to secure to all citizens of every race and color, and without regard to previous servitude, those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens. Whether this legislation was fully authorized by the XIIIth Amendment alone, without the support which it afterwards received from the XIVth Amendment, after the adoption of which it was re-enacted with some additions, it is not necessary inquire. It is referred to for the purpose of showing that at that time (in 1866) Congress did not assume, under the authority given by the XIIIth Amendment, to adjust what may be called the social rights of men and races in the community; but only to declare and vindicate those fundamental rights which appertain to the essence of citizenship, and the enjoyment or deprivation of which constitutes the essential distinction between freedom and slavery.

We must not forget that the province and scope of the XIIIth and XIVth Amendments are different; the former simply abolished slavery: the latter prohibited the states from abridging the privi leges or immunities of citizens of the United States, from depriving them of life, liberty or property without due process of law, and from denying to any the equal protection of the laws. The amend ments are different, and the powers of Congress under them are different. What Congress has power to do under one, it may not have power to do under the other. Under the XIIIth Amendment, it has only to do with slavery and its incidents. Under the XIVth Amendment, it has power to counteract and render nugatory all state laws and proceedings which have the effect to abridge any of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or to deprive them of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or to deny to any of them the equal protection of the laws. Under the XIIIth Amendment, the legislation, so far as necessary or proper to eradicate all forms and incidents of slavery and invol untary servitude, may be direct and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by state legislation or not; under the XIVth, as we have already shown, it must necessarily be, and can only be, corrective in its character, addressed to counteract and afford relief against state regulations or proceedings.

The only question under the present head, therefore, is, whether the refusal to any persons of the accommodations of an inn, or a public conveyance, or a place of public amusement, by an individual, and without any sanction or support from any state law or regulation, does inflict upon such persons any manner of servitude, or form of slavery, as those terms are understood in this country? Many wrongs may be obnoxious to the prohibitions of the XIVth Amendment which are not, in any just sense, incidents or elements of slavery. Such, for example, would be the taking of private property without due process of law; or allowing persons who have committed certain crimes (horse stealing, for example,) to be seized and hung by the posse comitatus without regular trial; or denying to any person or class of persons, the right to pursue any peaceful avocations allowed to others. What is called class legislation would belong to this category, and would be obnoxious to the prohibitions of the XIVth Amendment, but would not necessarily be so to the XIIIth, when not involving the idea of any subjection of one man to another. The XIIIth Amendment has respect, not to distinctions of race, or class, or color, but to slavery. The XIVth Amendment extends its protection to races and classes, and prohibits any state legislation which has the effect of denying to any race or class, or to any individual, the equal protection of the laws.

Now, conceding, for the sake of the argument, that the admission to an inn, a public conveyance, or a place of public amusement, on equal terms with all other citizens, is the right of every man and all classes of men, is it any more than one of those rights which the states by the XIVth Amendment are forbidden to deny to any person? And is the Constitution violated until the denial of the right has some state sanction or authority? Can the act of a mere individual, the owner of the inn, the public conveyance or place of amusement, refusing the accommodation, be justly regarded as imposing any badge of slavery or servitude upon the applicant, or only as inflicting an ordinary civil injury, properly cognizable by the laws of the state, and presumably subject to redress by those laws until the contrary appears?

After giving to these questions all the consideration which their importance demands, we are forced to the conclusion that such an act of refusal has nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servitude, and that if it is violative of any right of the party, his

redress is to be sought under the laws of the state; or if those laws are adverse to his rights and do not protect him, his remedy will be found in the corrective legislation which Congress has adopted, or may adopt, for counteracting the effect of state laws, or state action, prohibited by the XIVth Amendment. It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theatre, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or business. Inn-keepers and public carriers, by the laws of all the states, so far as we are aware, are bound, to the extent of their facilities, to furnish proper accommodation to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith apply for them. If the laws themselves make any unjust discrimi nation, amenable to the prohibitions of the XIVth Amendment, Congress has full power to afford a remedy under that amendment and in accordance with it.

When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to he the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protected. There were thousands of free colored people in this country before the abolition of slavery, enjoying all the essential rights of life, liberty and property the same as white citizens; yet no one, at that time, thought that it was any invasion of their personal status as freemen because they were not admitted to all the privileges enjoyed by white citizens, or because they were subjected to discriminations in the enjoyment of accommodations in inns, public conveyances and places of amusement. Mere discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded as badges of slavery. If, since that time, the enjoyment of equal rights in all these respects has become established by constitutional enactment, it is not by force of the XIIIth Amendment (which merely abolishes slavery), but by force of the XIVth and XVth Amendments.

