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FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
by sub-contractor. The merchants gave credit exclusively to contractors.
6. Defendant promised that if plaintiff would attend sale to be made under
7. Where debtor, creditor and third person, who owed debtor, came together
tract was not within the statue. Howell v. Field, 346.
1. To support donatio causa mortis there must be delivery of subject by
2. Where bonds are delivered under express promise in writing to return
3. Intestate, shortly before her death, gave promissory note to plaintiff, who
promise, not executed. Rogers v. Rogers, 622.
Guaranty indorsed upon note is absolute contract for payment at maturity
became lost and maker insolvent. Adams, foc., v. Tomlinson, 146.
Mere delay of ward on coming of age to compel guardian to settle accounts
meantime, have become insolvent. Newton v. Hammond, 219.
1. Abandonment of, by non-user does not work a forfeiture: a formal order
2. W., a butcher, bought an ox at S. market. While his drovers were
Held, that W. was not liable. Tillett v. Ward, 245, and note.
CREDITOR, 6. EXECUTION, 6. REPLEVIN, 5. TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 6.
1. Where wife has sufficient separate property she is not entitled to tempo-
2. Divorce suit abates by death of either party before decree : and this effect
3. Wife has right, independently of merits of case, to require husband, when
4. Jurisdiction exercised in divorce suit with respect to custody of children
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
5. Jurisdiction to award alimony in divorce proceedings is purely statutory. Hence judgment for alimony made without reserve, where time for new trial has elapsed and there is no statutory provision for modifying judgment, cannot
be changed. Sammis v. Medbury, 687. II. Separate Estate.
6. Conveyance to a married woman's separate use does not bar curtesy except where there is a clear intent: trustee's covenant to convey at her death to her appointees or heirs, held, not to indicate such an intention. Tremmel v. Kleiboldt, 75.
7. Husband can not pay debts with wife's separate money, and if creditor knowingly receives such, wife may recover. If invested by creditor in realty and husband insolvent, she may enforce a lien in equity. Maddox v. Oxford, 346.
8. In such a case it was a proper subject of equitable set-off that husband held bond for titles from creditor more than amount of wife's fund invested in the land, and that she subsisted on rents, &c., of the land. Id.
9. SOME POINTS OF COMPARISON BETWEEN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LEGISLATION, AS TO MARRIED WOMEN'S PPOPERTY, 761. III. Contracts, Conveyances, fc.
10. Contracts of feme covert are, by common law, void. Musick v. Dobson, 52, and note.
11. Mere moral obligation is not sufficient consideration to support promise, unless there is some antecedent legal liability. Therefore moral obligation of married woman, created by her agreement while covert, will not support a new promise made after coverture is ended, or make subsequent husband liable for debt. Id.
12. Purchase of land in wife's name is presumptively for her benefit: but presumption may be rebutted. Johnson v. Turner, 220.
13. Husband may ratify contract for necessaries furnished to wife on his credit, by promise to pay. Conrad v. Abbott, 75.
14. Wife's earnings, unless in independent business, cannot be basis of claim against husband to prejudice of his creditors. Triplet v. Graham, 146.
15. “Irrevocable power of attorney” to collect rents, given as security for loan, is between parties an equitable mortgage of rents, and when executed by married woman and acknowledged in statutory form, is valid against her. Joseph Smith Co. v. McGuinness, 418.
16. Where lien for purchase-money is reserved in deed for land purchased by married woman with her husband's consent, it may be enforced, though notes given be void against woman personally. Bedford v. Burton, 75.
17. In such a case, woman can not rescind sale, nor will she or her husband be allowed for permanent improvements. Id.
18. In such a case where interest above ordinary legal rate may be, and has been stipulated for, it may be recovered. Id. 19. Married woman purchases land, pays part cash and in deed,
as part of the purchase-money a mortgage debt. This was only separate property she possessed. She conveyed to F. and he to defendants by like deeds. Upon foreclosure, proceeds were insufficient to pay debt. Held, that aside from disability of coverture, acceptance by married woman of the deed was an agreement to pay mortgage debt as part of consideration. The transaction was not a purchase of equity of redemption. State v. Casey, 219.
20. Married woman may convey her separate property, her husband joining, and stipulate for such terms of payment as she may think best. Id.
21. Defendants as grantees of F., were liable to mortgagee for deficiency, but, in such action, it is a good defence to show, that before plaintiff has assented to, or acted on promise in his favor, the agreement has been rescinded. Id.
* * *
INCUMBRANCE. See MORTGAGE.
5. TROVER, 1. TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 4.
1. Plaintiff must show that goods purchased hy, were necessaries, notwith
standing defendant assumes burden of showing them not to be so. Wood v.
2. Infant sued for price of horse, showed that his sole business was to carry
3. General principles applicable where question of necessaries is involved.
4. When court can pronounce contract of infant to be to his prejudice, it is
5. Conveyance of land by infant for money consideration, not shown to have
6. Where infant is upon platform of railroad station, not as passenger or
7. Semble, that in such case company would only be liable for wanton or
intentional injury. Id.
