BILLS AND NOTES.

Acceptance of Draft by Person holding Collateral-Subsequent Indulgence to Acceptors-Discharge of Drawer.-Where a negotiable draft with a security thereon was drawn and accepted by the drawees, who held a mortgage to secure advances, and who received property of the drawer sufficient to pay the draft, after negotiation the acceptors were primarily and absolutely bound therefor to the holder; the drawer was bound to pay if the acceptors did not, and his security was equally liable with him. As to the holder, the acceptors may be regarded as makers and the drawer as a first indorser: Parmelee v. Williams, 68 or 69 Ga.

Where indulgence was granted to the acceptors in consideration of the payment of eighteen per cent. interest, and the acceptors became insolvent, the security was thereby released: Id

COMMON CARRIERS. See Railroad.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Title of Act.-The constitution does not require that the title of an act should contain a synopsis of the law, but that the act should contain no matter variant from the title. If the title is descriptive generally of the purposes of the act, it is sufficient, and it is not necessary that it should particularize the several provisions contained in the body of the act: Howell v. State, 68 or 69 Ga.

An act, the title of which was to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors within certain limits, was not unconstitutional as containing matter different from the title, because it provided that no intoxicating liquors, plantation bitters, or other intoxicating bitters sold under the name of patent medicine, should be sold within such limits: Id.

Contracts of a State-How not Enforceable.-The state of Louisiana, by legislative and constitutional enactments, contracted with the holders of certain bonds to levy and collect a certain annual tax, and to apply the revenue derived therefrom to the payment of the principal and interest of said bonds; by a subsequent constitution the further levy of the tax was stopped and the disbursing officers prevented from using the revenue from previous levies for said purpose. Certain of the boudholders sought to obtain an enforcement of the contract by a bill in equity and a petition for a mandamus, both against the state officers. Held, that the state officers were bound to do as directed by the state, that the courts could not control them as against the political power in their administration of the finances of the state, and that therefore the relief prayed for could not be granted: The State of Louisiana v. Jumel, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.

Law Impairing the Obligation of Contracts-Alteration of RemedyChanges in the forms of action and modes of proceeding do not amount to an impairment of the obligations of a contract, if an adequate and efficacious remedy is left or substituted: Antoni v. Greerhow, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.

By statute in Virginia the interest coupons of certain state bonds were "receivable at and after maturity for all taxes, debts, dues and demands due the state." For refusal to receive these coupons there

was a remedy against the tax collector by mandamus in the Supreme Court of Appeals; by a subsequent statute the coupons were to be received by the collector, when offered, but the taxes were to be paid in cash; and proceedings could at once be instituted by the tax-payer to test in a local court, subject to appeal, the genuineness and receivability of the coupons, and if the judgment was in his favor the money was returned to him. Held, that the change in the remedy, after the refusal by the collector to receive the coupons in payment of taxes, was not an impairment of the contract: Id.

Whether the tax-collector is bound in law to receive the coupon, notwithstanding the legislation which, on its face, prohibits him from doing so, and whether if he refuses to take the coupon and proceeds with the collection by force, he can be made personally responsible in damages, undecided: Id.

CONTRACT.

Grant of Exclusive Right to Non-patentable Invention.-A nonpatentable invention or improvement is not the subject of an exclusive right or property, but is common property, open to all the world: Albright v. Teas, 37 N. J. Eq.

A covenant by which the covenantor restrains himself, generally and absolutely, without limitation as to time or place, from exercising his skill and knowledge, is repugnant to public policy and void: Id.

CORPORATION.

Right to Remove Directors.-A joint stock company whose directors are appointed for a definite period, has no inherent power to remove them before the expiration of that period: Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Co. v. Hampson, L. R., 23 Ch. Div.

If the articles of association of a company contain no power to remove directors before the expiration of their period of office, but authorize the shareholders by special resolution to alter any of the articles, there must be a separate special resolution altering the articles so as to give power to remove directors before a resolution can be passed to remove any of them: Id.

