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destroy one of these elements, is to destroy the whole. The plain English of this is, that in God we find first, absolute cause, this is his essence; the second element is, necessary effect, this is the universe; the third element is, the relation between this cause and this effect.

Destroy one of these correlatives, and you destroy the other. Destroy the world, for instance, and you destroy God; for "there can be no more a God without a world, than a world without a God."

"There are, in human reason, two elements, and their relation; that is to say, three elements, three ideas. The existence of these three ideas, is not an arbitrary fiction of human reason; for, in their triplicity and in their unity, they constitute the very foundation of human reason. They appear there, to govern it, as reason appears in man to govern him. That which was true in reason, humanly considered, subsists in reason considered in itself; that which forms the foundation of our reason forms the foundation of eternal reason; and that is a triplicity which resolves itself into unity, and an unity which develops itself into triplicity. The unity of this triplicity alone, is real; and, at the same time, this unity would utterly perish, if limited to either of the three elements which are necessary to its existence; they have all the same logical value, and constitute one indecomposable unity. What is this unity? The divine Intelligence itself. Here is that thrice holy God, whom the family of man recognises and adores."

"What is the theory which I have just stated? It is the very foundation of the Christian religion. The God of Christians is both threefold and one, and the charges which are brought against the doctrine I teach, must extend even to the Christian trinity. The dogma of the trinity is the revelation of the divine essence, illuminated in its whole depth, and brought within the scope of thought. It does not seem that Christianity regards the divine essence as inaccessible, or interdicted to human intelligence; for it gives to the humblest mind instruction concerning it; it is the first truth which it teaches us in our childhood. But, it may be asked, do you forget that this truth is a mystery? I answer, no, I do not forget it; but neither do I forget, that this inystery is a truth. Moreover, I will speak plainly and unequivocally upon this point. Mystery is a word which belongs, not to the vocabulary of philosophy, but to that of religion. Mysticism is the necessary form of all religion, considered merely as religion; but under this form are ideas which may be approached and comprehended.”

Philosophy here assumes a lofty tone; to her nothing is mysterious. Religion is weak, and has to encounter many mysteries; but philosophy has no such word as mystery in her whole vocabulary. Could this view of the doctrine of the trinity be accepted by Trinitarians, the Unitarians would doubtless have but little farther controversy with

them upon the subject. And if this be a specimen of the revelations which Cousin's reason has made to him, we have only to recur to the testimony of Revelation to settle the question with regard to the claims of such reason to the attributes of divinity.

When philosophers undertake to advance some new and strange theory, which has only an equivocal value, even in their own estimation, it is curious to observe their anxiety to enlist in their favor the testimony of some theologian of acknowledged piety. Of this, we have here a very remarkable instance. Cousin is anxious to press in the testimony of Fenelon, in support of the doctrine, that "reason is literally a revelation," and, that all its dictates are divine inspirations; and the translator of the Philosophical Miscellanies is very sure, that he can find traces of this doctrine in the writings of President Edwards. But we are here again constrained to remark, for the sake of the young, into whose hands these translations may fall, that the quotation referred to, from the writings of Edwards, does not justify any such conclusion. Edwards is there speaking of the special influences of the Holy Spirit, which are shared only by the true children of God, and not of those revelations of reason, in order to the enjoyment of which, it is only necessary to be a human being.

The argument, by which the divinity of reason is here supported, is equally valid in proof of the divinity of our eyes. Our eyes reveal to us light, which is not our own, it is not the property of individuals, it is shared in general by all who have eyes. Moreover, this light comes to us necessarily; in order to prevent it, our eyes must be destroyed; just as it would be necessary to annihilate reason before we could prevent the truths it reveals. Why may we not, then, conclude, that the eye is not the property of an individual; that it is eye universal, eye absolute, or, in other words, the "divine in the human?"

We shall not be able to give, as we intended, a particular account of our author's distinction between pure, spontaneous reason, and practical reason. The latter is human, it is our own. This is what the Scotch philosophers call the discursive faculty. Spontaneous reason imparts to all men the same truths, and leaves them all equal. All the difference which exists between one man and another, between the peasant and the philosopher, is occasioned by

the various use which is made of practical reason. And this difference is not without its utility. It is necessary to make a distinction between man and man; without it, all would run into a state of fusion, become amalgamated into one mind, and occasion in society a universal stagnation. The distinction here drawn, while it makes high pretensions to originality, is the same which has been made by Jacobi, and some other German writers, between reason and the understanding. The same idea was adopted by Coleridge, and has been tampered with by many in our own country; but the distinction has by no one been so clearly expressed as by Jacobi; an extract from his writings may be seen in "Specimens of Foreign Literature," Vol. I.

