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tween one actuality and another, each present at the same time, is perceived. This can be the only source of certainty as to any truth or actuality, other than those simple isolated actualities or ideas already mentioned. The third is that by which the dissimilitude between one actuality and another, each present at the same time, is perceived. It will be immediately perceived, that this last mode of mental activity is full as necessary to the discovery of truth as either of the former, since it guards from admitting similar connections between objects essentially different. To explain this point fully, however, would require a lengthened discussion, into which we cannot, at the present time, enter. The first two mental acts of reflection are noticed in that order, because they are almost invariably combinedly active, while the third, though no less essential, is less frequently so. It will be perceived, that these three mental acts are frequently simultaneous, or so immediately combined, that, without careful attention, their distinctness may be lost sight of. That they are distinct mental acts, however, cannot admit of a doubt; and careful attention, as well to cases of correct conclusion, as to cases of hasty and erroneous conclusion, will serve clearly to illustrate the truth of the position.

In the remaining observations we must be brief. A careful consideration of the preceding propositions,-for it cannot be pretended, that there has been room here for lengthened argument,-will perhaps enable the reader to perceive, that a recognition of the three distinct mental acts comprised within the general act of reflection may be practically employed, with great, if not infallible, effect, in the determination of what is certain and necessary truth, and, therefore, in the discovery of truth; for the principal difficulty at present existing is, not that propositions enough are not presented to the world, as truth, but that ten thousand different and opposing propositions are presented, on the same subject, each asserted to be truth. It will be immediately perceived, that, according as one of the mental acts comprised within reflection or comparison, is allowed more play (to speak in popular language) than another, so surely will error, instead of truth, be the result. A man who, in comparison, sees only similitudes, will, at once, set down two facts, be

tween which any point of similitude exists, as referring to the same necessary connection in the way of cause and effect; he never stops to search for discrepances and dissimilitudes. This particular tendency, which is very strong among the majority of mankind, is the source of innumerable evils in religion, morals, and science. To take illustration from criminal jurisprudence,-in which especially its effect is to be dreaded,-how many have been the cases in which execution has been unjustly inflicted, on some grounds of circumstantial evidence which appeared strong, but which were, in fact, fallacious. The explanation of this, upon the principle already laid down, is this: there were many points actually proved in the conduct of A. B., the accused, for example, which bore exact similitude to conduct known to have been exhibited by many known murderers. By the second act of reflection, therefore, this conduct of A. B. was immediately set down as having the same connection with cause and consequence, and the individual pronounced a murderer. Had the third mental act of reflection been allowed full play, it would have been perceived that a dissimilar connection of cause and effect might have existed; that the connection presumed was not absolutely necessary. To give an example of this: a case took place many years ago, of the following nature. A man was tried for murder. It was proved, that he was met running quickly, and apparently in great agitation, from the spot where the murdered body was found; his clothes and hands exhibited marks of blood; and near the body lay his spade, covered with blood, evidently the instrument of the fatal deed. The circumstantial evidence appeared complete. There was no hesitation in the mind of the judge, of any one in court, or of any of the jury, save one, as to the guilt of the party. That single one of the jury maintained, that the guilt was not clear; and by that just (as we think), and, as it proved in this case, protecting rule, by which unanimity in the jury is required, the man was, after a long consultation, acquitted. The judge was so much struck with the conduct of the individual member of the jury mentioned, that he requested a private conference with him. The man stated, that, if he were assured of protection and silence, he would explain all. He then stated, that the death of

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the supposed murdered man had been caused, by pure accident, by himself; and that the accused was perfectly ignorant of the mode of the transaction. It subsequently appeared, that the accused was intimately acquainted with the deceased; that, upon returning to his field after an absence, he found him lying dead under the hedge; that, in his sudden emotion, he seized his hand, and thus became marked with blood; that he presently saw his own spade was lying by the side of the deceased, and apparently the cause of death; upon which he became alarmed lest suspicion should attach to him, and consequently fled.*

This case is remarkably instructive. It will show, that the principles laid down in this article are not metaphysical subtilties, but of practical utility and importance. Here were known facts or actualities, which the jury knew to be in very general connection with actual murder. The similitudes fixed their attention, and they pronounced that that connection was necessary in this case also. They did not exercise that act of reflection sufficiently, by which it would have been recognised, that, although there were many similitudes, all these actualities or facts might be totally disconnected with the supposed connected fact of murder;-that other facts might be the immediate and necessarily connected facts, -such as sudden emotion at the sight of a murdered friend, horror, alarm, &c.

