Some courts, however, proceeding on the theory that a mortgage is an interest in land, have held it taxable in the state where the land lies, although held by a non-resident.1 Other courts, without going to this extent, have said that if the mortgagee is a resident of the state, but of a district different from that where the land lies, the legislature may authorize the assessment in either district.2 but was merely a security for the debt; or in the language of the court " a mortgage being there [in Pennsylvania] a mere chose in action, it only confers upon the holder, or the party for whose benefit the mortgage is given, a right to proceed against the property mortgaged, upon a given contingency, to enforce, by its sale, the payment of his demand. This right has no locality independent of the party in whom it resides. It may undoubtedly be taxed by the state when held by a resident therein, but when held by a non-resident it is as much beyond the jurisdiction of the state as the person of the owner." In this case the court disapproved the reasoning, but affirmed the results of Northern Cent. R. Co. v. Jackson, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 262. This rule, although practically denied by some authorities (in Pennsylvania), yet seems to be supported both by principle and the weight of authority. Railey v. Board of Assessors, 44 La. Ann. 765; Liverpool, etc., Ins. Co. 7. Board of Assessors, 44 La. Ann. 760; Oliver v. Washington Mills, II Allen (Mass.) 268. In U. S. v. Erie R. Co., 106 U. S. 327, Mr. Justice Field said: "The tax is exacted from the creditor, the party who holds the coupons for interest. No collocation of words can change this fact. And so it was expressly adjudged with reference to a similar tax in the case of U. S. v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 17 Wall. (U. S.) 322. . . . The money which paid the interest was, until paid, the property of the company; when it became the property of the bondholders, it was outside of the jurisdiction of the United States." In Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Slack, 100 U. S. 595, the court held valid an act of the United States (14 Stats. at Large, 138), which imposed a tax of five per cent. upon the interest payable upon its bonds, the law being specially made applicable to non-residents. This was held to be a tax or excise upon the income of the company, and of which the interest payable on its funded debt formed a part. In Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 433, the court held that city bonds held by a non-resident alien could not be taxed by the city; basing its decision exclusively upon the ground that the city could not impair the obligation of its contract to pay the debt in full. In U. S. v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 17 Wall. (U. S.) 322, the court held that a tax imposed upon interest payable by a railroad corporation to the city of Baltimore, was a tax upon the property of a municipal corporation, and as it was not the purpose of the legislature in passing this act to impose a tax upon a municipal corporation, this tax could not be enforced. The supreme court of Ohio denied the right of the state to tax a debt secured by a mortgage upon land within the state, although the securities were in the hands of an agent within the state for the purpose of collection. Myers v. Seaberger, 45 Ohio St. 232. 1. Mumford v. Sewell, 11 Oregon 67; 50 Am. Rep. 462. A mortgage on land so far partakes of the character of realty that it is competent for the legislature to provide that the mortgage of a non-resident mortgagee shall be taxable where the land is situated. Detroit v. Board of Assessors, 91 Mich. 78. In Redfield v. Genesee County, I Clarke Ch. (N. Y.) 42, it was held that debts owing to non-residents for the purchase of land within the state, and secured by mortgage, were liable to be taxed in the town and county where the debtor resided, under the New York Act of April 27, 1833. See also Maltby v. Reading, etc., R. Co., 52 Pa. St. 140; Com. v. Delaware Div. Canal Co., 123 Pa. St. 594; Susquehanna Canal Co. v. Com., 72 Pa. St. 72; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Com., 66 Pa. St. 73. 2. State v. Runyon, 41 N. J. L. 105. But see People v. Eastman, 25 Cal. 603. (4) Miscellaneous Choses in Action.—Choses in action generally are to be taxed at the domicile of the party whose interest therein is assessed.1 (5) Shares of Stock.--Shares of stock in a corporation, like other forms of intangible personal property, are taxable at the domicile of the owner, whether the corporation be domestic or foreign, unless the statute provides otherwise. It is competent, however, for the state which grants corporate powers, or permits their exercise, to give to shares of stock a special situs for taxation purposes. It may thus provide that the stock shall all be assessed at the place of corporate residence.5 The place of taxa 1. Bradley v. Bauder, 36 Ohio St. 28; 38 Am. Rep. 547; People v. Park, 23 Cal. 138. Where a non-resident landholder, owning real estate in the state, sells it by an executory contract, and the contract is held in the state by his agent, it is taxable as personalty where it is held. Redmond v. Rutherford, 87 N. Car. 122. If contracts are in agent's hands, they are taxable at his domicile. People v. Willis, 133 N. Y. 382. 