domestic law and begins to be governed and protected by the national law of commercial regulation, are not of very close application here. The commodity may not have commenced its journey and so may still be completely within the jurisdiction of the state for purposes of state taxation, and yet at that same time the commodity may have been sold for delivery in another state. Any combination among dealers in that kind of commodity which in its direct and immediate effect forecloses all competition and enhances the purchase price for which such commodity would otherwise be delivered at its destination in another state, would, in our opinion, be one in restraint of trade or commerce among the states, even though the article to be transported and delivered in another state were still taxable at its place of manufacture." But commerce within a state can not be interfered with by the statute. "The views above expressed lead generally to an affirmance of the judgment of the court of appeals. In one aspect, however, that judgment is too broad in its terms-the injunction is too absolute in its directions-as it may be construed as applying equally to commerce wholly within a state as well as to that which is interstate or international only. This was probably an inadvertence merely. Although the jurisdiction of Congress over commerce among the states is full and complete, it is not questioned that it has none over that which is wholly within a state, and therefore none over combinations or agreements so far as they relate to a restraint of such trade or commerce. It does not acquire any jurisdiction over that part of a combination or agreement which relates to commerce wholly within a state by reason of the fact that the combination also covers and regulates commerce which is interstate. The latter it can regulate, while the former is subject alone to the jurisdiction of the state. The combination herein described covers both commerce which is wholly within a state and also that which is interstate. "In regard to such of these defendants as might reside and carry on business in the same state where the pipe provided for in any particular contract was to be delivered, the sale, transportation, and delivery of the pipe by them under that contract would be a transaction wholly within the state, and the statute would not be applicable to them in that case. They might make any combination they chose with reference to the proposed contract, although it should happen that some nonresident of the state eventually obtained it. "The fact that the proposal called for the delivery of pipe in the same state where some of the defendants resided and carried on their business would be sufficient, so far as the act of Congress is concerned, to permit those defendants to combine as they might choose in regard to the proposed contract for the delivery of the pipe, and that right would not be affected by the fact that the contract might be subsequently awarded to some one outside the state as the lowest bidder. In brief, their right to combine in regard to a proposal for pipe deliverable in their own state could not be reached by the Federal power derived from the commerce clause in the Constitution. "To the extent that the present decree includes in its scope the enjoining of defendants thus situated from combining in regard to contracts for selling pipe in their own state it is modified and limited to that portion of the combination or agreement which is interstate in its character. As thus modified, the decree is affirmed." 79 Fed. Rep., 627. Statement. In re Grice. February 22, 1897. The Texas anti-trust law of 1889 makes it a crime for two or more persons to unite to raise or lower prices or limit the production of an article. It provides that persons outside of the state who commit these acts within the state are guilty of a violation of the act. It exempts from its operation agricultural products and live stock while in the hands of the raiser or producer. John D. Rockefeller and several others, including the relator Grice, were indicted for violating this statute. Grice was imprisoned, and brought habeas corpus proceedings in the circuit court of the United States claiming that the statute is unconstitutional. Opinion. Swayne, district judge, who heard the case, held that the law was unconstitutional because it could not affect people outside of the state; that the state can not pass a law prohibiting reasonable restriction of trade, and reasonable combinations; that these rights are guaranteed by the federal constitution, and that reasonable combinations are by this law prohibited; that four-fifths of the people in Texas are farmers and cattle raisers, and that a law which exempts four-fifths of the people from its operation is unreasonable class legislation, and is void under the constitutional clause that provides that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The relator is discharged. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association. 290. 166 U. S., Statement. March 22, 1897. Defendants are a large number of railroad companies which entered into an agreement to establish and maintain rates on all freight traffic. The United States brings suit to enjoin defendants on the ground that the agreement is in violation of the Trust Act. Defendants claim : 1. That Congress did not intend the Trust Act to apply to railroads, because the Interstate Commerce Act impliedly gave railroads the right to fix rates; and if Congress had intended to change the Commerce Act by the Trust Act it would have said so. 2. The Trust Act does not apply to reasonable restraint of trade, and the agreement in question provides for only reasonable restraint of trade. Opinion. 