thority, not only to judge, but also to enforce their judgments, the result of a decision against the constitutionality of a legis. lative or executive act will be to render it invalid through the enforcement of the paramount law in the controversy which has raised the question.

"The same conclusion is reached by stating in consecutive order a few familiar maxims of the law. The administration of publie justice is referred to the courts. To perform this duty, the first requisite is to ascertain the facts, and the next to determine the law applicable to such facts. The constitution is the fundamental law of the State, in opposition to which any other law or any direction or order, must be inoperative and void. If, therefore, such other law, direction, or order seems to be applicable to the facts, but on comparison with the fundamental law the latter is found to be in conflict with it, the court, in declaring what the law of the case is, must necessarily determine its validity, and thereby in effect annul it. The right and the power of the courts to do this are so plain, and the duty is so generally-we may almost say universally-conceded, that we should not be justified in wearying the patience of the reader in quoting from the very numerous authorities upon the subject."

Mr. Webster said of the nature of our liberty and government:

"The first object of a free people is the preservation of their liberty, and liberty is only to be preserved by maintaining constitutional restraints and just divisions of political power. Nothing is more deceptive or more dangerous than the pretense of a desire to simplify government.

"The simplest governments are despotisms; the next simplest, limited monarchies; but all republics, all governments of law, must impose numerous limitations and qualifications of

authority, and give many positive and many qualified rights. In other words, they must be subject to rule and regulation. This is the very essence of free political institutions.

"The spirit of liberty is, indeed, a bold and fearless spirit; but it is also a sharp-sighted spirit; it is a cautious, sagacious, discriminating, far-seeing intelligence; it is jealous of encroachment, jealous of power, jealous of man. It demands checks; it seeks for guards; it insists on securities; it entrenches itself behind strong defenses, and fortifies itself with all possible care against the assaults of ambition and passion. It does not trust the amiable weaknesses of human nature, and therefore it will not permit power to overstep its prescribed limits, though benevolence, good intent, and patriotic purpose come along with it. Neither does it satisfy itself with flashy and temporary resistence to its legal authority. Far otherwise. It seeks for duration and permanence. It looks before and after; and, building upon the experience of ages which are past, it labors diligently for the benefit of ages to come. This is the nature of constitutional liberty; and this is our liberty, if we will rightly understand and preserve it."

Professor Lieber calls this the most Demosthenian passage ever uttered by Webster and a correct expression of the nature of our liberty. Following this he, Professor Lieber, says:

"Unity of power, if sought for in widespread democracy, must always lead to monarchical absolutism. Virtually it is such; for it is indifferent what the appearance or the name may be, the democracy is not a unit in reality; yet actual absolutism existing, it must be wielded by one man. All absolutism is therefore essentially a one-man government. The ruler may not immediately take the crown; the pear may not yet be ripe, as Napoleon said to Sieyes; but it soon ripens, and then the avowed absolute ruler has far more power than the

king whose absolute power is traditional, because the tradition itself brings along with it some limitations by popular opinion. Of all absolute monarchs, however, it is true that it is the vice of a pure (absolute) monarchy to raise the power so high and to surround it with so much grandeur that the head is turned of him who possesses it, and that those who are beneath him scarcely dare to look at him. The sovereign believes himself a god, the people fall into idolatry. People may then write on the duties of kings and the rights of subjects; they may even constantly preach upon them, but the situations have greater power than the words, and when the inequality is immense, the one easily forgets his duties, the others their rights.' Change the terms, and nearly every word applies to absolute democracies with equal truth. Aristotle says that extreme democracy (what we would call democratic absolutism) has the character of the tyrannis (monarchical absolutism). This is true, yet we must add these modifications: The power of the absolute monarch, though centered in one man, according to theory is left to him by those over whom he rules; he may be brought to an account; but the power of an absolute democracy is fearful reality, with which there is no reckoning. It strikes, and the strikers vanish. Where shall they be impeached? Even he who led them is shielded by the inorganic multitude that followed him. It is felt to be heroic to oppose the absolute monarch; it is considered unpatriotic or treasonable to oppose the absolute democracy, or those who call themselves the people."

The idea and ideal upon which the revolutionary fathers builded our governments, was of a government of law and not men; of equality before the law and a denial of special privilege. If the idea has been departed from,-if the ideal has been violated and an industrial feudalism built up in the

midst of a representative democracy, and if a train of governmental ills and evil practices has come in the wake of it,—it is not through inherent vice or defect in the fundamental structure but a violation of its spirit and intent if not its written word.

The idea of a flexible constitution, or no constitution bearing limitations upon legislative power, is at large in the land. A notion that constitutions must be changed more speedily than the people have themselves provided or demanded is also loose. With them consorts the proposition to recall judges and judicial decisions and impose on the guileless voter the duty of measuring with the constitutional yard-stick laws and decisions of courts, and let the majority decide.

Without imposing my personal views,-to you lawyers I propound, in conclusion, the following questions for your consideration. Is it a cheering prospect for the stability and permanence of our institutions? May not a majority, without constitutional restraints and limitations upon its action, be as despotic and unjust in its exercise of power as a monarch unhampered with such restraints? English history gives us knowledge of just judges removed because they refused to do the will of a despotic king. Is there difference in principle between such an act and a similar one by a majority acting despotically? The power to do at all involves the power to do wrong. The liberty that gives into the hands of a majority unguarded and unlimited power is not civil liberty, for that places limitations upon the power of the majority for the protection of the minority.

Are we at the beginning of governmental atavism? Shall we then begin the destruction of the work of a thousand years?

Shall we send the ship of state without chart or compass to tempt uncertain seas, or shall we continue to travel super antiquas vias?

Report of the Committee on Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation Laws

Mr. President:

At the last annual meeting a committee was appointed to report at this session on the subject of proposed legislation concerning employers' liability and workmen's compensation laws. (Report 1911, pp. 65, 90, 221.) In obedience therewith, your committee begs to submit the following report:

It is known to all that the common law upon the subject of liability and compensation for personal injuries received by employees while in service is undergoing radical changes. Many of the States have adopted statutes on this subject, notably New York, Massachusetts, Ohio, Wisconsin and Washington. Many other States, like Indiana, have modified or abolished the common law rules governing the liability of the employer to an employee injured while at work, but without further affirmative action as to the amount or mode of compensation.

This subject has also been considered at length by various organizations, among which may be mentioned: The National Civic Federation, the American Federation of Labor, the National Metal Trades Association, the Railway Claim Agents' Association; by a conference of State commissions and experts held at Chicago, and especially by the commission created by a joint resolution of Congress of date June 25, 1910. Besides, other bar associations and legislative commissions and the like now have the matter under consideration, and bills are being prepared for the purpose of legislation. So that, without more, it is safe to say that it is settled by the