is arrested, and prays for a writ of habeas corpus. The case comes before the United States Supreme Court for a decision on the constitutionality of the said laws.

Opinion.

"The power to regulate" interstate commerce "is solely in the general government, and it is an essential part of that regulation to prescribe the regular means for accomplishing the introduction and incorporation of articles into and with the mass of property in the country or state. No reason is perceived why, if Congress chooses to provide that certain designated subjects of interstate commerce shall be governed by a rule which divests them of that character at an earlier period of time than would otherwise be the case, it is not within its competency to do so." The act of Congress is valid. The original laws of Kansas became operative in respect to imported packages of intoxicating liquors in their original condition as soon as the act of Congress removed the impediment.

Prayer for writ of habeas corpus denied.

Reagan v. Mercantile Trust Company.

154 U. S., 413. Statement.

May 26, 1894.

The Mercantile Trust Company was trustee in a deed of trust executed by the Texas and Pacific Railway Company. The legislature of the State of Texas appointed a commission to regulate the rates to be charged by railroads for business done within the state. The Trust Company seeks to enjoin the commission from enforcing any rates against the Texas and Pacific Railway Company, on the ground that being incorporated by Congress it is not subject to state legislation. The case comes to the United States Supreme Court.

Opinion.

"Conceding to Congress the power to remove the corporation in all its operations from the control of the state, there is in the act creating this company nothing which indicates an intent on the part of Congress to so remove it, and there is nothing in the enforcement by the state of reasonable rates for transportation wholly within the state which will disable the corporation from discharging all the duties and

exercising all the powers conferred by Congress. By the act of incorporation Congress authorized the company to build its road through the State of Texas. It knew that, when constructed, a part of its business would be the carrying of persons and property from points within the state to other points also within the state, and that in so doing it would be engaged in a business, control of which is nowhere by the Federal Constitution given to Congress. It must have known that, in the nature of things, the control of that business would be exercised by the state, and if it deemed that the interests of the nation and the discharge of the duties required on behalf of the nation from this corporation demanded exemption in all things from state control, it would unquestionably have expressed such intention in language whose meaning would be clear. Its silence in this respect is satisfactory assurance that, in so far as this corporation should engage in business wholly within the state, it intended that it should be subjected to the ordinary control exercised by the state over such business. * * * We are of opinion that the Texas and Pacific Railway Company is, as to business done wholly within the state, subject to the control of the state in all matters of taxation, rates, and other police regulations."

Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company; Hyde v. Continental Trust Company.

158 U. S., 601. Statement.

May 20, 1895.

It is provided in the Federal Constitution that direct taxes shall be apportioned among the states according to their representative population. In 1894 Congress passed an act imposing a tax on incomes from whatever source derived. This tax not being apportioned among the states according to their population, its constitutionality is assailed. Opinion on first hearing.

A tax on the income of real estate is a direct tax, and in this act, not being apportioned as provided by the Constitution, is void.

A tax upon income derived from bonds issued by a municipal corporation is a tax upon the power of the state and its instrumentalities to borrow money, and is consequently repugnant to the Constitution.

Whether as to the income from personal property, as such, the act is unconstitutional as laying a direct tax, the judges who heard the argument are equally divided.

Opinion on second hearing.

A tax on real property is clearly a direct tax. A tax on personal property is a direct tax. That which gives value to real or personal property is its income. Property and its income are so closely connected that what is a direct tax upon one is a direct tax upon the other. Therefore, as the act imposes a tax on the income of real and personal property, and is not apportioned among the states according to their population, the act is unconstitutional.

172 U. S., 239. Statement.

Blake v. McClung.

December 12, 1898.

A statute of Tennessee provides that the assets of an insol vent foreign corporation doing business in that state shall be used to pay the debts of residents of Tennessee before paying debts of residents of other states. A foreign corporation doing business in Tennessee has become insolvent. Among its creditors are residents of Tennessee, citizens of Ohio, and a corporation of Virginia. The Ohio and Virginia creditors claim a pro rata share in the assets with the residents of Tennessee, on the ground that the said statute is unconstitutional. The case comes to the United States Supreme Court. Opinion.

1. As to the citizens of Ohio. "That [Tennessee] statute, by its necessary operation, excludes citizens of other states from transacting business with that corporation upon terms of equality with citizens of Tennessee." Therefore, it is in violation of the provision of the Federal Constitution that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states."

2. As to the Virginia corporation. A corporation is not a "citizen," therefore, the aforementioned provision of the Constitution does not apply to it.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." A corporation is a "person;" but here the phrase "within its jurisdiction" is all important. "A corporation not created by Tennessee, nor doing business there under conditions that subjected it to process issuing

nessee

* * *

from the courts of Tennessee at the instance of suitors, is not, under the above clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, within the jurisdiction of that state." The Virginia corporation "does not appear to have been doing business in Tenunder any statute that would bring it directly under the jurisdiction of the courts of Tennessee by service of process on its officers or agents. Nor do we think it came within the jurisdiction of Tennessee, within the meaning of the amendment, simply by presenting its claim in the state court and thereby becoming a party to this cause." As to the Virginia corporation the statute is constitutional.

Nicol v. Ames; In re Nichols; Skillen v. Ames, and Ingwersen v. United States.

173 U. S., 509. Statement.

April 3, 1899.

The war revenue act of 1898 imposes a tax on "each sale, agreement of sale or agreement to sell any products or merchandise, at any exchange or board of trade or other similar place," and requires that the seller deliver to the buyer a memorandum to which a revenue stamp shall be affixed. It is contended that this provision is unconstitutional, because: 1. It is a direct tax, and is not apportioned as required by the Constitution.

2. If an indirect tax, it is a stamp tax on documents not required to be made under state law in order to render the sale valid, and Congress has no power to require a memorandum to be made of transactions within the state for the purpose of placing a stamp thereon.

3. If an indirect tax, it is not uniform, as required by the Constitution.

Opinion of United States Supreme Court.

1. The tax is not upon the property sold, nor the sale, nor the person making it, but "is in effect a duty or excise laid upon the privilege, or opportunity or facility offered at boards of trade" and is, therefore, not a direct tax.

66

2. The tax is not upon the memorandum, nor does Congress assume to enact anything in opposition to the law of any state upon the subject of sales. It provides for a written memorandum containing the matters mentioned, simply as a means of identifying the sale, and for collecting the tax by means of the required stamp. Congress might have required a sworn report with the proper amount of stamps

* * *

* * *

thereon to be made at certain regular intervals, of all sales made subject to the tax. Whether the means adopted were the best and most convenient to accomplish that purpose was a question for the judgment of Congress and its decision must be conclusive in that respect."

3. In this case there is that uniformity which the Constitution requires. The tax or duty is uniform throughout the United States, and it is uniform or, in other words, equal, upon all who avail themselves of the privileges or facilities offered at the exchanges, and it is not necessary in order to be uniform that the tax should be levied upon all who make sales of the same kind of things, whether at an exchange or elsewhere."

The act is constitutional.