Aliens.--Foreigners who commit crimes in England are punishable exactly as if they were natural-born subjects. It is no defense on behalf of a foreigner that he did not know he was doing wrong, the act not being an offense in his own country. Though this is no defense, it may mitigate the punishment.(q). Ambassadors.-Different views, materially conflicting with each other, have been held as to the criminal liability of ambassadors and their suites. Some writers maintain that for no offense, whether it be against the life, person, or property of an individual, is an ambassador amenable to the criminal law of the country to which he is sent.(r) Others assert that though he is not punishable for crimes made such by the laws of the particular country, he is so for any great crimes which must be such in any system. Or, as it is sometimes expressed, he is punishable for mala in se, but not for acts which are merely mala quia prohibita. Thus, an ambassador might be convicted for murder or rape, but not for smuggling. The more probable and reasonable course seems to be to request the recall of the offender by his own state, with or without an expression of opinion that the offender should be punished in his own country. If this be refused, the ambassador might be dismissed, and pressure brought to bear on the other state to induce the latter to put him on his trial. There is one class of offenses which stand on a different footing, namely, offenses affecting the existence and safety of the state. For a direct attempt against the life of the sovereign, it is said that the offender would be directly pun Gray, 339; State v. Vermont Cent. R. R. Co., 27 Vt. 103; State v. Morris and Essex R. R. Co., 23 N. J. Law (3 Zabriskie), 360. The word "person" includes corporations or artificial persons as well as natural persons But in states where there is no common-law criminal jurisdiction, and where the statutes have provided no process for bringing the defendant into court but capias, the word "person" is held not to include corporations. State v. Cin. Fertilizer Co., 24 Ohio St. 611; State v. O. & M. R. R. Co., 23 Ind. 362. Corporations can now be indicted in Ohio. 74 Ohio L. 262. (1) R. v. Esop, 7 C. & P. 456. (r) Phillimore's International Law, vol. 2, c. 7 ishable by the state. (s) But, at any rate, in this and other offenses against the government, the state might demand the punishment of the offender by the foreign state; and if this demand were not complied with, might treat him as a public enemy, and demand satisfaction from that foreign state. The matter would then pass from the province of law to that of politics. (8) 1 Hale, P. C. 96-99; Fost. 187, 188. CHAPTER V. PRINCIPALS AND ACCESSORIES. THOSE who are implicated in the commission of crimes are either principals or accessories. This distinction is based on the consideration, whether the party was present or absent at the commission. It is recognized in felonies alone. Principals (i. e., those present) are either Principals in the first degree, or principals in the second degree. Accessories are either Accessories before the fact, or accessories after the fact. Of these, in their order: Principal in the first degree.-IIe who is the actor or actual perpetrator of the deed. It is not necessary that he should be actually present when the offense is consummated; thus, one who lays poison or a trap for another, is a principal in the first degree. Nor need the deed be done by the principal's own hands; for it will suffice if it is done through an innocent agent, as for instance, if one incites a child or a madman to murder. Principal in the second degree.-One who is present, aiding and abetting at the commission of the deed. (t) This presence need not be actual; it may be constructive. That is, it will suffice if the party has the intention of giving assistance, and is sufficiently near to give the assistance; as when one is watching outside, while others are committing a felony inside, the house. There must be both a participation in the act and a community of purpose (which must be an unlawful one) at the time of the commission of the crime. So that, as to the first point, mere presence or mere (t) Principals in the second degree are frequently termed aiders and abettors; sometimes also accomplices. The latter term, however, may include all participes criminis. neglect to endeavor to prevent a felony will not make a man a principal; as to the second, acts done by one of the party, but not in pursuance of the arrangement, will not render the others liable. The distinction between principals of the first and of the second degree is not a practically material one, inasmuch as the punishment of offenders of either class is generally the same. Accessories are those who are not (a) the chief actors in the offense, nor (b) present at its performance, but are some way concerned therein, either before or after the fact committed.(u) Accessory before the fact.-One who, being absent at the time when the felony is committed, yet procures, counsels, commands, or abets another to commit a felony.(x) This may be done not only by direct command or counsel, but also by expressing assent or approbation of the felonious design of another. But the bare concealment of a felony about to be committed does not make an accessory. is not necessary that there should be any direct communication between the accused and the principal; as if A. requests B. to procure the services of C. in order to murder D. It The accessory will be answerable for all that ensues upon the execution of the unlawful act commanded, at least for all probable consequences; as, for instance, if A. commands B. to beat C., and he beats him so that he dies, A. is acces sory to the murder. But if the principal intentionally commits a crime essentially different from that commanded, the person commanding will not be answerable as accessory for what he did not command. Thus, if A. commands B. to break into C.'s house, and B. sets fire to the house, A. can not be convicted of the arson. But a mere difference in the mode of effecting the deed, or in some other collateral matter, will not divest the commander of the character of accessory if the felony is the same in substance. Thus, if A. commands B. to kill C. by poison, and íu) 4 Bl. 35. (x) 1 Hale, P. C. 615. he kills him with a sword, A.'s cominand suffices to make him an accessory. With regard to manslaughter: As a rule the offense is sudden and unpremeditated, and this view of the nature of the crime having been taken, it has been said that there can be no accessory before the fact in manslaughter. But in many cases there is deliberation, though it is not accompanied by an intention to take away life. It is easy to present a case in which there may be an accessory before the fact to manslaughter. A. counsels B. to mischievously give C. a dose of medicine merely to make him sick, and C. dies in consequence; A. is guilty as an accessory before the fact to manslaughter.(y) As to the trial of those who command, counsel, or procure the commission of a felony: Until a recent date it was the rule that such a person could not be tried without his own consent, except at the same time with the principal, or after the principal had been tried and found guilty. He was merely an accessory, and therefore he could not be tried before the fact of the crime was established. Now two courses are open to the prosecution; either (a) to proceed, as formerly, against the person who counsels, etc., as an accessory before the fact with the principal felon, or after his conviction; or (b) to indict the counsellor for a substantive felony (for to that his offense is declared by the statute to amount), and this may be done whether the principal has or has not been convicted, and although he is not amenable to justice. The punishment in either case is the same. If one of these two modes has been adopted, of course the offender can not be afterward prosecuted in the other. (2) It is also provided that an accessory before the fact may be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished in all respects as if he were a principal felon.(a) To convict of the substantive felony under this act, it is still necessary to prove that the principal deed has actually been committed. Soliciting and exciting to the commis (y) R. v. Gaylor, 7 Cox, 253. (2) 24 and 25 Vict. c 94, 8 2. |