2. Discharge under insolvent law does not bar debt contracted before its pas- sage, the creditor in no way becoming party to insolvency proceedings. Conway v. Seamons, 622.
3. Nor is such debt discharged though merged in judgment rendered after passage of act. Id.
4. Law discharging such debt is unconstitutional. Id.
5. Maine insolvent law of 1878 was valid when enacted, though operation was suspended by U. S. bankrupt law then existing. When repeal of bankrupt law took effect insolvent law went into operation, and took cognisance of all acts within its provisions done while it was so suspended, and applied to contracts made during that time. Palmer v. Hixon, 419.
INSURANCE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 36. CORPORATION, 3. SHIP, 12. PLEADING, 4.
1. Law providing penalty against agent of foreign insurance company for acting without certificate of authority from auditor showing company's compli- ance with act, and declaring that any person aiding in transacting insurance bus- iness of such company shall be subject to such penalty is constitutional and valid. Pierce v. People, 622.
2. Defendant in this case regarded as agent of company, notwithstanding clause in policy providing that any person, other than the assured, who shall participate in any transaction concerning the insurance, will be deemed agent of assured. Id.
3. Where company refuses to receive premium on life policy, on ground of lapse of policy by reason of non-payment on day stipulated, and assured claims that company has waived right to assert forfeiture, equity has power to deter- mine and enforce rights of parties. Insurance Co. v. Tullidge, 688.
4. Although policy and renewal receipts may contain stipulation that agents of company shall not have authority to waive forfeitures where premiums have not been paid on or before day designated, yet course of business between agent, assured and company in giving effect to payments made when overdue, may pre- clude company from objecting to payment tendered when overdue, where no notice has been given. Id.
5. Under accident policy, providing that no claim shall be made where death or injury may have happened in consequence of exposure to obvious or unne- cessary danger, and containing condition that assured is required to use all due diligence for personal safety and protection, no recovery can be had for death of assured, caused by his being struck by railroad train, while running along tracks in front of it in night time, to get on train approaching in opposite direc- tion on parallel track. Tuttle v. Ins. Co., 688.
6. Person may insure his own life and make policy payable to person without interest therein. Hence, where policy was taken out on life of one and made payable to another (who had no legal interest in it) in case he survived the assured, and there was strong evidence to show that transaction was a wager, Held, that it was for jury to say whether policy was obtained in good faith. Langdon v. Insurance Co., 385, and note.
7. Applicant was asked: "Has any application ever been made, either to this or any other company, upon which a policy was not issued ?" Held, that negative answer was not improper, although application made to another com- pany had not been finally passed on. Id.
8. Applicant made full statement regarding name of his usual medical attendant to sub-agent, who, putting his own construction on the facts, filled in the wrong name. Held, that company could not take advantage of the mis- take. Id.
9. What is insurable interest. Assignment to person without. Id., note. 10. If dealings of insurance company with insured and other policy holders are such as to induce belief that payment of premium within reasonable period VOL. XXXI.—107
after day fixed will save a forfeiture, company cannot forfeit policy of one who acted on that belief and subsequently made or tendered payment. Insurance Co. v. Doster, 60.
11. Clause declaring that agents cannot receive overdue premiums or waive forfeitures, cannot be set up where company habitually send renewal receipts to its agent, leaving their use to his judgment, and he, with knowledge of com- pany, receives premiums several days after they are due, and insured, relying on such practice, tenders the premium within a reasonable time after it is due. Id.
12. Where it had been invariable custom of company to send insured state- ment of the premium due after deducting dividend, with notice when, where and to whom same could be paid, and on account of a failure to send such notice premium was not paid when due but was tende ed within reasonable time afterward, policy does not lapse. Id.
13. Semble, Where premium is liable to be reduced by dividends, company should give insured reasonable notice of amount of dividends and thereby of cash to be paid to keep policy alive. Id.
14. When person not sole beneficial owner, pays premium to keep up policy of life insurance, he is entitled to lien in following cases only: 1. By contract with beneficial owner. 2. By reason of right of trustees to indemnity out of trust property for money expended in its preservation. 3. By subrogation to their right of some person who at request of trustees, has advanced money for that purpose. 4. By reason of right of mortgagee to add to his charge any money paid to preserve property. In re Leslie, 753.
