will be time enough to decide those particular cases, when they shall occur and come before us for our determination. Opinion of Gibson, Judge. The case of the relator is embraced by the letter of the third section, and certainly does not fall within any of the exceptions of the tenth section of the act of March 1, 1780. By the provisions of either, she is indisputably free. It is not for us to conjecture what provision would have been made, if the present case had presented itself to the consideration of the legislature. An attempt to supply what this court might consider deficient, would be an assumption of legislative authority. But the 10th section, effectually guards against all constructions unfavourable to the class of persons intended to be benefited. If, even an equitable construction in favour of the master were not precluded, I am far from being satisfied, that the present case would be proper for its exercise. The support of the relator has caused him neither trouble nor expense. He was, it is true, deprived of the service of the mother from the time she absconded. But this did not happen in consequence of any act of the relator, and gives him no claim on her. Whether his case is to be considered a hard one or not, will depend much on the temper with which the mind may contemplate the positive, and artificial rights of the master, over the mother on one hand, and on the other, the NATU RAL RIGHTS OF HER CHILD. JUSTICE'S COURT. M. COLES, v. D. WILSON. Newburgh, (N. Y.) Oct. 10.This was an action brought to re cover the penalty given to the complainant, under the statute to "regulate highways," for not turning to the right in meeting on the road, as that statute regulates. The cause was called on the 29th September. The defendant acknowledged judgment, and the plaintiff gave the penalty, five dollars, to the corporation, to assist in bringing water into the village of Newburgh. J. W. JENNINGS V. ROBERT M'CONNELL. This was an action brought to recover damages for detention on the highway. It appeared in evidence, that the plaintiff, in a wagon, with one or two other carriages in company, was travelling on the Little Britain Road. They overtook the defendant in a wagon loaded with hay, moving very slow; they wished to pass, and attempted a number of times-the defendant as often cut them off by turning across the road. He had a boy on the load of hay with him, who kept a look-out, and informed when the carriages were going to attempt to pass. By this zig-zag manoeuvering, he was enabled to detain the carriages for an hour or two, and by that means broke up a visiting party the company was on. That the road was wide enough to permit a passage but for the interference of the defendant. The court said, the highway was a common property, belonging to all travellers, and appropriated for their use and benefit, and that when any one turned out of his way to obstruct it, and prevent a free psssage, it was depriving the traveller of his right, and he had a claim on the obstructor for damages-that the evidence supported a gross obstruction. Of course a judgment was given for the plaintiff. Baltimore, April 14.-Don Joseph Almeida was lately arrested on a charge of piracy under the Spanish treaty, in virtue of a warrant issued by a justice of the peace for the state of Maryland, under the act of congress of 1789. A habeas corpus was granted by judge Bland, made returnable before Baltimore county court. The case was argued before Judges Bland and Hanson, and it was urged among other objections on the part of the prisoner, that congress had no power under the constitution of the United States, to invest any judge or justice of the peace with any judicial authority, which is confined by the constitution to the supreme court and such inferior tribunals as congress shall from time to time ordain. Both the judges concurred in supporting this objection, and gave separate and elaborate opinions, discharging the prisoner, among other reasons, for defect of authority in the magistrate on whose warrant the arrest was made. By the above decision it is in effect declared, that no state judge or justice of the peace has power to arrest or commit any person for a violation of the laws of the United States. From the Ohio Western Herald. STATE OF OHIO, 1816. For some time since, doubts have been entertained as to the power of congress to vest jurisdiction in the state courts, to hear and determine cases and infrac tions of the penal and revenue laws of the United States The question was lately raised in Vir. ginia, before the superior court of that commonwealth, and a determination had adverse to the juris. diction. The question was raised in a court of this state, and a deci. sion had adverse to the jurisdiction. As this decision is upon a law question of much importance to the whole country, I have requested a copy of judge Tappan's opinion, and herewith enclose it to you for publication in the Herald. Your's, B. UNITED STATES V. ALEXANDER CAMPBELL. Information filed by J. C. Wright, collector of the revenue for the 6th collection district of Ohio, against Alexander Campbell, for selling domestic distilled spirits without a license therefor from the collector, contrary to the act of congress in such case made and provided, and praying "that the said Alexander Campbell may forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of one hundred and fifty dollars penalty, and also the fur ther sum of fifteen dollars duty by law imposed upon a license to retail, &c. according to the provisions of the acts of congress in such cases made and provided," &c. The defendant filed the following exceptions to the jurisdiction of this court. "And the said Alexander Campbell says, that the informa tion filed against him by John C. Wright, collector, contains no matter or thing to which he the said Alexander Campbell is in this court bound to answer, for that the retailing liquor by the quart is not an offence against any of the laws of the state of Ohio, of offences against which laws only this court The constitution of the United States creates a distinct and separate government from the several state governments, and delegates can take jurisdiction-and for that also by the constitution of the state of Ohio, no man can be held to answer any offence in the courts of the said state except upon indict-specific and limited powers to the ment or presentment of a grand jury; wherefore the said Alexander Campbell prays that he may be discharged from answering said information, and that the same may be quashed.-C. Hammond, attorney for defendant." Judge TAPPAN.