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INSURANCE.

23. Insurer may be estopped to insist on conditions and restrictions contained
in policy, issued with knowledge of facts inconsistent therewith, but neither
party to contract of insurance void as against public policy is estopped to deny its
legality. Spare v. Ins. Co., 409.

24. After date of contract for sale of house insured against fire, and before
completion of purchase, house was damaged by fire and loss paid by company
in ignorance of contract. The purchase being subsequently completed, and the
purchase-money received by defendants having the effect of extinguishing the
loss, Held, that insurance company could recover amount paid by them.
Castellain v. Preston, 769, and note : reversing same case, 168, and note.

25. If insured calls upon insurer to pay loss, and latter makes no specific
objection to form or sufficiency of proofs of loss, or to entire neglect to furnish
same in season for claimant to repair error, but declines payment on other
grounds, he cannot set up defects in proof as defence, or most that he can claim
is that question of waiver may go to jury. Mosely v. Ins. Co., 688.

26. Where subject of insurance was only “goods and groceries," and there
was clause in policy forbidding the keeping of gunpowder for sale or on storage,
“upon or in the premises insured,Held, that meaning of “ premises" here was
“ lands and tenements," that it did not include “goods and groceries,” and
therefore, if gunpowder had been kept on “premises not insured, it would
not vitiate policy. Id.

27. A presumption of a man's insanity is not raised by his suicide ; but that
fact, in connection with other evidence, is pertinent to issue of insanity,
especially where suicide is immediately preceded by murder or attempted murder
of members of family, and the destruction of his property without any ap-
parent motive or provocation. Karow v. Ins. Co., 283.

28. Where there is nothing in policy to contrary, insurer is not released from
liability because property was burned by assured while insane, nor unless
burning was caused by voluntary act, assent, procurement, or design of as-
sured. Id.

29. Collision of steamboats caused fire, and one of them with goods insured
“against immediate loss by fire,” sank before goods were burned. Held, that
if damage could have been avoided except for fire, loss was within policy.
Exp. Co. v. Ins. Co., 75.

30. Person taking out policy in mutual company is at once bound by charter
and by-laws. Ins. Co. v. Miller Lodge, 76.

31. Usage of such company to notify members of annual interest on deposit
notes, and time of payment, does not impose duty so to do. Id.

32. Company cannot, without assent or request of insured, apply to such
annual interest a dividend of profits not expressly made applicable thereto.

Id.
INTEREST. See ACCORD, 3. DAMAGES, 4, 5. Equity, 17. IIUSBAND AND

Wife, 18. LEGACY, 4, 5. NATIONAL BANK, 2.

1. Maker of note being sued, agreed by separate instrument, in consideration
of dismissal of suit, that interest to accrue upon the note should bear interest.
Held, valid. Jasper Co. v. Taris, 347.

2. Open account bears interest only after demand. Richardson v. Laclede
Co., 347.

3. Where plaintiff seeks to recover interest on interest, burden of proof is on
him to prove promise to pay same for valuable consideration, and an accept-
ance, actual or constructive, of such promise ; where forbearance is relied on
as such consideration, it must appear that time was actually given in pursuance
of the request implied by the promise. Edgerton v. Weaver, 284,

4. Note was given for debt, with interest added at twenty per cent. ; Texas
statute provides, that “all judgments * * * shall bear interest at rate of
eight per cent. per annum, * * * except when the contract upon which the
judgment is founded bears a specified interest greater than eight per cent. per
annum, and not exceeding the highest rate of conventional interest permitted
by law (twelve per cent.), in which case the judgment shall bear the same rate
of interest specified in such contract.Held, That judgment ou above note
only bore interest at eight per cent. Ewell v. Daggs, 689.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See CRIMINAL LAW, 29. STATUTE, 6.

1. License to sell, from United States, does not dispense with necessity for license under state law. Pierson v. The State, 419.

2. Sale of liquor by club_to members not within statute prohibiting sales without license. Graff v. Evans, 99, and note.

3. Two persons, unconnected in business, selling liquor to husband habitually intoxicated, are jointly liable to wife. Rantz v. Barnes, 483.

4. Barkeeper selling liquor to adult and seeing minor present, and understanding he is to participate in drinking same, is not guilty of selling or giving liquor to minor. Siegel v. The People, 623.

5. If jury should find that barkeeper knew that adult was being used by minor as a screen, they might find him guilty. Id.