1. The Commerce Act and the Trust Act are consistent with each other and, therefore, the Trust Act applies to railroads just as if there were no Commerce Act. It 2. The Trust Act says every contract in restraint of trade. Therefore, the courts have no right to confine the scope of the Act to contracts in unreasonable restraint of trade. includes all contracts in restraint of trade whether reasonable or unreasonable. The agreement violates the Trust Act, and an injunction is proper. Pierre V. A. Brett v. Martin C. Ebel et al. 29 N. Y. App. Div., 256. Statement. May, 1898. Plaintiff and defendants were engaged in the business of ship brokers, chartering vessels from various ports in the West Indies and South America. Plaintiff sold defendants "all his interest and good will in the business of freighting vessels from Port au Prince and said Brett's Line, Haiti Packets," and, for $1,800 a year, promised that while H. Becker & Co. or their successors made shipments by sail to Port au Prince he would not solicit freights or do any business with Port au Prince in or from any place in the United States east of the Mississippi River. Plaintiff sues to recover money due under this contract and is met by the defense that the contract is illegal, being contrary to the United States Trust Act of 1890. Opinion. * * * The Federal act "certainly was not intended to prohibit a man from selling his business in the ordinary way and from thereupon obtaining the full value thereof through the instrumentality of an incidental covenant not to compete with the purchaser within some limited area. In our judgment the present contract is not in contravention of this Federal act. It certainly is not within its spirit. If that act were to be construed literally and technically so as to embrace such a contract as the present, it would involve consequences most harmful to the commercial community." The contract was legal. 82 Fed., 529. 171 U. S., 578. Statement. United States v. Hopkins et al. Circuit Court, September 20, 1897. Defendants were engaged as commission merchants in receiving, buying, selling, and handling live stock at the Kansas City stock-yards. These stock-yards furnished the only available public market for that purpose for an area including many states and territories. Defendants formed themselves into an association agreeing upon certain limits to the commissions charged and the number of persons that each member could employ to travel and solicit business, and agreeing that members should do no business with nonmembers. The United States seeks to enjoin defendants from acting under this agreement. Opinion of the Circuit Court. By receiving stock from foreign states and shipping stock to foreign states, defendants are engaged in interstate commerce. The agreement is in restraint of interstate commerce. The Trust Act prohibits all restraints upon interstate trade, and it is immaterial under that law whether the restraints be reasonable or unreasonable. The injunction is granted. Opinion of the United States Supreme Court. The business of the members of this exchange is not interstate commerce. It affects it indirectly, but that is all. "The services of members of the different stock and produce exchanges throughout the country in effecting sales of the articles they deal in are of a similar nature. Members of the New York Stock Exchange buy and sell shares of stock of railroads and other corporations, and the property represented by such shares of stock is situated all over the country. Is a broker whose principal lives outside of New York state, and who sends him the shares of stock or the bonds of a corporation created and doing business in another state, for sale, engaged in interstate commerce? We think it would be an entirely novel view of the situation if all the members of these different exchanges throughout the country were to be regarded as engaged in interstate commerce. The bill of the United States is discharged. * * * United States v. Coal Dealers' Association of California et al. 85 Fed., 252. Statement. Circuit Court, January 28, 1898. Practically all the coal used in San Francisco is mined in Washington, Oregon and British Columbia. A very large number of the coal dealers in San Francisco formed themselves into an association, agreeing not to sell coal below certain prices. This association entered into a contract with the producers of coal in Washington, Oregon and British Columbia whereby the producers agreed to cooperate with the association to carry out its purposes, and the producers agreed not to sell coal to any non-member except for a much higher price than they charged members. United States seeks to enjoin proceedings under this arrangement. Opinion of the court. The combination affects the sale of coal as soon as it arrives in San Francisco from other states and before it has become a part of the mass of property in the state. Until it has become part of the mass of property in the state it remains in interstate commerce, and therefore comes under |