(3) Water Craft.-The principles governing the taxation of vessels are not essentially different from those controlling the taxation of other personal property.1 A vessel may be taxed at the domicile of the owner, or at the place where it has its situs. This situs is at its home port.3 This will generally be, as well, the place where it is registered or enrolled, but not necessarily so, the location of the home port being a question of fact.5 October of a certain year, are not liable for the taxes of such year under Colorado Gen. Stat., ch. 94. Pueblo County v. Wilson, 15 Colo. 90. In Illinois, live stock belonging to the owner of a farm which lies in two counties, in one of which he lives, and between the portions of which in each county there is no fence, so that the stock may be pastured in either county, is taxable only in the county of his residence under Illinois Revenue Act, ch. 120, § 7, making personal property taxable in the county of residence. Section 8, which makes such stock taxable where the farm with which they are connected is situated, when the owner does not reside thereon, does not affect the case. People v. Caldwell, 142 Ill. 434. In Massachusetts, horses kept in the only barn upon a farm which lies in two towns, are taxable in the town where the barn is situated, under Massachusetts Pub. Stat., ch. 11, § 20, cl. 3, providing that "horses kept throughout the year in places other than those where the owners reside shall be assessed to the owners in the places where they are kept," although the residence of the owner is on the same farm, in the other town, and the horses are used for work upon all parts of the farm. Pierce v. Eddy, 152 Mass. 594. In Nevada, cattle are to be taxed in the county where they remain permanently and have their home. State v. Shaw, 21 Nev. 222. In Wyoming, horses owned within the territory of the Shoshone Indian Reservation by a white person holding no official position, are taxable by the authorities of Wyoming in the county within which they are kept, under U. S. Rev. Stats., § 839, and the treaty of July 3d, 1868. Torrey v. Baldwin, 3 Wyoming 430. 1. St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 11 Wall. (U. S.) 423. 2. In Hooper v. Baltimore, 12 Md. 464, the owner of a vessel resided in Baltimore County and the vessel was registered at the port of Baltimore, from whence she sailed. This was the nearest port of registration and the only one at which she could have been registered. The court held that the ship could not be taxed by the city for municipal purposes. See also Pelton v. Northern Transp. Co., 37 Ohio St. 450. 3. Dillon on Municipal Corporations (4th ed.), § 787; Irvin v. New Orleans, etc., R. Co., 94 Ill. 105; Mobile v. Baldwin, 57 Ala. 62; 29 Am. Rep. 712; The Blanchard v. Martha Washington, 1 Cliff. (U. S.) 466; Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 471; Hill v. The Golden Gate, Newb. (U. S.) 308; St. Louis v. Consolidated Coal Co., 113 Mo. 83; Wilkey v. Pekin, 19 Ill. 160; Wheeling, etc., Transp. Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S. 273; People v. Niles, 35 Cal. 282; Irvin v. New Orleans, etc., R. Co., 94 Ill. 105; St. Joseph v. Saville, 39 Mo. 461; Gunther v. Baltimore, 55 Md. 457; Wheeling, etc., Transp. Co. v. Wheeling, 9 W. Va. 170; 27 Am. Rep. 552. Boats owned by an unincorporated company in Ohio, and used in that state, are taxable in the district in which the company's principal office is located, and in which the managing agent resides. Pomeroy Salt Co. v. Davis, 21 Ohio St. 555. 4. Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. (U. S.) 596. 5. The question of the location of the home port is one of fact. It depends wholly upon the locality of her owner's residence and not upon the place of her enrollment. St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Boat Co., 11 Wall. (U. S.) 423. But see Roberts v. Charlevoix Tp., 60 Mich. 197, where the court held that a vessel enrolled and licensed or registered under the United States. navigation laws, and owned by a nonresident of the state, does not become subject to the taxing power of the state by engaging in business therein. The statute may provide, however, that the vessel shall be assessed where it is permanently employed, or where it is registered or enrolled.2 If the vessel, under the law, is taxable in any one of several places in the same jurisdiction, it can be taxed in one of them only, and any subsequent assessment will be void.3 It cannot in any event be taxed at a point at which it merely touches or where it remains temporarily only.4 (4) Logs and Lumber-(See also LOGS AND LUMBER, vol. 13, p. 1018).-Logs and lumber are liable to taxation like other personal property. If in transitu, however, they are not taxable 5 1. A dredge boat, a tug boat, and mud scows owned by a foreign corporation and brought into Alabama for use in fulfilling a dredging contract with the national government, of indefinite duration, with a probability of other contracts to complete the improvement, are taxable within the state, although they are floating property, and although the tug is registered at the port of the owner's domicile. National Dredging Co. v. State (Ala. 1893), 12 So. Rep. 720. 