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ber, 1824, shall cease to have effect, notwithstanding what was disposed in the first point of its 31st article.
3d. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if neither party notifies to the other its intention of reforming any of or all the articles of this treaty twelve months before the expiration of the twenty years stipulated above, the said treaty shall continue binding on both parties beyond the said twenty years, until twelve months from the time that one of the parties notifies its intention of proceeding to a reform.
4th. If any one or more of the citizens of either party shall infringe any of the articles of this treaty, such citizens shall be held personally responsible for the same, and the harmony and good correspondence between the two nations shall not be interrupted thereby; each party engaging in no way to protect the offender or sanction such violation.
5th. If unfortunately any of the articles contained in this treaty should be violated or infringed in any way whatever, it is expressly stipulated that neither of the two contracting parties shall ordain or authorize any acts of reprisal, nor shall declare war against the other on complaints of injuries or damages, until the said party considering itself offended shall have laid before the other a statement of such injuries or damages, verified by competent proofs, demanding justice and satisfaction, and the same shall have been denied, in violation of the laws and of international right.
6th. Any special or remarkable advantages that one or the other power may enjoy from the foregoing stipulation are, and ought to be, always understood in virtue and as in compensation of the obligations they have just contracted, and which have been specified in the first number of this article.
This treaty was by its own stipulation to remain in full force and effect for twenty years, and then if neither party gave notice of intended termination it was to continue in force, terminable by either party by twelve months' notice. No such notice on either side has ever been given, and no other treaty with New Granada on this subject has ever been executed. This treaty is consequently of force, and the canal communication, should it be accomplished in accordance therewith, and with the concurrence of the United States that it is in such accordance, which under this treaty must be deemed essential, would be to-day under the protection and guarantee of the United States, and both its projectors and the Government of New Granada would be authorized in certain contingencies to call upon the Government of the United States for the fulfillment of this obligation.
Indeed it is proper to add that on several occasions the Government of the United States has been called on to consider and enforce its guarantee.
In 1862 Mr. Seward addressed Mr. Adams at London and Mr. Dayton at Paris as follows:
Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
SIR: The treaty between the United States and the Republic of New Granada, signed on the 12th day of December, 1846, contains a stipulation which it will be seen was made not for any special or peculiar interest or advantage of the United States, but for the benefit and advantage of all nations, and which is in the following words, contained in the 35th article of said treaty:
"And in order to secure to themselves the tranquil and constant enjoyment of these advantages, and as an especial compensation for the said advantages, and for the favors they have acquired by the 4th, 5th, and 6th articles of this treaty, the United States guarantee positively and efficaciously to New Granada, by the present stipulation, the perfect neutrality of the before-mentioned Isthmus, with the view that the free transit from the one to the other sea may not be interrupted or embarrassed in any future time while this treaty exists; and, in consequence, the United States also guaranty, in the same manner, the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses over the said territory."
On the 26th of June last Mr. P. A. Herran, minister plenipotentiary of the Granadian Confederation near the Government of the United States, transmitted to this Department a note, of which a translation is hereto annexed, marked A.
In this note Mr. Herran gave information that Mosquera, a revolutionary chief, who is engaged in subverting the Granadian Confederation, had sent an armed force to
occupy the Isthmus of Panama, which proceeding was opposed by an unavailing protest of the governor of Panama, and Mr. Herran therefore invoked the interposition of this Government in accordance with the treaty obligations above set forth. Simultaneously with the reception of this note of Mr. Herran's, substantially the same information which it gave was received from our consul residing at Panama, and the President therefore instructed our naval commander at that port to take care to protect and guarantee at all hazards, and at whatever cost, the safety of the railroad transit across the Isthmus of Panama. Mr. Herran now insists that, owing to the character of the population on the Isthmus and the revolutionary condition of that region, the security of the transit across the Isthmus cannot be adequately insured by the presence and activity of a mere naval force, and that the Granadian Confederation is entitled, therefore, to the special aid of a land force to be sent from the United States, and suggests that it should be made to consist of three hundred cavalry.
This Government has no interest in the matter different from that of other maritime powers. It is willing to interpose its aid in execution of its treaty and for the benefit of all nations. But if it should do so it would incur some hazard of becoming involved in the revolutionary strife which is going on in that country. It would also incur danger of misapprehension of its objects by other maritime powers if it should act without previous consultation with them. The revolutionary disturbances existing in that quarter are doubtlessly as well known and understood by the Governments of Great Britain and France as they are by this Government, and they are probably also well informed of the proceedings of Mosquera, which has moved Mr. Herran's application to the President. He desires an understanding with these two Governments upon the subject, and you are therefore instructed to submit the matter to Earl Russell, as Mr. Dayton will likewise be instructed to confer with Mr. Thouvenel.
The points to be remembered are:
First. Whether any proceeding in the matter shall be adopted by the United States with the assent and acquiescence of the British and French Governments.
Secondly. What should be the force and extent of the aid to be rendered to the Granadian Confederation.
Thirdly. Whether these Governments will unite with the United States in guaranteeing the safety of the transit and the authority of the Granadian Confederation, or either of these objects, and the form and manner in which the parties shall carry out such agreement.
