the district, taking the property out of the district, nor changes in the lines of the district after that time, will divest the liability for the tax.1 (1) Domicile (See also DOMICILE, vol. 5, p. 857).-The question of domicile in matters of taxation, as in other connections, is one of fact, the burden of proving which rests on the public body seeking to collect the tax.3 If the facts show that the domicile is in a given place, it is there presumed to remain, although the taxpayer has formed an intention to remove, an actual removal being necessary to a change of domicile.4 If a removal v. Portland, 2 Oregon 81; Pueblo County v. Wilson, 15 Colo. 90. Cotton shipped out of the state prior to the date of the assessment is not taxable. Colbert v. Leake County, 60 Miss. 142. See also Templeton v. Levee Com'rs, 16 La. Ann. 117. And where the owner removed all his stock of goods and closed up his store prior to the date of the assessment, he was held. not taxable. Field v. Boston, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 65. In Pueblo County v. Wilson, 15 Colo. 90, the court construed the Colorado statute which provided for the assessment of horses and cattle running at large in the county in which they are being herded or kept upon a certain day. 1. If, after a tax has been raised and assessed on the inhabitants of a district, part of the district is set off into another district, the inhabitants of such remain liable to pay the tax, the liability being fixed by the assessment. Waldron v. Lee, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 323. But a removal of the property from the taxing district after the assessment has been made, will not relieve the owner from liability to pay the tax already imposed, even though the owner subsequently pays a tax elsewhere. People v. Holladay, 25 Cal. 300; DeArman v. Williams, 93 Mo. 158. Nor after a levy thereon under the provisions of a statute. State v. Easterbrook, 3 Nev. 173. And in Warren v. Werner, 14 Wis. 366, where, after due service of the notice required by law to be given by the assessor, the owner of personal property, within the ten days thereafter allowed for listing his property, removed to another town, he was not thereby relieved from his liability to pay the tax imposed in the former town. See also Barber v. Potter, 8 R. One jury, Bailey v. Buell, 59 Barb. (N. Y.) 158. The facts sufficient to constitute domicile have been stated under the head of DOMICILE, vol. 5, p. 857. Some additional cases are here noted. residing in Rhode Island from April to December and there voting and taxed, cannot be taxed on personal property in New York, although he lives there in a hired house from December to April. People v. Barker, 70 Hun (N. Y.) 397. See also Kellogg v. Oshkosh, 14 Wis. 623; Carnoe v. Freetown, 9 Gray (Mass.) 357. An unmarried man is properly taxed in the county where he spends most of his time, and where his interests are, notwithstanding the fact that he keeps trunks and clothing in another county. King v. Parker, 73 Iowa 757. See also Cabot v. Boston, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 52; Lee v. Boston, 2 Gray (Mass.) 484; Cochrane v. Boston, 4 Allen (Mass.) 177. 3. A town which taxes a man as a resident, takes upon itself the burden of showing that he is such, if the right is questioned. . Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), p. 372; Hurlburt v. Green, 41 Vt. 490. Consent to be taxed has been held not to affect the matter, if he is not in fact a resident. Blood v. Sayre, 17 Vt. 609. 4. Stoddert v. Ward, 31 Md. 562; 100 Am. Dec. 83; Pickering v. Cambridge, 144 Mass. 244. In Finley v. Philadelphia, 32 Pa. St. 381, Lowrie, C. J., said: "Clearly the liability to taxation does not depend upon the intention of any one relative to his domiciliation, for this would make the state's power of taxation dependent, in numberless cases, on the pleasure of the persons proposed to be taxed. Residence is a definite and obvious fact, and is of itself a sufficient ground of liability Otis v. Boston, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 44. The fact that a person was taxed in with intention to remain is shown, it is immaterial what the purpose of the person removing was, even though his only object was to secure a lower rate of taxation.1 One who has thus removed cannot, by still considering himself a resident at his old home and putting in a list there, avoid acquiring the new domicile.2 A mere transient cannot be taxed.3 A man's home, not his place of business, determines his domicile.4 It is undoubtedly true, as a general principle, that a person must have some domicile,5 and that a 'domicile once acquired remains until a new one is secured. As far as taxation purposes are concerned, however, some courts have made an exception and held that one, by removing with intention to acquire a new domicile in another state, and having actually left the former state, loses his domicile, although he has in fact not acquired another. This doctrine doubtless rests upon the ground that the state has lost jurisdiction by the removal. But the town to which he has removed, is not competent evidence to show that he did not continue to be taxable in the town of his former residence. Mead v. Boxborough, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 362. 