-This is a very important question of jurisdiction, upon which, if I had doubts, I would take further time to deliberate before giving an opinion: as I have none, I will not delay the cause by a continuance, but proceed to give my opinion, notwithstanding the pressure of business may prevent my adverting to many of the reasons and grounds whereon that opinion is founded. There can be no hesitation in asserting that a proceeding by information is a criminal prosecution, and that it hath always been used as such-4th Bl. Com. chap. 23d, the King vs. Berchet and others, 1st Shower, 106,-I refer to these authorities as fully supporting both propositions. The first question will then be, can the United States prosecute for offences against their laws in the state courts? This will depend upon the constitution of the United States and the constitution of this state. The state of Ohio is a sovereign and independent state, not controlable by any earthly power in the making or administration of its laws, except only in such particulars as it hath delegated a portion of that sovereignty to the United States by the federal constitution, and as it hath limited itself in the exercise of power by the same constitution. government so created. By the 3d article, section 1 and 2, the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court and in such inferior courts as the congress may from time to time ordain and establish-and "The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States and treaties made or which shall be made under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party," &c. The judicial power of the United States extends to the case now before this court, and that power is wholly vested in the United States courts: the supreme court of the United States hath an appellate jurisdiction in all controversies to which the United States shall be a party; there is no clause in the constitution of the United States which authorizes congress to give jurisdiction to the state courts, or to require the performance of any judicial duties of them; it cannot be said that congress by their laws ordained and established us a court of the United States; for by the operation of the 8th section of the 3d article of the constitution of this state, if such were the fact, we should cease to be a state court; and will it be imagined that an appeal can be taken from this court to the supreme court of the United States? The powers not dele. gated to the United States by the constitution are expressly reserved to the states or to the people; it follows necessarily and clearly to my mind, that congress has no power to vest any jurisdiction whatever in the state courts. This is a criminal prosecution; it may well be doubted whether one sovereign state can sue in the municipal courts of another state; but waiving this point, as not necessary to be here decided, I assume it to be a settled principle in jurisprudence, that one sovereign state cannot make use of the municipal courts of another government to enforce its penal laws. No one would doubt for an instant, if the government of Great Britain or France, or even one of the other states of the union, were to attempt to maintain a criminal prosecution in our courts, that it would not be permitted; and yet, as to its judicial power, and its penal laws, the government of the United States is as much an independent state and separate government as Great Britain, France, or either of the United States. cy, nothing more than the establishment of such a principle is wanting to vest congress with absolute power, and to effect a com. plete consolidation of the states. We have seen that the constitution of the United States doth not give congress the power of vesting ju risdiction in the state courts-the constitution and laws of the state of Ohio do not give us jurisdiction, nor can we sustain it on general principles of law. An opinion has been read, in which it is stated, that the 3d arti cle of the constitution of the United States vests in the government of the United States a privilege of having their causes determined in their own courts, and that this privilege may be waived by them. By the first article of the constitution, the legislative powers of the United States are vested in congress-by the 2d, the executive power of the United States is vest ed in a president. I do not see why this doctrine of privilege and waiver may not with as much reason be applied to the legislative and executive, as to the judicial power, and so the whole government of the United States waived. This theory is new, it is beyond my comprehension. The second question raised in this case is, whether the court can sustain a criminal prosecution by information under the constitution of this state. It hath been urged, that the constitution gives to congress the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, excises, &c. and to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying that power into execution; that to collect the excise they have judged it necessary to vest a jurisdiction in certain cases in the state courts. If they have judged it to be necessary, they have been mistaken-convenience is not necessity-their own tribunals are sufficient to enforce their laws. If it be true, that congress, under this pro-ed or confined in jail shall be put vision of the constitution, may pass any laws they deem necessary to carry their specific powers into execution, and are the sole judges of such necessity, where are they to stop? Possessing the sword and the purse of the whole confedera By the 10th sect. of the 8th art. of the constitution of Ohio, it is declared, "That no person arrest to answer any criminal charge, but by presentment, indictment, or impeachment." An information is as much a cri minal prosecution as an indict ment; the same process issues on the one as on the other, to bring 0 the person charged or informed against before the court, and that process with us is a capias-the defendant hath been taken by a capias, and is now holden to answer this information. I think that a fair construction of our constitution requires us to say, that the proceeding by information is prohibited by it. If we examine the history of informations, we shall find that they have crept into use against the plain meaning of Magna Charta-that although in England a series of precedents support them, yet they are neither suited to our principles of government, nor countenanced or permitted by the state constitution. Such is the unanimous opinion of the court. In other words, that though the liquor composed of water and alcohol be sold as so much spirits, yet it is not the law that it should be taxed as such. It will be perceived at once to what an immense amount (many millions a year) such a construction involves the public revenue, external as well as internal: and it is matter of general interest that the first attempt that tended to establish it, has terminated, as this appears to have done, in the confirmation of the tax, and the satisfaction of those, who, under erroneous impressions, had resisted its pay ment. MARINE COURT, NEW YORK. This is an action brought by plaintiff, as proprietor of the National Advocate, for the sale and delivery of that paper to the defendant, charging from the first March, 1814, to 7th October, 1816, at the rate of $10 per year. John H. Edwards, the carrier, testifies, that previous to 1st January, 1815, he commenced leaving the said paper at defendant's Philadelphia, May 22.-The important question involved in the cases depending in the District Court of Pennsylvania, now in session in this city, against a number of the Distillers of Lancaster county, after considerable progress had been made in one of the trials, was settled yesterday, in consequence of an intimation from the Judge, that the defendants' ground was untenable, upon which they very properly abandoned it, with-house-that on that day he preout further effort to withhold payment of the duties as claimed by the United States. The ground taken was, that the distiller is not liable to pay duty on the quantity of spirituous liquor he distils and sells, but on the proportion of alcohol or dephlegmated spirits contained in that quantity of spirituous liquor, separating the water from the alcohol, and excluding all but the pure spirit from the account in estimating the duties to be paid. sented a new year's address, as usually done (to subscribers) to the defendant, headed the "National Advocate," directed to the patrons of the paper, and that defendant gave him 50 cents-that he continued to leave the paper regularly every morning until some time in October last-that that on the 1st January 1816, he presented another new year's address to said defendant, at which time he received 25 cents-that the first conversation he ever had |