St. 390; McLean v. Lafayette Bank, 3 McLean 622; MacGregor v. MacGregor, 9 Iowa 65. A judgment in the alternative a foreign court may also decline to enforce. It has been held in Maryland that a judgment rendered in another state for a return of property in a replevin suit, and in default of return, for the value of the property, would not support an action of debt elsewhere: Thorner v. Battory, 41 Md. 593; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 74. And in Vermont a like ruling was made respecting a judgment of another state for the penalty of a bond, to be discharged on the payment of a lesser sum in instalments. Such a judgment, it was said, not being for an absolute indebtedness, has no force whatever except in the very jurisdiction where it was rendered and whose statutes alone support it: Dimick v. Brooks, 21 Vt. 569. These cases, though decided upon special facts, have general application. We shall not, however, discuss such cases here, but shall limit our attention to judgments for the simple payment of money, passing by those of exceptional and peculiar character, and also proceedings in rem, which stand upon their own reasons.

A money judgment is evidence of a settled demand, but it is not always conclusive evidence. And when its conclusiveness is in question it may become necessary to distinguish between a judgment. rendered in a country foreign to that in which suit is brought upon. it, and a judgment rendered in one of the states of the American Union and sued upon in another. In the one case the force and effect of the judgment must depend altogether upon international law; in the other we have, besides the principles of international law, the provision of the Constitution of the United States that "full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof:" Art. 4, sect. 1. This provision, it is generally conceded, adds something to the force and effect which the judgments of other jurisdictions receive from the laws of nations, and precludes certain defences which might otherwise be open. In a certain qualified sense state judgments are made by it domestic judgments in every state: McGilvray v. Avery, 30 Vt. 538.

It will be convenient, therefore, to consider the two classes of judgments separately.

I. As to judgments rendered in one state and sued upon in

another. The constitution, as has been seen, declares that full faith and credit shall be given them, and by this it was no doubt meant that they should receive in other states the same faith and credit they are entitled to in the state in which they are rendered, and Congress, pursuant to the power conferred upon it, has so declared: Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch 481; Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234; McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312. But "faith and credit" is one thing; force and effect is another; and a judgment may be entitled to faith and credit everywhere, and yet outside the state where it was rendered be of no force or effect whatever. Some judgments from their nature must of necessity spend their force within the state; as where they provide for the performance of some local act; others for other reasons may not be enforceable elsewhere. And sometimes, as has been intimated, it may appear, that the jurisdiction of the court rendering it was insufficient for any purpose of affirmative relief elsewhere. And as the question of jurisdiction is always of prime importance, a few words in explanation may be essential.

It is an admitted principle in the law of nations, that every state, for the purpose of enforcing private rights and redressing private wrongs, has jurisdiction not only over its own citizens, but also over all others who may, for business or pleasure, come within its territory. For judicial purposes this jurisdiction is enforced by means of the personal service of process or some substitute therefor, whereby the party is brought into court and is permitted to meet and defend the charges made and the demands set up against him. The service gives the court jurisdiction of his person, and entitles it, if the demands are sustained, to enter a personal judgment against him. But the party sued may waive the service by voluntarily, in person or by attorney, appearing in the suit; and this appearance makes the jurisdiction of the person equally complete and effectual.

It is also an admitted principle that every state has jurisdiction of all property which is within its territory and protected by its laws, whether belonging to its own people or owned abroad; and that it may entertain suits for the purpose of enforcing claims against such property or against its owners. But as it may not be possible for the purposes of suits to obtain service upon the owner, it is necessary, if the jurisdiction of the state in respect to the property is to be enforced, that some substitute for such service be

provided for. If, for example, a citizen of Indiana owes a debt to a citizen of Michigan, and also is owner of property in Michigan, so that his property but not his person is subject to the laws of the last-mentioned state, it will still be necessary, if the property is to be reached for the satisfaction of the debt, that judgment be first obtained upon it; and no judgment is possible until the party concerned is actually or constructively notified to appear and defend. If the party is not actually within the state it will be impossible to make service of process upon him; for one state can no more send its writs into another state for service than it could send its officers to make arrests or to collect taxes; one of these would be as much an invasion of sovereignty as the others: Bischoff v. Wethered, 9 Wall. 312; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714; Scott v. Noble, 72 Penn. St. 115. The state must, therefore, provide for constructive notice; and what this shall be, and what its force and effect, must be determined by the wisdom of the legislature. Perhaps it will be by attachment of property, and the notification of the owner by mail or in the public papers, or perhaps by notification without attachment. Whatever it may be, if the law on the subject is complied with the court in which suit is brought obtains jurisdiction to proceed to judgment, and upon this judgment the property within the state may be seized and applied in satisfaction.