1. People v. Caldwell, 142 Ill. 434. 2. One who has removed from one township to another, and for the purpose of evading the payment of taxes in the latter, mails a schedule of his personal property to the assessors of the former township and pays, taxes thereon in such township, is not relieved thereby from liability to taxation on such property in the township to which he has removed. Mahany v. People, 138 Ill. 311. 3. An individual is to be taxed in the place of his domicile or home, and not where he is personally residing for a mere temporary purpose, having a home in some other place. Moore v. Wilkins, 10 N. H. 452. A person having a permanent residence, where he votes and pays taxes, is not subject to taxation in another place merely because he spends a few months there during the year visiting relatives. People v. Barker, 63 Hun (N. Y.) 630. One coming to a state with his family and servants for a part of the year to reside in a house owned by him, does not thereby become a resident. State v. Ross, 23 N. J. L. 517. A, who had emigrated to Canada many years before, after living there five years became a peddler, and as such traveled through Ohio, where he loaned money. To look after his interests, and as peddler, he visited the state as often as once a year, but car ried his securities with him wherever he went. It was held that he was not a resident of Ohio. Grant v. Jones, 39 Ohio St. 506. The hiring of a yard, storage and sale of lumber therein, and erection of a small building thereon, for use of employés, does not subject a tenant to taxation there. Loud v. Charlestown, 103 Mass. 278. 4. Welty on Assessments, § 37. Where a taxpayer removes from one taxing district to another, and claims to have acquired a domicile in the latter district, the burden rests upon him to establish a residence therein so permanent as to exclude the existence of an intention to make a domicile elsewhere. Hartford v. Champion, 58 Conn. 268. 7. One who abandons his residence in the commonwealth before the first of May, with the fixed intention not to return, and has actually left the commonwealth, is not taxable on his poll and personal property there, although he may be still on the way to his new domicile. Colton v. Longmeadow, 12 Allen (Mass.) 598. To the same effect is Briggs 21. Rochester, 16 Gray (Mass.) 337. The above criticised in Borland v. Boston, 132 Mass. 89; 42 Am. Rep. 427. cases are The case of Mead v. Boxborough, II Cush. (Mass.) 362, held that if an inhabitant of a town removes to another town in the state, not intending to remain there permanently nor to return to his former home, he loses his domicile in such former home. it must be said, in this connection, that the weight of authority is, however, the other way.1 (2) Residence, Inhabitancy, etc.-(See also INHABITANT, vol. 10, P. 770; RESIDENCE, vol. 21, p. 122). The statutes often provide that taxation of personalty shall be at the residence of the owner. The definition of the term "residence," is elsewhere given.2 It must be a fixed and permanent home, as distinguished from a temporary abiding place.3 One may have two places of residence,4 in which case the assessors, unless restrained by the terms of the statute, may choose between them.5 If the owner lives on a farm lying in two counties, his only residence is in the county where his house is situated. The question of residence, like that 1. Borland v. Boston, 132 Mass. 89; 42 Am. Rep. 427; Matter of Nichols, 54 N. Y. 62. An inhabitant of the commonwealth who removes from the town of his residence, with the intention of never residing there again, and of removing to another state, is still, so long as he remains in the commonwealth, liable to taxation in that town, until he acquires another domicile. Bulkley v. Williamstown, 3 Gray (Mass.) 493. An inhabitant of A left that place on March 30, with the intention of residing in C. On April 1, he arrived at B and the next day reached C, where he established his residence. It was held that, for the purpose of taxation, he was to be deemed an inhabitant of A on April 1, and was liable to taxation there. Littlefield . Brooks, 50 Me. 475. Under a Minnesota statute in force in 1876, imposing a tax upon “all personal property of persons residing" within the state, in reference to the quantity of property held or owned by such residents on May 1st, 1876, it was held that the personal property of one who had been a resident of the state, but who was in itinere on May 1st, for the propose of making New York City the place of future residence, was subject to taxation under the statute. McCutchen v. Rice County, 2 McCrary (U. S.) 337. 