 385; Hosmer v. People, 87 Ill. 385; Hosmer v. People, 96 Ill. 58; Nobles County v. Sutton, 23 Minn. 299.

Where a judgment against land for taxes, is in proper form, and it is affirmed on appeal, a general judgment of affirmance is sufficient, without specifying the taxes due on each tract. Durham v. People, 67 Ill. 414.

In State v. California Min. Co., 13 Nev. 203, it was held that an undertaking on appeal in a suit for taxes, which complies with the Civil Practice Act for a stay of execution, is sufficient.

Jurisdictional Limits.-In Rhode Island, provisions limiting the jurisdiction of the court, on appeal, to a certain amount in ordinary cases, do not

apply to tax suits. Tripp v. Torrey, 17 R. I. 359. And see as to Louisiana, State v. Sies, 30 La. Ann. 918.

3. See Speight v. People, 87 Ill. 595; Law v. People, 87 Ill. 385; Karnes v. People, 73 Ill. 274; Chiniquy v. People, 78 Ill. 570; Melrose 7. Bernard, 126 Ill. 496; Hosmer v. People, 96 Ill. 58.

Where a judgment for taxes is partly valid, special objection must be made to the invalid part, in order to save the question on appeal. Jenkins v. Rice, 84 Ind. 343. And see Speight v. People, 87 Ill. 595.

An objection that a delinquent tax list was not properly certified by the auditor, is not available in the appellate court, where the list itself is not contained in the record, and there is no statement showing that there was a want of a certificate, or that it was defective in any respect. State v. Manhattan Silver Min. Co., 4 Nev. 318.

Where a taxpayer appears before the court and makes specific objections to a judgment for taxes, but does not object on account of the levy being improperly made, he admits the legality of the levy, and cannot afterwards question it on appeal. Karnes v. People, 73 Ill. 274. 4. People v. Dragstran, 100 Ill. 286; Law v. People, 87 Ill. 385.

A judgment for illegal taxes or taxes which are in part illegal, will be reversed. Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill. 9; Campbell v. State, 41 Ill. 454.

The right of a city to maintain an ordinary action at law for the collection of delinquent taxes, is not a jurisdictional question which may be first urged in the appellate court. Davenport v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 38 Iowa 633.

5. Chicago v. Wright, 32 Ill. 192; People v. Dragstran, 100 Ill. 286.

When the error appears upon the face of the record of the tax, it may be first urged upon appeal. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. People, 101 Ill. 446.

warrant, showing the proceedings taken under it, is usually required.1

A clause in a tax warrant, directing the tax collector to make his return at a certain time, is held directory only, and does not prevent the collector from making collection after that time. The power to collect remains until the taxes are actually paid,3 and the warrant may be extended when necessary to effect the collection.4

b. OF DELINQUENCY.-In general, property cannot be sold to enforce the tax,5 nor an action brought for its recovery or to charge

1. See Olean v. King, 116 N. Y. 355; Shimmin v. Inman, 26 Me. 228; Upton v. Kennedy, 36 Mich. 215; Mast v. Nacogdoches County, 71 Tex. 380; Judevine v. Jackson, 18 Vt. 470; Taylor v. French, 19 Vt. 49. See also infra, this title, Tax Sales.

2. Picket v. Allen, 10 Conn. 146; White v. State, 51 Ga. 252; Smith v. Messer, 17 N. H. 420; Homer v. Cilley, 14 N. H. 85; Sheldon v. Van Buskirk, 2 N. Y. 473. And see Gove v. Newton, 58 N. H. 359; Richards v. Stogsdell, 21 Ind. 74; Bassett v. Porter, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 487.

A tax warrant is not invalidated by the fact that an unreasonably brief time was granted for its payment, provided the notice and proceeding by the collector were legal and regular. Weeks v. Batchelder, 41 Vt. 317.

In Walker v. Miner, 32 Vt. 769, it was held that a neglect to comply with a statutory provision requiring a warrant for the collection of a school tax to specify a limited time within which the tax is to be collected, is not a defect of which a taxpayer can take advantage, and, though it may render the warrant informal and defective as between the district and collector, it does not invalidate the action taken by the latter to collect the tax.

3. Homer v. Cilley, 14 N. H. 85; Smith v. Messer, 17 N. H. 420; Perry County v. Selma, etc., R. Co., 58 Ala. 546; Jacks v. Dyer, 31 Ark. 334; White 7. State, 51 Ga. 252; Union Trust Co. v. Weber, 96 Ill. 346; McCracken v. Elder, 34 Pa. St. 239. And see Brown v. Porter, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 373; Bassett v. Porter, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 487.

A constitution requiring taxes on movable property to be collected in the year in which the assessment is made, does not prohibit the collection of the tax during a subsequent year; the failure to collect a tax in the year in which

it is assessed, not operating to discharge it. Oteri v. Parker, 42 La. Ann. 374.

4. Griswold v. Union School Dist., 24 Mich. 262; Bird v. Perkins, 33 Mich. 28; Fairfield v. People, 94 Ill. 244; Bradley v. Ward, 58 N. Y. 401. And see First Nat. Bank v. St. Joseph Tp., 46 Mich. 526; Drennan v. Beierlein, 49 Mich. 272; Brown v. Hogle, 30 Ill. 119; Brown 7. Porter, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 373; Chadwell v. State, 8 Heisk. (Tenn.) 340.

A renewal signed by all the supervisors personally, and attested by the town clerk, is a sufficient renewal by them as a board. New Richmond Lumber Co. v. Rogers, 68 Wis. 608.

In Blain v. Irby, 25 Kan. 499, it was held that where a levy is made upon the personal property of the person against whom the tax warrant is issued, previous to the return day of the warrant, a sale thereof is not invalid by being made after the return day.

An act extending the time for the collection of taxes does not revive a warrant which has already expired. Phillips v. New Buffalo Tp., 68 Mich. 217.

In Michigan, a township treasurer cannot sue for a tax after the expiration of his warrant, and his warrant cannot be extended beyond the next annual session of the board of supervisors. Putman v. Fife Lake Tp., 45 Mich. 125.

In New Jersey, an alias can be issued by a justice other than the one who issues the original tax warrant, only when a request is made for the issue of the second writ, by the township committee. State v. Dobbs, 42 N. J. L. 136.

5. See Kelly v. Craig, 5 Ired. (N. Car.) 129; Mordecai v. Speight, 3 Dev. (N. Car.) 428; Wartensleben v. Haithcock, 80 Ala. 565; Fleming v. McGee, 81 Ala. 409; Simms v. Greer, 83 Ala.

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