Interest to November 18, 1899... Fi. fa. issued October 27, 1899, costs, includ- Judgment, First National Bank, debt............ That the claims upon which the above-stated judgments are founded are of such nature that they are dischargeable in bankruptcy as provided in the Act of Congress entitled "An Act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy in the United States," approved July 1, 1898; that execution has been issued upon each of said judgments and the real estate of your petitioner, scheduled and described in his said petition, has been advertised to be sold thereunder by the sheriff of Washington county, at public Judgment, Armour & Co., for use of T. F. sale, on Saturday, the 18th instant. Your petitioner further represents that a sale of said real estate under said executions, after proceedings in bankruptcy have been instituted, will work injury to the estate of the bankrupt for the following reasons: 1. Prospective bidders for said property will be deterred from bidding by reason of the pending of bankruptcy proceedings, lest the said proceedings might affect unfavorably the title which would pass by a sale by the sheriff under said executions. 2. A sale of said property by the sheriff under said executions will not command as high or good a price as a sale made by order of the said United States District Court. Wherefore your petitioner prays that an injunction may be granted by your honorable court with the customary writ directed to the said execution creditors above named, restraining them from proceeding in said writs for the time and in the manner prescribed in section 11 of the Act of Congress herein before mentioned. The answer of the lien creditors was as follows: 1. The aggregate assessed value of the real estate standing in the name of the petitioner is | $6,600; and that real estate in the borough of Washington, Pa., is sought to be assessed at its real value. 2. That the aggregate amount of the lien indebtedness of the petitioner, including attorneyss' commissions, costs and deferred interest, is $7,140.73. | Interest to November 18, 1899....... Fi. fa. No. 28 November Term, 1899, issued Birch, debt........... Interest to November 18, 1899.. Fi. fa. No. 29 November Term, 1899, issued Interest to November 18, 1899.. Fi. fa. No. 30 November Term, 1899, issued Total......... 28 12 70 69 125 00 9 94 6 25 778 60 53 34 67 33 223 10 8 62 27 17 311 55 12 05 33 71 ..$7,140 73 4. That the latest of the foregoing liens was entered of record in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington county, Pa., on the 28th day of March, 1899. 5. That inquiry of the sheriff developes the fact that the added costs of a sale of said real estate to the costs already incurred will not exceed $5. 6. That in addition to the above indebtedness, respondents discover from the schedule filed by the bankrupt, that there are taxes against said property to the amount of $132.46 and they are informed and believe that said taxes, not being entered as a lien of record, have not priority over their judgments on a sale by the sheriff, but they will be prejudiced to that amount if said sale be permitted to be made by a trustee in bankruptcy. 7. Respondents deny the allegations of the petition, that a sale of said real estate under. said executions would work an injury to the estate of the bankrupt, for the reason that they are informed and believe that the liens against said property much exceed the fair market 3. That said lien indebtedness consists of and value thereof. in order of priority, as follows: Mortgage, George E. Bentel, debt.......... Mortgage, Nancy B. McKeever, debt................. Attorneys' commissions..... Judgment, J. L. Thistle, debt... Interest to November 18, 1899.. Attorneys' commissions....... Judgment for use of Frederick Hood, fl. fa. No. 20 November Term, 1899.................. $2,000 00 150 00 134 00 Finally, respondents are informed and be. lieve that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought, for the reason that the petition does not set forth facts sufficient therefor. He placed no market value upon the real estate, neither is he joined by any creditor, secured or unsecured, in his petition. He is also guilty of laches, said executions were issued on the 27th of October, 1899. The petition in bankruptcy was filed on the 6th day of November follow450 00 ing, and the petition to which this answer is 50 00 500 00 19 16 made was not presented to the referee until November 14th, four days prior to the date fixed for the sheriff's sale of said property, which date, if the property be not sold, will necessitate a continuance until the Saturday preceding the second Monday of February next, and add to the lien indebtedness the accumulations of interest. the person who is authorized to hold himself out as an attorney is competent to give advice. Indeed, the latter is to the great body of the community the more important of the two objects. The requirement that anyone applying to be admitted as an attorney who has practiced his profession in a foreign country shall have been at the bar of that country for a Respondents, showing as above, pray that certain length of time is intended to operate in said petition be dismissed. For bankrupt, Miller & Miller. the same direction. When the practitioner comes from a foreign State whose system of law For Frederick Hood and Armour & Co., T. F. is analagous to our own, we may fairly assume Birch. that after he has resided here long enough to become eligible in other respects to be admitted comes. And now, November 14, 1899, the petition for to our bar, he has such acquaintance with our a restraining order on the sheriff of Washing-system of