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23. Insurer may be estopped to insist on conditions and restrictions contained
24. After date of contract for sale of house insured against fire, and before
25. If insured calls upon insurer to pay loss, and latter makes no specific
26. Where subject of insurance was only “goods and groceries," and there
27. A presumption of a man's insanity is not raised by his suicide ; but that
28. Where there is nothing in policy to contrary, insurer is not released from
29. Collision of steamboats caused fire, and one of them with goods insured
30. Person taking out policy in mutual company is at once bound by charter
31. Usage of such company to notify members of annual interest on deposit
32. Company cannot, without assent or request of insured, apply to such
Wife, 18. LEGACY, 4, 5. NATIONAL BANK, 2.
1. Maker of note being sued, agreed by separate instrument, in consideration
2. Open account bears interest only after demand. Richardson v. Laclede
3. Where plaintiff seeks to recover interest on interest, burden of proof is on
4. Note was given for debt, with interest added at twenty per cent. ; Texas
INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See CRIMINAL LAW, 29. STATUTE, 6.
1. License to sell, from United States, does not dispense with necessity for license under state law. Pierson v. The State, 419.
2. Sale of liquor by club_to members not within statute prohibiting sales without license. Graff v. Evans, 99, and note.
3. Two persons, unconnected in business, selling liquor to husband habitually intoxicated, are jointly liable to wife. Rantz v. Barnes, 483.
4. Barkeeper selling liquor to adult and seeing minor present, and understanding he is to participate in drinking same, is not guilty of selling or giving liquor to minor. Siegel v. The People, 623.
5. If jury should find that barkeeper knew that adult was being used by minor as a screen, they might find him guilty. Id.
6. Indictment following words of statute, charged defendant with keeping or maintaining house “used for illegal sale or keeping of intoxicating liquor.”' Held, That charge must be construed to mean keeping for such illegal use or with knowledge that house was so used. State v. McGough, 546.
7. At trial upon this indictment, justice allowed defendant's witness to be asked, in cross-examination, if witness did not tell A., witness for state, that if A. would mix up testimony in F.'s case, F. would give A. $20. Held, error, inquiry being irrelevant, as no connection appeared between F.'s case and case on trial. Id.
8. Justice instructed jury, "He, the defendant, is presumed to know the kind of business which was openly being carried on in his establishment by his servants and agents. The defendant admitted that he was the keeper of the place, and that he was there personally in charge of it during the time covered by the indictment. He is not only presumed to know but he is responsible.”
Held, error, knowledge and responsibility of defendant being for jury. Id. JOINT STOCK COMPANY. See CORPORATION, 14, 15. JUDGMENT. See ACCORD, 2. CORPORATION, 11. FORMER RECOVERY, 1•
INSOLVENCY, 3. INTEREST, 4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 2. UNITED STATES COURTS, 5.
1. Court cannot, at subsequent term, correct judgment in respect to costs, where that subject was considered and judgment entered by clerk as directed by court, unless such power was carried forward by motion made during terin at which judgment was rendered. Williams v. Williams, 146.
2. Defendant served with process issuing from court of competent jurisdiction is concluded by judgment. Harbig v. Freund, 146.
3. THE REMEDIES FOR THE COLLECTION OF JUDGMENTS AGAINST DEBTORS WHO ARE RESIDENTS OR PROPERTY HOLDERS IN ANOTHER STATE, OR
WITHIN THE BRITISH DOMINIONS, 697. JUDICIAL SALE.
1. Caveat emptor applies to administrator's sale of lands for payment of debts. Tilley v. Bridges, 419.
2. Administrator or executor selling lands under decree of court, has no authority to warrant title. If purchaser obtains no title, he must, as general
rule, suffer the loss, unless fraud or inistake has entered into transaction. Id. JURISDICTION. See REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 4. JUROR AND JURY. See CRIMINAL LAW, 13.
1. In the selection of grand and petit jury for Baltimore county, under provisions of Act of 1870, ch. 220, one of forty-eight names drawn for general panel was non-resident. This name was not among grand jurors. Held, 1. That this did not affect the grand jury. 2. That statute was to be regarded mainly as directory, and irregularitjes not materially violating it or prejudicing rights of the citizen were not fatal. State v. Glasgow, 347.
2. The Maryland law which exempts persons over seventy from jury service does not disable them. Green v. State, 347.
3 I8 TAE JURY SYSTEM A FAILURE ! 81. LANDLORD AND TENANT. See ACTION, 1. AGENT, 1. FIXTURE, 6, 8, 12. NEGLIGENCE, 6.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
1. If lessor deprives lessee of beneficial enjoyment and lessee therefore abandons premises, it is an eviction. Skalir v. Shurte, 76.
2. Assignee for creditors, who, in conduct of his trust, continues in possession of premises let to his assignor, does not become personally liable for rent unless there be special agreement. White v. Thomas, 76.
3. Demise of factory with fixtures and machinery, implies no warranty that machinery is in good repair or of sufficient capacity to do work for which premises were let. Naumberg v. Young, 146.
4. Owner leased to tenant rooms in upper story approached by stairway common to all the tenants, the railing of which was out of repair. The stairway became dangerous from ice and snow and tenant slipped and caught rail, which gave way. Held, that landlord, who had made no covenant to repair, was not liable. Percell v. English, 312, and note.
