As all labor competes with other labor, and the labor that an individual may do for himself, or that the State may do for its own use, is in a sense in competition with other labor, the competition of convict labor with free labor can not be entirely eradicated. The only remedy is to be found in the reduction of that competition to the minimum, and this can be accomplished best by a scheme which considers and provides for, first, the punishment and reformation of the criminal; second, the diminution of competition with free labor; and third, the maintenance of the convicts. The weight of the evidence appears to be that the system which most nearly accomplishes the first and second of these conditions, and incidentally the third, is the one that should be adopted.

The objectionable features of convict labor are not to be found in the fact that prisoners are employed, but to the methods of their employment and the fact that the products of their labor are sold in the open market.

In response to the general demand for reformative laws, the general tendency of prison legislation has been in the direction of reducing the quantity of goods manufactured for sale, and the assumption by the State of the complete control and management of the prison population. This is shown by the following facts, obtained from recent reports of the Department of Labor:

Considering the penitentiaries and prisons of the country, it appears that the total value of the work done and goods produced by the convicts was $24,271,078.39 in 1885 and $19,042,472.33 in 1895, a decrease of 21.5 per cent, while the number of convicts increased from 41,877 in 1885 to 54,244 in 1895. In 1885 there were 12 States in which the lease and 15 in which the public-account systems of employment were in use, while in 1895 there were but 7 States in which the lease system was used and 27 in which the public-account system was in use. The lease system is one of the methods of employment in which the State has no control over the quantity or disposition of the products, and but slight control over the discipline and care of the prisoner, while under the public-account system the State has full control of both.

The lease, contract, and piece-price systems of employing convicts are the three methods under which the products of their labor are utilized for the pecuniary benefit of both private individuals and the State. As now conducted the three systems have many features in common. The contract and piece-price systems are used generally where the convicts are to be worked at or immediately adjoining the prison, and the State has control, to some extent at least, by direct supervision over the discipline, hours of work, and the character and quantity of product. The lease system is used, as a rule, where the convicts are employed away from the prison proper or in detached buildings styled prisons, but under the complete control of the lessee, subject to the conditions of the lease and the laws and rules adopted

for the care of the prisoners. The objections to the lease system are hereinafter presented, and they appear to the commission to be suf ficient to warrant the conclusion that it should not be tolerated in any civilized community. In 1898 it was in use in 9 States, but in almost every case the objectionable features of the system had been eradicated, as far as possible, by stringent laws, rules, and inspections, and in all but 2 of the States, Florida and Louisiana, the convicts were also worked under other systems in connection with the lease system. In the States where the system is in vogue the authorities are practically unanimous in its condemnation, and excuse its use by stating that it appears to be the best that can be adopted under the present conditions.

The contract, piece-price, and public-account systems are all objectionable, from an industrial standpoint, chiefly because under them the products of convict labor are sold in the open market and enter into competition with products of free labor.

By reference to the desirable and undesirable features presented for each system, and also to the synopsis showing the present condition of employment and the recommendations of those in charge of convict labor in the different States, it will be seen that the conditions that are beneficial to the prisoner and the interests of free labor do not depend entirely on the system of employment, but largely on the administration of the system; also that certain systems of employment tend more than others to assist in the development of the desirable features of prison life, and that with this end in view the contract and piece-price systems were developed from the lease system. The adoption of the public-account system followed naturally from the use of the contract and piece-price methods.

During the year 1898 the contract system was used in 24 States, the piece-price system in 10 States, and the public-account system in 30 States. Fifteen of the States using the contract system also used the public-account system, and all but 2 of the States using the piece-price system also used the public account system. Therefore, of the various schemes devised for the employment of convicts with the intention of deriving revenue from such work the public-account system is in the most general use.

The growth of the public-account system and decrease in the contract and other systems is indicated by the following information taken from the bulletin of the Department of Labor. This statement has reference only to the penitentiaries and prisons. Since its preparation there have been material changes in some of the States; for instance, in New York, where goods to the value of $1,999,769.02 were produced under the piece-price system in 1895, the use of that system has been discontinued and the convicts are now engaged, exclusively, in the manufacture of goods for the use of the State and its institutions.

Summary of value of goods produced or work done by systems of work, 1885 and 1895

By this brief table one can note the general changes in values. Under the public-account system there were produced in the United States in 1885 goods to the value of $2,063,892.18, but under this system in 1895 there were produced goods to the value of $4,888,563.36, being an increase of more than 100 per cent. This system has become more popular in recent years, hence the increase. Looking at the next line we find that under the contract system there has been a decrease of about 50 per cent, the decrease being from $17,071,265.69 to $8,190,799.70. This system (the contract) has become offensive during the past few years, and legislatures have sought to change their plans from that either to the public-account system or to the piece-price system; under the latter the value of goods has increased from $1,484,230.52 in 1885 to $3,795,483.24 in 1895, an increase of over 150 per cent. Under the lease system the values show the effect of agitation in the Southern States, where that system more generally prevailed in 1885, for there the value of goods. produced or work done decreased from $3,651,690 to $2,167,626.03 in 1895, a decrease of 40.6 per cent. But the totals show a great change, the decrease being from $24,271,078.39 in 1885 to $19,042,472.33 in 1895, a decrease of 21.5 per cent.

