foreign country landing in the port of New York, who is not a citizen of the United States, and holding the vessel which brings him liable for the tax, is a regulation of commerce within the exclusive power of Congress: State of New York v. The Compagnie Generale, S. C. U. S., Oct Term 1882.

The tax in question is void because forbidden by the Constitution of the United States; Id.

Interstate Commerce-Right of a State to bridge Rivers lying wholly within its Borders.-The plaintiff in error, a transportation company created under the laws of Michigan, complained of a bridge across the Chicago river, and of certain regulations of the Chicago city councils providing for the closing of the drawbridge between certain hours and at certain intervals. These regulations were reasonable in themselves and necessary to the city traffic. Held, that in the absence of legislation of Congress, a state has full power to legislate in regard to the rivers within its borders, and also to exercise all necessary police regulations. This latter power embraces the construction of roads, canals and bridges, &c., and it can be exercised more wisely by the states than by a distant authority: Escanaba Transportation Co. v. Chicago, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.

When the state's power is exercised so as unnecessarily to obstruct the navigation of a river, Congress may interfere and remove the obstruction, and in such a conflict the state must yield to the general government: Id.

CONTRACT.

Vendor and Purchaser-Money deposited to Indemnify against Liens. -Money placed in the hands of a third person by the vendor and purchaser of lands, under an agreement to pay out of it assessments and taxes subsisting against the lands as liens, cannot be recovered by the vendor upon his procuring the assessment to be set aside. Such agreement held to be for the indemnity of the purchaser against liability to pay for the improvement: Cross v. Hayes, 16 Vroom.

Construction-Evidence.-By a written contract plaintiffs agreed to finish two stores in a certain manner "and also to finish the front part of the basement, with the stairway going up to the second story, and also the outside two cornices." In an action to recover for extra work done on the inside of the front basement wall, that the language of the contract is so vague and ambiguous that extrinsic evidence was admissible to aid in its construction and that upon such evidence it should have been submitted to the jury to determine whether the work in question was covered by the contract or not. Unaided by extrinsic evidence, this court is of the opinion that "the front part of the basement" means not merely the external front, but both sides of the front basement wall: Bedard et al. v. Bonville, 57 Wis.

CORPORATION. See Evidence.

Receiver-Right of Pledgee of Stock.-S. made a conveyance to C. of certain property upon special trust to secure the debts of S., and subsequently transferred to C. his stock in the Q. Co. as "pledge and collateral security" to secure the performance by S. of the conditions of

the trust deed; after breach in the conditions of the trust deed, C. filed a bill in equity and asked that a receiver be appointed of the Q. Co., charging that the property of the company was managed and controlled by one not a stockholder, whose control was adverse to the interests of the creditors, whose management was impairing the value of the property, and through whom it had become impracticable for C. to sell the stock pledged for any sum commensurate with its just value. C. held in pledge nearly all the stock of the Q. Co., the balance of the stock being held by F. as administrator. Held, that C. though not technically a creditor, was as pledgee of a majority of the stock for the benefit of the S. creditors to be considered as an equitable creditor, and as such was entitled to the protection of the court. Held, further, that the thing in litigation was in the view of equity not the stock itself but the property of the Q. Co. represented by the stock: Chafee v. The Quidnick Company, 14 R. I.

COURT.

What Interest Disqualifies.-The fact that a judge of the Superior Court had formerly been a director of a railroad company, and was so at the time that an attorney rendered professional services to the company does not disqualify him from presiding at the trial of a suit for such services, if at that time he had ceased to be a director, owned no stock, and was not otherwise interested.. It is present, not past interest that disqualifies a judge: Johnson v. Marietta and North Georgia Railroad, 67 or 68 Ga.

COVENANT. See Damages.

Action for Breach-Damage-Pleading-An action may be maintained for a breach of covenant against liability, without alleging or proving damage resulting from such breach; but in the case of a Covenant against damage because of liability, such damage must be proved: Griswold v. Selleck, 57 Wis.

An agreement by a purchaser of land to assume and pay an incumbrance thereon implies, at most, a covenant of indemnity against damage resulting from a breach of such agreement, and not a covenant against liability for the debt: Id.

