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MASTER AND SERVANT.

servant, without fault, from negligence of such master; especially where injured employee was child receiving orders solely from said master and without access to president or general superintendent: and it makes no difference that master violated orders. Atlanta Cotton Factory v. Speer, 147.

11. Railroad company is liable in action on behalf of fireman killed by washing out of culvert, which was in improper condition, resulting from negligence and carelessness of its bridge-builder and road-master : his neg. ligence was negligence of defendant, and notice to him of defective construction was notice to latter. Davis v. Railroad Co., 623.

12. Workman was injured by break of elevator chain and fall of elevator. His business was to load elevator on lower floor and unload it on upper. Staircase near elevator connected the floors, and workman was injured while riding with his load on elevator. It appearing that chain had broken some six weeks before and had been repaired, and evidence being conflicting whether employer's superintendent had been notified of break, and it also appearing that ratchets to arrest fall of elevator were not in working order : Held, that employer's negligence was the jury, and that he was not relieved from liability if defective condition of chain and ratchets arose from negligence of fellow-workmen of plaintiff, whose duty it was to take care of them. Mulvey v. Locomotive Works, 623.

13. M., while using machine in his capacity of workman for manufacturing company discovered its defects and unsafe condition and complained to foreman, under whose orders he worked and whose duty it was to see that machinery was in order. Foreman promised to remedy defects and directed him to work on machine. M. thereupon continued to use machine, and, in so doing, was injured through said defects before any steps were taken to remedy same. Keld, that his knowledge was not conclusive of contributory negligence, but was a fact to be considered by jury in determining that question. Manufacturing Co.

v. Morrissey, 574, and note. MECHANICS' LIEN.

Where promissory note is given and received in payment for materials and

work the lien is waived. Crooks v. Door, Sash and Lumber Co., 348. MINOR. See Infant. GUARDIAN AND WARD. PARENT AND CH[LD. MORTGAGE. See ATTACHMENT, 2. COVENANT, 2. DEED, 4. DURESS, 3.

FIXTURE, 4, 5, 7. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 15, 19. INSURANCE, 17, 18. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 9. Trust AND TRUSTEE, 3, 4. UNITED STATES

Courts, 4. VENDOR AND VENDEE, 2, 3. I. Of chattels.

1. Owner of land, or mortgagor in possession after condition broken, may make valid chattel mortgage of growing crop superior to lien of subsequent attachment. Kimball v. Sattley, 689.

2. Mortgage of chattels belonging to another with oral consent or ratification of owner, cannot affect subsequent mortgage of same chattels by owner to one

without notice of ratification. Maier v. Daris, 549. II. Of realty.

3. Right of mortgagee to recover on insurance policy or mortgage where debt has been paid on the other. Castellain v. Preston, 168, note.

4. Trustee in deed of trust is trustee for both debtor and creditor, and he must use efforts of prudent man to protect all interests in property. Ventres v. Cobb, 284.

5. All persons must take notice of boundaries of counties and legislative changes thereof. Welch v. Stearns, 147.

6. Where mortgage has been recorded in one county and mortgaged premises become by legislative enactment part of another county, notice of foreclosure should be published in county in which the land is when notice is given. Id.

7. Generally, one purchasing land subject to mortgage, by express agreement assumes the mortgage. In such case, as between parties, purchaser becomes

MORTGAGE.

primarily liable and mortgaged property the primary fund for payment of debt.
George v. Andrews, 755.

8. Mortgagee may, by his dealings with purchaser and mortgagor, recognise
purchaser as principal and mortgagor as only security. Id.

9. Extension of time of payment of mortgage by agreement between holder
and purchaser, without concurrence of mortgagor, discharges him from liability.
Id.

NANCE.

ment.

Pana v.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Constitutional Law, 5, 20. Contract,
21. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 1. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT, 1. ORDI-

Surety, 4. Taxation, 1. WHARF, 2.
1. City not liable for negligent acts of officers or men employed in fire depart-

Wilcox v. City, 814.
2. Board of supervisors can, in good faith, compromise judgment in favor of
county. Collins v. Welch, 148.

3. When tax collector arrests tax-payer for non-payment of tax already paid
and which is thereupon paid a second time, the town is not liable for arrest, nor
for money while in hands of collector. Inhabitants, g-c., v. Hurd, 148.