2. Boats. Under a statute providing that "all persons in the state owning water-craft, shall be required to list the same for assessment and taxation in the county, township, city, or town in which the same may be enrolled, registered or licensed, or kept when not enrolled, registered or licensed," it was held that an assessment at the domicile of the owner was illegal where the boat was kept and used elsewhere. Eversole v. Cook, 92 Ind. 222. 3. The Illinois statute provided for the taxation of sailing vessels, steamboats, etc., in the county, town, village or district in which the same may belong or be enrolled, registered or licensed, or kept when not enrolled, registered or licensed. It was held that after a vessel has been rightfully listed in one place, it is not subject to taxation elsewhere. Halstead . Adams, 108 Ill. 609; Vogt v. Ayer, 104 Ill. 583. 4. State v. Haight, 30 N. J. L. 428; Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. (U.S.) 471; Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. (U. S.) 596; New Albany v. Meekin, 3 Ind. 480; 56 Am. Dec. 522; Mobile v. Baldwin, 57 Ala. 61; 29 Am. Rep. 712; St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 11 Wall. (U. S.) 431, reversing 40 Mo. 580; People v. Niles, 35 Cal. 282; Wilkey v. Pekin, 19 Ill. 160. But see Oakland v. Whipple, 39 Cal. 112. In Hays 7. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. (U. S.) 596, Nelson, J., said: "We are satisfied that the State of California had no jurisdiction over these vessels for the purpose of taxation; they were not, properly, abiding within its limits, so as to become incorporated with the personal property of the state; they were there but temporarily, engaged in lawful trade and commerce, with their situs at the home port where the vessels belonged, and where the owners were liable to be taxed for the capital invested, and where the taxes had been paid." 5. Logs and Lumber.-Posts, ties, and poles, kept for sale, are taxable as "merchant's goods, wares and commodities" under the Wisconsin statute, in the county where kept for sale, irrespective of the residence of the owner, although sales thereof are actually made in another county where the owners reside and do business as merchants. Torrey v. Shawano County, 79 Wis. 152; Mitchell v. Plover Tp., 53 Wis. 548; Sanford v. Spencer, 62 Wis. 230; Washburn v. Oshkosh, 60 Wis. 453. In Michigan, logs in camp are taxable at the place where the camp is located, if there is an office there receiving funds and making returns to headquarters. Ryerson v. Muskegon, 57 Mich. 383. Logs left by an Iowa company in a bayou on the Illinois side of the Mississippi river for safe-keeping are taxable in Illinois. Burlington Lumber Co. v. Willetts, 118 Ill. 559. Fire wood, pulp wood and kiln wood cut from wild land in a town, by a resident thereof, and carried prior to April 1st to a landing situated on the track, to stay there till sold, and which is in part shipped to other parts and in part sold to local parties in the course of the year, is "personal property employed in trade," and taxable in such at the place where they are situated. In order to be in transitu, they must have actually started on their journey.2 The mere fact that they are intended for shipment is not enough. If delivered to the common carrier, or at the starting point on the ice or in the water, ready for immediate moving, their journey has begun.4 Standing, growing trees are a part of the realty and can be taxed only where it lies.5 (5) Property in Transitu or Temporarily Present.-In order to be taxed at a place other than the owner's domicile, an article of personalty must be a part of the property of the place. It must be towns under Maine Rev. Stats., ch. 6, § 14, providing that such property shall be taxed in the town where so employed on April 1st. Gower v. Jonesboro, 83 Me. 142. In Standard Oil Co. v. Combs, 96 Ind. 179; 49 Am. Rep. 156, the court held that staves, purchased by a nonresident, and remaining in the state to receive a finishing process before shipment to another state, were taxable within the state. Lumber on the premises of the manufacturer, awaiting transportation to the vendee, is not taxable where it is, as in a place of "storage," although the title is passed, especially if anything remains to be done to complete the transfer. Osterhout v. Jones, 54 Mich. 228. 1. LOGS AND LUMBER, vol. 13, p. 1049. 2. Logs, cut, hauled, and piled on the ice, to await the opening of a river, and to be floated then to another state, are not in transit, and so exempt in the state where cut and piled. C. N. Nelson Lumber Co. v. Loraine, 22 Fed. Rep. 54. 