CRIMINAL LAW. See BAIL.

Conspiracy-Indictment-Demurrer.-An indictment charged conspiracy on the part of two directors of a national bank to procure declaration of a dividend with knowledge of the fact that the bank had made no net profits to pay it. Held, the declaration of a dividend by an association is not a wilful misapplication of its funds by individual directors. It is an act done by them as officers and not in their individual capacity. There being no crime, therefore under sect 5209 of the Revised Statutes of the U. S., there could be no valid indictment under sect. 5440: United States v. Britton S. C. U. S., October Term, 1882.

Juror-Qualification-Interest.-Where a city policeman was slain, and the mayor and counsel employed counsel to prosecute the slayer, this was not alone sufficient to disqualify all grand and traverse jurors residing within the corporate limits from sitting in the case, on the

VOL. XXXI.-69

ground that they would be liable to taxation to satisfy the attorneys' fees. Such interest, if it exists at all, is too minute and remote to furnish a ground for challenge: Doyal v. State, 67 or 68 Geo.

A person over sixty years of age is not a qualified juror; and if the court is apprised of the fact in time, it is its duty to excuse such person. Although one summoned as a juror, and who is over sixty years of age, may not have offered any excuse before the jury was impaneled, yet if when his name was called in its order on the panel he made known his age and desired to be excused, there was no error in so doing, although the defendant may have exhausted all his challenges but one in order to secure such person on the jury: Id.

Settlement of Misdemeanor.-Where a defendant in a criminal case, who had been convicted of a misdemeanor and sentenced to pay a specified fine or serve ninety days in the chain gang, procured two other parties to give their promissory note in satisfaction thereof, and such note was accepted by the solicitor general as the equivalent of cash, the consideration was not illegal, and in a suit thereon, a plea to that effect was properly stricken: Blaine v. Hitch, 66 or 67 Geo.

Perjury by an Officer of a National Bank-Power of Notaries to administer Oath-Prior to the passage of the Act of February 26th, 1881 (21 Stat. 352) notaries public in the several states, had no authority to administer to officers of national banks the oath required by sect. 5211, Revised Statutes, U, S. An indictment against an officer of a national bank, under sect. 5392, for a wilfully false declaration or statement in a report made under sect. 5211, verified by his oath, administered by a notary public of a state, prior to the Act of 1881, cannot be sustained: United States v. Curtis, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term, 1882.

Nolle pros-When and how entered.-At the common law, only the attorney-general could exercise the power to enter a nolle pros. upon an indictment, and in New Jersey, there being no statute upon the subject, this power is still reposed in the attorney-general or the several prosecutors of the pleas; but, under the long-established practice in this state, an indictment, after it passes under the control of the court, may not be discharged without the consent or under the advice of the court: State v. Hickling, 16 Vroom.

The peremptory power of the court, where the common law prevails, is never exerted, upon the representative of the state to discharge an indictment, in whole or in part, at the instance of parties. This can only be done where such power is conferred upon the court by statute: Id.

Intoxicating Liquor-Indictment-Evidence.-An indictment following the words of the statute charged the defendant with keeping or maintaining a house "used for the illegal sale or keeping of intoxicating liquor." Held, that the charge must be construed to mean keeping for such illegal use or with knowledge that the house was so used: State v. Me Gough, 14 R. I.

At the trial upon this indictment the presiding justice allowed one of the defendant's witnesses to be asked in cross-examination if the witness did not tell A., a witness for the state, that if A. would mix up the testimony in F.'s case, F. would give A. twenty dollars. Held, error,

the inquiry being irrelevant as no connection appeared between F.'s case and the case on trial: Id.

The presiding justice instructed the jury, "He, the defendant, is presumed to know the kind of business which was openly being carried on in his establishment by his servants and agents. The defendant admitted that he was the keeper of the place and that he was there personally in charge of it during the time covered by the indictment. He is not only presumed to know but he is responsible." Held, error, the knowledge and responsibility of the defendant being for the jury to infer from the evidence, not for the court to determine as a matter of law: Id.