4. Power of to pass ordinance interfering with rights of individuals or public
must clearly appear in its charter ; .authority to pass ordinances to suppress
gambling, and such others for peace and good of town, as may be deemed ex-
pedient, not repugnant to constitution, &c., does not warrant passage of ordi-
nance forbidding keeping of billiard table for hire. State v. Belvidere, 148.

5. Bound by unauthorized acts of officers of that branch which is invested with
jurisdiction to act for corporation upou subject to which particular act relates.
City v. Railroad Co., 284.

6. Property of county being held for public, is under uncontrolled power of
General Assembly. Harris v. Board of Supervisors, 483.

7. Where bonds donated by municipal corporation to railroad company re-
cited, on their face, that an election had been held in accordance with author-
izing statutes, Held, 1. That defect in method of election in no way impairs vali-
dity of bonds in hunds of bona fide holder. 2. That decision of state Supreme
Court to contrary, is not binding on United States Supreme Court. Town of

Bowler, 484.
8. In the absence of erpress power city cannot subscribe or donate to manu-
facturing company, and bonds so given are not valid in hands of purchaser for
value but with knowledge. Ottawa v. Carey, 549.

9. In Illinois, under coustitution of state, corporate authorities of cities can-
not be invested with power to levy and collect taxes except for corporate pur-
poses ; hence city could not borrow money nor issue bonds unless it had power
to pay same by taxation. Id,

10. City has power to establish such reasonable appliances in public thor-
oughfares where railroads pass, as will by temporary arrest of travel, protect
public from danger. Tertor v. Railroad Co., 348.

11. In action against, for damages resulting from breaking of plank in
bridge, the ground is positive misfeasance, or else neglect ; in latter case notice
of condition of street is necessary, in the foriner not. Mayor, fc., of Bruns-
wick v. Braxton, 348.

12. Legislature having provided for assessment of tax on railroad companies,
and its payment and collection by comptroller-general, if power to assess and
levy tax on railroads had been conferred on municipal corporation by previous
act, it must yield to last act on subject. City v. Savannah Railway Co., 755.

13. City had notice of hole in sidewalk near railroad crossing and neglected
to repair same within reasonable time. Person in passing over such walk, ex-
ercising due care, stepped into hole, whereby be was unavoidably thrown upon
railway track before approaching train, and in attempting to get up his clothes
caught upon rail or spike in sidewalk, and he was killed by train. Held, that
city was liable. City v. Schmidt, 815.

14. Under Illinois constitution corporate authorities of cities cannot be in-
vested with power to levy and collect taxes except for corporate purposes. Held,
that unless city had been invested with power to raise money by public taxation
to be devoted to private parties for developing water-power in city or vicinity

Vol. XXXI.-108

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

for manufacturing purposes, bonds so given were void in hands of purchaser
with notice. City v. Carey, 755.

15. Semble, that power to subscribe to company's stock would not, of itself,
authorize donation to it. ld.

16. Under general grant of power to declare what shall be a nuisance town
anthorities will have no right to pass ordinance declaring thing a nuisance which
is clearly not such ;, in doubtful cases the action of the authorities will bind the
court. Railway Co. v. Town of Lake View, 420.

17. On the other hand there are many things which courts, without proof,
will declare nuisances, and ordinance declaring them such will be valid on its
face ; of this character is use of steam for propelling street cars along thickly
populated public street. Id.

18. Where city is, by its charter, limited to levy of one per cent. of taxes for
all purposes whatever, three-tenths of which shall be for payment of its bonded
indebtedness, and city does levy one per cent. tax, court, on application of cred-
itor who has recovered judgment on bonds of city, will compel application of
three-tenths of such taxes to payment of such judgment, if that much is neces-
sary. City v. Underwood, 421.

· 19. Where county courts were authorized to subscribe in behalf of township
to stock of railroad company“ building or proposing to build a railroad into,
through or near such township," and to issue county bonds in payment, and
there was a vote of township in favor of issuing certain bonds and subscription
was made and bonds issued, reciting that they were authorized by vote of peo-
ple and issued under order of court; it appearing that, at time vote was taken
and bonds issued, company only proposed to build road from point nine miles
distant from township to further distance, and interest on the bonds having been
paid for three years, Held, that courts should acquiesce in determination by
qualified voters and local authorities that proposed road was “near'' township.
Kirkbride v. Lafayette County, 690.