3. In Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, certain logs were cut in New Hampshire, and hauled down and deposited in and on the banks of a stream, for the purpose of being floated down the river into another state, but, by reason of low water, were delayed there nearly a year and taxed by the township in which they lay. The court held that, aside from the owner's intent to export them, the logs were not in course of commercial transportation. 4. Logs cut by contractors and delivered in a lake for convenience in storage, but for no definite time, whence the owners had contracts to transport them to another place, are in transit to the latter place, and not taxable at the lake. Pardee v. Freesoil Tp., 74 Mich. 81. See also Corning v. Masonville Tp., 74 Mich. 177. In Connecticut River Lumber Co. v. Columbia, 62 N. H. 286, the court held that logs cut and delivered on the ice on a river, where they lie temporarily waiting transportation down the river, as soon as the ice shall break up, are in transitu and cannot be taxed. And in Blount v. Munroe, 60 Ga. 61, it was held that a tax could not be imposed upon lumber awaiting shipment in the hands of an exporter, which was actually shipped immediately afterwards, as such a tax would be in violation of the constitutional prohibition against a tax upon imports or exports. See also Clarke v. Clarke, 3 Woods (U. S.) 408. Michigan.-Lumber piled at a railway station simply for shipment is not taxable as property in storage. Monroe v. Greenhoe, 54 Mich. 9. Logs piled by the side of a railway track for shipment, but not actually in transit, are within the Michigan statute providing that property so piled shall not be deemed in transitu, but shall be assessed to the owner in the township where it is situated; and the fact that the contracts have been made with parties to load the logs, or that some event has occurred to prevent shipment, or that it is the owner's intention to ship in the near future, is immaterial. Maurer 7. Cliff, 94 Mich. 194. Under the Michigan statute, property in transit is taxed at the place of destination, provided that forest products in transit are to be held destined to the sorting grounds of the booming company nearest the mouth of the stream, unless the contrary is made to appear. Brooks v. Arenac Tp., 71 Mich. 231; Fletcher v. Alcona Tp., 72 Mich. 18. 5. Fletcher v.Alcona Tp.,72 Mich. 18. located there.1 If it is merely in transit through the place, it cannot be taxed there.2 This subject, so far as it concerns logs and lumber, has just been considered. The same general principles apply to all kinds of personal property. Here also the mere intention to ship is immaterial. In order to be in transitu, the goods must have begun their journey.3 A delivery to a common carrier is enough, even though the goods have not been physically moved. Unless such delivery can be shown, however, they will not be considered as in transitu unless they have been actually launched on their way to their destination. The carrying of the goods to the depot and the leaving them there until a convenient time to move them, do not constitute a part of their transportation. If actually on their journey, mere delay at a point 1. Property which happens to be temporarily within the jurisdiction cannot be taxed there. People v. Niles, 35 Cal. 287; Herron v. Keeran, 59 Ind. 473; 26 Am. Rep. 87; Rhyno v. Madison County, 43 Iowa 632; Torrent v. Yager, 52 Mich. 306; People v. Tax Com'rs, 23 N. Y. 242; Bennett v. Birmingham, 31 Pa. St. 15; State v. Charleston, 2 Spears (S. Car.) 719. But see McCormick v. Fitch, 14 Minn. 252. A city ordinance which attempts to impose a license tax upon wagons of outside residents engaged in hauling in and out of the city, is void. Charles v. Nolle, 52 Mo. 122; 11 Am. Rep. 440. St. A traveling circus and menagerie owned by a non-resident and brought into the state to be exhibited at various places, and then taken into other states for the same purpose, will not be subject to taxation within the state. Robinson v. Longley, 18 Nev. 71. In Com. 7. American Dredging Co., 122 Pa. St. 386, the court passed upon the validity of a tax imposed upon scows, tug boats, and dredges owned by a resident of the state, but which had never been within it, and which were carried from place to place without the state, for the purpose of dredging; and stated the general rule to be, that personal property of a visible and tangible nature, permanently located within another state, would be taxable where found; but held that the property in question, being in different localities, for short periods of time and for temporary purposes, was properly taxable by the state wherein its owner resided. 