15. If application for policy provides that representations and answers therein "shall form the basis and become part of the contract of insurance" and "that any untrue answers will render the policy null and void," and policy recites that it is issued "in consideration of the representations and agreements in the application for this policy, which application is referred to and made a part of this contract," in an action upon policy, application is to be considered part of contract, and if representations in it are in a material respect untrue, action cannot be maintained, though untrue representations were inserted by agent employed by defendant to solicit insurance, without knowledge of applicant, who orally stated truth to agent. McCoy v. Insurance Co., 220.
16. Consignee of goods damaged in transit, has no right to abandon them to insurance company and claim whole insurance, except in case of total loss, or of such damage as to render them unmarketable. Hicks v. McGehee, 419.
17. Where order confirming sale made under foreclosure to mortgagee who is a party, is at same term vacated and sale set aside for want of notice, in- surable interest of mortgagor in possession is same as before sale. Ins. Co. v. Sampson, 220.
18. Where, in such case, loss occurs after confirmation, and before sale set aside, insurable interest of mortgagor not divested by such unauthorized sale and confirmation. Id.
19. A policy, providing that it shall be void in case insured shall make other insurance without consent, is avoided by such subsequent insurance, even though second policy is itself avoided by similar provision. Turner v. Ins. Co., 275. 20. Policy on articles of furniture described them as "all contained in house No. McMillen street, Providence, R. I." Insured, without knowledge of in surer, removed these articles to house in another street, where they were con- sumed. Held, that statement of locality was continuing warranty, and that insured could not recover. Lyons v. Ins. Co., 419.
21. Contract for insurance with person who has no insurable interest in property, or who can not sustain any pecuniary loss by injury thereto, is a mere wager. Spare v. Ins. Co., 409.
22. Judgment creditor has insurable interest in property of debtor; but to recover, must show that judgment debtor has not sufficient property left, out of which to satisfy judgment. Id.
23. Insurer may be estopped to insist on conditions and restrictions contained in policy, issued with knowledge of facts inconsistent therewith, but neither party to contract of insurance void as against public policy is estopped to deny its legality. Spare v. Ins. Co., 409.
24. After date of contract for sale of house insured against fire, and before completion of purchase, house was damaged by fire and loss paid by company in ignorance of contract. The purchase being subsequently completed, and the purchase-money received by defendants having the effect of extinguishing the loss, Held, that insurance company could recover amount paid by them. Castellain v. Preston, 769, and note: reversing same case, 168, and note.
25. If insured calls upon insurer to pay loss, and latter makes no specific objection to form or sufficiency of proofs of loss, or to entire neglect to furnish same in season for claimant to repair error, but declines payment on other grounds, he cannot set up defects in proof as defence, or most that he can claim is that question of waiver may go to jury. Mosely v. Ins. Co., 688.
26. Where subject of insurance was only "goods and groceries," and there was clause in policy forbidding the keeping of gunpowder for sale or on storage, "upon or in the premises insured," Held, that meaning of "premises "here was "lands and tenements," that it did not include "goods and groceries," and therefore, if gunpowder had been kept on "premises "not insured, it would not vitiate policy. Id.
27. A presumption of a man's insanity is not raised by his suicide; but that fact, in connection with other evidence, is pertinent to issue of insanity, especially where suicide is immediately preceded by murder or attempted murder of members of family, and the destruction of his property without any ap- parent motive or provocation. Karow v. Ins. Co., 283.
28. Where there is nothing in policy to contrary, insurer is not released from liability because property was burned by assured while insane, nor unless burning was caused by voluntary act, assent, procurement, or design of as- sured. Id.
29. Collision of steamboats caused fire, and one of them with goods insured "against immediate loss by fire," sank before goods were burned. Held, that if damage could have been avoided except for fire, loss was within policy. Exp. Co. v. Ins. Co., 75.
30. Person taking out policy in mutual company is at once bound by charter and by-laws. Ins. Co. v. Miller Lodge, 76.
31. Usage of such company to notify members of annual interest on deposit notes, and time of payment, does not impose duty so to do. Id.
