2. Discharge under insolvent law does not bar debt contracted before its pas-
sage, the creditor in no way becoming party to insolvency proceedings. Conway
v. Seamons, 622.
3. Nor is such debt discharged though merged in judgment rendered after
passage of act. Id.
4. Law discharging such debt is unconstitutional. Id.
5. Maine insolvent law of 1878 was valid when enacted, though operation
was suspended by U. S. bankrupt law then existing. When repeal of bankrupt
law took effect insolvent law went into operation, and took cognisance of all
acts within its provisions done while it was so suspended, and applied to contracts
made during that time. Palmer v. Hixon, 419.
INSURANCE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 36. CORPORATION, 3.
SHIP, 12. PLEADING, 4.
1. Law providing penalty against agent of foreign insurance company for
acting without certificate of authority from auditor showing company's compli-
ance with act, and declaring that any person aiding in transacting insurance bus-
iness of such company shall be subject to such penalty is constitutional and
valid. Pierce v. People, 622.
2. Defendant in this case regarded as agent of company, notwithstanding
clause in policy providing that any person, other than the assured, who shall
participate in any transaction concerning the insurance, will be deemed agent
of assured. Id.
3. Where company refuses to receive premium on life policy, on ground of
lapse of policy by reason of non-payment on day stipulated, and assured claims
that company has waived right to assert forfeiture, equity has power to deter-
mine and enforce rights of parties. Insurance Co. v. Tullidge, 688.
4. Although policy and renewal receipts may contain stipulation that agents
of company shall not have authority to waive forfeitures where premiums have
not been paid on or before day designated, yet course of business between agent,
assured and company in giving effect to payments made when overdue, may pre-
clude company from objecting to payment tendered when overdue, where no
notice has been given. Id.
5. Under accident policy, providing that no claim shall be made where death
or injury may have happened in consequence of exposure to obvious or unne-
cessary danger, and containing condition that assured is required to use all due
diligence for personal safety and protection, no recovery can be had for death
of assured, caused by his being struck by railroad train, while running along
tracks in front of it in night time, to get on train approaching in opposite direc-
tion on parallel track. Tuttle v. Ins. Co., 688.
6. Person may insure his own life and make policy payable to person without
interest therein. Hence, where policy was taken out on life of one and made
payable to another (who had no legal interest in it) in case he survived the
assured, and there was strong evidence to show that transaction was a wager,
Held, that it was for jury to say whether policy was obtained in good faith.
Langdon v. Insurance Co., 385, and note.
7. Applicant was asked: "Has any application ever been made, either to
this or any other company, upon which a policy was not issued ?" Held, that
negative answer was not improper, although application made to another com-
pany had not been finally passed on. Id.
8. Applicant made full statement regarding name of his usual medical
attendant to sub-agent, who, putting his own construction on the facts, filled in
the wrong name. Held, that company could not take advantage of the mis-
take. Id.
9. What is insurable interest. Assignment to person without. Id., note.
10. If dealings of insurance company with insured and other policy holders
are such as to induce belief that payment of premium within reasonable period
VOL. XXXI.—107
after day fixed will save a forfeiture, company cannot forfeit policy of one who
acted on that belief and subsequently made or tendered payment. Insurance
Co. v. Doster, 60.
11. Clause declaring that agents cannot receive overdue premiums or waive
forfeitures, cannot be set up where company habitually send renewal receipts to
its agent, leaving their use to his judgment, and he, with knowledge of com-
pany, receives premiums several days after they are due, and insured, relying
on such practice, tenders the premium within a reasonable time after it is
due. Id.
12. Where it had been invariable custom of company to send insured state-
ment of the premium due after deducting dividend, with notice when, where
and to whom same could be paid, and on account of a failure to send such
notice premium was not paid when due but was tende ed within reasonable
time afterward, policy does not lapse. Id.
13. Semble, Where premium is liable to be reduced by dividends, company
should give insured reasonable notice of amount of dividends and thereby of
cash to be paid to keep policy alive. Id.
14. When person not sole beneficial owner, pays premium to keep up policy
of life insurance, he is entitled to lien in following cases only: 1. By contract
with beneficial owner. 2. By reason of right of trustees to indemnity out of
trust property for money expended in its preservation. 3. By subrogation to
their right of some person who at request of trustees, has advanced money for
that purpose.
