have erroneously been ascribed to others.* It is sufficient, that every one necessarily recognises his own existence as an undoubted truth or actuality. In so far, at any rate, each man rests satisfied, that he has attained to the discovery of truth. Now a man's consciousness can be said to consist in nothing else than in the ideas or perceptions and emotions existent within him. Each of these, it matters not to the present purpose by what law, is accompanied by a consciousness of actuality. No man, in whose mind an idea is present, can for a single moment doubt, whether that idea exists or not. Its presence is, in fact, felt truth; proof of its actuality. It may, or may not, be the case that it represents, correctly, some object in the external world; the idea, the impression on the mental retina, is an actuality, a truth, at any rate. And here, it is thought, will be perceived the practical utility of a precise definition of the word truth. In the very felt existence of an idea, there is, in so far, an attainment of truth. We know that the idea exists. Even the ideas or visions present in spectral illusions are real existences. There may be nothing in the external world which is perceived through the medium of the eye; the whole may originate in a diseased condition of that organ upon which the functions of mind in this life depend for their healthy exercise; still the ideas are there; they are actualities: we may reason upon them as we like, and infer or not the existence of corresponding external objects, but there is no doubt of the reality of the ideas. And this is the only sense in which the word, intuitive, can be correctly used. We all have, and must necessarily have, intuitive belief in the reality and actuality of our ideas; we have not, and cannot have, in fact, intuitive belief, in the only correct sense of that term (immediate, uncompounded), in the reality and actuality of the external facts which those ideas present; that belief is a result of reflection. It would seem that this confusion of the idea with the thing to which that idea refers, has occasioned much of the obscurity and doubt in philosophical discussions, and has led to much obscuration in the discovery of truth. It all originates in the want of

*There can be little doubt that Bishop Berkeley's views are very generally misunderstood on this matter. He had not the slightest doubt of the reality of an external world. See his "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous." London, 1725. Passim, but especially pp. 74, 134, 161, and 164.

Thus PLATO denied

a precise definition of what is truth. that the senses can ever lead to true knowledge, while EPICURUS, on the contrary, taught that the senses are always to be trusted; that they alone are the foundations of all real knowledge; and that they are infallible;* infallible, however, inasmuch as the impressions received by them, are true impressions, which must be reflected upon by reason, to ascertain their consistency with the external world.

It is hoped that these very brief and condensed remarks will have sufficed to render it evident, that there are actualities or truths, of the reality of which the mind can by no possibility entertain a doubt. That point once established, a basis is fairly laid, whereon the whole superstructure may be raised. It is a point, however, which it is necessary very clearly and thoroughly to understand, but which the definition given of truth will, it is apprehended, enable every person to recognise.

Having thus established, that every individual must, necessarily, be cognizant of certain truths or actualities, and which he necessarily perceives to be truths or actualities, we next proceed to inquire, in what manner these ideas, intuitive truths, or actualities, must be employed, in order to arrive at the truth or actuality with reference to other objects, the correct idea of which (still continuing to use the term, "idea," in the same sense, as, simply, mental cognizance) cannot, without this effort, be, by any natural means, produced within the mind. This must be by that mental or internal process commonly known by the name (it is a mere name, not in actual existence; it signifies a mode, not an essence) of reflection. Before proceeding to examine in what this consists, an important observation presents itself.

It appears to us, that there exists one principle, one actuality or truth, which universal experience, through countless ages, without a single exception, has shown to exist as a constant relation between every existent fact and some other; which ought to serve as a guide in all physical, as well as moral investigations, but which is too frequently lost sight of, or rather, is seldom at all considered. This principle or truth is, that there is no single

* Lucretius, Lib. IV, passim; especially, see line 380, &c.

circumstance, or fact, or actuality, in nature, which is SIMPLY and INDEPENDENTLY EXISTENT IN ITSELF; which does not stand in the relation of necessary connection with some other circumstance, or fact, or actuality, in nature. Few men recognise this principle; most men think and reason as if such a principle had no existence; and yet its denial involves an absurdity; it implies that something, in our sphere, may be underived, uncreated. If one single circumstance or fact can exist without a cause, where shall we say, that a cause, or a creator, or any necessary connection, is to be presumed? Were this principle constantly borne in mind, we should never hear of there being exceptions to laws of nature, &c. Exceptions may exist to rules of grammar, for there is no necessary connection between the termination us, for example, and the masculine gender. In facts of nature, there is a necessary connection, or there is NOT. If there is, no exception can exist, for the statement of such exception involves a contradiction, viz., that there is not a necessary connection. In that which nature presents in necessary combination, there can be no exception to the combination. In that which man, finding it created, places in certain arbitrary combinations, there may be endless exceptions; for the combination is not necessary to the existence of the object, as in the former case. Thus, although Erasmus may have written it, and Lilly sanctioned it, and all men since have read it and obeyed it, that

'Propria quæ maribus tribuuntur, mascula dicas,"

yet this is not a case to which nature has affixed her eternal signet, as one between the parts of which a necessary connection must exist.