In the survey we have taken of the above system, we have necessarily left several prominent particulars unnoticed; and, with regard to others, we may have, in some instances, mistaken the author's meaning. Where, however, we have feared the least mistake, we have given his own language. As he has not given us his system, in a connected manner, we have made our own arrangement of his materials; and our quotations have, therefore, been necessarily taken out of the connection in which the author penned them. In no other circumstances would this liberty have been justifiable. But we are not conscious of introducing, at any time, a quotation in a connection adapted to misrepresent his sentiments. The extracts, which we have referred to no particular page, may all be found in the first six lectures of his Introduction to the History of Philosophy; and we have made no extracts which are not accessible to the mere English reader.

Great pains have been taken to recommend this system to the young men of our country. But it is still struggling for existence in the land which gave it birth, and we predict, that it will, in a short period, be permitted to expire, without sympathy or regret. Cousin is surrounded by many profound thinkers, who are turning their attention, with characteristic enthusiasm, to the study of mental science. We rely much upon their efforts in expelling from the veins of French literature the poison of German Transcendentalism. And we cannot relinquish the hope, that France, having once carried out, to their last 5

VOL. IV.NO. XIII.

dreadful results, the principles of a false philosophy, till the nations have trembled at the fearful and bloody tragedies she had enacted, may yet be permitted to complete for the world a philosophical system, whose pure light may be her own future guide, and whose benignant results may be her highest glory.

Especially has this system been highly commended, on account of its religious influence. It has been hailed as the most probable means of securing a very desirable end, -the "scientific grounding of a spiritual religion." But from the view, which we have given of this system, our readers may judge of its religious influence. Cousin, indeed, makes high pretensions of regard for Christianity. But it is too evident, that he does not understand the Christian religion. He has never seen it; he has never felt its influence; and, with all his philosophical analysis, we do not perceive, that he has ever discovered in human nature the disease for which Christianity supplies the remedy. He has, it is true, contemplated the Christian religion as a form of civilization, and one, too, that is destined to triumph over all others; but he has never viewed it as a means of regeneration, in the Scripture sense of that term. Indeed, according to his system, piety is only a philosophical refinement; and for man, there is no God but reason, no holier spirit than the inspirations of genius. The following may be regarded as a specimen of his manner of expressing his regard for Christianity :

"Christianity is the philosophy of the people. He who now addresses you, sprang from the people and from Christianity; and I trust you will always recognise this, in my profound and tender respect for all that is of the people and of Christianity. Philosophy is patient; she knows what was the cause of events in former generations, and she is full of confidence in the future; happy in seeing the great bulk of mankind in the arms of Christianity, she offers, with modest kindness, her hand to Christianity, to assist her in ascending to a yet loftier elevation."

Truly this is modest kindness and humility! But when one, who was once in the embrace of avowed infidelity, can give no better account of his conversion to Christianity, than that which is contained in the above paragraph, we are capable of no other feelings towards him than those of unmingled commiseration.

The commendatory remarks, made by Dugald Stewart,

in some of his last writings, with regard to Cousin, have contributed not a little to the favorable introduction of his philosophy among ourselves. But these remarks may be accounted for, when we reflect, that Cousin was at first a disciple of the Scottish school; but after he returned from Germany, and resumed his lectures, in 1828, he assumed a very different tone of feeling and remark towards the Scottish writers. Their system is now a "timid philosophy," a "pallid idealism," "insular, like the island which gave it birth." Stewart surely could not have perused these remarks.

Notwithstanding the numerous errors in the system of Cousin, he may, nevertheless, be read with profit by those whose minds are in some degree matured upon philosophical subjects. He furnishes many fine specimens of psychological analysis, among which, we would especially recommend his remarks, in his Examination of Locke, with reference to our idea of causation. He plainly refutes the dangerous and absurd theory of Brown, who resolves this idea into a mere succession of antecedents and consequents. Cousin clearly proves, that our idea of causation is a necessary conception of the intellect; and, that, after it is once evolved, it can never again be expelled from the mind; forcibly reminding us of the language of Horace :

"Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret."

The system we have been considering, is denominated Eclecticism. Eclecticism, however, cannot, strictly speaking, be applied to mental philosophy. It may be employed in matters of taste or utility; in architecture, for instance, or in forms of government; but in an affair of argument it is entirely inapplicable. Who ever heard of Eclecticism in mathematics? He that carries in his own hand the measuring rod, by which the truth of other systems can be tested, must have first constructed a true system of his own. Eclecticism, therefore, is below the dignity of a philosopher; and, if we trace its history, we shall find, that it has always originated from ignorance of the true method of philosophising, from the darkness and perplexity of the human mind, with reference to difficult subjects, or from a timid disposition to sacrifice truth, in order to tranquillize the minds of heated partisans; and

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