2. Bradley v. Bauder, 36 Ohio St. 28; 38 Am. Řep. 547; Evansville Hall, 14 Ind. 27; Conwell v. Connersville, 15 Ind. 150; Griffith v. Watson, 19 Kan. 23; Howell v. Cassopolis, 35 Mich. 471; Worth v. Ashe County, 82 N. Car. 420; Worth v. Ashe County, 90 N. Car. 409; Strong v. O'Donnell, 10 Phila. (Pa.) 575; Nashville 7. Thomas, 5 Coldw. (Tenn.) 600. V. This is so, even though the statute provides that property to be taxable must be "in the city or "within the city." Ogden v. St. Joseph, 90 Mo. 522. But see contra, People v. Tax Com'r, 4 Hun (N. Y.) 595; People v. Tax Com'r, 5 Hun (N. Y.) 200. In Connecticut, under the statute, stock owned by residents in non-resident corporations, whether public or private, is taxable only in case such shares are not taxed in the state where the corporations are located. Lockwood v. Weston, 61 Conn. 211. 3. In Seward v. Rising Sun, 79 Ind. 351, it was held that a city has the right to tax its citizens for stock owned by them in a foreign railroad company, although a tax has been paid thereon in the state where the corporation is located. See also Dyer v. Osborne, II R. I. 321; 23 Am. Rep. 460; McKeen v. Northampton County, 49 Pa. St. 519; 88 Am. Dec. 515; Dwight v. Boston, 12 Allen (Mass.) 316. Under a law providing for the assessment of " shares or property in any incorporated company for a bridge or a turnpike road," a resident is liable to be taxed for his stock in a turnpike company of another state. Great Barrington v. Berkshire County, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 572. See also Holton v. Bangor, 23 Me. 264; Whitsell v. Northampton County, 49 Pa. St. 526. 4. Williams 7. Weaver, 75 N. Y. 30. Under North Carolina Laws of 1891, ch. 326, shares of stock in domestic manufacturing corporations must be taxed at the principal office or other place of business of the corporation. Wiley v. Salisbury, III N. Car. 397. 5. Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), p. 23; Welty on Assessments, § 56; Tappan v. Merchant's Nat. Bank, 19 Wall. (U.S.) 490. corpo Faxton v. McCosh, 12 Iowa 527, upheld a statute providing that rations shall be taxed through the shares of the stockholders, and when stockholders are non-residents, their interest shall be taxed in the county in which is situated the principal business office within the state." The court said: "The interest of each shareholder is property within the jurisdiction of the state. The certificate of shares may be with the owner, but it is only paper evidence of such interest, the property it represents being within reach of the taxing power. The legislature has thought proper to provide that the property of this company, which has its existence by virtue of its enactment, shall bear its proportion of the burden of taxation in this way. Those who seek the benefit of this company, do so with this understanding." See also Baltimore v. Baltimore City Pass. R. Co., 57 Md. 31; American Coal Co. v. Allegheny County, 59 Md. 185. But it has been held that the stock tion of shares of national bank stock has been treated already in connection with the subject of national banks.1 d. PLACE AS AFFECTED BY OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION.— (1) In General.-The general rule as to place, stated above, presupposes that the legal title of the property and the right of possession are in the taxpayer. We are now to consider the effect of title and possession on the subject.2 (2) Corporate Property (See also CORPORATIONS, vol. 4, p. 272a). The same principles govern the taxation of the property of a corporation as that of private individuals. Its real property is taxable where it lies; its personal property at its corporate residence or at the place where it is located, at the option of the legislature. The subject of corporate residence is elsewhere treated. It is there that a tax on the capital stock is levied, wherever the property represented by it may be.5 (3) Railroad Property.--Railroad property may be taxed in the same way as other property, namely, real property in the several districts in which it lies; personal property at the principal office of the company. Special provisions are often made for the taxation of railway property, which are elsewhere considered.8 (4) Partnership Property.-The state may authorize the taxation of the interest of a partner at his domicile, even though the business is conducted in another state. Generally, however, the place where the business is carried on is designated as the place where the personal property of the partnership is to be taxed.10 It of banks incorporated by a state, but held and owned by non-resident stockholders, is not subject to the taxing power of the state. Union Bank v. State, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 490. 