2. See RESIDENCE, vol. 21, p. 122. In New Jersey, the residence required to make one liable to a personal tax in a particular township or ward, is precisely the same in kind as that which will entitle him to vote there. State v. Casper, 36 N. J. L. 367. In Douglass v. New York, 2 Duer (N. Y.) 110, the plaintiff resided during a part of the year in New York, and was there taxed upon his personal property. The statute provided that every person should be taxed in the town or ward where he resided, for all his personal property. The court held that the plaintiff had a residence in New York for the purpose of taxation, although his domicile was elsewhere. This case is almost identical with Bartlett v. New York, 5 Sandf. (N. Y.) 44. 3. Culbertson v. Floyd County, 52 Ind. 361. 4. See RESIDENCE, vol. 21, p. 124. 5. Bell . Pierce, 51 N. Y. 16, affirming 48 Barb. (N. Y.) 51. A person taxable in a city under the New York statute declaring a person's residence, if he resides in two or more places during any one year, to be where his principal business is transacted, is taxable in the ward in the city where he resides. Bowe . Jenkins, 69 Hun (N. Y.) 458. See also Thayer v. Boston, 124 Mass. 132; 26 Am. Rep. 650; Wade v. Matheson, 4 Lans. (N. Y.) 158; Mann v. Clark, 33 Vt. 55; Church v. Rowell, 49 Me. 367. 6. Personal property of one owning a farm lying partly in two counties, is taxable only in the county where the house in which he lives is located, under Illinois Revenue Act, ch. 120, § 7, making such property taxable in the county, town or district where the owner resides. People v. Caldwell, 142 Ill. 434. In Judkins 7. Reed, 48 Me. 386, the town line passed through the house of the plaintiff, and the court held that he was a resident .of, and taxable in, that town in which the larger, as well as the most indispensable part of his house was situated. In Cheney v. Waltham, 8 Cush. of domicile, is one of fact to be proved by competent evidence. The assessor's list is not admissible against the party taxed.1 The home of the taxpayer is his residence-not his place of business.2 If one's residence is in a certain place for all other purposes, it is his residence for taxation purposes also.3 Taxes are often imposed on "inhabitants." The term "inhabitancy" is broader than domicile.4 This question, like that of domicile, is one of fact, the burden of proving which is on the corporation taxing,5 "Actual place of abode," is another phrase often used in the tax laws.6 b. TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY—(1) In General.—Tangible personal property is assessed sometimes at the domicile of the owner; sometimes at the place where it is situated.8 Money, while a mere medium of exchange, is, so far as taxation (Mass.) 327, where a dwelling house was divided by a boundary line, the court held that the owner would be considered a resident of that town in which he performed those offices which mainly characterized his home (such as sleeping, eating, sitting, and receiving visitors), and that he had no right to elect to reside and to be taxed for his personal property in the other town. 1. Gregory v. Bugbee, 42 Vt. 480. 2. Nugent v. Bates, 51 Iowa 77; 32 Am. Rep. 117. 3. Meserve v. Folsom, 62 Vt. 504. 4. Welty on Assessments, § 36; Burroughs on Taxation, p. 44. A stranger coming into a town, becomes liable to a license tax as an "inhabitant and member of the corporation." Wilmington v. Roby, 8 Ired. (N. Car.) 254. 5. Lyman v. Fiske, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 231; 28 Am. Dec. 293. To recover in an action of debt for taxes assessed upon personal property under Maine Rev. Stat., ch. 6, § 12, it must be established that the defendant was an inhabitant of the plaintiff town at the time of the assessment. Rockland v. Farnsworth, 83 Me. 228. 6. "Actual place of abode " is where one has his home and family irrespective of business absences. Arnold v. Davis, 8 R. I. 341. Under the Rhode Island statute, providing that "all ratable personal property shall be taxed in the town in which the owner shall have had his actual place of abode for the larger portion of the twelve months next preceding the first day of April in each year," the "larger portion of the twelve months," means more than half of them in duration of time. Ailman v. Griswold, 12 R. I. 339. See also Green v. Gardiner, 6 R. I. 242. Where one moves from his own farm to the town farm in an adjoining district, under contract to carry it on for a year, intending to make it his home for the year and so continue two years thereafter, he is a resident of the latter district, even though he carries on his own farm and expects to return. Woodward v. Isham, 43 Vt. 123. 7. See cases in preceding notes. 