4. By reason of right of mortgagee to add to his charge any
money paid to preserve property. In re Leslie, 753.
15. If application for policy provides that representations and answers
therein "shall form the basis and become part of the contract of insurance"
and "that any untrue answers will render the policy null and void," and
policy recites that it is issued "in consideration of the representations and
agreements in the application for this policy, which application is referred to
and made a part of this contract," in an action upon policy, application is to
be considered part of contract, and if representations in it are in a material
respect untrue, action cannot be maintained, though untrue representations
were inserted by agent employed by defendant to solicit insurance, without
knowledge of applicant, who orally stated truth to agent. McCoy v. Insurance
Co., 220.
16. Consignee of goods damaged in transit, has no right to abandon
them to insurance company and claim whole insurance, except in case of
total loss, or of such damage as to render them unmarketable. Hicks v.
McGehee, 419.
17. Where order confirming sale made under foreclosure to mortgagee who
is a party, is at same term vacated and sale set aside for want of notice, in-
surable interest of mortgagor in possession is same as before sale. Ins. Co. v.
Sampson, 220.
18. Where, in such case, loss occurs after confirmation, and before sale set
aside, insurable interest of mortgagor not divested by such unauthorized sale
and confirmation. Id.
19. A policy, providing that it shall be void in case insured shall make other
insurance without consent, is avoided by such subsequent insurance, even though
second policy is itself avoided by similar provision. Turner v. Ins. Co., 275.
20. Policy on articles of furniture described them as "all contained in house
No. McMillen street, Providence, R. I." Insured, without knowledge of in
surer, removed these articles to house in another street, where they were con-
sumed. Held, that statement of locality was continuing warranty, and that
insured could not recover. Lyons v. Ins. Co., 419.
21. Contract for insurance with person who has no insurable interest in
property, or who can not sustain any pecuniary loss by injury thereto, is a mere
wager. Spare v. Ins. Co., 409.
22. Judgment creditor has insurable interest in property of debtor; but to
recover, must show that judgment debtor has not sufficient property left, out of
which to satisfy judgment. Id.
23. Insurer may be estopped to insist on conditions and restrictions contained
in policy, issued with knowledge of facts inconsistent therewith, but neither
party to contract of insurance void as against public policy is estopped to deny its
legality. Spare v. Ins. Co., 409.
24. After date of contract for sale of house insured against fire, and before
completion of purchase, house was damaged by fire and loss paid by company
in ignorance of contract. The purchase being subsequently completed, and the
purchase-money received by defendants having the effect of extinguishing the
loss, Held, that insurance company could recover amount paid by them.
Castellain v. Preston, 769, and note: reversing same case, 168, and note.
25. If insured calls upon insurer to pay loss, and latter makes no specific
objection to form or sufficiency of proofs of loss, or to entire neglect to furnish
same in season for claimant to repair error, but declines payment on other
grounds, he cannot set up defects in proof as defence, or most that he can claim
is that question of waiver may go to jury. Mosely v. Ins. Co., 688.
26. Where subject of insurance was only "goods and groceries," and there
was clause in policy forbidding the keeping of gunpowder for sale or on storage,
"upon or in the premises insured," Held, that meaning of "premises "here was
"lands and tenements," that it did not include "goods and groceries," and
therefore, if gunpowder had been kept on "premises "not insured, it would
not vitiate policy. Id.
27. A presumption of a man's insanity is not raised by his suicide; but that
fact, in connection with other evidence, is pertinent to issue of insanity,
especially where suicide is immediately preceded by murder or attempted murder
of members of family, and the destruction of his property without any ap-
parent motive or provocation. Karow v. Ins. Co., 283.
28. Where there is nothing in policy to contrary, insurer is not released from
liability because property was burned by assured while insane, nor unless
burning was caused by voluntary act, assent, procurement, or design of as-
sured. Id.
29. Collision of steamboats caused fire, and one of them with goods insured
"against immediate loss by fire," sank before goods were burned. Held, that
if damage could have been avoided except for fire, loss was within policy.
Exp. Co. v. Ins. Co., 75.
30. Person taking out policy in mutual company is at once bound by charter
and by-laws. Ins. Co. v. Miller Lodge, 76.