I hardly need say that this Government is not less anxious to avoid any such independent or hasty action in the matter as would seem to indicate a desire for exclusive or especial advantages in New Granada than the British Government can be that we shall abstain from such a course.
I am, &c., &c.,
WILLIAM H. SEWARD.
The same, mutatis mutandis, to Mr. Dayton at Paris, No. 180.
Mr. Adams responded as follows: No. 201.]
LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
SIR: Yesterday I had a conference with Lord Russell at the foreign office, in the course of which I went over the various subjects whereupon I had received instructions in your late dispatches. I propose to review them in the order in which they came up.
Lastly I read to his lordship the dispatch No. 296, relating to the claim of Mr. Herran for the fulfillment of the guarantee to New Granada to protect the transit on the Isthmus of Panama. I observed that it must be obvious that the Government of the United States could not desire just at this time to enlarge the field of operation for its forces; hence that its performance of this obligation would necessarily depend only upon a full conviction of its imperative character. On that point it would be glad to consult with other powers most interested in the transit which it was the object to preserve. His lordship seemed already well informed of the facts in the case. He said that he did not yet perceive the contingency to have occurred which called for interposition. It was true that General Mosquera was in occupation of the territory in resistance to the Granadian Government. Such things were happening all the time in South America. But there had been no attempt, so far as he knew, to obstruct the free transit across the Isthmus, nor did he understand that any disposition had been shown to do 0. Until there should be some manifestation of the sort, any demonstration might have the appearance of interposing to effect a different purpose. His lordship added that on the happening of an actual derangement of the communication the British Government would readily co-operate with the United States in the measures that might be thought necessary to make good the privileges secured by the guarantee.
I believe this closed all the topics to which it had been made my duty especially to call his lordship's attention. I then took my leave of him, probably for the season, as he spoke of his departure from town next week, and mentioned, that the under secretary would in his absence attend to the transaction of any business that I might have occasion to propose.
I have, &c.,
CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.
Mr. Dayton responded as follows:
PARIS, August 29, 1862.
SIR: I have to-day called the attention of Mr. Thouvenel to your dispatch No. 180, in reference to the application of New Granada for assistance in the preservation of the neutrality of the Isthmus and the sovereignty of that country. Somewhat to my suprise, I found that your dispatch had not been submitted by the minister ad interim to Mr. Thouvenel on his return, and that, in point of fact, he had not yet seen it. He informed me, however, that the same question substantially had been presented to him through Mr. Mercier, and that a written reply had been forwarded some days since, which doubtless has been or will be promptly communicated to you. Mr. Thouvenel, however, seemed to think your communication was rather in the nature of a conference as to what you should under the circumstances do, than as indicating any fixed determination to act in the premises. He says that in the view he took he did not see that it was necessary that you should under the treaty do anything at all. That the neutrality of the Isthmus was not in question and the railroad had not been disturbed. He said that whether one party or the other had control of the Government of New Granada did not affect the question. That France had not recognized Mosquera or his Government because there was an opposition in arms against him, or, in other words, there was a civil war between opposing parties. That if the railroad were about to be interrupted or destroyed he would not think it improper for the United States to interfere, but if matters remained now as they were a month since, when his advices were received, he thought it uncalled for at this time by any treaty stipulation. He referred, too, to the somewhat anomalous position of Mr. Herran, who made the call for interference, and who, he seemed to think, did not represent the Government actually in power. He further said that a few days since the British ambassador had applied to them to know what view the French Government took of this matter, and he had sent him by way of reply a copy of his late note to Mr. Mercier. That they had not as yet heard what action the British Government had taken upon the question.
The above is the substance of our conversation. I should have asked from Mr. Thouvenel (as I had from Mr. Rouher) a written a reply, but for the fact stated that he had already written to Mr. Mercier. If you have occasion to communicate to the Government of New Granada the view taken by France, a copy of this note, if asked for, will doubtless be supplied by Mr. Mercier.
I am, &c.,
WM. L. DAYTON.
In 1864 the Government of the United States was called upon to interfere, if the necessity should arise, to prevent the importation of troops and munitions of war by Spain across the Isthmus of Panama for the purpose of carrying on war against Peru. And although fortunately the necessity did not arise, the Attorney-General, to whom the case was referred for an opinion, held that under the guarantee of the treaty such interference would be obligatory. (Opinions Attorney-General vol. xi, p. 69.)
In 1865 the question arose as to the obligation of the United States to comply with the requisition of the President of the United States of Colombia (New Granada) for a force to protect the Isthmus of Panama from invasion by a body of insurgents of that country. In this case the Government of the United States held, under the opinion of the AttorneyGeneral, and so communicated to its representative at Bogota, that the guarantee of New Granada in the sovereignty and property over the territory was only as against other and foreign Governments, and did not authorize the United States to take sides with one or the other party in the intestine troubles of that nation. (Opinions Attorney-General, vol. xi, pp. 392-3.)
Four years after the signature of this treaty and two years after its ratification the United States and Great Britain, April 19, 1850, executed the treaty which is generally known as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.
