the wool at the time of its arrival at the place of its destination, and for the factor to make advances on the wool by paying these drafts. It is further averred that "it was understood by the plaintiff that the drafts to be honored by the defendants were to be honored on the security of the wool, bills of lading for which were attached to the drafts, and were not to exceed in amount the customary advances on such wool." Held, that proof of these facts was properly received in evidence, not as specific items of claim, but as affecting market value. Error to the Common Pleas No. 2, of Philadelphia County. pied by plaintiff, under a lease, as a coal wharf and A railroad company entered upon a property occuyard. Certain appliances necessary to the enjoyment A usage, if known to the parties to a transac-of the use of the yard were rendered useless by the tion to which it relates, is obligatory, and unless entry of the railroad, and had to be reconstructed at excluded by the terms of the contract, enters into an elevation, which increased the cost of raising and and is regarded as a part of it, as much as though storing the coal, and increased the breakage and waste in handling it : it had been written therein. (Stultz v. Dickey, 5 Binn. 287; Hursh v. North, 40 Pa. 241.) It is admissible to add incidents to a contract which are not inconsistent with its terms, and to ascertain the intention of the parties in reference to matters, about which the contract is silent. (Clarke's Browne on Usages and Customs, p. 167.) The usage described in the affidavit is not unreasonable or in conflict with positive law. It does not contradict the terms of the instrument on which the plaintiff relies, but it explains them and gives effect to the intention of the parties. The letter of the defendants must be read in the light of the usage known to the parties, and applicable to the transaction between them. When so read it is fatal to the plaintiff's claim for the overdraft. We think the affidavit presents a good defence to the action. In cases to recover damages for the appropriation of land by railroad companies for the purpose of laying tracks, etc., the measures of damages is the depreciation of the market value of the property caused by the location and construction of the railroad. But the elements to be considered in the ascertainment of this depreciation are as varied as the properties affected and the uses to which they are applied. A specification of elements of damage is impossible, because they cannot be anticipated, and many of them remain to be developed in the course of the litigation consequent upon the taking of property by eminent domain. Opinions of witnesses conversant with the property. taken, and the general selling price of lands in the Issue, in which John J. Kersey was plaintiff, and the Schuylkill River East Side R. R. Co. was defendant, framed to determine what damages, if any, were sustained by plaintiff in consequence of the taking and occupying by defendant of a certain piece of ground used as coal wharf and yard of which plaintiff was lessee. a Viewers were appointed who assessed damages Defendant apin plaintiff's favor of $7700. pealed and this issue was framed. The facts necessary to a report of the case are stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court. Upon the trial, before FELL, J., plaintiff offered to prove as part of the damage to his leasehold interest (1) the cost of reconstructing his runs and appliances, in order to give him the same facilities for continuing his business to the end of his term, after the entry of the railroad, as he had before; it having been shown that the runs had to be reconstructed after the entry of defendant, in order to enable plaintiff to conduct his business. (2) The increased cost of handling and storing his coal with the new appliances up to the end of his term. (3) The increased breakage and wastage of coal to the end of the term, resulting from the new appliances. This evidence was admitted under objection. Verdict for plaintiff for $9320. A motion for a new trial having been refused, defendant took this writ, assigning for error the admission of the above evidence. Thad. L. Vanderslice (Lewis C. Cassidy with him), for plaintiff in error, cited— R. R. Co. v. Eby, 107 Pa. 166. Where one is compelled by the entry of a railroad to remove and re-establish the same busi ness elsewhere, he must be allowed the expense company, failing to provide these facilities it conof such removal and re-establishment. R. R. Co. v. Walker v. Post, 4 Abbott's Prac. Rep. 382. R. R. Co. v. McCutcheon, 18 WEEKLY NOTES, 527. R. R. Co. v. Vance, 115 Pa. 325. March 17, 1890. THE COURT. No complaint is made by the defendant company of the instructions to the jury on the question of damages, and our inquiry is limited to alleged error in the admission of evidence. The plaintiff was the lessee of a wharf property on the Schuylkill River in Philadelphia, extending from the river to Twenty-fourth Street. It was leased to him "as a coal wharf and yard." Upon it he carried on the business of receiving, storing, and delivering coal for other parties, and of receiving, storing, and selling coal and sand on his own account. The appliances used in the business and necessary to carry it on, belonged