This principle, then, that there is no circumstance or actuality in nature which is simply and independently existent in itself (which may be termed, in brief, the principle of nihil disjunctum), ought ever to be borne in mind, as the foundation of every process for the discovery of truth. Here is an actuality;-say the simple idea of the table before me,-of which I am conscious, which I know to be an actuality or truth. I know that this actuality must be, necessarily, dependent for its existence upon some other actuality, or true and necessary existence.

What is that other actuality? This is

the simple form in which every proposition will present itself, if the principles already endeavored to be explained be taken as the guide.

We are now arrived at the third point, and a most important one, in the process. A perception of one actuality has been attained (and the perception of one or more actuality must necessarily, by the very principle just explained, be the foundation for the discovery of another actuality), and another recognised actuality has been applied to it, that it must necessarily be connected with some other actuality: thus, the principle of nihil disjunctum acts as a kind of feeler, thrown out to discover the connected actuality or truth which we are anxious to discover. The question now arises, How are we to set about making this discovery? The answer is, by the process called reflection.

It is foreign to the object of this article to discuss, in any way, the essence of mind, or the merits of any system of mental philosophy. It is wished carefully to avoid any thing like an involvement in the peculiar doctrines of any mental theory. The mental processes to be now considered shall, therefore, be spoken of simply under the term of mental acts, without any controversy as to this or that faculty.

Reflection is a mode of mental activity,-the most mysterious of all the modes of mental activity, the distinguishing phenomena of which appear to us to be, that it is not, as in the case of a simple perception of any simple object, one simple isolated idea, as it may be called, which is present to the mind, but two or more distinct ideas or actualities are present together, at one and the same time, and are compared together. This extraordinary and mysterious power, by which alone we are capable of forming any notion of the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience in the Deity, is possessed in any appreciable degree at least, by man alone, of all living creatures on earth. In this it is that he stands distinct from the brutes. It is this, and this only, which constitutes him a reasoning being. It is by this, alone, that man is able to proceed at all in the discovery of truth, with respect to any objects beyond those which are immediate, and simple, and isolated. Yet how has this noble power been often abused by man in the professed pursuit of truth;

how has it been perverted, so as to give to error the semblance of truth, rather than to discover truth itself!

It appears to us, that the chief reason of the abuse to which man's capacity of reflection, or comparison (as perhaps it should be more precisely termed), is liable to be, and has been so often, subject, is, ignorance as to the modes in which the operations of reflection are conducted. Perhaps it is not too much to say, that a correct knowledge of these modes would, of itself, enable us to attain to a criterion or standard, by which we should be enabled, in part at least, to decide how far we had. arrived at a correct determination of the truth. We shall endeavor to examine this point; and it must be immediately perceived, that it is a point of eminent practical importance.

In saying that the distinguishing phenomena of reflection are, the presenting of two or more distinct ideas or actualities together, at one and the same time, and comparing them together, the generic characteristics of reflection were stated. But the act of reflection is not a simple or single one. It is an assemblage of distinct mental acts, each distinguished by specific characteristics. To enter fully into the discussion of these, and to demonstrate the necessary truth of them, would require a volume. A very brief outline shall be here given, which the reader is requested candidly to consider. Be it observed, that nothing is said here of the power by which the acts are performed, but the acts themselves alone are mentioned.

It has been stated, that the general mode of the mental act of reflection is, to render two or more ideas present to the mind at the same time, and to compare them together. But this comparison must be made in three ways: and probably every person, accustomed to reflect at all upon the mode of action of his own mind, will recognise the truth of the following remarks.

In every pure and deliberate, and not partial or hasty, reflection or comparison, three distinct mental acts take place. The first of these is that by which the similitude of two distinct and separate actualities or ideas, present at the same time, is perceived. This is a most important element in reflection, as will be immediately perceived. The second is that by which the necessary connection (in accordance with the principles already explained) be