15. EXECUTION, 6. NUISANCE, 1. PARTNERSHIP, 18. RAILROADS, 3, 9,
1. Where injury is irreparable, equity will interfere by injunction; and, if
2. Court may punish party for wilful violation of injunctional order, not-
3. One against whom injunction is issued upon an ex parte application, does
4. To have nuisance abated by, party must show that injury complained of
5. Mandatory injunction is awarded as of course, wherever it is necessary
6. Will not lie to prevent simple trespass, consisting of single act, where per-
7. Trustees of Methodist Episcopal church can be compelled by mandatory
memory. Tompkins v. Halleck, 220
1. Discharge no bar to action by creditor not a party to proceedings, who is
2. Discharge under insolvent law does not bar debt contracted before its pas-
3. Nor is such debt discharged though merged in judgment rendered after
4. Law discharging such debt is unconstitutional. Id.
5. Maine insolvent law of 1878 was valid when enacted, though operation
INSPECTION. See ConstITUTIONAL LAW, 22.
INSURANCE. See ConstituTIONAL LAW, 36. CORPORATION, 3. PARTNER-
SHIP, 12. PLEADING, 4.
1. Law providing penalty against agent of foreign insurance company for
2. Defendant in this case regarded as agent of company, notwithstanding
of assured. Id.
3. Where company refuses to receive premium on life policy, on ground of
4. Although policy and renewal receipts may contain stipulation that agents
5. Under accident policy, providing that no claim shall be made where death
6. Person may insure his own life and make policy payable to person without
7. Applicant was asked : “ Has any npplication ever been made, either to
8. Applicant made full statement regarding name of his usual medical
9. What is insurable interest. Assignment to person without. Id., note.
10. If dealings of insurance company with insured and other policy holders
after day fixed will save a forfeiture, company cannot forfeit policy of one who acted on that belief and subsequently made or tendered payment. Insurance Co. v. Doster, 60.
11. Clause declaring that agents cannot receive overdue premiums or waive forfeiturcs, cannot be set up where company habitually send renewal receipts to its agent, leaving their use to his judgment, and he, with knowledge of company, receives premiums several days after they are due, and insured, relying on such practice, tenders the premium within a reasonable time after it is due. Id.
12. Where it had been invariable custom of company to send insured statement of the premium due after deducting dividend, with notice when, where and to whom same could be paid, and on account of a failure to send such notice premium was not paid when due but was tende ed within reasonable time afterward, policy does not lapse. Id.
13. Semble, Where premium is liable to be reduced by dividends, company should give insured reasonable notice of amount of dividends and thereby of cash to be paid to keep policy alive. Id.
14. When person not sole beneficial owner, pays premium to keep up policy of life insurance, he is entitled to lien in following cases only: 1. By contract with beneficial owner. 2. By reason of right of trustees to indemnity our of trust property for money expended in its preservation. 3. By subrogation to their right of some person who at request of trustees, has advanced money for that purpose.
4. By reason of right of mortgagee to add to his charge any money paid to preserve property. In re Leslie, 753.
15. If application for policy provides that representations and answers therein “shall form the basis and become part of the contract of insurance and “that any untrue answers will render the policy null and void," and policy recites that it is issued “in consideration of the representations and agreements in the application for this policy, which application is referred to and made a part of this contract,” in an action upon policy, application is to be considered part of contract, and if representations in it are in a material respect untrue, action cannot be maintained, though untrue representations were inserted by agent employed by defendant to solicit insurance, without knowledge of applicant, who orally stated truth to agent. McCoy v. Insurance
Co., 220. III. Fire.
16. Consignee of goods damaged in transit, has no right to abandon them to insurance company and claim whole insurance, except in case of total loss, or of such damage as to render them unmarketable. Hicks v. McGehee, 419,
17. Where order confirming sale made under foreclosure to mortgagee who is a party, is at same term vacated and sale set aside for want of notice, insurable interest of mortgagor in possession is same as before sale. Ins. Co. v. Sampson, 220.
18. Where, in such case, loss occurs after confirmation, and before sale set aside, insurable interest of mortgagor not divested by such unauthorized sale and confirmation. Id.
19. A policy, providing that it shall be void in case insured shall make other insurance without consent, is avoided by such subsequent insurance, even though second policy is itself avoided by similar provision. Turner v. Ins. Co., 275.
20. Policy on articles of furniture described them as "all contained in house No.- McMillen street, Providence, R. I." Insured, without knowledge of in surer, removed these articles to house in another street, where they were consumed. Held, that statement of locality was continuing warranty, and that insured could not recover. Lyons v. Ins. Co., 419.
21. Contract for insurance with person who has no insurable interest in property, or who can not sustain any pecuniary loss by injury thereto, is a mere wager. Spare v. Ins. Co., 409.
22. Judgment creditor has insurable interest in property of debtor ; but to recover, must show that judgment debtor has not sufficient property left, out of which to satisfy judgment. Id.