32. Company cannot, without assent or request of insured, apply to such annual interest a dividend of profits not expressly made applicable thereto. Id.
INTEREST. See ACCORD, 3. WIFE, 18. LEGACY, 4, 5. 1. Maker of note being sued, agreed by separate instrument, in consideration of dismissal of suit, that interest to accrue upon the note should bear interest. Held, valid. Jasper Co. v. Tavis, 347.
DAMAGES, 4, 5. EQUITY, 17. HUSBAND AND NATIONAL BANK, 2.
2. Open account bears interest only after demand. Richardson v. Laclede Co., 347.
3. Where plaintiff seeks to recover interest on interest, burden of proof is on him to prove promise to pay same for valuable consideration, and an accept- ance, actual or constructive, of such promise; where forbearance is relied on as such consideration, it must appear that time was actually given in pursuance of the request implied by the promise. Edgerton v. Weaver, 284.
4. Note was given for debt, with interest added at twenty per cent.; Texas statute provides, that "all judgments * * * shall bear interest at rate of eight per cent. per annum, *** except when the contract upon which the judgment is founded bears a specified interest greater than eight per cent. per annum, and not exceeding the highest rate of conventional interest permitted by law (twelve per cent.), in which case the judgment shall bear the same rate of interest specified in such contract. Held, That judgment on above note only bore interest at eight per cent. Ewell v. Daggs, 689.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See CRIMINAL LAW, 29. STATUTE, 6.
1. License to sell, from United States, does not dispense with necessity for license under state law. Pierson v. The State, 419.
2. Sale of liquor by club to members not within statute prohibiting sales without license. Graff v. Evans, 99, and note.
3. Two persons, unconnected in business, selling liquor to husband habitu- ally intoxicated, are jointly liable to wife. Rantz v. Barnes, 483.
4. Barkeeper selling liquor to adult and seeing minor present, and under- standing he is to participate in drinking same, is not guilty of selling or giving liquor to minor. Siegel v. The People, 623.
5. If jury should find that barkeeper knew that adult was being used by minor as a screen, they might find him guilty. Id.
6. Indictment following words of statute, charged defendant with keeping or maintaining house "used for illegal sale or keeping of intoxicating liquor." Held, That charge must be construed to mean keeping for such illegal use or with knowledge that house was so used. State v. McGough, 546.
7. At trial upon this indictment, justice allowed defendant's witness to be asked, in cross-examination, if witness did not tell A., witness for state, that if A. would mix up testimony in F.'s case, F. would give A. $20. Held, error, inquiry being irrelevant, as no connection appeared between F.'s case and case on trial. Id.
8. Justice instructed jury, "He, the defendant, is presumed to know the kind of business which was openly being carried on in his establishment by his servants and agents. The defendant admitted that he was the keeper of the place, and that he was there personally in charge of it during the time covered by the indictment. He is not only presumed to know but he is responsible." Held, error, knowledge and responsibility of defendant being for jury. Id.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY. See CORPORATION, 14, 15.
JUDGMENT. See Accord, 2. CORPORATION, 11. FORMER RECOVERY, 1. INSOLVENCY, 3. INTEREST, 4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 2. UNITED STATES COURTs, 5.
1. Court cannot, at subsequent term, correct judgment in respect to costs, where that subject was considered and judgment entered by clerk as directed by court, unless such power was carried forward by motion made during term at which judgment was rendered. Williams v. Williams, 146.
2. Defendant served with process issuing from court of competent jurisdic- tion is concluded by judgment. Harbig v. Freund, 146.
3. THE REMEDIES FOR THE COLLECTION OF JUDGMENTS AGAINST DEBT- ORS WHO ARE RESIDENTS OR PROPERTY HOLDERS IN ANOTHER STATE, OR within the BRITISH DOMINIONS, 697.
1. Caveat emptor applies to administrator's sale of lands for payment of debts. Tilley v. Bridges, 419.
2. Administrator or executor selling lands under decree of court, has no authority to warrant title. If purchaser obtains no title, he must, as general rule, suffer the loss, unless fraud or mistake has entered into transaction. Id. JURISDICTION. See REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 4.