The necessity for this treaty having arisen from the complication of the interests of Great Britain and the United States in Central America, its special provisions were confined to the adjustment of such questions in that region as seemed to threaten the amicable relations of these two powers, and provided that neither Great Britain nor the United States would ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over a ship-canal through the territory of Central America, erect or maintain any fortification commanding the same or in the vicinity thereof, occupy, fortify, colonize, or assume or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any part of Central America, nor make use of any alliance, connection, or influence with any of these States to obtain any unequal advantages in regard to commerce or navigation through such canal.
These stipulations, it will be observed, were confined to Central America, and were finally carried out by negotiations with the states of Central America themselves. These negotiations were sometimes under the joint recommendation of the United States and Great Britain, sometimes separate with Great Britain, but, as I shall have occasion to show hereafter in some detail, were known in their progress to the United States, and, with some differences of opinion, frankly and amicably discussed between the two governments, were considered as generally satisfactory.
But besides these stipulations, confined to Central America, the 8th article of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty provided:
The Governments of the United States and Great Britain having not only desired in entering into this convention to accomplish a particular object, but also to establish a general principle, they hereby agree to extend their protection, by treaty stipulation, to any other practicable communications, whether by canal or railway, across the isthmus which connects North and South America, and especially to the interoceanic communications which are now proposed to be established by the way of Tehuantepec and Panama.
It is evident from the language of this article that the special stipulations in reference to Central America were not thus made obligatory in relation to Mexico and New Granada, as indeed they could scarcely have been without the diplomatic intervention of those powers themselves.
But the United States undertook by this provision to extend to Great Britain such participation in the general benefits of any interoceanic connection which might be opened in these countries as was afforded by the principles of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty; and these were to be secured by "treaty stipulations," to be made at the proper time and under such conditions as might appear wisest and best when that time should come. This declaration, therefore, of a general principle to be put in practice, could not and did not modify either the rights or obligations which the United States had acquired or assumed by the treaty with New Granada of 1846, and which still exist in all their binding effect. The concession, the building, and the administration of the Panama Railroad are a sufficient illustration of the correctness of this view.
In April, 1856, occurred the riot at Panama, by which the lives of many American citizens were sacrificed and a vast amount of valuable property was destroyed by a mob, which, if not instigated, were certainly not restrained, by the New Granadian authorities.
This atrocious outrage excited universal indignation, and the Government of the United States was forced to consider whether it would not be obliged to assume a position of more direct and vigorous authority on the Isthmus.
In December, 1856, Mr. Marcy, then Secretary of State, sent two special ministers to Bogota with instructions to submit to the consideration of the New Granadian Government the project of a treaty, with the draft of which they were furnished. Those instructions and the project of treaty are herewith submitted to you. (Inclosure No. 1.)
The necessity for this new arrangement, Mr. Marcy explained, sprung from the utter inability or unwillingness of the New Granadian Government to afford the necessary protection to the transit of the Isthmus, and the consequent imposition upon the United States of its obligations of guarantee. He proposed the creation of a belt of territory twenty miles broad, running from the Atlantic to the Pacific on lines equidistant from the line of the Panama road. The sovereignty of New Granada was to be formally admitted, but the government of the territory was to be placed in the hands of two municipalities, one at the Atlantic, the other at the Pacific terminus of the Panama Railroad. The authorities of these municipalities were to be selected by the inhabitants of the territory and charged with the police protection of persons and property. He further proposed that the United States should acquire either the possession or control of certain islands in the harbors at each terminus, where they could make naval stations, keep supplies, and be in condition to enforce effectively the guarantee of the Isthmus. He was careful to disclaim all intention of seeking any commercial advantage over other nations, expressed his willingness to admit them to a participation in the benefits of the treaty, and declared his conviction that the terms of the projected treaty did not conflict with the general and generous principles which the United States had joined Great Britian in declaring.
This treaty was unacceptable to the New Granadian Government. In 1868 another attempt was made by Mr. Seward to negotiate a treaty which should more precisely define and regulate the relations between the United States and New Granada. You will find herewith [inclosure No. 2] his instructions covering a draft of projected treaty, and he was so anxious to conclude some satisfactory arrangement that Mr. Caleb Cushing was sent as special agent to join the minister resident at Bogota and endeavor to procure its adoption. You will find herewith [inclosure No. 3] the treaty which was signed, and which appears to be in conformity with his instructions, but for reasons of which I am ignorant it was not ratified by the Senate.
In 1870 another effort was made through Hurlbut to reach the same desirable end, and you will find herewith the treaty which he negotiated and the history of its negotiation [inclosure No. 4]. The treaty was acceptable to the United States, but was so extensively and so seriously modified by the Congress of New Granada, to whom it was in due course submitted for ratification, that it could not be accepted by this Government. These amendments are included in inclosure No. 4.
This was the last effort on the part of the United States to negotiate with New Granada on the subject of an interoceanic canal. Congress abolished the mission to that power in 1876, and diplomatic relations were not renewed until the restoration of the mission and the appointment of the present minister in the summer of 1878.
During all this time there have been various concessions by the Colombian Government to parties professing the desire and ability to execute