to him. ceded he was entitled to, and had promised he should have, he constructed such appliances as were necessary for the continuance of the business as it existed before the location of the railroad. The increased height of the structures increased the cost of raising the coal, and the breakage and waste in handling it. This additional expense and loss, together with the cost of the new appliances, he was allowed to prove on the trial of this issue. The company objected to this evidence, and now contends that the Court erred in admitting it. It is well settled that the proper measure of damages is the depreciation in the market value of the property caused by the location and construction of the railroad. But the elements to be considered in the ascertainment of this depreciation are as varied as the properties affected and the uses to which they are applied. A specification of all these elements is impossible, because they cannot be anticipated, and many of them remain to be developed in the course of the litigation consequent upon the taking of property by eminent domain. In the ordinary case of the appropriation of land for railroad purposes the opinions of witnesses who are conversant with the property and the general selling price of lands in the vicinity, are received on the question of its value unaffected by the road, and its value as affected by it. But this is not exclusive of other, and, in some cases, better methods of proof. It may be stated as a general principle applicable to cases of this sort, that whatever injuriously affects the property, as the direct and necessary result of the location of the road upon it, may be considered in the assessment of damages. In this case the estate of the plaintiff was limited to a particular use. Its enjoyment in accordance with the terms of its creation, required that the appliances which had been rendered useless by the entry of the defendant company, should be reconstructed at an elevation which increased the cost of raising and storing the coal, and increased the breakage and waste in handling In January, 1886, the defendant company entered and located its road upon the demised premises, appropriating for that purpose a strip of land sixty feet in width, and dividing the property into two parts. The sheds, runs, and other appliances indispensable to the business for which the property was leased, were practically destroyed by this action of the company, and the construction of new ones adapted to the changed condition became necessary in order to continue the business. A bridge with a single span of sixty-eight feet and an elevation of twenty-one feet above the railroad tracks, and a derrick, sheds, and runs, of a corresponding height, were required. The company recognized the necessity for these appliances as the direct consequence of the location of its railroad, and admits that it promised the plaintiff to construct them, but ex-it. cuses its non-performance on the ground that it could not agree with him as to the details of the work. In other words, the plaintiff wanted better structures than the company was willing to build, or considered necessary, in view of the probable duration of his leasehold. It was contemplated by the parties that the business should be continued by the plaintiff, and that he should have as far as practicable the same facilities for carrying it on that he had before enjoyed. It was the only business which his lease allowed him to establish there, and if he abandoned it his leasehold was worthless, because he could not sublet or sell it without the consent of his lessor. The We think these matters were properly received in evidence as descriptive of the injury inflicted and the burden imposed on the property by the occupation of it for railroad purposes; and that they were for the consideration of the jury, not as specific items of claim, but as affecting market value. The specifications of error are dismissed and The judgment is affirmed. H. C. O. July '89, 7. January 14, 1890. contribute to the expenses of the suit, against the River Front Railroad Company. The respondent was incorporated in 1876 under the general Railroad Act of 1868, and empowered, Contracts Construction of-Surplusage-Rail-inter alia, to construct, maintain, and operate a road companies-Sidings, switches, turnouts railroad on Delaware Avenue from Dock Street — Agreement as to construction of, construed-northwardly above Vine Street. The ordinance Parties. of the city of Philadelphia consenting to the construction of the railroad contained, inter alia, the following: In construing a writing, a word not plainly inserted by accident or mistake, is never to be treated as surplusage while there is a plain and natural construction which can be given to it not manifestly destructive of the general intent of the sentence. : SECTION 1. That the River Front Railroad Company be and the same is hereby authorized to occupy with a single-track railroad, for ordinary railroad purposes and uses, with suitable and necessary turnouts into and upon the warehouses and wharves located thereon when said turnouts are requested by the owners of said warehouses and wharves-so much of Delaware Avenue as lies between Dock Street and the south side of Callowhill Street. SECTION 2. [Having specifically