On the whole we are of opinion, that no countenance of authority for the passage of the law in question can be found in either the XIIIth or XIVth Amendments of the Constitution; and no other

ground of authority for its passage being suggested, it must necessarily be declared void, at least so far as its operation in the several states is concerned.

This conclusion disposes of the cases now under consideration. In the cases of the United States v. Michael Ryan, and of Richard A. Robinson and Wife against The Memphis and Charleston Railroad Co., the judgments must be affirmed. In the other cases, the answer to be given will be that the first and second sections of the Act of Congress of March 1st 1875, entitled, "An act to protect all citizens in their civil and legal rights" are unconstitutional and void, and that judgment should be rendered upon the several indictments in those cases accordingly. And it is so ordered.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.1

COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND.'

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT

ACTION. See Attachment.

ADMIRALTY. See Attachment.
ARBITRATION.

Partnership Settlement by Accountant-Opening of Settlement.— Where partners sought and obtained the aid of an accountant in adjusting their accounts, for the purpose of a settlement, and he prepared a paper showing what he considered a fair settlement between them, which they adopted: Held, that this was no arbitration, and the paper prepared by the accountant was no award, it merely constituting a settlement, liable to be opened for mistake: Stage v. Gorich, 107 Ill.

Where it clearly shown that one partner has made advances for the use of the firm, of considerable sums, which were not taken into consideration at a settlement had between the partners, on bill filed by one of the partners for an account, it was held, the cause should have been referred to the master to state anew the accounts, so far as concerned the omitted items: Id.

1 From Hon. Norman L. Freeman, Reporter, to appear in 107 Ill. Rep.

2 From J. Schaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 60 Md. Reports.

3 From John Lathrop, Esq., Reporter: to appear in 134 Mass. Rep.

4 From Edwin T. Palmer, Reporter, to appear in 55 Vt. Rep.

ATTACHMENT.

Replevin for Goods attached--Assumpsit against Officer for Money held under Attachment.-The mortgagee of goods attached, while in the possession of the mortgagor, by an invalid attachment, may maintain replevin against the attaching officer: Allen v. Wright, 134 Mass.

Money held under an invalid attachment may be recovered of the attaching officer in an action for money had and received: Id.

Seamens' Wages.-The wages of a seaman on a coasting voyage on the Atlantic coast are subject to attachment by the trustee process: White v. Dunn, 134 Mass.

BILLS AND NOTES.

When not Negotiable-Stipulation for Interest-Parol Evidence to vary-Estoppel.-In an action upon a non-negotiable promissory note, signed by the defendant and payable to a third person or bearer, the plaintiff offered to show that when the defendant gave him the note, he told the defendant it should be in his name or to his order, and that the defendant replied, "It is all right, it makes no difference, it is payable to bearer and you can collect." Held, that the evidence was inadmissible to vary the legal effect of the instrument; and that it could not operate as an estoppel to prevent the defendant from contending that the plaintiff could not maintain an action on the instrument in his own name: Whitwell v. Winslow, 134 Mass.

A promissory note for a certain amount, payable to a person named or bearer" with interest the same as savings banks pay," is not negotiable: Id.

Transfer after Maturity-Defences-Set-off-The maker of a note, transferred after it is due, sued in the name of the transferree, cannot plead in offset a matter which existed between him and the payee at the time of the transfer, although he can payment or any defence which grew out of the note transaction: Armstrong v. Noble, 55 Vt.

BOND.

Good as a Common-Law Obligation, though not in compliance with the Statute. An obligation entered into voluntarily, and for a sufficient consideration, unless it contravenes the policy of the law, or is repugnant to some provision of the statute, is valid at common law, notwithstanding the attempt may have been to execute it pursuant to a statute with the terms of which it does not strictly comply: Barnes v. Brookman, 107 Ill.

COMMON CARRIER.

Surrender of Goods under Attachment—Trover by Consignor -A common carrier is not liable in trover to the consignor, for surrendering the possession of goods, entrusted to him for carriage, to an officer, who attaches them upon legal process against the consignee: French v. Star Union Trans. Co., 134 Mass.

A common carrier, who surrenders the possession of goods entrusted to him for carriage, to an officer, who attaches them upon legal process against the consignee, is not liable to an action by the consignor, after