1. See NATIONAL BANKS, vol. 16, p. 187. 2. See also supra, this title, Upon Whom Imposed. 3. Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), p. 377; Baldwin v. Trustees of Ministerial Fund, 37 Me. 369; People v. McLean, 80 N. Y. 254; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Com., I Bush (Ky.) 250; Ontario Bank v. Bunnell, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 186. 4. See TAXATION (CORPORATE), vol. 25. 5. People v. Tax Com'rs, 51 Hun (N. Y.) 312; Quincy R. Co. v. Adams County, 88 Ill. 615. 6. Dillon on Mun. Corp. (4th ed.), § 789; Bakewell v. Police Jury, 20 La. Ann. 334; Morgan's Louisiana, etc., R., etc., Co. v. Board of Reviewers (La. 1887), 3 So. Rep. 507; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Hamilton County, 73 Iowa 313; Railroad Co. v. Marion County, 48 Ohio St. 249. A railroad company should be considered as a resident of the several towns through which its road extends, within the meaning of the tax laws. And its real estate should not be "assessed as non-resident lands." People v. Fredericks, 48 Barb. (N. Y.) 173. Elevated railroads in New York City may be taxed as "lands" or "real estate." People v. Tax Com'rs, 82 N. Y. 462. 7. Mohawk, etc., R. Co. v. Clute, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 384. 8. See TAXATION (CORPORATE), vol. 25. 9. St. John v. Mobile, 21 Ala. 224; Bemis v. Boston, 14 Allen (Mass.) 366. 10. St. John v. Mobile, 21 Ala. 224; Hoadley v. Essex County, 105 Mass. 527; Swallow v. Thomas, 15 Kan. 66; Putnam v. Fife Lake Tp., 45 Mich. 125; McCoy v. Anderson, 47 Mich. 502; Fairbanks v. Kittredge, 24 Vt. 9. This is the rule adopted, under the Massachusetts statute, in regard to property employed in business. Barker v. Watertown, 137 Mass. 227. So in Michigan, under the statute, personal property cannot be taxed at a place other has been held that if the statute is silent, personalty will be taxed at its actual situs, on the ground that a partnership can properly have no domicile.1 The legislature can always designate the place where the partnership is situated as the place of taxation.2 (5) Property in Trust.-Property in trust is, in the absence of a special provision of statute, taxed at the same place as though the trustee were the absolute owner.3 If there are several trustees residing in different districts, the tax must be apportioned among them.4 Property is sometimes made taxable to the beneficiary, in which case the question of place is determined in the same man-ner as though he held the full title.5 A fund in charge of a court is taxable in the jurisdiction in whose control it is." than the place of business, even though it is manufactured, and some sales are made there. McCoy v. Anderson, 47 Mich. 502; Putnam v. Fife Lake Tp., 45 Mich. 125. A foreign firm having a resident partner in New York, there carrying on the business tributary to that abroad, is liable to taxation upon the amount invested in the business in New York. Matter of McMahon, 66 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 190. 1. Taylor v. Love, 43 N. J. L. 142. 2. The personal property of a partnership is assessable in the locality where it is, if the place of business is there. Williams v. Saginaw, 51 Mich. 120. 3. Perry on Trusts (4th ed.), § 331; Smith v. Byers, 43 Ga. 191. See also Latrobe v. Baltimore, 19 Md. 13; Baltimore v. Stirling, 29 Md. 48; People v. Board of Assessors, 40 N. Y. 154; Lewis v. Chester County, 60 Pa. St. 325. A resident trustee cannot be taxed for securities without the state, in the joint possession of himself and his two non-resident co-trustees, held for nonresident beneficiaries, even though secured by liens on land within the city. People v. Barker, 135 N. Y. 656; 4 Silv. (N. Y.) 648. The rule is the same as that stated in the text where the trustee is a corporation. Greene Foundation v. Boston, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 54. A state has power to tax property, real and personal, held in trust therein for a non-resident. Price v. Hunter, 34 Fed. Rep. 355. 4. Academy of Richmond County v. Augusta, 90 Ga. 634; Hardy v. Yarmouth, 6 Allen (Mass.) 277. Where only two of three trustees of personal property reside in a state, only two-thirds of the trust property should be taxed in that state. Appeal Tax Ct. v. Gill, 50 Md. 377. To the same effect see People v. Coleman, 119 N. Y. 137; 21 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 168. Resident and non-resident trustees. cannot be jointly assessed. Stinson v. Boston, 125 Mass. 348. 