jurisprudence and our laws as would ton county and answer thereto having come on render him a safe counsel to those clients who for hearing before me, the petition is refused apply to him. But, as is well known our system and a restraining order is denied on the grounds differs greatly from the law which is adminthat the secured claims alone are more than istered in the country whence this applicant the real estate is reasonably worth, and a sale It is quite true that as to all the rules by a trustee under the bankrupt court would be of law which are based upon the broad principles of no advantage to these creditors, and further, of natural right and equity there can be no that the petitioner is the bankrupt himself and difference between the laws of any two civilized is not joined by any creditor who claims injury communities; but the knowledge which is rewill be done to the estate by a sheriff's sale. quisite to enable one safely to advise his client Dated at Washington this 14th day of Novem-requires not only a knowledge of those broad ber, A. D. 1899. H. RUSSELL MYERS, Referee. principles of law which are common to all systems, but an intimate acquaintance with the peculiar rules which have grown out of the THE ADMISSION OF FOREIGN ATTORNEYS customs of a particular country, and which TO THE BAR IN THIS COUNTRY. The application of Lorenzo Giuseppe Maggio for admission to practice as an attorney and counselor in New York was recently denied by the appellate division of the Supreme Court of that State. Mr. Maggio had presented papers showing that he was a naturalized citzen of the United States, born in Italy, and that for more than three years he was an attorney of the higher courts in that kingdom, practicing his profession at Palermo. He presented proofs of his good standing at the bar of that country, and also of his good character. In all these matters his papers complied with the rules authorizing the court in its discretion to admit to practice those who had been attorneys for a certain length of time in foreign countries. In its decision the court said per curiam: "It has been for nearly a quarter of a century the endeavor to raise the standard of learning required by persons who seek to practice the profession of the law in this State. The object of this effort has not been not alone to elevate the profession, but quite as much to assure to all who have occasion to consult lawyers that have been established by the provisions of its statutes. The foundation of the law of Italy is the civil code of the Roman Empire, altered by the custom and statutes of the various States now comprising that kingdom, and again changed by the statutes of the kingdom itself and by the construction of its courts. The jurisprudence of this State, based as it is on the Constitution of the United States and of the State, interpreted according to the principles of the common law, has in all those respects nothing common to the law of Italy, and one may be a learned counselor in the laws of that country and still by no means be competent to give intelligent advice to clients whose affairs are to be controlled by the system established in the State of New York. We think, therefore, that it would be a wise exercise of the discretion that the law has vested in us to assume that this gentleman, however learned he may be in the laws of his own country, is fitted to assume the position of attorney, to give advice to clients upon the laws of this State, and therefore the application must be denied."-The Law Student's Helper. Pittsburgh Legal Journal PITTSBURGH, PA., DECEMBER 6, 1899. Court of Quarter Sessions, ALLEGHENY COUNTY. COMMONWEALTH v. REEFER. For Commonwealth, A. B. Hay. Opinion by STOWE, P. J. Filed November 6, 1899. The evidence in this case established without No.20. controversy the fact that John Reefer, the defendant, was engaged on March 11, 1899, in selling oil and delivering it at a grocery store on Twenty-second street, Pittsburgh, from a "tank wagon," for which he had no certificate of inspection to show the character of the oil, and which "tank wagon" had no stencil mark, brand or other evidence thereon, of inspection, and that he represented that the carbon oil he was then selling was 120° fire test and the water white oil of 150°, and that the actual test of the water white oil was 137° Fahrenheit. Inspection of refined petroleum-If inspected, and fire test found sufficient, no additional inspection required before sales thereafter. Under the Act of May 15, 1874, P. L. 189, refined pe troleum which had been properly examined, tested and certified by duly authorized oil inspectors of the connties where the same was manufactured before shipment to points of storage for sale, and the fire test of which is above the standard fixed by the Act (110° Fahrenheit), is not required to be again tested and certified every time it is thereafter sold in small quantities. And the act does not require that the vessel or package from which such oil is sold in small quantities shall be "branded" every time it is emptied and filled from a large tank. The sale of such oil out of a tank wagon which did not bear the brand of a duly authorized inspector is not prohibited by the act. No. 288 June Sess., 1899. The evidence further showed that the oil sold oil stored in the tank station or warehouse of by defendant was part of a larger quantity of the Freedom Oil Works Company, located at Freedom, Beaver county, situated on West Carson street, Pittsburgh, and that the oil sold by defendant was taken from said tank station or warehouse on the morning of said 11th March. The oil which was in said tank station was manufactured some at Freedom, Pa., some at Warren, Pa., some