Liability of for Fraud of Agents.-Strictly speaking, corporations, while acting within the scope of the powers delegated to them, cannot be guilty of wilful fraud; yet it is settled that corporations carrying on trade or business of any kind, are equally, and to the same extent, liable for the frauds and wrongs of their agents, perpetrated in the course of their employment, as individual principals would be under like circumstances: Western Maryland Railroad Co. v. The Franklin Bank of Baltimore, 60 Md.

Sale to on Fraudulent Representation of Officer-Rescission.—A sale of chattels to a corporation may be rescinded where credit therefor was given to the corporation on the strength of contemporaneous represen tations of the officers as to its solvency and prosperity, which representations are shown to have been false and fraudulent when made: Candy v. The Globe Rubber Co., 37 N. J. Eq.

CRIMINAL LAW.

Former Conviction-Ordinance.-The conviction of the defendant in

the mayor's court, under a municipal ordinance for disturbing the peace, will not protect the accused from a subsequent prosecution by the state for assault and battery, though the same transaction be involved in both cases: De Graffenreid v. State, 68 or 69 Ga.

Murder-Riot Incited by Prisoner-Evidence of Acts and Declarations of Mob.-Where at and before the killing there was a great riot by many persons who composed a mob, and the accused was one of them, and took part in the riot, incited it, and was in great part responsible therefor, he was liable for each and every illegal act committed by such mob, and what was said and done by the mob or any of its members, was proper evidence on the trial of the defendant: McRae v. State, 68 or 69 Ga.

Burglary-Evidence-Possession of Stolen Articles.-Where a burglary has been committed, and money, goods or other property which were in the house at the time of the burglary are soon thereafter found in the possession of a person who is unable to account for his possession, it raises a presumption of his guilt, and the jury would be authorized to convict upon this alone. This matter is entirely for the jury, taking into consideration the character of the accused, the nature of the property found upon his person or in his possession, the length of time which had elapsed since the burglary, and the difficulty or impossibility on the part of the accused to account for his possession of the stolen property: Lundy v. State, 68 or 69 Ga.

DESCENT. See Will.

DURESS.

Mortgage-In Settlement of Criminal Charge.-Where an agent of a guano company had collected money for them, and failed to return it, and another agent of the company demanded the amount, and threatened a prosecution unless it was secured, and a mortgage was given to secure the amount: Held, that if the mortgage was given to settle or suppress the criminal prosecution, it could not be collected. If given not for such purpose, but to secure what the defaulting agent owed his principal, it could be collected: Wheaton v. Ansley, 68 or 69 Ga.

EQUITY. See Limitations, Statute of

Recovery of Fines given by City to Dispensaries-Discovery from Sheriff-The Act of 1853, ch. 305, provides, that all fines imposed by the criminal court of Baltimore city on persons convicted of keeping houses of ill-fame, shall be divided equally between such dispensaries of said city as shall have had under their charge during the year preceding, at least 1500 patients. On demurrer for want of jurisdiction, to a bill filed by a dispensary in the city of Baltimore against a former sheriff, for a discovery and payment into court of the sums collected by him from fines imposed under said act, in order that the same might be distributed among the several dispensaries entitled to the fund, it was Held, that the complainant was entitled to the relief prayed for, and the demurrer to the bill was properly overruled by the court below: Snowden v. The President and Managers of the Baltimore General Dispen

sary, 60 Md.

Relief against Action at Law.-Equity only interferes with an action

at law where there are equitable circumstances which render it unjust, as against the defendant at law, that the suit should proceed: Held, in this case, that it constitutes no ground for such interference that the plaintiffs have no right to bring the action at law; nor that, if they recover, they will hold the damages in trust, in part for the defendants at law; nor that the defendants at law should be allowed to retain so much of the damages recovered as would be payable to them as one of the cestuis que trust; nor that there has been no breach of the covenant which is the basis of the action; nor that if there has been such breach, equity ought to relieve against it: Long Dock v. Bentley, 37 N. J. Eq.

ERRORS AND APPEALS. See Admiralty.