The criterion for the discovery of truth will then be found to consist, in obliging each of the three modes of mental act embraced within reflection to be equally active-one not being allowed a superior force to another. Thus the truth will be considered as established, only when disconnection between two or more facts is found either impossible, or in the highest degree improbable. But thus, also, will the means for the discovery of truth be rendered much clearer, and much more free from that doubt and difficulty which seem, at present, to attend the determination of every point.

It had been intended to examine this subject more in detail; to proceed to investigate the different modes in which the principles touched upon may be applied in the investigation of truth, in connection as well with physical

* The particulars of this case may be relied upon as authentic.

as with moral science; to exhibit the reason why man can never attain to an adequate conception of the attributes of Deity; and to examine, in detail, the principles of evidence laid down and employed by Paley, in his "Evidences of Christianity," and in his "Horæ Paulinæ," as also those employed by the learned author of the "Rationale of Circumstantial Evidence," compared with the principles laid down and attempted to be explained here. The length to which these remarks have already extended prevents such intention being fulfilled. It can only be added, that the "Essay" above mentioned, contains an exceedingly interesting and careful examination of that important branch of morals,-not only in its legal, but in its general application,—circumstantial evidence, or evidence of probability. It is a work peculiarly attractive, on account of the frequent and judicious illustration of the subject by reference to actual cases, so that no point or position is left unsustained by an example. We are glad to understand that the work has already been recommended, by the highest authority in this country in such matters, for republication here. It can hardly fail to command the attention and interest, as well of the general reader, as of the members of the profession of which the author is himself an ornament.

This, and every other contribution to the enlightening of the course of proof and evidence, has a direct bearing upon the subject treated of in this paper; the most noble and most worthy object to which the faculties of man can be directed; and which we cordially agree with our author in saying ought to be "the great object of all intellectual research," namely, THE DISCOVERY Of Truth.

S.

ARTICLE VI.

LIFE AND SELECT DISCOURSES OF REV. SAMUEL H. STEARNS.

Life and Select Discourses of Rev. SAMUEL H. STEARNS. Boston. Published by Josiah A. Stearns, and Whipple & Damrell. 1838. pp. 420.

We have read through this unpretending volume, with more than common pleasure. It is an unostentatious sketch of the short-lived career of one of those simplehearted, high-minded men, whose characters it is always refreshing to contemplate. We love to turn away from the stir and strife that often so sadly disfigure the scenes of the common world, and even from the pages of literature which describe them, and trace the calm course, even though it end in a too early grave, of an aspiring scholar, whose sensibility to the beautiful in nature, and in human character, was ever fresh, and of an ardent and pure-minded Christian, whose interest in man remained undiminished, amidst all the manifestations of human folly and corruption. We reverence the heavenly grace, that sits upon a meek and quiet spirit,-a spirit which, though in love with contemplation, does not forget the necessity of action,— which, in communion with itself and with the Spirit of all truth, sits down to think its own thoughts, to form its own opinions, and shape its own plans for the conduct of life; and we are ever ready to welcome a biography which gives us glimpses of such a character, even though it does not, in all respects, come up to our notion of what a biography should be. The interest, with which we contemplate the manifestations of such a spirit in the life of a clergyman, is increased by the contrast which it presents with the features of the age in which we live. The present is a time when the clergy are peculiarly exposed to secular influences, and are in special danger of becoming men of business, rather than scholars; creatures of expediency and policy, leaders of sects, and promulgators of reforms, rather than independent and devoted students and

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