But while the court in this manner obtains jurisdiction for the purposes of a judgment, and may give such effect to the judgment as shall be prescribed by the laws of the state so far as any property within the state is concerned (St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 353; Pope v. Terre Haute Car Mfg. Co., 87 N. Y. 137), it acquires no jurisdiction whatever of the person of the defendant, and the judgment charges him with no personal obligation for its satisfaction. If property within the state is sold upon the judgment, the sale will be recognised everywhere as valid: Melhop v. Doane, 31 Iowa 397; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 147; but if the defendant is sued upon the judgment in another state, it will be treated, for all the purposes of a personal demand, as a mere nullity: D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714; St. Clair v. Cox, 106 Id. 353; Ruggles v. Coleman, Hardin 413; Thurber v. Blackbourne, 1 N. H. 242; Whitttier v. Wendell, 7 Id. 257; Sim v. Frank, 25 Ill. 125; Jones v. Warner, 81 Id. 348; Kilburn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 41; s. c. 4 Am. Dec. 321; Robinson v. Ward, 8 Johns. 86; s. c. 5 Am. Dec. 327; Bates v. Delavan, 5

Paige 299; Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend. 148; s. c. 21 Am. Dec. 172; Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462; s. c. 6 Am. Dec. 88; Pelten v. Platner, 13 Ohio 209; s. c. 42 Am. Dec. 197; Arndt v. Arndt, 15 Ohio 33; Rogers v. Burns, 27 Penn. St. 525; Winston v. Taylor, 28 Mo. 82; Outhwite v. Porter, 13 Mich. 533; Rentschler v. Jamison, 6 Mo. App. 135.

ment.

It is also sometimes provided by statute that when suit is brought upon a joint obligation, and one or more of the parties are served with process but not all, the case may proceed to judgment against all, and execution may be had in form against all upon the judgBut whatever may be the force the statute shall assume to give the judgment within the state, it can give it none elsewhere as to the party not served; and it could not in any other state be made the ground of a personal recovery against him. Such a party has not had his day in court, and a judgment cannot charge him with a personal obligation until that has been accorded him; Wood v. Walkinson, 17 Conn. 500; Bimeler v. Dawson, 5 Ill. 536; s. c. 39 Am. Dec. 430; Oakley v. Aspinwall, 4 N. Y. 513; Frothingham v. Barnes, 9 R. I. 474; Scott v. Noble, 72 Penn. St.

115.

But it may sometimes appear that although the party was served with process, the court had no jurisdiction of the case, because it was not such a case as the law of the state had referred to that particular tribunal for hearing and judgment. Such a case is one in which the court has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter; and if it assumes to act, its action and judgment will be entitled to no respect and no obedience, either in its own state or elsewhere. This is so plain a case as to need neither comment nor authorities.

It may be assumed, however, that generally when suit is brought upon a judgment in another state, there will be nothing in the recitals of the transcript to show any want of jurisdiction of either subject-matter or person. In such a case the judgment is entitled to "faith and credit" as establishing conclusively an indebtedness. It will be assumed that the court had jurisdiction; but no such assumption can be made in opposition to the recitals of the record; and if the recitals are that a certain insufficient notice was given, it cannot be presumed there was any other. See Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350; Meyer v. Ralli, 1 C. P. Div. 358. Still as it is always possible that the court may have rendered the judgment

without jurisdiction either of the subject-matter or the person, if the party sued is allowed to show this fact, he will thereby show that the judgment, either generally or as to him at least, is no judgment at all, and therefore entitled to no faith and credit. It has sometimes been thought that the defendant would be allowed to make this showing when he could do so without contradicting the recitals of the record, but not otherwise; the recitals importing absolute verity; but the later authorities do not sustain this restriction. The defendant according to these may show in any case that the court rendering the judgment had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter; or, if it ever had it, lost it before judgment: Thompson v. Whitan, 18 Wall. 457; Reel v. Elder, 62 Penn. St. 308; s. c. 1 Am. Rep. 414; Pennywit v. Foote, 27 Ohio St. 600; s. c. 22 Am. Rep. 340. He may also show that the court never acquired jurisdiction of his person; and for this purpose may give evidence that the process issued in the case was never served, and if the record shows an appearance entered for him by attorney, he may prove that the appearance was unauthorized: Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. 163; Knowles v. Gas Light Co., 19 Wall. 58; Bartlett v. Knight, 1 Mass. 401; s. c. 2 Am. Dec. 36; Shumway v. Stillman, 4 Cow. 292; s. c. 15 Am. Dec. 374; 6 Wend. 447; Thompson v. Emmert, 15 Ill. 416; Lawrence v. Jarvis, 32 Ill. 304; Marx v. Fore, 51 Mo. 69; s. c. 11 Am. Rep. 432; People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247; s. c. 12 Am. Rep. 260; Eaton v. Hasty, 6 Neb. 419; s. c. 29 Am. Rep. 365; Carleton v. Bickford, 13 Gray 596; Gilman v. Gilman, 126 Mass. 26; s. c. 30 Am. Rep. 646; Bowler v. Huston, 30 Grat. 266; s. c. 32 Am. Rep. 673; Rankin v. Goddard, 54 Me. 28; 55 Id. 389.

On the other hand if the court had jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, the fact that the jurisdiction was exercised irregularly, is of no legal importance when suit is brought upon the judgment. Neither is it important that the court erred in matter of law and reached an erroneous conclusion. Errors like these may warrant the judgment being set aside on appeal or writ of error, but they do not authorize it to be attacked otherwise; or, as the legal phrase is, collaterally: Kinnier v. Kinnier, 45 N. Y. 535; s. c. 6 Am. Rep. 132. And there would be an obvious impropriety, to use no stronger term, in the courts of one state assuming to sit as courts of error on the proceedings of courts of other states