at Oak Grove Station, Washington county, Pa., and some at Coraopolis, Allegheny county, Pa., and all of which was duly inspected in tank cars, before being placed in said tank station, by proper legally appointed oil inspectors and found to be above the legal test, as appears by the exhibits in this case offered in evidence, numbered from 1 to 7 in Misdemeanor under the Act of May 15, 1874, P. L. 189, entitled "An Act to provide for the better security of life and property from the dangers of coal and petroleum oils." The inclusive, and that the oil sold by defendant from dictment contained three counts, charging that his tank wagon came from and was a part of defendant on March 11, 1899, unlawfully did the contents of this tank station or warehouse, sell and offer for sale as an illuminator for con- all of which had been duly inspected before sumption within the limits of this Common-being placed in said tank station, and was wealth certain kerosene and petroleum:"1. Without having first ascertained that the fire test of said kerosene and petroleum was not less than 110° F. "2. Said kerosene and petroleum then and there being drawn from a vessel and package that did not then and there bear the brand of a duly authorized inspector. "3. Without having had the fire test applied to said kerosene and petroleum by a duly qualified and authorized inspector." On the trial, before STOWE, P. J., there was a verdict finding the facts, and submitting the law thereon to the court. The facts appear in the opinion, infra. Subsequently the case was argued before STOWE, P. J., and SLAGLE, J. above the fire test required by law, that is above 110° F. The question raised by these facts is whether this sale under the circumstances was a violation of the Act of 15th May, 1874, P. L. 189. We are of the opinion that it was not. The first and third counts of the indictment are not sustained by the evidence and were abandoned on the argument as being untenable under the facts shown; the fire test having been properly ascertained to be over 110° F. and certified by duly authorized inspectors before the oil was placed in the large storage tank. But the second count alleges and the evidence shows that defendant sold this oil, drawn from the large storage tank, from a "tank wagon," which wagon did not bear the brand State, so far as we have been able to discover, of a duly authorized inspector. This brings us to the question whether a sale of oil which had been properly examined, tested and certified by duly authorized oil inspectors of the counties where the same was manufactured before shipment to points of storage for sale, and which is above the legal standard must be again tested and certified and the vessel from which it is sold in small quantities be "branded" every time it is emptied and filled from a large tank. We are therefore of opinion that under the facts found by the jury in this case, the defendant is not guilty of any of the charges contained in the indictment in this case. It is therefore ordered and adjudged that a judgment of not guilty be entered upon the indictment presented in this case against defendant, and that the county pay the costs. and therefore, in the absence of any precedent, we have concluded to give expression to the reasons on which we base our conclusion. The limitation of prosecutions for criminal offenses to certain specified periods results only from the so-called statutes of limitation, and an examination of section 77 of the Act of March 31, 1860, limiting the time for prosecutions in this State, makes it clear that a prosecution for desertion does not come within its provisions, as it only applies to indictable offenses, and It seems to us that such a conclusion is en-only limits the time within which "indicttirely unwarranted by the act, and carried to ments" shall be brought, notwithstanding the its legitimate extent would involve a series of fact that the terms "indictments" and "proseinspections never contemplated by the Legis-cutions" are used in the act, it having been lature. expressly decided in Com'th v. Haas, 57 Pa. 443, that the term "prosecution is synony mous with "indictment;" nor can it be contended that a prosecution for desertion comes within the provisions of the Act of March 26, 1785, relating to actions, suits, bills, indictments or informations brought for any forfeiture upon any penal Act of Assembly. The Act of 1860, referred to above, is somewhat general in its character, inasmuch as it limits "indictments" and "prosecutions" for certain specified felo nies and misdemeanors to certain specified periods, and then limits "indictments" and “prosecutions" for other felonies not named or excepted, and for all misdemeanors, to certain other specified periods; but desertion being neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, and not | being specially provided for in the act, the provisions of the act cannot apply. No citatioon of authority is necessary to support this statement; but we find the following in the opinion of the Supreme Court in Com'th v. McDonald, 16 S. & R. 400: "Unless there is a limit to prosecutions Court of Quarter Sessions, CAMBRIA COUNTY. COMMONWEALTH v. KERBEY. Wife desertion—Liability of husband for sup- deserted, is not barred by the statute of limitations. The Act of April 13, 1867, P. L. 78, authorizing the arrest of the husband for wife desertion, is remedial not penal in its nature, and s an additional remedy to by statute, there is no limit; there are some compel him to support his wife and chi dren. No. 73 Sept. T., 1899. Charge, desertion. On plea of defendant that the statute of limitations was a bar to his liability for support. For