6. Indictment following words of statute, charged defendant with keeping or maintaining house “used for illegal sale or keeping of intoxicating liquor.”' Held, That charge must be construed to mean keeping for such illegal use or with knowledge that house was so used. State v. McGough, 546.

7. At trial upon this indictment, justice allowed defendant's witness to be asked, in cross-examination, if witness did not tell A., witness for state, that if A. would mix up testimony in F.'s case, F. would give A. $20. Held, error, inquiry being irrelevant, as no connection appeared between F.'s case and case on trial. Id.

8. Justice instructed jury, "He, the defendant, is presumed to know the kind of business which was openly being carried on in his establishment by his servants and agents. The defendant admitted that he was the keeper of the place, and that he was there personally in charge of it during the time covered by the indictment. He is not only presumed to know but he is responsible.”

Held, error, knowledge and responsibility of defendant being for jury. Id. JOINT STOCK COMPANY. See CORPORATION, 14, 15. JUDGMENT. See ACCORD, 2. CORPORATION, 11. FORMER RECOVERY, 1•

INSOLVENCY, 3. INTEREST, 4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 2. UNITED STATES COURTS, 5.

1. Court cannot, at subsequent term, correct judgment in respect to costs, where that subject was considered and judgment entered by clerk as directed by court, unless such power was carried forward by motion made during terin at which judgment was rendered. Williams v. Williams, 146.

2. Defendant served with process issuing from court of competent jurisdiction is concluded by judgment. Harbig v. Freund, 146.

3. THE REMEDIES FOR THE COLLECTION OF JUDGMENTS AGAINST DEBTORS WHO ARE RESIDENTS OR PROPERTY HOLDERS IN ANOTHER STATE, OR

WITHIN THE BRITISH DOMINIONS, 697. JUDICIAL SALE.

1. Caveat emptor applies to administrator's sale of lands for payment of debts. Tilley v. Bridges, 419.

2. Administrator or executor selling lands under decree of court, has no authority to warrant title. If purchaser obtains no title, he must, as general

rule, suffer the loss, unless fraud or inistake has entered into transaction. Id. JURISDICTION. See REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 4. JUROR AND JURY. See CRIMINAL LAW, 13.

1. In the selection of grand and petit jury for Baltimore county, under provisions of Act of 1870, ch. 220, one of forty-eight names drawn for general panel was non-resident. This name was not among grand jurors. Held, 1. That this did not affect the grand jury. 2. That statute was to be regarded mainly as directory, and irregularitjes not materially violating it or prejudicing rights of the citizen were not fatal. State v. Glasgow, 347.

2. The Maryland law which exempts persons over seventy from jury service does not disable them. Green v. State, 347.

3 I8 TAE JURY SYSTEM A FAILURE ! 81. LANDLORD AND TENANT. See ACTION, 1. AGENT, 1. FIXTURE, 6, 8, 12. NEGLIGENCE, 6.

WASTE.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

1. If lessor deprives lessee of beneficial enjoyment and lessee therefore abandons premises, it is an eviction. Skalir v. Shurte, 76.

2. Assignee for creditors, who, in conduct of his trust, continues in possession of premises let to his assignor, does not become personally liable for rent unless there be special agreement. White v. Thomas, 76.

3. Demise of factory with fixtures and machinery, implies no warranty that machinery is in good repair or of sufficient capacity to do work for which premises were let. Naumberg v. Young, 146.

4. Owner leased to tenant rooms in upper story approached by stairway common to all the tenants, the railing of which was out of repair. The stairway became dangerous from ice and snow and tenant slipped and caught rail, which gave way. Held, that landlord, who had made no covenant to repair, was not liable. Percell v. English, 312, and note.

5. A promise to repair made after the lease, is nudum pactum. Id. 6. Landlord who lets tenements in building to different tenants, with right of way in common over flight of stone steps, without railing, leading from street to yard, is not liable to tenant injured by falling upon ice accumulated upon steps, if it is not landlord's duty to keep them clear of ice, although so constructed and of such material as to occasion accumulation of ice, there being

no change in construction since tenancy began. Wood v. Cotton Co., 813. LEGACY.

1. To make legacy specific, it must clearly appear that testator intended legatee to take particular thing and nothing else. Wyckof' v. Executors of Perrine, 754.