Determination of Jurisdictional Limit.-Although the appellant in the court below claimed $3000, yet as he was there awarded $1500, the matter in dispute in the Supreme Court of the United States, required to be $2500, was but $1500, and the court had no jurisdiction: Hilton v. Dickinson, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.

Decree when final.-A decree is final for the purpose of an appeal when it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined: Railway Co. v. Express Co., and Ex parte Norton, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.

EVIDENCE. See Criminal Law.

EXECUTION.

Exemption-Injunction against Sale of exempted Articles.-On a judgment against a married woman, a sheriff seized her chattels, consisting of household furniture, &c. She was living with her husband, who was insolvent and contributed but little to the family's support, and she had for several years almost entirely maintained him and her children. Held, that her right to claim exemption under the execution act, as "a debtor having a family residing in this state." not being clear, she therefore was not entitled to an injunction restraining the sheriff from selling the chattels which she claimed were exempt: Muir v. Howell, 37 N. J. Eq.

If her right had been clear, injunction in equity would have been appropriate relief: Id.

EXECUTOR.

Negligence-Failure of Bank in which Funds were deposited.—Before an order for the distribution of the proceeds of a mortgage had been made, one of the distributees died intestate, and soon afterwards one of the decedent's children applied for his share of decedent's portion, but the executor, who had charge of the fund, refused to pay him, or any one except decedent's administrator. Pending the appointment of such administrator he deposited the fund in a bank, in the name of himself, adding, "Estate of Hassel C. Jacobus," his testator. The bank was then in excellent standing, but failed before an administrator had been appointed. Held, that the executor was not liable for the loss of the funds: Jacobus v. Jacobus, 37 N. J. Eq.

FORMER RECOVERY.

Judgment against surviving Member of Firm.-A prior judgment concludes only parties and privics, not strangers. A judgment against the surviving member of a firm does not conclude the representatives of the deceased partner: Buckingham v. Ludlum, 37 N. J. Eq.

FRAUDS, STATUte of.

Recovery for Services rendered under invalid Contract.-A person rendering services under a contract invalid by the Statute of Frauds, may recover their value in an action on the quantum meruit: Buckingham v. Ludlum, 37 N. J. Eq.

INJUNCTION. See Execution.

Nuisance-When Party entitled to Equitable Relief-A party asking to have a nuisance abated by injunction, will be entitled to relief by that process whenever he can clearly demonstrate two facts: 1st, that the injury of which he complains is such, in its nature and extent, as to call for the interposition of a court of equity; and, 2d, that the right on which he grounds his title to relief is clear, whether that fact has been made plain by the action of the appropriate tribunals for the adjudication of questions of legal right, or is so by the settled law of the state, when applied to the facts of his particular case: Stanford v. Lyon, 37 N. J. Eq.

A mandatory injunction is awarded, as of course, whenever it is the necessary and appropriate process for carrying the decree of the court into effect: Id.

Religious Society-Closing of Church against Pastor. The trustees of a Methodist Episcopal church closed the church building against the duly appointed preacher, on the ground that it was not for the interest of the church that he should be its pastor, and that he was appointed against the wish of the majority of the members. Held, that they had no right to do so and, after answer, a mandatory injunction was issued requiring them to open the building to the preacher and the church: Whitcar v. Michenor, 37 N. J. Eq.

INSURANCE.

Payment of Premiums by Stranger or Part Owner-Lien.-When a person, not the sole beneficial owner, pays the premiums to keep up a policy of life insurance, he is entitled to a lien on the policy or its proceeds in the following cases: (1) By contract with the beneficial owner; (2) By reason of the right of trustees to an indemnity out of their trust property for money expended by them in its preservation; (3) By subrogation to their right of some person who, at the request of trustees, has advanced money for the preservation of the property; (4) By reason of the right of a mortgagee to add to his charge any money paid by him to preserve the property: In re Leslie, L. R., 23 Ch. Div.

In no other cases can a lien on a policy for premiums paid be acquired either by a stranger or by a part owner of the policy: Id.

LANDLORD AND TENANT. See Agent.

LEGACY.

When Specific-Debt.-To make a legacy specific, it must appear,

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