5. Hathaway v. Fish,13 Allen (Mass.) 267; Davis v. Macy, 124 Mass. 193. In Massachusetts, the principal rule, as stated in the text, is substantially made the law by statutory provisions. Dorr v. Boston, 6 Gray (Mass.) 131. But where the trustee is required by the terms of his trust to pay the income of the fund in his hands to another person, the tax must be assessed upon the trustee in the place in which such other person resides, if within the state, and if he resides out of the state, in the place where the trustee resides. Davis v. Macy, 124 Mass. 193. See also Freetown v. Fish, 123 Mass. 355; Ricker v. American Loan, etc., Co.,140 Mass. 346. In Rhode Island, property held in trust, the income of which is to be paid to any person, shall to that extent be assessed against the trustee in the town in which such beneficial owner resides. Greene v. Mumford, 4 R. I. 313. But a trustee resident in another state, who holds as trustee no property in this state, is not liable to taxation in the town, in this state, where the cestui que trust resides. Antony v. Caswell, 15 R. I. 159. 6. Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), p. 376. But the court of chancery is not a person having a residence in any partic (6) Property in Hands of Guardians and Conservators.--In the absence of statutory provision on the subject, the property of an infant or incapable is taxed at the same place as though no disability existed.1 The statute, may, however, provide for the assessment of personal property at the domicile of the guardian or conservator.2 (7) Property of Decedents.-There is a conflict in the cases in regard to the place where the personal property belonging to the estate of a deceased person is to be taxed. Some courts, proceeding on the theory that the title is in the personal representative, hold that it is taxable at his domicile, even though it has not in fact reached his hands, or even though the deceased resided in another state.3 If, however, the administrator or executor is not ular town, within the meaning of the Revised Statutes, and cannot be taxed as trustee of its suitors, for the funds in the court. Matter of Kellinger, 9 Paige (N. Y.) 62. 1. Louisville v. Sherley, 80 Ky. 71; Kirkland v. Whately, 4 Allen (Mass.) 462; School Directors v. James, 2 W. & S. (Pa.) 568; 37 Am. Dec. 525; West Chester School Dist. v. Darlington, 38 Pa. St. 157, 159; Mason v. Thurber, 1 R. I. 481. 2. Tousey v. Bell, 23 Ind. 423; Vogel v. Vogler, 78 Ind. 353; Baldwin v. First Parish, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 494; Payson v. Tufts, 13 Mass. 493; West Chester School Dist. v. Darlington, 38 Pa. St. 157. If the statute requires that one be assessed in the town or ward where he lives for "all personal estate in his possession, or under his control as agent, trustee, executor or administrator," a committee of the estate of a lunatic is not included. People v. Tax Com'rs, 100 N. Y. 215. 3. Gallatin v. Alexander, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 475; Cameron v. Burlington, 56 Iowa 320; State v. Jones, 39 N. J. L. 246; State v. Holmdel Tp., 39 N. J. L. 79; Johnson v. Oregon City, 2 Oregon 327; State v. St. Louis County Ct., 47 Mo. 594. If there be several executors residing in different districts, the tax must be apportioned between them. State v. Matthews, 10 Ohio St. 431. This case was followed in Todd v. Hughes, 3 Ohio L. J. 206. But in Brown v. Noble, 42 Ohio St. 405, where the administration was committed to several persons residing in different counties, the court held that moneys, credits, and investments belonging to the estate, must be listed for taxation in the county where the administrator having actual possession and control of the property to be listed, resided. And in New York, where the statute provides that every person shall be assessed where he resides for his personal estate, including all personal property in his possession or under his control as executor or administrator, the court held that one of several coexecutors could not be assessed for property belonging to the estate, but which was in the possession and under the control of the other executors. People v. Tax Com'rs, 17 Hun (N. Y.) 293. But this case was distinguished in People v. Tax Com'rs, 38 Hun (N. Y.) 536, in which it was held that the tax would be assessed to all of three executors, although the property assessed was in the possession and under the control of one acting executor. The court, in the language of Mr. Justice Savage, in Murray v. Blatchford, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 616, said: "If a man appoints several executors, they are esteemed in law but as one person representing the testator, and, therefore, the acts done by any one of them, which relate either to the delivery, cost, sale, payment, possession or release of the testator's goods, deemed the acts of all, for they have a joint and entire authority." are It has been held that if ancillary administration is granted, the state in which it is so granted may impose a tax on all tangible property situated in the state. Alvany v. Powell, 2 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 51. But the property must have actually come to the estate; hence, where a member of a California firm, but a resident of New York, died in the latter state, his executors were held |