named the streets on When by a written agreement it was stipulated that a railroad company "will lay down between certain points, a single track only without sidings for standing or passing trains, and will at no time lay down or construct any such switches or turnouts between said points," the general intent of the agreement being clearly to prohibit sidings for standing or pass-which the railroad company could build its track, coning trains, the words "such switches or turnouts" tinued] "it being clearly understood and defined that must be construed to refer as its antecedent to the any and all sidings or turnouts that may be constructed words "sidings for standing or passing trains," and from and out of the line of the railroad as herein auonly to prohibit such sidings, the words "sidings," thorized into or upon any warehouse or wharf adjoin"switches," and "turnouts" being in this agreement ing the same, and between the north side of Cumberequivalent to each other. land Street and the south line of Callowhill Street, When in the above case, by a municipal ordinance of a city whose consent was necessary to the construction of its road, the railroad company was authorized to construct a single track with suitable and necessary turnouts which shall be free to this and another railroad, so that all manufacturers and business in 66 terests along the said line shall have the full benefit of receiving from and delivering property to said road,' whether this ordinance would operate to invalidate the above agreement or not, it is at least an additional reason for not straining the language of the agreement into an abandoment of the business rights which the road was under an obligation to the city to preserve, when the natural meaning of the agreement does not call for such a construction. shall be at all times free to and for the use of the said River Front and Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Companies, so that all manufacturers and business interests along the said line shall have the full benefit of receiving from and delivering property to said roads." In June, 1877, the above bill was filed averring that Delaware Avenue, although opened, paved, and used for years, was not a highway as to which the State had the usual power, because Girard, by his will, had bequeathed $500,000 “to lay out, regulate, curb, light, and pave a passageway or street on the east part of the city fronting the river Delaware to be called Delaware Avenue...," and this fund had been so apof the Court, and a petition was subsequently filed plied, and it prayed that the appellant railroad praying for an attachment against the officers of the company should" be enjoined from constructing, railroad company for contempt in constructing a turn- maintaining, and operating said railroad, extendout from their track into a warehouse, and an answering from a point of connection with the Pennsylwas filed averring that the owners of the warehouse vania Railroad at Delaware Avenue and Dock had requested such turnout in accordance with the Street to Vine Street, or any part thereof." above ordinance, and obtained a permit from the municipal authorities to construct the same: When the above agreement had been made a decree Held, that it was error for the Court to order the removal of the turnout without making the said owners a party to the proceeding. Appeal of the River Front Railroad Company from a decree of the Common Pleas No. 2, of Philadelphia County, awarding an attachment against the officers of said company for contempt in violating an injunction granted by said Court. Bill in equity, by the city of Philadelphia, trustee under the will of Stephen Girard, deceased, J. Wheaton Smith and others, owners of land fronting on Delaware Avenue between Vine and Walnut streets, as well for themselves as for others of like interest who should come in and No answer was filed, and the questions involved in this bill were never discussed, both parties agreeing that a decree should be entered as follows: And now, to wit, March 30, A. D. 1878, this cause coming on to be heard by counsel, and it appearing to the Court that the parties plaintiff and defendant have agreed as follows, that is to say: That the said deVine Street and Walnut Street, in the city of Philafendants will lay down on Delaware Avenue, between delphia, a single track only, without sidings for standing or passing trains, the rails to be of a pattern and to be so laid that they shall offer no greater obstruction than those now laid on the said avenue south of Dock Street, and that the said defendants will at no time lay down or construct any such switch or turnouts between said points. Upon motion of the several solicitors for said parties plaintiff and de order of this Court. The railroad was thereafter constructed, and has been in operation since 1881. On January 22, 1889, the above-named complainants filed a petition, reciting the above proceedings, alleging that the said railroad company had constructed, in contempt of said injunction, a curved siding from their railroad into and upon certain premises connected with the track by a switch or turnout, and praying an attachment for contempt. fendant asking that the said agreement be made an was thereby stipulated that the railroad company