2. Ogilvie . Crawford County, 2 McCrary (U. S.) 148; 12 Fed. Rep. 196; Standard Oil Co. v. Bachelor, 89 Ind. I; Monroe v. Greenhoe, 54 Mich. 9; Boyce v. Cutter, 70 Mich. 539; Brooks v. Arenac Tp., 71 Mich. 231; Pardee v. Freesoil Tp., 74 Mich. 81; Connecticut River Lumber Co. v. Columbia, 62 N. H. 286; Coe v. Errol, 62 N. H. 303; Hurley v. Texas, 20 Wis. 634. Coal belonging to a non-resident, which is being sent across the state and which is lying at a wharf awaiting assortment and shipment, has no situs within the state, and cannot be taxed. State v. Engle, 34 N. J. L. 425; State v. Carrigan, 39 N. J. L. 35. But grain which has been bought by an agent for a commission and stored in a warehouse where it lies subject to the order of the owner, is not in transitu and will be taxable. Walton v. Westwood, 73 Ill. 125. Wood cut in California and owned by a citizen of that state, thrown into a river and passing a certain county in Nevada on its way to market in another Nevada county, is not taxable in the former county. Conley v. Chedic, 7 Nev. 336. 3. Hill v. Graham, 72 Mich. 659; Carrier v. Gordon, 21 Ohio St. 609. But this case is distinguished in Standard Oil Co. v. Bachelor, 89 Ind. 1, in which it was held that if goods have in any sense started on their journey, they will not be subject to taxation at a place where they are at a railroad station awaiting shipment. Where property has been purchased by a non-resident who intends to ship, but is prevented from doing so by the fact that navigation has not opened, it is taxable in the place where it is. Carrier v. Gordon, 21 Ohio St. 605. 4. Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517; 62 N. H. 303. Corn owned by a non-resident and will not render them taxable.1 When the goods have reached their destination, and have been taken in charge by one rightly asserting control, though not consigned to any specially authorized agent, and not yet unloaded, they may be taxed.2 (6) Construction of Special Statutory Terms.-The states, in exercising the right to tax property within their limits, frequently provide for the assessment of property, whether of residents or non-residents, employed in business within the state. Such legislation is legitimate. In order to come within the meaning of the phrase "employed in business," or similar expressions, the business must be other than of a merely temporary character.4 Such a phrase would include property employed in a banking business. The meaning of other expressions commonly found in statutes is considered in the note.6 The law may and fre temporarily in cribs awaiting transportation, has been held not liable to taxation. There must, however, be a purpose to ship immediately, or at least as soon as transportation can be conveniently obtained, followed by actual shipment within a reasonable time, to exempt the property from taxation. Ogilvie v. Crawford County, 2 McCrary (U. S.) 148. 1. Burroughs on Taxation, p. 56; State v. Engle, 34 N. J. L. 425; State v. Carrigan, 39 N. J. L. 35; Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517; 62 N. H. 303. 2. Pittsburgh, etc., Coal Co. v. Bates, 40 La. Ann. 226; 8 Am. St. Rep. 519. 3. Duer v. Small, 4 Blatchf. (U. S.) 263; Danville Banking, etc., Co. v. Parks, 88 Ill. 170; Leonard v. New Bedford, 16 Gray (Mass.) 292; Putnam v. Fife Lake Tp., 45 Mich. 125; McCoy v. Anderson, 47 Mich. 502; Taylor v. Love, 43 N. J. L. 142; Ament v. Humphrey, 3 Greene (Iowa) 255; Lemp v. Hastings, 4 Greene (Iowa) 448; Gray v. Kettell, 12 Mass. 160; Shaw v. Hartford, 56 Conn. 351; Comstock v. Grand Rapids, 54 Mich. 641. Where one has a factory, at a state prison, in charge of an agent, and is a jobber of the goods so made at another place, his property at the prison may be taxed under a statute providing that goods of manufacturers in the hands of agents shall be listed where the agent's business is conducted. Selz v. Cagwin, 104 Ill. 647. A private banker living in one place and having a bank in another, is to be regarded as a resident of the latter place, so far as the matter of taxation is concerned. Miner v. Fredonia, 27 N. Y. 155. 4. Tazewell County v. Davenport, 40 Ill. 197; People v. Horn Silver Min. Co., 105 N. Y. 76. If the statute provides that non-residents "doing business" in the state shall be taxed on sums invested "in said business," a tax cannot be assessed against a manufactured article sent into the state merely for sale by an agent. People v. Tax Com'r, 23 N. Y. 242. 5. McCutchen v. Rice County, 2 McCrary (U. S.) 337. 6. Property Within the State.-See People v. Campbell, 138 N. Y. 543. Goods in Stores, Shops, etc.-In Kalkaska Tp. v. Fletcher, 81 Mich. 446, the statute provided that all goods situate in a township other than where the owner resides, should be assessed in the township where situate, if the owner hired a shop, store, etc., for use in connection with them. The defendants attached a stock of goods and rented a store in which to keep them, under the sheriff's charge, until the termination of the suit. The court held that a tax could not be imposed upon these goods, pending the attachment proceedings, for defendants were neither the owners of the goods at the time of the assessment, nor did they occupy a store within the meaning of the statute. A building in which ice is stored is not a "store" within the meaning of a statute taxing property of nonresidents having stores within the town. Hittinger v. Westford, 135 Mass. 258. Merchandise or Stock in Trade.-Cotton cloth in process of being printed and prepared for market, is not "mer |