Be it remembered, that on the twelfth* day of January, A. D.'1819, and in the forty-third year of the Independence of the United States of America, Thomas B. Wait, of the said district, has deposited in this office the title of a book, the right whereof he claims as proprietor, in the words following, to wit: "State Papers and Publick Documents of the United States, from the accession of George Washington to the Presidency, exhibiting a complete view of our Foreign Relations since that time. Third edition. Published under the patronage of Congress. Including Confidential Documents, first published in the second edition of this work." In conformity to the act of the Congress of the United States, entitled, "An act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of Maps, Charts, and Books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned:" and also to an act, entitled, "An act sup plementary to an act, entitled, An act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of Maps, Charts, and Books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies during the times therein mentioned; and extending the benefits thereof to the arts of Designing, Engraving and Etching Historical, and other Prints." JNO. W. DAVIS, Clerk of the District of Massachusetts. The date of the certificate of copy right in Vols. 1, 11 and 11, instead of the first should be the twelfth day of January. CONTENTS. : Page. DOCUMENTS accompanying President's Message, April 3, 1798-communications from X. Y. Z. &c. Message, May 4, 1798, transmitting all communica- tions from Envoys in France, excepting those Message, June 21, 1798, announcing the arrival of Gen. Marshall, one of our Envoys to France, and transmitting letter from Mr. Gerry Speech opening Congress, December 8, 1798 Message, Jan. 8, 1799, transmitting letter from the acting Consul at Havana, informing of the par- tial capture of an American fleet under convoy Message, Jan. 18, 1799, transmitting Mr. Gerry's Mr. Skipwith's communications from France Message, Jan. 21, 1799, transmitting Report of Secre- tary of State, relative to late negotiations with Message, Jan. 28, 1799, transmitting French arret, declaring neutral sailors on board enemies' ships Message, Feb. 15, 1799, transmitting information Message, Feb. 7, 1800, transmitting papers relative to Jonathan Robbins, alias Thomas Nash Message, Feb. 17, 1800, relative to treaty with Russia 307 Speech opening Congress, November 22, 1800 307 tary of State, relative to British depredations President Jefferson's Inaugural Address, March 4,1801 321 Message opening Congress, December 8, 1801 Documents respecting Barbary, December 8, 1801 Message, April 20, 1802, transmitting a Report from Secretary of State, relative to spoliations com- mitted under Spanish authority AMERICAN STATE PAPERS. DOCUMENTS ACCOMPANYING THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE OF APRIL 3, 1798. [Continued from Vol. III.] October 30. IMMEDIATELY after breakfast the subject was resumed. M. Y. spoke without interruption for near an hour. He said that he was desirous of making a last effort to serve us, by proposing something which might accommodate the differences between the two nations; that what he was now about to mention, had not by any means, the approbation of the directory; nor could M. Talleyrand undertake, further than to make from us the proposition to the directory, and use his influence for its success: that last week M. Talleyrand could not have ventured to have offered such propositions; but that his situation had been very materially changed by the peace with the emperor: by that peace he had acquired in an high degree, the confidence of the directory, and now possessed great influence with that body; that he was also closely connected with Buonaparte and the generals of the army in Italy; and was to be considered as firmly fixed in his post, at least for five or six months: that under these circumstances he could undertake to offer, in our behalf, propositions which before this increase of influence, he could not have hazarded. M. Y. then called our attention to our own situation, and to the force France was capable of bringing to bear upon us. He said that we were the best judges of our capacity to resist, so far as depended on our own resources, and ought not to deceive ourselves on so interesting a subject. The fate of Venice was one which might befal the United States. But he proceeded to observe, it was probable we might rely on forming a league with England. If we had such a reliance it would fail us. The situation of England was such, as to compel Pitt to make peace on the terms of France. A variety of causes were in operation which made such an effect absolutely certain. To say nothing of the opposition in England to the minister and to the war, an opposition which the fears of the nation would increase; to say nothing of a war against England which was preparing in the north; an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men, under the command of Buonaparte, spread upon the coast of France, and aided by all the vast resources of his genius, would most probably be enabled to invade England; in which event their government would be overturned: but should this invasion not be absolutely effected, yet the alarm it would spread through the nation, the enormous expense it must produce, would infallibly ruin them, if it was to be continued; and would drive them to save themselves by a peace: that independent of this, France possessed means which would infallibly destroy their bank and their whole paper system. He said he knew very well it was generally conjectured that Buonaparte would not leave Italy, and the army which had conquered under him, and which adored him: he assured [us that] nothing could be more unfounded than the conjecture; that Buonaparte had for more than ten days left Italy for Rastadt, to preside over the Congress which was formed for adjusting the affairs of the empire. He said that Pitt himself was so confident of the absolute necessity of peace, that after the naval victory over the Dutch, he had signified his readiness to treat on the same terms which he had offered before that action: we could not then rely on the assistance of England. What, he asked, would be our situation if peace should be made with England before our differences with France would be accommodated? But, he continued, if even England should be able to continue the war, and America should unite with her, it would not be in our power to injure France. We might indeed wound her ally; but if we did, it would be so much the worse for us. After having stated the dangers attending us, if we should engage in the war, he proceeded to the advantages we might derive from a neutral situation and insisted at large on the wealth which would naturally flow into our country, from the destruction of England. He next proceeded to detail the propositions which are in sub |