documentary or otherwise, before said justice or referee appointed in the order for his examination, or in obedience to the subpoena of the court, or referee acting under such order, or either of them or in any such case or proceeding. § 7. A referee appointed as provided in this act possesses all the powers and is subject to all the duties of a referee appointed under section ten hundred and eighteen of the code of civil procedure, so far as practicable, and may punish for contempt a witness duly served as prescribed in this act for non-attendance or refusal to be sworn or to testify, or to produce books, papers and documents according to the direction of the indorsement aforesaid, in the same manner, and to the same extent as a referee appointed to hear, try and determine an issue of fact or of law. § 8. Chapter three hundred and eighty-three of the laws of eighteen hundred and ninety-seven is hereby repealed. § 9. This act shall take effect immediately. [Became a law May 25, 1899, with the approval of the governor.] CASES CONSTRUING STATUTES. The People of the State of New York v. Carson J. Sheldon et al. 139 N. Y., 251. October 3, 1893. Statute construed. , "If two or more persons conspire, either to commit any act injurious to the public health, or to public morals, or to trade or commerce, * * * each of them is guilty of a misdemeanor." (New York Penal Code, sec. 168.) Statement. Defendants agreed to sell no coal except at prices fixed by a majority of them. They are prosecuted for conspiracy. Opinion. “The trial judge charged the jury: If the defendants entered into the organization agreement for the purpose of controlling the price of coal and managing the business of the sale of coal, so as to prevent competition in price between the members of the exchange, the agreement was illegal, and if you find that this was their intent, and that the price of coal was raised in pursuance of the agreement to effect its object, the crime of conspiracy is established." This was a correct charge. Defendants were convicted. Harvey F. Drake et. al. v. Steverin Siebold. 81 Hun., 178. Statement. October, 1894. Nearly all the coal dealers in Rochester, N. Y., were members of a combination known as The Rochester Coal Exchange, which from time to time issued schedules of prices at which coal should be sold by all of its members. The parties to this action were members of this association. A contract was entered into between plaintiffs and defendant whereby plaintiffs were to supply the defendant with large quantities of coal at stated times, the price of which was to be the schedule price set by the said association at the time the coal was delivered. Defendant received part of the coal, and then refused to take any more, and plaintiffs bring this suit to recover damages for the breach of contract. Opinion. * * * The object of the coal exchange was to prevent competition in the sale of a prime necessary. The combination between the dealers, followed by overt acts, was a conspiracy within the meaning of the statute, which provides that when two or more persons conspire "to commit any act injurious to trade or commerce," they are guilty of a misdemeanor. (Penal Code, sec. 168, subd. 6.) The object of the association was illegal, and the contract on which this action is based was in furtherance of that object and is void. The plaintiffs can not recover. The National Harrow Co. v. E. Bement & Sons. 21 N. Y. App. Div., 290. Statute construed. October, 1897. "No domestic stock corporation and no foreign corporation doing business in this state shall combine with any other corporation or person for the creation of a monopoly or the unlawful restraint of trade, or for the prevention of competition in any necessary of life." (L. 1892, ch. 688, amended by L. 1897, ch. 384.) Statement. Plaintiff corporation was organized ostensibly to manufacture and deal in harrows. Its stock was issued for patents assigned to it. It manufactured no harrows itself, but obtained eighty-five patents and made contracts with those from whom they were purchased to continue manufacturing the harrows under licenses, the corporation reserving the right to fix the prices at which the harrows should be sold. Defendant, who held a license to make harrows, broke the contract, and this suit is to enforce it. Defendant claims that the sale of its patent and the receiving back a license is void because it was with a view to giving the plaintiff a monopoly. Opinion. "The section is a disjunctive one and prohibits corporations from combining to accomplish three things: (1) Creation of a monopoly;' (2) 'the unlawful restraint of trade;' and (3) the prevention of competition in any necessary of life."" It follows that the contract in question falls within the terms of this statute, and is void. Plaintiff can not recover. In the Matter of the Application of the Attorney-General for an Order for the Examination of Witnesses under the Provisions of Chapter 383 of the Laws of 1897. The Attorney-General, appellant; Robert M. Olyphant, respondent. 