5. A promise to repair made after the lease, is nudum pactum. Id. 6. Landlord who lets tenements in building to different tenants, with right of way in common over flight of stone steps, without railing, leading from street to yard, is not liable to tenant injured by falling upon ice accumulated upon steps, if it is not landlord's duty to keep them clear of ice, although so constructed and of such material as to occasion accumulation of ice, there being
no change in construction since tenancy began. Wood v. Cotton Co., 813. LEGACY.
1. To make legacy specific, it must clearly appear that testator intended legatee to take particular thing and nothing else. Wyckof' v. Executors of Perrine, 754.
2. If debt is subject of specific legacy, payment of debt, whether voluntary or compulsory, will destroy legacy. Id.
3. Gift of personal property for life, with power to legatee to use it as she may deem proper, or to sell it, or any part of it, for her benefit, as she may deem needful or best, Held, absolute. Kendall v. Kendall, 284.
4. Will, executed in 1848, contained clause : “I give and bequeath to my daughter, - $1000, to be paid on her marriage or when she arrives at age, with interest after, at her option." Legatee attained majority in 1849, and was married in 1853 ; testatator died in 1854. Deld, that legacy drew interest as soon as daughter arrived at age. Trustees v. Grover, 813.
5. Legacy bears simple interest, and payments should be applied first to
extinguish interest and then principal. Id. LIBEL.
1. Action for can be maintained against corporation. Evening Journal v. McDermott, 147.
2. Previous or subsequent publications admissible to show temper of defendant's mind in publication complained of, even though barred by Statute of Limitations. Id.
3. Publication in newspaper of false statement that person was convicted and sentenced to prison for libel, is actionable, without proof of special damage. Boogher v. Knapp, 483.
4. In action for, where language is ambiguous or ironical, plaintiff's acquaintances may state their understanding as to whom charge refers, and what it imputes, Knapp v. Fuller, 689.
5. Defendant, after suit brought, published another article referring to plaintiff by name : admissible to show animus. Id.
6. What one of defendants said, few days after first publication, manifesting hostile feeling toward plaintiff, also admissible. Id.
7. Defendant wrote defamatory statements of plaintiff in letter to W., under circumstances making it privileged, but by mistake placed it in envelope directed to another person, who received and read letter. Held, that publication was privileged in absence of malice in fact. Tompson v. Dashwood, 754.
8. If any one, including proprietor of newspaper, goes out of his way to asperse personal character of public man, and to ascribe to him base and corrupt motives, he does so at his peril, and must either prove truth of what he says or answer in damages. Negley v. Farrow, 813.
9. Malice, but not in ordinary sense of hatred or ill will, is essential ele-
10. Statute 32, Geo. III, ch. 60, not in force in Maryland, where court
always decides whether publication is in law a libel. Id.
AND WIFE, 7. 16. INSURANCE, 14.
AND TRUSTEE, 9.
1. May be pleaded by a county. Gains v. Hot Springs County, 419.
2. In action for damage against railroad company for unreasonable delay
3. Action entirely arising out of a statute not within. Cowenhoven v. Free-
4. Is not suspended or waived by representation made by administrator to
5. New cause of action, cannot escape statute, by being introduced by way
6. But where new count is added merely to restate same cause of action,
7. Upon a plea of, the only evidence given of possession during first year
8. Instrument signed by maker and witnessed, stating that maker had
9. Action to foreclose mortgage, given secure note, may be commenced at
10. Award under seal is specialty within meaning of statute, though submis-
11. “I thank you for your very kind intentions to give up the rent of Tyn-
12. Trusts which fall within exclusive jurisdiction of courts of equity are not
13. Courts of equity only follow statute by analogy, and when it is not
14. Creditor of firm may have relief in cquity for payment of his debt,
15. Representatives of deceased partner cannot set up statute against firm
16. One partner cannot set up statute against other, where there have been
LUNATIC. See INSANITY.
1. Incapable of acquiring pauper settlement in his own right. Inhabitants,
2. Such a person, until forty-eight years of age, lived in his father's family
acquired while pauper was in hospital. Id.
1. Voluntary dismissal of civil action is prima facie evidence of want of
2. Although action is commenced with probable cause, yet if plaintiff con-
3. Advice of counsel, on full and fair statement of facts and information,
4. On issue of probable cause, certain depositions in former suit, tending to
5. N. C. Co., & corporation, with malice and without probable cause, sued
during period of ouster. Coal Co. v. Upson, 483.
Will not lie upon relation of citizen and owner of land abutting upon street
1. Railroad company and its train hands must guard the trackmen from .
2. Agreement between connecting lines of railroad does not affect third par-
3. Contract to work for period of seven months for $14 per month is entire,
4. Servant not ordinarily required to work during unseasonable hours ; but
5. Mere request to perform unseasonable service does not justify servant in
6. Person employed by city to superintend digging of trench, and one em-
7. Master not liable for injury occurring from negligence of fellow-workman,
8. Where performance of duties peculiar to master is intrusted to mere work-
9. It is duty of master, in assigning servant to duty at or about dangerous
10. Corporation is negligent if it employs an imprudent or incompetent per-