31. Usage of such company to notify members of annual interest on deposit
notes, and time of payment, does not impose duty so to do. Id.
32. Company cannot, without assent or request of insured, apply to such
annual interest a dividend of profits not expressly made applicable thereto.
Id.
INTEREST. See ACCORD, 3.
WIFE, 18. LEGACY, 4, 5.
1. Maker of note being sued, agreed by separate instrument, in consideration
of dismissal of suit, that interest to accrue upon the note should bear interest.
Held, valid. Jasper Co. v. Tavis, 347.
DAMAGES, 4, 5. EQUITY, 17. HUSBAND AND
NATIONAL BANK, 2.
2. Open account bears interest only after demand. Richardson v. Laclede
Co., 347.
3. Where plaintiff seeks to recover interest on interest, burden of proof is on
him to prove promise to pay same for valuable consideration, and an accept-
ance, actual or constructive, of such promise; where forbearance is relied on
as such consideration, it must appear that time was actually given in pursuance
of the request implied by the promise. Edgerton v. Weaver, 284.
4. Note was given for debt, with interest added at twenty per cent.; Texas
statute provides, that "all judgments * * * shall bear interest at rate of
eight per cent. per annum, *** except when the contract upon which the
judgment is founded bears a specified interest greater than eight per cent. per
annum, and not exceeding the highest rate of conventional interest permitted
by law (twelve per cent.), in which case the judgment shall bear the same rate
of interest specified in such contract. Held, That judgment on above note
only bore interest at eight per cent. Ewell v. Daggs, 689.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See CRIMINAL LAW, 29. STATUTE, 6.
1. License to sell, from United States, does not dispense with necessity for
license under state law. Pierson v. The State, 419.
2. Sale of liquor by club to members not within statute prohibiting sales
without license. Graff v. Evans, 99, and note.
3. Two persons, unconnected in business, selling liquor to husband habitu-
ally intoxicated, are jointly liable to wife. Rantz v. Barnes, 483.
4. Barkeeper selling liquor to adult and seeing minor present, and under-
standing he is to participate in drinking same, is not guilty of selling or giving
liquor to minor. Siegel v. The People, 623.
5. If jury should find that barkeeper knew that adult was being used by
minor as a screen, they might find him guilty. Id.
6. Indictment following words of statute, charged defendant with keeping or
maintaining house "used for illegal sale or keeping of intoxicating liquor."
Held, That charge must be construed to mean keeping for such illegal use or
with knowledge that house was so used. State v. McGough, 546.
7. At trial upon this indictment, justice allowed defendant's witness to be
asked, in cross-examination, if witness did not tell A., witness for state, that
if A. would mix up testimony in F.'s case, F. would give A. $20. Held,
error, inquiry being irrelevant, as no connection appeared between F.'s case
and case on trial. Id.
8. Justice instructed jury, "He, the defendant, is presumed to know the
kind of business which was openly being carried on in his establishment by his
servants and agents. The defendant admitted that he was the keeper of the
place, and that he was there personally in charge of it during the time covered
by the indictment. He is not only presumed to know but he is responsible."
Held, error,
knowledge and responsibility of defendant being for jury. Id.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY. See CORPORATION, 14, 15.
JUDGMENT. See Accord, 2. CORPORATION, 11. FORMER RECOVERY, 1.
INSOLVENCY, 3. INTEREST, 4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 2. UNITED
STATES COURTs, 5.
1. Court cannot, at subsequent term, correct judgment in respect to costs,
where that subject was considered and judgment entered by clerk as directed
by court, unless such power was carried forward by motion made during term
at which judgment was rendered. Williams v. Williams, 146.
2. Defendant served with process issuing from court of competent jurisdic-
tion is concluded by judgment. Harbig v. Freund, 146.
3. THE REMEDIES FOR THE COLLECTION OF JUDGMENTS AGAINST DEBT-
ORS WHO ARE RESIDENTS OR PROPERTY HOLDERS IN ANOTHER STATE, OR
within the BRITISH DOMINIONS, 697.
1. Caveat emptor applies to administrator's sale of lands for payment of
debts. Tilley v. Bridges, 419.
2. Administrator or executor selling lands under decree of court, has no
authority to warrant title. If purchaser obtains no title, he must, as general
rule, suffer the loss, unless fraud or mistake has entered into transaction. Id.