2. If debt is subject of specific legacy, payment of debt, whether voluntary or compulsory, will destroy legacy. Id.

3. Gift of personal property for life, with power to legatee to use it as she may deem proper, or to sell it, or any part of it, for her benefit, as she may deem needful or best, Held, absolute. Kendall v. Kendall, 284.

4. Will, executed in 1848, contained clause : “I give and bequeath to my daughter, - $1000, to be paid on her marriage or when she arrives at age, with interest after, at her option." Legatee attained majority in 1849, and was married in 1853 ; testatator died in 1854. Deld, that legacy drew interest as soon as daughter arrived at age. Trustees v. Grover, 813.

5. Legacy bears simple interest, and payments should be applied first to

extinguish interest and then principal. Id. LIBEL.

1. Action for can be maintained against corporation. Evening Journal v. McDermott, 147.

2. Previous or subsequent publications admissible to show temper of defendant's mind in publication complained of, even though barred by Statute of Limitations. Id.

3. Publication in newspaper of false statement that person was convicted and sentenced to prison for libel, is actionable, without proof of special damage. Boogher v. Knapp, 483.

4. In action for, where language is ambiguous or ironical, plaintiff's acquaintances may state their understanding as to whom charge refers, and what it imputes, Knapp v. Fuller, 689.

5. Defendant, after suit brought, published another article referring to plaintiff by name : admissible to show animus. Id.

6. What one of defendants said, few days after first publication, manifesting hostile feeling toward plaintiff, also admissible. Id.

7. Defendant wrote defamatory statements of plaintiff in letter to W., under circumstances making it privileged, but by mistake placed it in envelope directed to another person, who received and read letter. Held, that publication was privileged in absence of malice in fact. Tompson v. Dashwood, 754.

8. If any one, including proprietor of newspaper, goes out of his way to asperse personal character of public man, and to ascribe to him base and corrupt motives, he does so at his peril, and must either prove truth of what he says or answer in damages. Negley v. Farrow, 813.

row, 813.

LIBEL.

9. Malice, but not in ordinary sense of hatred or ill will, is essential ele-
ment in action for libel ; but if publication be in itself libellous, law in such
case implies malice, and only question before jury on plea of not guilty, pub-
lication being established, is the amount of damage ; in estimating which, jury
are to consider whether article was published wantonly, or as editors of news-
paper honestly commenting upon official conduct of plaintiff. Negley v. Far-

10. Statute 32, Geo. III, ch. 60, not in force in Maryland, where court

always decides whether publication is in law a libel. Id.
LICENSE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5, 16. INTOXICATING LIQUOR, I.
LIEN. See ADMIRALTY, 3. ATTACHMENT, 4. CORPORATION, 9. HUSBAND

AND WIFE, 7. 16. INSURANCE, 14.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See BIEL OF REVIEW. Gift, 2. TRUST

AND TRUSTEE, 9.

1. May be pleaded by a county. Gains v. Hot Springs County, 419.

2. In action for damage against railroad company for unreasonable delay
in transportation of merchandise, where portion of delay occurred more than
six years prior to date of writ, the damage for that portion of delay was
barred. Jones v. Railway Co., 420.

3. Action entirely arising out of a statute not within. Cowenhoven v. Free-
holders, 147.

4. Is not suspended or waived by representation made by administrator to
Orphans' Court to procure order to sell lands for payment of debts, nor is
order of sale such an adjudication as prevents administrator setting it up at
law. Everett v. Williams, 548.

5. New cause of action, cannot escape statute, by being introduced by way
of amendment into declaration in action for different cause, brought before
lapse of statutory time. North Chicago Co. v. Monka, 814.

6. But where new count is added merely to restate same cause of action,
plea of statute thereto is improper. Id.

7. Upon a plea of, the only evidence given of possession during first year
was that defendant's grantor went once upon the land, set up two stakes at
what he was told were corners, tried to ascertain the boundaries and afterwards
paid the taxes for the year. Held, insufficient. Bradstreet v. Kinsella, 348.

8. Instrument signed by maker and witnessed, stating that maker had
received of S. a horse, for which he promised to pay S., or order, a sum named
in one month from date," said horse to be and remain the entire and absolute
property of the said S. until paid for in full by me," is not a promissory note,
and an action brought thereon, more than six years after its date, cannot be
maintained. Sloan v. McCarty, 689.

9. Action to foreclose mortgage, given secure note, may be commenced at
any time within twenty-one years after execution, notwithstanding note is
barred by statute. Riddle v. Howenstein, 689.