JUROR AND JURY. See CRIMINAL LAW, 13.
1. In the selection of grand and petit jury for Baltimore county, under pro- visions of Act of 1870, ch. 220, one of forty-eight names drawn for general panel was non-resident. This name was not among grand jurors. Held, 1. That this did not affect the grand jury. 2. That statute was to be re- garded mainly as directory, and irregularities not materially violating it or prejudicing rights of the citizen were not fatal. State v. Glasgow, 347.
2. The Maryland law which exempts persons over seventy from jury service does not disable them. Green v. State, 347.
3 IS THE JURY SYSTEM A FAILURE? 81.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See ACTION, 1. AGENT, 1. FIXTURE, 6, 8, 12. NEGLIGENCE, 6.
1. If lessor deprives lessee of beneficial enjoyment and lessee therefore abandons premises, it is an eviction. Skalir v. Shurte, 76.
2. Assignee for creditors, who, in conduct of his trust, continues in posses- sion of premises let to his assignor, does not become personally liable for rent unless there be special agreement. White v. Thomas, 76.
3. Demise of factory with fixtures and machinery, implies no warranty that machinery is in good repair or of sufficient capacity to do work for which premises were let. Naumberg v. Young, 146.
4. Owner leased to tenant rooms in upper story approached by stairway com- mon to all the tenants, the railing of which was out of repair. The stairway became dangerous from ice and snow and tenant slipped and caught rail, which gave way. Held, that landlord, who had made no covenant to repair, was not liable. Percell v. English, 312, and note.
5. A promise to repair made after the lease, is nudum pactum. Id.
6. Landlord who lets tenements in building to different tenants, with right of way in common over flight of stone steps, without railing, leading from street to yard, is not liable to tenant injured by falling upon ice accumulated upon steps, if it is not landlord's duty to keep them clear of ice, although so constructed and of such material as to occasion accumulation of ice, there being no change in construction since tenancy began. Wood v. Cotton Co., 813. LEGACY.
1. To make legacy specific, it must clearly appear that testator intended legatee to take particular thing and nothing else. Wyckoff v. Executors of Perrine, 754.
2. If debt is subject of specific legacy, payment of debt, whether voluntary or compulsory, will destroy legacy. Id.
3. Gift of personal property for life, with power to legatee to use it as she may deem proper, or to sell it, or any part of it, for her benefit, as she may deem needful or best, Held, absolute. Kendall v. Kendall, 284.
4. Will, executed in 1848, contained clause: "I give and bequeath to my daughter, -, $1000, to be paid on her marriage or when she arrives at age, with interest after, at her option." Legatee attained majority in 1849, and was married in 1853; testatator died in 1854. Held, that legacy drew interest as soon as daughter arrived at age. Trustees v. Grover, 813.
5. Legacy bears simple interest, and payments should be applied first to extinguish interest and then principal. Id.
1. Action for can be maintained against corporation. McDermott, 147.
2. Previous or subsequent publications admissible to show temper of de- fendant's mind in publication complained of, even though barred by Statute of Limitations. Id.
3. Publication in newspaper of false statement that person was convicted and sentenced to prison for libel, is actionable, without proof of special damage. Boogher v. Knapp, 483.
4. In action for, where language is ambiguous or ironical, plaintiff's ac- quaintances may state their understanding as to whom charge refers, and what it imputes, Knapp v. Fuller, 689.
5. Defendant, after suit brought, published another article referring to plain- tiff by name: admissible to show animus.
6. What one of defendants said, few days after first publication, manifesting hostile feeling toward plaintiff, also admissible. Id.
7. Defendant wrote defamatory statements of plaintiff in letter to W., under circumstances making it privileged, but by mistake placed it in envelope directed to another person, who received and read letter. Held, that publica- tion was privileged in absence of malice in fact. Tompson v. Dashwood, 754. 8. If any one, including proprietor of newspaper, goes out of his way to asperse personal character of public man, and to ascribe to him base and cor- rupt motives, he does so at his peril, and must either prove truth of what he says or answer in damages. Negley v. Farrow, 813.
« SebelumnyaLanjutkan » |