21 Misc. Rep., 101. 22 App. Div., 285. 155 N. Y., 441. Statement. July, 1897. November, 1897. April, 1898. An order was granted by Judge Chester, commanding Robert M. Olyphant and others to appear before a referee and testify concerning an alleged trust. A motion in the Supreme Court to vacate the order was granted. The attorney-general appealed to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, and was there defeated. He then carried the case to the Court of Appeals, and was again defeated. Statute construed. Chapter 383, of the Laws of 1897, makes combinations in restraint of trade criminal; and to enforce the law provides as follows: "Whenever the attorney-general deems it necessary or proper to procure testimony before beginning any action or proceeding under this chapter, he may present to any justice * * * of the Supreme Court an application in writing for an order directing such persons as the attorney-general may require to appear before a justice of the Supreme Court, or a referee designated in such order, and answer such relevant and material questions as may be put to them, concerning any alleged illegal contract in violation of this chapter. * ** The testimony given by a witness in a proceeding or examination under this act shall not be given in evidence against him in any criminal action or proceeding, nor shall any criminal action or proceeding be brought against such witness on account of the testimony so given by him, nor shall any person be excused from answering any questions that may be put to him on the ground that it may tend to convict him of a violation of the provisions of this act. Opinion of Supreme Court. 1. The administrative, judicial and executive departments must be kept distinct. One man can not perform duties under two of these departments. For a judge to order witnesses to give testimony solely to aid the attorney-general is to do an administrative act. The law giving such power is unconstitutional. 66 * * * 2. "An attempt has apparently been made in the statute in question to give immunity to the witnesses." The language of the statute comes far short from giving absolute immunity to the witness from prosecution." Hence, this law conflicts with our constitution where it says: "No person * * * shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Therefore it is void. 3. The order summoning witnesses must be set aside. Opinion of the Appellate Division. 1. In granting the order to call witnesses the judge has to determine whether it is necessary. Therefore, the act is judicial, and the law granting the power is constitutional. 2. The application of the attorney-general did not state facts enough. The order was rightly vacated. Opinion of the Court of Appeals. A case like this is not appealable to this court; therefore the questions involved will not be determined. John G. Walsh and G. Wells Walsh v. John Dwight et al. 40 N. Y. App. Div., 513. Statute construed. May, 1899. Every contract or combination in the form of trust or otherwise, made after the passage of this act, whereby competition in the state of New York in the supply or price of any article or commodity of common use in the said state for the support of life and health may be restrained or prevented, for the purpose of advancing prices, is hereby declared illegal. (Chap. 716, Laws 1893.) Statement. Defendants are manufacturers of Dwight's Cow Brand Saleratus and Soda. They agreed with jobbers and dealers to give them a discount on prices if they would not sell any saleratus for less than the price fixed on Dwight's Cow Brand. Plaintiffs, rival manufacturers of saleratus, by this scheme lost much trade, as they claim, $50,000 worth; to recover damages this action is brought. Opinion. Ingraham, Judge, speaking for the court says: "This act did not have the effect of preventing a manufacturer from fixing the price at which his article should be sold, or from making an agreement with these persons who acted as the jobbers or retailers of his manufactured articles that they should deal exclusively in his merchandise, or would not sell the merchandise of other persons at a less price than that for which his product was sold. The act was evidently intended to prevent manufacturers or dealers in any article or commodity of common use from combining together to advance the price of such article or commodity by which the supply or price of the same would be restricted or regulated.” Plaintiffs can not recover. COMMON-LAW DECISIONS. Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber. 106 N. Y., 473. Statement. 1887. A contract existed between plaintiff and defendant, whereby for a sufficient consideration defendant agreed not to engage in the manufacture or sale of matches, except as |