10. Award under seal is specialty within meaning of statute, though submis-
sion was by parol. Halnon v. Halnon, 689.

11. “I thank you for your very kind intentions to give up the rent of Tyn-
y-bwrwydd next Christmas, but I am happy to say at that time both principal
and interest will have been paid in full.” Held, sufficient a knowledgment to
bar statute. Green v. Humphreys, 754.

12. Trusts which fall within exclusive jurisdiction of courts of equity are not
subject to statute. Buckingham v. Ludlum, 754.

13. Courts of equity only follow statute by analogy, and when it is not
against conscience to do so. Id.

14. Creditor of firm may have relief in cquity for payment of his debt,
against separate assets left by deceased partner, if surviving partner be insol-
vent and firm assets exhausted. Id.

15. Representatives of deceased partner cannot set up statute against firm
creditor, so long as surviving partner continues liable for debt and has right to
seek contribution from deceased partner's estate, for payment of debts of firm. Id.

16. One partner cannot set up statute against other, where there have been
dealings in respect to partnership affairs, within six years. Id.

LUNATIC. See INSANITY.

1. Incapable of acquiring pauper settlement in his own right. Inhabitants,
fc., v. Inhabitants, &c., 147.

2. Such a person, until forty-eight years of age, lived in his father's family
and was then sent to insane hospital. Held, That he followed father's residence

acquired while pauper was in hospital. Id.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. See ABATEMENT. CORPORATION, 1.

1. Voluntary dismissal of civil action is prima facie evidence of want of
probable cause. Wetmore v. Mellinger, 711.

2. Although action is commenced with probable cause, yet if plaintiff con-
tinues to prosecute it when there is no probable cause, he is liable for malicious
prosccution. That probable cause had ceased to exist, must, however, appear
otherwise than from evidence introduced on trial. Id., and note.

3. Advice of counsel, on full and fair statement of facts and information,
will not protect, unless acted on in good faith. Id.

4. On issue of probable cause, certain depositions in former suit, tending to
show that defendant could have ascertained facts which would have had impor-
tant bearing on such issue, adversely to his right to maintain prior action, were
admissible. Id.

5. N. C. Co., & corporation, with malice and without probable cause, sued
M. and others, in civil action, and by order of injunction made on its ex parte
application, prevented M., and others from entering upon their property, and
also from prosecuting profitable business. After year had passed, N. C. Co.
dismissed its action. Held, that company was liable in action of malicious pros-
ecution, and that measure of damages was value of use of property, in business,

during period of ouster. Coal Co. v. Upson, 483.
MANDAMUS.

Will not lie upon relation of citizen and owner of land abutting upon street
through which line of railroad authorized by ordinance would pass, to compel
city clerk to make advertisement required by crdinance. State v. Henderson,

221.
MARRIAGE. See CONTRACT, 6. HUSBAND AND Wire.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See Agent, 8, 9. NEGLIGENCE, 5.

1. Railroad company and its train hands must guard the trackmen from .
danger as far as practicable. Dick v. Railroad, 76.

2. Agreement between connecting lines of railroad does not affect third par-
ties, nor make employees of one line co-employees of others. Railroad Co. v.
State, 77.

3. Contract to work for period of seven months for $14 per month is entire,
and full performance, or valid excuse for non-performance, must be shown to
recover thereon. Koplitz v. Powell, 284.

4. Servant not ordinarily required to work during unseasonable hours ; but
if he voluntarily does so, it is no ground for claiming extra compensation or that
there is breach of contract by employer. Id.

5. Mere request to perform unseasonable service does not justify servant in
quitting ; nor does refusal to perform same justify discharge. Id.

6. Person employed by city to superintend digging of trench, and one em-
ployed as laborer to dig trench, by same master, are prima facie fellow servants.
Flynn v. City, 814.

7. Master not liable for injury occurring from negligence of fellow-workman,
unless latter was known to be careless or incompetent. Fones v. Phillips,
420.

8. Where performance of duties peculiar to master is intrusted to mere work-
man, such workman, quoad hoc, and to extent of master's duty intrusted to him,
stands in master's place, and his negligence binds master. Id.

9. It is duty of master, in assigning servant to duty at or about dangerous
machinery, to give detailed and special warning as to all latent dangers, not dis-
coverable by reasonable and ordinary exercise of diligence. Id.

10. Corporation is negligent if it employs an imprudent or incompetent per-
son as master over other employees, and responsible for injury to another

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