DAMAGES.

Covenant on Warranty of Title-Mesne Profits-Interest-Expenses. -In covenant brought against the grantor of a deed containing full covenants of warranty, by the grantee who had been evicted by the holder of a paramount title, the parties having agreed on the value of the land in question, the eviction having occurred within the period of limitation for action of trespass, which was four years, and no action for mesne profits having been brought, Held, that the plaintiff grantee was entitled to interest on the agreed value for four years prior to the entry of his judgment: Point Street Iron Works v. Turner, 14 R. I.

The grantor had been notified to defend the ejectment suit, but neither defended nor notified the grantee that he preferred to make no defence. Held, that the grantee should recover his reasonable expenses and counsel fees paid in defending the title: Id.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Assignment.

Novation-Agreement between Officers of Corporations.-A., the treasurer of a Rhode Island company and agent of a Massachusetts company, and B., the home agent of the latter company, arranged to transfer accounts so that a debt of A. to the Mass. company and one of B. to the R. I. company should be cancelled by B. paying the excess in cash. Before this arrangement was consummated A. received notice that B.'s agency was revoked, and B. never completed the arrangement by paying. Held, That the R. I. company could not, by virtue of this arrangement, maintain a suit against A. for the amount of B.'s debt to it less the amount of A.'s debt to the Mass. company: Providence Gas Burner Co. v. Barney, 14 R. I.

EJECTMENT. See Damages.

EXECUTION. See Sheriff's Sale.
EVIDENCE.

Cross-examination-Direction of Court.-When the witness is a party to the action the court may, probably, in its discretion, allow a broader range of cross-examination than in ordinary cases; but such latitude is not a right of the adverse party: Norris v. Cargill et al., 57 Wis.

So, in an action for the breach of a contract of employment by the discharge of the plaintiff, the incompetency and disobedience of the plaintiff, and the fact that after his discharge he might have earned more than he admits he did, are matters purely defensive, and while it

may not be error to permit them to be shown on the cross-examination of the plaintiff, it is not error to refuse such permission: Id.

One who accepts employment to perform skilled labor impliedly undertakes that he possesses the requisite skill, and in an action for a breach of the contract of employment, evidence that he represented that he possessed such skill is immaterial and its exclusion is not error: Id.

Officer of Corporation-Admission by.-A declaration made by the president of a canal company about the time of the construction under his direction of a certain work for the use of the canal, with regard to the purpose of the company in building it, is competent evidence against the company: Halsey v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 16 Vroom.

A declaration respecting the management of a section of the canal, made by the supervisor of that section in response to a complaint concerning his management, is competent evidence again the company: Id.

ERRORS AND APPEALS.

United States Court-Practice.-Under the law of Ohio, the Auditor of Mahoning County subpoenaed the cashier of Youngstown National Bank to appear before him with his books, &c., in a matter relating to the perfecting of county tax lists. The bank filed a bill in equity in the United States Circuit Court to enjoin the auditor alleging for cause that such a proceeding on his part would unlawfully expose its business affairs, lessen public confidence in it as a depository of money, &c., and greatly impair its franchises. The Circuit Court dismissed the bill and the bank appealed: Held, that the appeal must be dismissed on the ground that the amount in controversy did not exceed $5000: First National Bank v. James B. Hughes et al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.

FIXTURE.

Intention of Parties-Pleading-Whether a building, erected by one. person on the land of another, with the latter's permission, is real or personal property, is a question of fact to be decided according to the actual or imputed intention of the parties: Pope v. Skinkle, 16 Vroom. An averment in a pleading that a building erected as a dwellinghouse is personalty, is an issuable averment, and is confessed by a demurrer: Id.

If a pleading appear on its face to be false in an essential allegation, it is bad on demurrer: Id.

INTOXICATING LIQUOR. See Criminal Law.

JUROR. See Criminal Law.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

When not barred by proceedings in Orphans' Court.-The Statute of Limitations is not suspended by a representation made by an administrator to the Orphans' Court, to procure an order to sell lands to pay debts, with respect to debts included in the representation: Everett v. Williams, 16 Vroom.