8. People v. Holladay, 25 Cal. 30; Oakland v. Whipple, 39 Čal. 112; Powell v. Madison, 21 Ind. 335; Rieman v. Shepard, 27 Ind. 288; Eversole v. Cook, 92 Ind. 222; Mills v. Thornton, 26 Ill. 300; 79 Am. Dec. 377; Dunleith v. Reynolds, 53 Ill. 45; Com. v. Gaines, 80 Ky. 489; Chauvenet v. Anne Arundel County, 3 Md. 259; Leonard v. New Bedford, 16 Gray (Mass.) 292; Colbert v. Leake County, 60 Miss. 142; State v. Falkinburge, 15 N. J. L. 320; State v. Ross, 23 N. J. L. 517; Barnes v. Woodbury, 17 Nev. 383; Steere v. Walling, 7 R. I. 317; State v. Charleston, 2 Spears (S. Car.) 719. See also Johnson v. Lexington, 14 B. Mon. (Ky.) 521. Thus, property consisting of oxen and a portable sawmill, which has been located and used in a certain county for nearly three years, has acquired a situs and will be taxed in that county. Trammell v. Connor, 91 Ala. 398. Coal sent by the owners to their agents in another state, to be there sold upon its arrival, becomes a part of the general mass of property in that state, and will be taxable. Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622. questions are concerned, a form of tangible personal property.1 It may be taxed at the owner's domicile, but is generally taxed where it is actually situated.2 (2) Animals. The statutes often provide for the taxation of cattle and other animals where they are herded or usually kept.3 1. State v. Earl, 1 Nev. 397. 2. People v. Ogdensburgh, 48 N. Y. 390; McCutchen . Rice County, 2 McCrary (U. S.) 337. "It is property within the state and subject to taxation, it is visible and tangible, and expressly made taxable by statute, and is taxable where situated." Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Board, 44 La. Ann. 91. But see Culbertson v. Floyd County, 52 Ind. 361. Money invested in business will be taxed, although the owner is a nonresident. Matter of McMahon, 66 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 190. And a law providing for the taxation of the capital of a nonresident is constitutional. Duer v. Small, 4 Blatchf. (U. S.) 263. In Miner v. Fredonia, 27 N. Y. 155, the court held that banking capital will be subject to taxation in the place where the business of such bank is located, treating this as an exception to the general rule mobilia sequuntur personam. Where a resident of one state has exclusive control and management of money for investment of foreign capitalists, some of which is invested in his state, and the securities are made and held by him in his own name in such state, they are taxable in that state. Hutchinson v. Board of Equalization, 66 Iowa 35. Where a foreign insurance company deposits, with the comptroller of the state, the funds required by statute to enable it to do business, it is liable for taxes upon them. International L. Assurance Soc. v. Com'rs of Taxes, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 318. 3. Smith v. Mason, 48 Kan. 586; Ford v. McGregor, 20 Nev. 446; Whitmore v. McGregor, 20 Nev. 451. Where cattle were owned, herded and managed at the owner's "home ranch" in one county, but were turned out to graze in another county during a part of the year, it was held that they properly belonged in the county where the owner's ranch was for the purpose of taxation. The court in this case said: "But, by assigning to this class of personal property a situs for the purpose of taxation, independent of the mere residence of the owner, it does not necessarily follow that the property can be legally assessed in whatever county it may first be found during the period of assessment." Barnes 7. Woodbury, 17 Nev. 383. To the same effect is Ford v. McGregor, 20 Nev. 446. The case of Graham v. Chautauqua County, 31 Kan. 473, presents a different state of facts. In this case the Kansas statute provided for the listing and taxing of cattle where they were usually kept. The cattle taxed were kept about an equal time in each township. There was nothing in the case showing that the owner had a "home ranch" in either township, and nothing to indicate that the cattle were to be taken from the township in which they were assessed, back to the township where the owner claimed they should have been assessed. The court held that the assessment was properly made in the township in which the cattle were found. In People v. Townsend, 56 Cal. 633, the court declared void an act taxing migratory cattle, basing its decision upon the principle that one local community cannot be taxed for the benefit of another, even though all personal property is required to be listed and assessed in the county where it is situated. Nevertheless cattle ranging across the line will be taxed in the county where the owner resides. Court . O'Connor, 65 Tex. 334. But under subsequent legislation, where pastures lie upon county boundaries, cattle are to be taxed in proportion to the pasture land situated in each county. Nolan v. San Antonio Ranch Co., 1 Tex. 315. In Hardesty v. Fleming, 57 Tex. 395, under a statute which provides that all property, real and personal, except such as is required to be listed and assessed elsewhere, shall be listed and assessed in the county where it is situated, it was held that where cattle ranged across the line and were within the state for five months, they were taxable there. In Colorado, cattle and horses purchased outside of the state by residents, and driven into the state for the purpose of pasturage in the month of |