20. Under constitution of Missouri, city ordinance is void which undertakes
to confer upon one person right to remove and convert to his own use carcases
of all dead animals, not slain for food, found within limits of city, to exclusion
of right of owners to remove and use them before thev become a nuisance.

River Rendering Co. v. Behr, 690.
MURDER. See CRIMINAL LAW, V.
NATIONAL BANKS. See BANK, 4, 5. CRIMINAL LAW, 20, 27. ERRORS AND

APPEALS, 11.

1. Have power to lend money upon personal obligation secured by pledge of
warehouse receipt. Cleveland v. Bank, 690.

2. Interest received by, greater than lawful rate can not be set off in action
on note; but bank can only recover face of note without interest. Bank v.
Childs, 348.

3. Where stockholder, with good ground to apprehend failure of bank, col-
lusively transfers his shares to irresponsible person, transaction will be deemed
a fraud on creditors and transferror will be held to liability imposed by 2 12 of
-ct of June 3d 1864. Bowden v. Johnson, 285.

4. Bill in equity in such a case, praying for discovery as well as relief,
sustained. Id.

5. National banking act confers power to receive special deposits, and where
national bank has been accustomed to receive United States bonds as such,
gratuitously, it is liable for loss occurring through want of that degree of care
which good business man would exercise in keeping property of such value.
Bank v. Zent, 484.

6. Demand, and refusal by bank to deliver, with no other explanation than
statement that it has no such bonds in its possession, furnish sufficient proof
of loss by negligence. Id.

7. Sect. 3466 Rev. Stat. U. S., giving priority to demands of United States
against insolvents cannot be applied to demands against national banks which
have failed, because inconsistent with national banking act. Bank v. United
States, 484.

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NEGLIGENCE, See Barlment. COMMON CARRIER, 10, 11. MASTER AND

SERVANT, 11, 13. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1, 11, 13. National Banks,
5, 6. RAILROAD, 4, 6, 8. SHIPPING, 2.

1. Is the omission to use the means reasonably necessary to avoid injury to
others. Railroud Co. v. Johnson, 117, and note.

2. To inaintain action for, there must be fault on part of defendant and no
want of ordinary care on part of plaintiff'. Difference between ordinary and
slight negligence. Comparative negligence. Id.

3. Aside from statutory or municipal regulation, no rate of speed at which
railroad train may be run is negligence per se. Powell v. Railway, 485.

4. In clear case of contributory negligence the court should direct jury to
find for defendant. Id.

5. If negligence of railroad company contributes to injury, company is
liable, even though negligence of fellow-servant also contributes. Railway Co.
v. Cummings, 285.

6. When bowl is set by landlord in tenant's room for his exclusive use, with
apertures insufficient to carry off all water delivered by faucet if left open,
and this defect and tenant's negligence in using bowl are together the cause of
damage, liability of landlord is that of owner as distinguished from that of
occupant. McCarthy v. Savings Bank, 285.

7. Landlord does not insure against tenant's negligence, nor does his liabil-
ity follow from fact that building does not contain most improved system of
water pipes. Id.

8. That boy between six and seven was upon railroad track at or near street
crossing, though his father had shortly before seen him going toward track,
not enough to establish contributory negligence as matter of law. Johnson v.
Railroad, 148.

9. One who places in hands of child article known to be dangerous, is liable
for natural and probable result of his act, although there be an intervening
agency. Binford v. Johnson, 50, and note.
10. Act in direct violation of criminal statute negligence per se.

Id.
11. Liability for injury received by child while trespassing. Id, note.

12. Railroad company liable, notwithstanding negligence of intestate, if or-
dinary care was not exercised by its employees after they knew of intestate's
negligence. Beems v. Railroad Co., 148.

13. Natural effects of tort are those which might reasonably be foreseen ;
proximate effects those between which and the tort there intervenes no culpable
and etficient agency. Mere failure by third parties to extinguish fire started
through negligence of defendant, not such agency. Wiley v. Railroad Co.,
148.

14. Where passenger is injured by mutual negligence of servants of com-
pany on whose train he is rightfully travelling, and of servants of another com-
pany with whom he has no contract, action may be maintained against either
company. Railway Co. v. Shacklet, 421.

