2. The State governments have no right to tax any of the means employed by the United States government to execute its constitutional powers.

9 Wheat., 1. Statement.

Gibbons v. Ogden.

1824.

The State of New York gave Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton the exclusive right to navigate all waters within the jurisdiction of the state with vessels propelled by steam for a term of years. Gibbons navigated the bay of New York with a steamboat running between New York City and Elizabethport, N. J., which steamboat had been duly licensed as a coasting vessel, under acts of Congress regulating the coasting trade. Ogden, who had succeeded to the rights of Livingston and Fulton, brought suit to restrain Gibbons. The case went to the United States Supreme Court for a decision on the constitutionality of the said grant to Livingston and Fulton.

Opinion by Chief Justice Marshall.

"The sole question is, Can a state regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states while Congress is regulating it?" It can not. When the laws of Congress, enacted under the Constitution, and state laws conflict the state laws must yield. The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, "like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself; may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution."

The grant was unconstitutional.

12 Wheat., 413.

Statement.

Brown et al. v. Maryland.

1827.

The State of Maryland indicted plaintiffs for violating a statute of that state requiring any person selling foreign goods to pay $50 license. Justice Marshall, speaking for the United States Supreme Court, said:

Opinion.

"We think, then, that the act under which the plaintiffs in error were indicted is repugnant to the article of the Constitution which empowers Congress to regulate

commerce

*

Farmers' and Mechanics' National Bank v. Dearing.

91 U. S., 29.

Statement.

October, 1875.

An act of Congress provided that a national bank should forfeit all interest for taking more than the legal rate in the state where situated. An act of the State of New York provided that both interest and debt should be forfeited for charging more than 6 per cent interest. Plaintiff, situated in the State of New York, loaned defendant $2,000 on a note at ten per cent interest. Plaintiff sued on the note. The New York Court of Appeals held the note absolutely void. Plaintiff carried the case to the United States Supreme Court. Opinion.

National banks are designed to be used to aid the government in the administration of the powers granted by the Constitution; and Congress, which is the sole judge of the necessity for their creation, having brought them into existence, the states can exercise no control over them, nor in any way affect their operation, except so far as Congress may see fit to permit. The state act must yield to the Federal act with which it conflicts.

Plaintiff can recover the principal of the note.

94 U. S., 113. Statement.

Munn v. Illinois.

1876.

In 1872 Munn was manager of the Northwestern Elevator in the city of Chicago. A statute of Illinois fixed the maximum charge for storing and handling grains by warehousemen in cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants. Munn charged higher rates than the statute allowed, and was indicted. The case comes to the United States Supreme Court. Munn claims that the statute is unconstitutional because repugnant to the provisions:

1. That no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."

2. That no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," and,

3. That Congress has the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states."

Opinion.

"Every statute is presumed to be constitutional.

*

If there is doubt, the expressed will of the legislature should be sustained."

* * **

1. Under the police "powers the government regulates the conduct of its citizens one towards another, and the manner in which each shall use his property, when such regulation becomes necessary for public good. In their exercise it has been customary in England from time immemorial, and in this country from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, etc., and in so doing to fix a maximum of charge to be made for services rendered, accommodations furnished, and articles sold. From this it is apparent that, down to the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was not supposed that statutes regulating the use of private property necessarily deprived an owner of his property without due process of law. cumstances they may, but not under all. does not change the law in this particular." Elevators, like inns, are impressed with a public interest, and so the state can regulate them without "depriving any person of * * * property, without due process of law," as the expression is used in the Fourteenth Amendment.

Under some cir-
The amendment

2. "After what has already been said, it is unnecessary to refer at length to the other provision of the Fourteenth Amendment which is relied upon, viz, that no state shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' Certainly, it can not be claimed that this prevents the state from regulating the fares of hackmen or the charges of draymen in Chicago, unless it does the same thing in every other place within its jurisdiction. But, as has been seen, the power to regulate the business of warehouses depends upon the same principle as the power to regulate hackmen and draymen," and what can be done in the one case can be done in the other.

3. "The warehouses" in question "are situated and their business carried on exclusively within the limits of the State of Illinois. They are used as instruments by those engaged in state as well as those engaged in interstate commerce, but they are no more necessarily a part of commerce itself than the dray or the cart by which, but for them, grain would be

transferred from one railroad station to another. Incidentally they may become connected with interstate commerce, but not necessarily so. Their regulation is a thing of domestic concern, and, certainly, until Congress acts in reference to their interstate relations, the state may exercise all the powers of government over them, even though in so doing it may indirectly operate upon commerce outside its immediate jurisdiction. We do not say that a case may not arise in which it will be found that a state, under the form of regulating its own affairs, has encroached upon the exclusive domain of Congress in respect to interstate commerce, but we do say that, upon the facts as they are represented to us in this record, that has not been done."

The statute is held constitutional.

100 U. S., 82. Statement.

Trade-Mark Cases.

October, 1879.

In 1870 Congress passed an act providing for the registration of trade-marks in the Patent Office; in 1876 another act was passed punishing the fraudulent use, sale or counterfeiting of trade-marks thus registered, the two acts being so connected that they stand or fall together. Under the latter act three persons were indicted. In defense the constitutionality of the legislation is assailed. The cases come to the Supreme Court.

Opinion.

If an act of Congress can in any case be extended, as a regulation of commerce, to trade-marks, it must be limited to their use in " commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." The legislation in question is not in its terms or essential character a regulation thus limited, but in its language embraces and was intended to embrace all commerce, including that between citizens of the same state.

The acts are unconstitutional.

Walling v. The State of Michigan.

116 U. S., 446.

January 18, 1886.

Statement.

Walling, a "drummer," came to Michigan to solicit orders liquors to be shipped from Chicago, and was arrested under

a Michigan statute requiring one engaged in that business to have a license. Walling carried the case to the Supreme Court of the United States.

Opinion.

"We think that the act in question operates as a regulation of commerce among the states in a manner within the exclusive power of Congress, and that it is for this reason repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and void."

Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District.

120 U. S., 489. Statement.

March 7, 1887.

A Tennessee statute required "all drummers, and all persons not having a regular licensed house of business within the taxing district, offering for sale or selling goods, wares or merchandise therein by sample" to pay for a license. Robbins was selling goods in Tennessee by sample for a firm in Ohio. Being indicted for a breach of the said statute, Robbins brings the case before the United States Supreme Court. Opinion.

"The negotiation of sales of goods which are in another state for the purpose of introducing them into the state in which the negotiation is made is interstate commerce. Therefore, as applied to persons soliciting orders for houses doing business in other states, the statute in question is unconstitutional, it being inconsistent with the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several states.

135 U. S., 100. Statement.

Leisy v. Hardin.

1890.

A statute of Iowa prohibited the sale of any intoxicating liquors, except for pharmaceutical, medicinal, chemical or sacramental purposes, and under a license from a county court of the state. Plaintiff shipped intoxicating liquor from Illinois into Iowa and sold it there in the original packages. A large number of these packages were seized by defendant, a constable of Iowa, by virtue of the said statute. Plaintiff brings replevin to obtain possession of the liquor, claiming the statute is repugnant to the power given to Congress to regulate commerce among the states.