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Equity and Constitutional Law. By John D. Lawson. 8vo., pp. 311. St. Louis: F. II. Thomas.

MALONE.- A Treatise on Real Property Trials, showing the difference between the old Action of Ejectment and the Action to Record Real Property, embracing the Procedure, the Principles of Law and the Rules of Evidence which prevail in Real Property Causes, both in Law and Equity, and the Nature and Mode of enforcing Trusts (either Express or by Implication) with which Real Property may be charged. Including the Doctrine of the Wife's Separate Estate in Lands, and the Rights, Incidents and Liabilities o-f the same; and her General Rights to Real Estate under Recent Legislatio n of the several States; the Widow's Dower; and a reference to the Legislative Changes on this question ; Statutory Liens ; their Effect, Nature and Incidents. By William Henky Malone. 8vo., pp. 814.

Washington : W. II. Morrison,

Maxwell.--On the Interpretation of Statutes. By Sir P. B. MAXWELL. 2d ed. 8vo., pp. 688. London: W. Maxwell & Son.

Morgan.—United States Import Duties under existing Laws and Decisions and Digest of the Tariff Laws. By Samuel T. MORGAN. 6th ed. 8vo., pp. 357. Baltimore: Cushings & Baily.

Morrell.-A Popular Statement of the Law of Insurance, including Fire, Life, Accident and Marine Insurances; with special reference to the requirements of Fire Offices in cases where the Electric Light is used ; together with Practical Directions to Persons desirous of becoming insured, and References to Iniportant Legal Decisions. By C. F. Morrell. 8vo., pp. 175. London: Henry Sweet.

Overton.-A Treatise on the Law of Liens at Common Law, Equity, Statutory and Maritime. By D. Y. Overton. 8vo., pp. 817. New York: Banks & Bros.

RAPALJE.-A Dictionary of American and English Law, with Definitions of the Technical Terms of the Canon and Civil Laws. By STEWART RaPALJE and R. L. Lawrence. 2 vols. 8vo., pp. 1380. Jersey City: F. D. Linn & Co.

SNYDER.-A Collection of important Judicial Opinions by Eminent Judges. By W. L. SNYDER. 8vo., pp. 792. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co.

Story.—Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domnestie, in regard to Contracts. Rights and Remedies, and especially in regard to Marriages, Divorces, Wills, Successions and Judgments. By Joseph Story. 8th ed., by M. M. Bigelow. 8vo., pp. 901. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.

THATCHER.-A Digest of Statutes, Equity Rules and Decisions upon the Jurisdiction, Pleadings and Practice of the Circuit Courts of the United States. By ERASTUS THATCHER. 8vo., pp. 976. Boston : Little, Brown & Co.

Wharton.—Wharton's Law Lexicon; Forming an Epitome of the Law of England, and containing full Explanations of the Technical Terms and Phrases thereof, both Ancient and Modern. Including the various Legal Terms used in Commercial Business, together with a Translation of Latin Law Maxims, and Selected Titles from the Civil, Scotch and Indian Law. 7th ed. By J. M. Lely. 8vo., pp. 882. London: Stevens & Sons.

WILLIAMS.— The Tariff Laws of the United States, with Explanatory Notes, Citations from Decisions of the Courts and the Treasury Department. By C. F. WILLIAMS. 8vo., pp. 193. Boston: Soule & Bugbee.





WHENEVER a party who has obtained a judgment in one state or county has occasion to take proceedings for its enforcement in another, he finds--perhaps to his surprise—that his judgment as such has no extra-territorial force, but that in other jurisdictions it is merely evidence of a settled demand, upon which judgment must be obtained in a new suit before there can be process for its enforcement. A creditor cannot, for example, upon a judgment recovered in New York, have an execution in Pennsylvania ; for courts issue executions only upon their own judgments; and while it would no doubt be within the competency of legislative power to authorize courts to issue final process upon the transcripts of judgments produced to them from other jurisdictions, it has not, either in the United States or in Great Britain, been deemed wise to do so. By international law judgments properly obtained are entitled to respect everywhere; but when relief is to be given upon them it must be given according to the local law and the local judicial practice; and this involves the necessity of obtaining judgment in the jurisdiction where process of enforcement is desired: McLure v. Benceni, 2 Ired. Eq. 513 ; s. C. 40 Am. Dec. 437; Savings Inst. v. Guber, 34 N. J. Eq. 130.