15. No legal presumption that railroad company, while in exercise of lawful
right to run its locomotives and trains over its road and to use fire in so doing,
will not permit fire to escape. Pulmer v. Railway, 485.

16. That railroad company uses good machinery and most approved ap-
pliances to prevent escape of fire, and has careful and competent men in charge,
will not, in case fire does escape of itself, rebut prima facie inference of
negligence. Id.

17. Railroad companies must use reasonable precautions to prevent fire being
carried against all except extraordinary and unusual winds. Id.

18. Where obstruction in street is in plain view of driver of vehicle, and he
drives against it, he is guilty of contributory negli ce, and it is no answer to
say that his attention was taken up with looking above ground to direct team.
Yahn v. City, 644.

19. That woman sixty-seven years old, injured by being knocked down by
horse and wagon, while crossing street on some flagstones at junction with two
other streets, all much travelled, in compact part of city, did not, before and
while crossing, look up or down the street but straight ahead, is not conclusive
evidence of want of due care ; question is for jury. Shapleigh v. Wyman, 690.

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NEGLIGENCE.

20. Person sailing in his yacht on Lord's day in violation of statute, if run into by steamboat, can only maintain action if act of those in charge of steamboat was wanton and malicious. Wallace v. River Nav. and Ex. Co., 691.

21. Freight car was left standing on side track so near main track as to make collision inevitable. Passenger was sitting with elbow on sill of open window resting his head on his hand. Corner of coach struck freight car so that it jarred the passenger's elbow outside window and his arm was crushed between the two cars. Held, that he was not guilty of contributory negligence. Far

low v. Kelly, 421. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT.

1. Overdue coupon of municipal bond which has not matured, is. Town of Thompson v. Perrine, 221.

2. Transfer after maturity, of interest coupons payable to bearer on day

named, only passes title of transferror. Mckim v. King, 77. NOTARY PUBLIC. See Bills and Notes, 27. CRIMINAL LAW, 27. NOTICE. See ATTACHMENT, 8. BANK, 2. MORTGAGE, 5. MUNICIPAL COR

PORATION, 11. RAILROAD, 12. SURETY, 1.

Purchaser is not chargeable with constructive notice of all instruments and incumbrances of record, but only of such as lie in apparent chain of title.

Grundies v. Reid, 815. NOVATION. See DEBTOR AND CREDitor, 7 NUISANCE. See Equity, 15. INJUNCTION, 4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,

16, 17.

1. Ringing at early hour (to arouse boarding-house keepers or operatives living with them) of bell weighing 2000 pounds and set in open tower 40 feet from ground, and so situated as to residences owned and occupied before erection of bell, that they receive full force of sound, the inmates being deprived of sleep and their comfort impaired, is a private nuisance; and mill owner may be restrained by injunction, the ringing not being shown to be necessary or reasonable ; and evidence of custom to so ring bells in other places is inadmissible. Davis v. Sawyer, 349.

2. NOISE AND VIBRATION AS ELEMENTS OF NUISANCE, 625. OFFICER. See ATTACHMENT, 2, 3, 6, 7. ATTORNEY, 1. PROHIBITION, 2.

SHERIFF, 2.

1. Town marshal may be bailiff. Constable cannot be sheriff, deputy sheriff or clerk of superior court, but may be marshal. Lewis v. Wall, 549.

2. Where officer is called upon by nature of service, to make an inquiry and investigation after process comes into his hands, he is only required to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence in so doing Street v. Pennell, 285.

3. A sheriff who erroneously certifies in levy on land that appraisers were disinterested, is not liable in absence of negligence. Id.

4. Remedy for such error is in motion for leave to amend return, and in power of court under such motion, to extenıl necessary relief. Id.

5. In absence of constitutional or legislative restriction, where no definite term of office is prescribed by law, power of removal is incident to power of appointment, and that power is sole judge of existence of cause.

Patton v. Vaughan, 422.

6. In action on treasurer's official bond, his settlement with county court is

conclusive. Hunnicutt v. Kirkpatrick, 122. ORDINANCE.

1. Charter and ordinances of city stand in same relation as constitution and statutes of state. Quinette v. City, 485.

2. Where city charter provided that judges of election should receive no pay, and repealed all inconsistent ordinances, Held, that ordinance providing for

pay of judges and clerks was repealed only as to judges. Id. PARENT AND CHILD.

1. Father of infant child is entitled to its custody rather than mother; and

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