order of this Court, it is decreed that the said agreement will lay down on Delaware Avenue, between be and is hereby made an order of this Court to be ob- Vine Street and Walnut Street, a single track served and performed by the parties hereto according to the tenor and true meaning thereof, and that the only, without sidings for standing or passing prayer of the plaintiffs in their bill filed for an injunc- trains, and that the said defendants will at no tion against the defendants to restrain them from con- time lay down or construct any such switches or structing, maintaining, and operating their said rail- turnouts between said points," etc. The words road from the point of connection with the Pennsylvania Railroad at Delaware Avenue and Dock Street to Vine sidings, switches, and turnouts in relation to Street be and the same is hereby refused. And in lieu railroads, are of course of modern growth, and thereof the defendants, their workmen, employés, and not only in popular use but in the dictionaries agents, are perpetually enjoined and restrained from are treated as to some extent interchangeable. violating in any manner the aforesaid agreement and Thus, the only definition that Webster gives of siding is "the turnout of a railroad" (noted as English), and turnout is defined as "a short side track on a railroad which may be occupied by one train while another is passing on a main track; a siding." But even without the authority of the dictionaries to sustain them, we think it quite clear that the parties to this agreement meant.to use the words as equivalents. The appellants are to lay down "a single track only, without sidings for standing or passing trains," and they are at no time to construct" any such The railroad company filed an answer, averring, switches or turnouts." Such grammatically reinter alia, that Messrs. Crowell & Class, on Oc-fers to an antecedent, and if "switches or turntober 29, 1888, being the owners of the above outs" do not here refer to the "sidings" before premises, did request a turnout in accordance mentioned, then there is no antecedent, and we with the ordinance above referred to, and did, on must treat the word "such" as used ungramsaid day, receive a permit from the department matically or throw it out altogether as surplusage. of highways, to remove the street pavement at To this last resort, in fact, the appellees' argusaid locality, to lay a track into their warehouse ment is driven. But a word not plainly inserted from the track of this respondent at that point; by accident or mistake, is never to be thrown out that said turnout is a lawful structure; and that entirely while there is a plain and natural conthe same is not in conflict with the agreement-struction which can be given to it not manifestly said agreement manifestly not applying to a turn-destructive of the general intent of the sentence. out constructed at the request and by the owner The general intent of this agreement is not at all of a warehouse. That the respondent was with- doubtful. It is to limit the railroad company to out authority of law to make an agreement of the kind, and that the franchise possessed by it could not be so maintained. That no decree has ever been entered by the judgment of the Court, and that it is erroneous to characterize said decree as a final decree, made according to the due course of proceedings in a Court of Chancery. a single track, and the provision that it shall be without sidings for standing or passing trains is intended to enforce that limitation, and to secure the street from such occupation as might amount practically to a double track. This done, the present action of the railroad is conformed to the intent of the parties, and there the stipulation on The Court, without filing an opinion, entered a the subject might have ended, but to secure the decree ordering an attachment to issue and the future, the agreement goes on to say and the siding to be removed; whereupon the said rail-defendants will at no time lay down or conroad company took this appeal, assigning for struct”—what ?_"any such switches or turnerror the decree of the Court as above. David W. Sellers, for the appellant. John G. Johnson and F. Carroll Brewster (Francis E. Brewster with them), for the appellees. March 10, 1890. THE COURT. Though this case arises upon a litigation of much wider scope yet the present controversy turns on the construction of a single sentence in the agreement between the parties which was by consent made a decree of the Court in the original suit. It outs." That is, the company will not in the future lay down any such additions to their single track, as they have agreed not to do now, to wit, sidings for standing or passing trains, which shall in effect double their single track. This we think is the plain general intent of the agreement, and the natural meaning of the language used to express it. It does not therefore seem to require further discussion. But if we look at the other writings in the case, and particularly at the ordinance under which the railroad was constructed, not for the purpose of enter Jan. '89, 324. v. Loftus. January 8, 1890. Married women-Rights and powers of-Transfer of loans by-Domicile-Act of March 18, 1875-Act of June 3, 1887-Constitutional law-Foreign