JURISDICTION. See REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 4.
JUROR AND JURY. See CRIMINAL LAW, 13.
1. In the selection of grand and petit jury for Baltimore county, under pro-
visions of Act of 1870, ch. 220, one of forty-eight names drawn for general
panel was non-resident. This name was not among grand jurors. Held,
1. That this did not affect the grand jury. 2. That statute was to be re-
garded mainly as directory, and irregularities not materially violating it or
prejudicing rights of the citizen were not fatal. State v. Glasgow, 347.
2. The Maryland law which exempts persons over seventy from jury service
does not disable them. Green v. State, 347.
3 IS THE JURY SYSTEM A FAILURE? 81.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See ACTION, 1. AGENT, 1. FIXTURE, 6, 8,
12. NEGLIGENCE, 6.
1. If lessor deprives lessee of beneficial enjoyment and lessee therefore
abandons premises, it is an eviction. Skalir v. Shurte, 76.
2. Assignee for creditors, who, in conduct of his trust, continues in posses-
sion of premises let to his assignor, does not become personally liable for rent
unless there be special agreement. White v. Thomas, 76.
3. Demise of factory with fixtures and machinery, implies no warranty that
machinery is in good repair or of sufficient capacity to do work for which
premises were let. Naumberg v. Young, 146.
4. Owner leased to tenant rooms in upper story approached by stairway com-
mon to all the tenants, the railing of which was out of repair. The stairway
became dangerous from ice and snow and tenant slipped and caught rail, which
gave way. Held, that landlord, who had made no covenant to repair, was not
liable. Percell v. English, 312, and note.
5. A promise to repair made after the lease, is nudum pactum. Id.
6. Landlord who lets tenements in building to different tenants, with right
of way in common over flight of stone steps, without railing, leading from
street to yard, is not liable to tenant injured by falling upon ice accumulated
upon steps, if it is not landlord's duty to keep them clear of ice, although so
constructed and of such material as to occasion accumulation of ice, there being
no change in construction since tenancy began. Wood v. Cotton Co., 813.
LEGACY.
1. To make legacy specific, it must clearly appear that testator intended
legatee to take particular thing and nothing else. Wyckoff v. Executors of
Perrine, 754.
2. If debt is subject of specific legacy, payment of debt, whether voluntary
or compulsory, will destroy legacy. Id.
3. Gift of personal property for life, with power to legatee to use it as she
may deem proper, or to sell it, or any part of it, for her benefit, as she may
deem needful or best, Held, absolute. Kendall v. Kendall, 284.
4. Will, executed in 1848, contained clause: "I give and bequeath to my
daughter, -, $1000, to be paid on her marriage or when she arrives at age,
with interest after, at her option." Legatee attained majority in 1849, and was
married in 1853; testatator died in 1854. Held, that legacy drew interest as
soon as daughter arrived at age. Trustees v. Grover, 813.
5. Legacy bears simple interest, and payments should be applied first to
extinguish interest and then principal. Id.
1. Action for can be maintained against corporation.
McDermott, 147.
2. Previous or subsequent publications admissible to show temper of de-
fendant's mind in publication complained of, even though barred by Statute of
Limitations. Id.
3. Publication in newspaper of false statement that person was convicted and
sentenced to prison for libel, is actionable, without proof of special damage.
Boogher v. Knapp, 483.
4. In action for, where language is ambiguous or ironical, plaintiff's ac-
quaintances may state their understanding as to whom charge refers, and what
it imputes, Knapp v. Fuller, 689.
5. Defendant, after suit brought, published another article referring to plain-
tiff by name: admissible to show animus.
6. What one of defendants said, few days after first publication, manifesting
hostile feeling toward plaintiff, also admissible. Id.
7. Defendant wrote defamatory statements of plaintiff in letter to W.,
under circumstances making it privileged, but by mistake placed it in envelope
directed to another person, who received and read letter. Held, that publica-
tion was privileged in absence of malice in fact. Tompson v. Dashwood, 754.
8. If any one, including proprietor of newspaper, goes out of his way to
asperse personal character of public man, and to ascribe to him base and cor-
rupt motives, he does so at his peril, and must either prove truth of what he
says or answer in damages. Negley v. Farrow, 813.
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