The fact of this necessity is always an embarrassment, and sometimes a very serious one. It may, indeed, in some cases prove Vol. XXXI.-88


an insurmountable obstacle to any remedy whatever, outside the jurisdiction in which the judgment was rendered. Reason for this will generally be found in the nature of the judgment, and its dependence upon some condition or upon the local law where it was given. A judgment may be for the payment of money simply, or it may be for payment subject to conditions, or it may be for the performance of some personal act, such as the delivery of goods, the transfer of corporate stocks, or the conveyance of land, or it may simply affirm the title to property to be in one or the other of the parties. If it be a judgment for the payment of money simply, it will be received elsewhere as evidence of a debt, and judgment may be obtained upon it. But where a judgment is for payment on conditions, the conditions usually arise from something peculiar in the local law, and are likely to depend altogether upon it. But the local law cannot be taken with the judgment into another state. If a court has decreed the performance of some personal act, and the party has failed to obey, a court in a foreign state, where he may happen to be, will not undertake to compel obedience. A court in Georgia would not, on the footing of a decree made in Alabama, for the conveyance of Georgia lands, compel one of its citizens to make the transfer. If the transfer were actually made in pursuance of the decree, the transferree might protect himself in the enjoyment of the property under it: Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. 444; Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148; Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 25; Corbett v. Nutt, 10 Wall. 464; Wood v. Parsons, 27 Mich. 159; and if without obtaining conveyance he succeeds in acquiring the possession, the decree may, perhaps, be received as an equitable defence to any suit that may be instituted to oust him: Burnley v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St. 474. But if the plaintiff in such a decree is compelled to invoke judicial aid to obtain in another jurisdiction the relief which the decree undertakes to give him, he may find, perhaps, that he is under the necessity of taking up the litigation anew and proving his case again. He may even find that while the court had ample jurisdiction for some purposes to make the decree the benefit of which he seeks, it had none for the purposes most important to him, and therefore he can take advantage of it only so far as he has suoceeded in enforeing it in the state where it was rendered: Wakins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 25; Lewis v. Darling, 16 How. 1; Brown v. Easton, 23 Vt. 435; Salmond v. Price, 13 Ohio 368; Price v. Johnston, 1 Ohio

St. 390; McLean v. Lafayette Bank, 3 McLean 622; MacGregor v. MacGregor, 9 Iowa 65. A judgment in the alternative a foreign court may also decline to enforce. It has been held in Maryland that a judgment rendered in another state for a return of property in a replevin suit, and in default of return, for the value of the property, would not support an action of debt elsewhere: Thorner v. Battory, 41 Md. 593 ; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 74. And in Vermont a like ruling was made respecting a judginent of another state for the penalty of a bond, to be discharged on the payment of a lesser sum in instalments. Such a judgment, it was said, not being for an absolute indebtedness, has no force whatever except in the very jurisdiction where it was rendered and whose statutes alone support it: Dimick v. Brooks, 21 Vt. 569. These cases, though decided upon special facts, have general application. We shall not, however, discuss such cases here, but shall limit our attention to judgments for the simple payment of money, passing by those of exceptional and peculiar character, and also proceedings in rem, which stand


their own reasons. A money judgment is evidence of a settled demand, but it is not always conclusive evidence. And when its conclusiveness is in question it may become necessary to distinguish between a judgment rendered in a country foreign to that in which suit is brought upon it, and a judgment rendered in one of the states of the American Union and sued upon in another. In the one case the force and effect of the judgment must depend altogether upon international law; in the other we have, besides the principles of international law, the provision of the Constitution of the United States that “ full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof:” Art. 4, sect. 1. This provision, it is generally conceded, adds something to the force and effect which the judgments of other jurisdictions receive from the laws of nations, and precludes certain defences which might otherwise be open. In a certain qualified sense state judgments are made by it domestic judgments in every state: McGilvray v. Avery, 30 Vt. 538.

It will be convenient, therefore, to consider the two classes of judgments separately.

I. As to judgments rendered in one state and sued upon in another. The constitution, as has been seen, declares that full faith and credit shall be given them, and by this it was no doubt meant that they should receive in other states the same faith and credit they are entitled to in the state in which they are rendered, and Congress, pursuant to the power conferred upon it, has so declared: Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch 481; Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234; McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312. But “ faith and credit" is one thing; force and effect is another; and a judgment may be entitled to faith and credit everywhere, and yet outside the state where it was rendered be of no force or effect whatever. Some judgments from their nature must of necessity spend their force within the state; as where they provide for the performance of some local act; others for other reasons may not be enforceable elsewhere. And sometimes, as has been intimated, it may appear, that the jurisdiction of the court rendering it was insufficient for any purpose of affirmative relief elsewhere. And as the question of jurisdiction is always of prime importance, a few words in explanation may be essential. .

It is an admitted principle in the law of nations, that every state, for the purpose of enforcing private rights and redressing private wrongs, has jurisdiction not only over its own citizens, but also over all others who may, for business or pleasure, come within its territory. For judicial purposes this jurisdiction is enforced by means of the personal service of process or some substitute therefor, whereby the party is brought into court and is permitted to meet and defend the charges made and the demands set up against him. The service gives the court jurisdiction of his person, and entitles it, if the demands are sustained, to enter a personal judgment against him. But the party sued may waive the service by voluntarily, in person or by attorney, appearing in the suit; and this appearance makes the jurisdiction of the person equally complete and effectual.

It is also an admitted principle that every state has jurisdiction of all property which is within its territory and protected by its laws, whether belonging to its own people or owned abroad ; and that it may entertain suits for the purpose of enforcing claims against such property or against its owners. But as it may not be possible for the purposes of suits to obtain service upon the owner, it is necessary, if the jurisdiction of the state in respect to the property is to be enforced, that some substitute for such service be

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