The contract system has been adopted in preference to the lease system, because under it the State has a better supervision and control of the prisoner, and the obnoxious theory that he is worked at manual labor, not for his punishment and reformation, but to produce revenue for the State, is to some extent removed.

The piece-price system was devised, not only to embrace the desirable features of the contract system, but in order that the State might have control of the quantity of the work performed by the convicts and incidentally the quantity to be thrown upon the open market for sale.

The popularity of the public-account system is due to the fact that under it the prison is better adapted to accomplishing the end for which it was designed, i. e., the punishment and reformation of the criminal, and also because the State has complete control of the products of the labor of the criminal.

While the advocates of the contract and piece-price systems maintain that under them as high a degree of reformatory and disciplinary potency can be reached as under the public-account system, the true reason why those systems are adopted is that under them the labor of the convicts has resulted in giving a larger revenue to the State.

The amount of revenue that could be derived has been the controlling factor in the adoption of one of these systems, rather than the assistance that the system would lend to prison discipline and removal of the competition with free labor.

The trend of the legislation in the different States, also the present methods under which convicts are employed and the recommendations of those charged with the responsibility for the conduct of such employ. ment, together with the recommendations of the numerous commissions, committees, bureaus, penologists and others, all point to the fact that the true theory of prison life is that the criminal should, in every respect, be under the absolute control of the State.

The adoption of the public-account system is the first step in the direction of the State having complete control of the prisoner and his labor. The reasons why the system has not been put in general use, to the exclusion of all others, are that under it the products of convict labor are sold in the open market in competition with the products of free labor, and its adoption has almost invariably resulted in financial loss.

In order to obviate these objections laws have been adopted providing that the work of the prisoners should first be directed to the production of articles and supplies for their own support, and the care and maintenance of the buildings in which they are confined. Practically all of the States now have laws to this effect, and in many of them the prisoners are also engaged in manufacturing supplies or producing agricultural products for the use of other institutions.

The two great sources of expense of prisons are the support of the prisoners and the maintenance of their imprisonment. The experience of prison industry has been, that when employed in productive work the convicts earn enough to support themselves, but, with a few excep tions, not enough to pay the cost of imprisonment. The employment of convicts in producing articles for their own support, to that extent, relieves the State from the necessity of entering the open market either as a seller or producer of goods to be used in connection with its convict system.

After a careful consideration of the subject in all of its phases as presented in numerous reports, of the testimony and recommendations that have been submitted, of the present systems of employing convicts, and the conditions that have culminated in the adoption of those systems, the commission feels warranted in arriving at the following conclusions:

First. That provision should be made in the laws of each State for the employment of all prisoners in productive labor.

Second. The State should have absolute control of the care, punishment, reformation, and employment of the prisoners, as well as the disposition of the products of their industry.

Third. The employment of prisoners in productive labor does, of necessity, result in competition of some character with free labor and industry.

Fourth. The employment of prisoners with the intention of producing revenue, either for the State exclusively, or for private individuals or corporations and the State jointly, tends to the greatest competition with free labor.

Fifth. That a system of employing prisoners for the purpose of producing revenue has a tendency to detract from the punitive, reformatory and disciplinary features of the prisons.

Sixth. The employment of prisoners in the production of supplies for the maintenance of State, county, and municipal institutions and the support of the inmates of the same, or in work on the public buildings or roads, tends to the least direct competition with free labor.

Seventh. Of the various systems for employing convicts, those under which private individuals or corporations are interested have resulted in procuring the greatest revenue to the State.

Eighth. No system of employing convicts, however wise in conception and however carefully guarded, can be entirely free from the danger of abuses in management.

Ninth. The most desirable system for employing convicts is one which provides, primarily, for the punishment and reformation of the prisoner and the least competition with free labor, and, secondarily, for the revenue of the State.

Tenth. In order to harmonize the antagonistic interests of the different States it is essential that the industrial operations of all the penal, reformatory, and eleemosynary institutions in each should be under the supervision of a central office.

Eleventh. The adoption of laws embracing the above principles has been retarded by the prevailing industrial, economic, social, and climatic conditions in many of the States. These conditions are so diversified, and the industrial, moral, and educational possibilities of the prison population differ so widely in the several States that the commission is of the opinion that it is impracticable for all of them to adopt a uniform law for the employment of prisoners, that would be identical in all of its provisions. The necessity for uniform legislation is however fully realized; it is the only permanent remedy for the abuses that exist under the systems now prevailing, and for the abatement of competition with free labor.

The commission accordingly submits the following general provisions of law mainly from the New York statute, which are in harmony with the above conclusions, and recommends that all, or such of them as may be possible, shall be embodied in the laws of the different States, with such additional provisions as to management as may be necessary to meet the prevailing social conditions:

PROPOSED PROVISIONS OF LAWS REGULATING EMPLOYMENT OF PRISONERS.

Within ten days after the passage of this act the governor by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint four persons who shall be commissioners for the purpose of this act, to be called commissioners of prisons, who shall constitute the State commission of prisons; one of the persons so appointed