statutes-Lex loci rei sitæ. The only married women whose rights and capacities the Legislature of Pennsylvania has any power to regulate are those within the Commonwealth. The provisions of the Act of June 3, 1887 (P. L. 332), do not apply to any others. by birth a citizen of Pennsylvania, has by her marriage domicile here and acquired that of her husband, are with a subject and resident of Great Britain, lost her governed by the laws of Great Britain and are not affected by the laws of Pennsylvania. ing into the consideration of any of the questions raised by the original litigation, and settled by the agreement, but merely as illustrative of the Farmers' and Mechanics' National Bank situation of the parties and the subject matter before them, we find our view strongly confirmed. The ordinance by which the city of Philadelphia gave its consent to the building of the railroad authorizes the construction of "a single track railroad for ordinary railroad purposes and uses, with suitable and necessary turnouts into and upon the warehouses and wharves." Part of the consideration to the city for permitting the occupation of its streets is thus shown to be the facilitation of business by such railroad connections with the warehouses and wharves, and this purpose is expressed still more explicitly in the The general rights, capacities, and disabilities in resecond section, relating to the railroad on Dela-gard to her personal property of a married woman who, ware Avenue, north of Callowhill Street, etc., in which it is stipulated that all sidings and turnouts shall be free to both the River Front and the Reading railroads, "so that all manufacturers and business interests along the said line shall The general rule that the validity of a transfer of have the full benefit of receiving from and deliv-personal property is to be determined by the law of ering property to said roads." Whether the ap- the domicile of the owner is subject always to the pellant could enter into any agreement which power of the State to provide otherwise as to any would deprive the business on Delaware Avenue property having an actual or legal situs within its of this convenience, which was part of the consideration for which the city granted the permis- 24), declaring that a married woman may sell and The provisions of the Act of March 18, 1875 (P. L. sion to build the railroad at all, we are not required transfer loans of the Commonwealth, of the city of to consider, but the fact that the appellant was un-Philadelphia, etc., like a feme sole, are intended not der obligation to the city to preserve such business so much to enlarge the capacity of a married woman rights is an additional reason for not straining the to deal with her property as to regulate the mode of language of the agreement into an abandonment transfer of certain kinds of property owing their exof them, when the natural meaning does not call istence to Pennsylvania law and having their legal for such construction. We are of opinion, therefore, that the making of the turnout in contro-public safety and convenience in the transaction of This Act is a regulation of property made for the versy was not a violation of the agreement or the business, and is applicable to all owners of the classes of property named, even though some of them may be foreigners or non-resident; and as the purpose of the Act is the public convenience it must be construed it all necessary powers to make it effective, and among liberally, and the authority to transfer will carry with them the power to do so by attorney. decree founded thereon. The view we have taken renders it unnecessary to consider the other questions involved, but we may say that, as the case is now presented, it was an error to order the removal of the turnout without making the owners of the premises party to the proceeding. The answer avers that the owners, Messrs. Crowell and Class, requested a turnout in accordance with the ordinance aforesaid, and obtained a permit from the department of highways to remove the street pavement, and lay a track into their warehouse from the track of respondent, and that this is the turnout in question. It is perhaps not entirely clear, from this answer, whether the turnout was actually constructed by and is the property of Crowell & Co., or the railroad, but in either aspect Crowell & Co., had an interest in its maintenance, if not a property in the thing itself, and could not be deprived of either without notice and a hearing. Orders reversed, and record remitted for dismissal of the petition with costs. Opinion by MITCHELL, J. C. K. Z. borders. situs in this Commonwealth. For the same reason the Act is constitutional. It is not special legislation on the affairs of the city of Philadelphia, but the regulation of the mode of transfer of certain kinds of property for the public business convenience. L., a woman born in the city of Philadelphia, married a subject of Great Britain. The marriage took place abroad, and she continued to reside there. She of certain certificates of loans of the city of Philadel executed a power of attorney, authorizing the transfer phia. The transfer agent of the city of Philadelphia refused to make the transfer, on the ground that there was no authority for the execution of the power of at |