plaintiff, M. B. Stephens, districtattorney. For defendant, F. J. O'Connor. offenses which, by particular statutes, must be prosecuted within a limited time, and this shows the general law to be to the contrary." Wife desertion is neither a felony, a misdemeanor nor a crime, and the Act of 1867, authorizing the arrest of a husband for wife desertion, is but an additional remedy to be applied to compel the husband to support his wife and Opinion by BARKER, J. Filed September 21, children; the statute is remedial in its nature 1899. It appeared from the information and the evidence in the above stated case that the act of desertion complained of occurred more than two years prior to the date of the information, and the defendant's counsel contended that the prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations. The precise question involved has not been passed upon by any of the courts in this and not penal. There is no provision for an indictment or for punishment for the desertion, although the court may imprison for non-compliance with the order for support. Justice AGNEW, in Com'th ex rel. Demott, 64 Pa. 305, says that the warrant is of a quasi-criminal nature; that the proceeding is intended as a remedy for the wife or children--the party injured; that it is in the nature of a criminal charge for the desertion and neglect of maintenance, and that the record of finding or quasiconviction of the fact of desertion and neglect is conclusive on the defendant; further adding that "maintenance is the sole object of the act." An expression of Justice PAXSON in his opinion in the case of Gise v. Com'th, 81 Pa. 432, has been cited by the counsel for the defendant, as follows: "There is a period in the history of every crime when it is completed and the offender becomes liable to the penalties of the law. From that moment the statute commences to run." Desertion is not a "crime." (See the well considered opinion of Stone, Secretary of the Commonwealth, in Extradition Case, 9 Pa. C. C. Reps. 27, and there is no "statute" in this State that commences to run" against a prosecution for desertion, as we have already demonstrated. 66 Court of Common Pleas, DAUPHIN COUNTY. KREIMER and CLARK'S NOMINATONS. Election laws-Nomination papers-Signed in The names of the candiates in nomination papers must Nos. 33 and 65 Jan. T., 1900. Objections to nomination papers. Opinion by SIMONTON, P. J. Filed October 18, 1899. There are a number of lower court decisions to the effect that the act of desertion is complete when the husband leaves his wife; that it is not a continuing or accruing offense; but in none of these cases was the question of the On September 8, 1899, nomination papers application of the statute of limitations consid- were filed in the office of the secretary of the ered. In The City v. Bailey, 8 Phila. 485, it | Commonwealth, purporting to nominate as was held that the desertion is a single act and is complete when it occurs, and, therefore, that when it occurred out of the State, the continued desertion and failure to maintain did not give jurisdiction to the courts of this State under the Act of 1836. In Com'th v. Cauley, 7 Kulp, 539, and Com'th v. Bowman, 6 Id. 176, desertion was held to be a single act, in the sense that, after a dismissal of a prosecution, or a conviction and sentence and discharge under the insolvent laws, another prosecution would not lie, the circumstances remaining the same; and in Com'th v. Markley, 17 Pa. C. C. Reps. 254, it was held that desertion is a single act, in the sense that, after the expiration of the period within which the defendant was sentenced to pay a stipulated amount, subsequent prosecution was barred. For the reasons above given, we are satisfied that there is no statutory bar to the prosecution in this case, and no other sufficient reason has been given why an order should not be made requiring the defendant to provide for the support of his wife and children. We did not advise ourselves sufficiently at the hearing in this case as to the circumstances of the parties to enable us to make an order fixing the amount to be paid, and therefore the defendant is directed to present himself in court on October 4, when and where such order will be made as may seem proper to us under the circumstances. candidates of the "Socialist Labor Party" Herman Kreimer for the office of State treasurer, Edward Kuppinger for the office of judge of the Supreme Court, and H. C. Parker for the office of judge of the Superior Court, and on September 14, 1899, nomination papers were filed in the office of the secretary, purporting to nominate as candidates of the same party, for the same offices Samuel Clark for the office of State treasurer, Donald L. Munro for the office of judge of the Supreme Court, and Valentine Remmel for the office of judge of the Superior Court. These nomination papers will be known respectively throughout this opinion as the Clark papers and the Kreimer papers. On September 30, 1899, objections were filed by Samuel Clark and his associates to the Kreimer papers, one of which was, "That the said nomination papers were circulated and signed in blank without the names of any candidates being named thereon, and that the names of the candidaies appearing thereon were written therein after they had been signed by the voters purporting to have signed them, and that they are consequently fraudulent, null and void, and did not operate to make any valid nominations for the said offices." On October 9, 1899, objections were filed by Herman Kreimer and his associates to the Clark papers, the chief objection specified being that Herman Kreimer, Edward Kuppinger, H. C. Parker and others had secured the exclusive |